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1. Introduction 
Capital cities play an important role in shaping the political, social and cultural identity of a nation. 
As the seat of power and decision-making, capital cities represent a nation’s identity. However, the 
political and symbolical centrality of capital cities in the national urban system has been challenged. 
The decline of the nation state, the rise of transnational institutions, the ascendance of global cities, 
and the increasing concentration of the knowledge economy in a few dominant metropolitan 
centers force capital cities to enter a globalized and increasingly knowledge-intense interurban 
competition. As a consequence, the political economy of capital cities is changing and “the 
traditional view of the capital city as the reliable host city of the nation state, which was mired in a 
comfortable dependency of the very state it was hosting, may not hold up anymore” (Mayer et al. 
2016, 12). These challenges are particularly salient in capital cities that are not the primary economic 
centers of their respective nations – so-called secondary capital cities (SCCs). 
Globalization scholars argue that SCCs have lost importance because global cities are much more 
critical to the functioning of the global economy since they constitute nodal points in the world 
city network by coordinating and controlling capital flows (Friedmann 1986; Sassen 1991; Scott 
2001). Compared to global cities, SCCs are nationally-orientated and do not display a coherent 
integration into the world city network (Taylor and Derudder 2014). Similarly, rescaling theories 
imply that along with the up-scaling and down-scaling of state functions in global capitalism, SCCs 
disappear from the central locus and have to arrange themselves in the periphery of the global 
economy (Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner 1999; Brenner 2004). As a consequence, SCCs lost ground 
over the last couple of decades – “casualty both to fashionable enthusiasm for ‘global cities’ against 
national centers, and to a shift of interest toward less formal and monolithic kinds of institutions 
than those which were the staple of political capitals during the last century” (Gordon 2003, 3).  
This decline in importance also affects scholarly attention. SCCs lost ground over the last couple 
of decades – “casualty both to fashionable enthusiasm for ‘global cities’ against national centers, 
and to a shift of interest toward less formal and monolithic kinds of institutions than those which 
were the staple of political capitals during the last century” (Gordon 2003, 3). Research about high 
profile cities such as global or world cities (e.g. Sassen 1991), global city-regions (e.g. Scott 2001), 
metropolitan regions (e.g. Hall and Pain 2006), and megaregions (Florida, Gulden, and Mellander 
2008) dominated urban studies since beginning of the 1990s. Thus, SCCs remain rather 
understudied. 
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And yet, the recent economic crisis has revealed that SCCs still play an important role because 
global capital flows are regulated within the context and institutions of nation states (Rodrik 2011) 
that are for the most part located in capital cities. Important decisions about bail outs of banks and 
industrial firms were taken in Washington, D.C. and not in New York City or Detroit. Furthermore, 
the study of SCCs is meaningful because this type of capitals are distributed globally. Famous 
examples of SCCs are located in Africa (e.g. Pretoria, Abuja), Asia (e.g. Jerusalem, Karachi), 
Australia (e.g. Wellington, Canberra), Europe (e.g. Berlin, The Hague), North-America 
(Washington D.C., Ottawa), and South-America (e.g. Brasilia). The global system of capital cities 
is dynamic. New capital cities have been established from scratch or capital cities have been 
relocated to smaller cities. For example, the Brazilian capital was relocated from Rio de Janeiro to 
Brasilia in 1960, Abjua became the new Nigerian capital in Abuja in 1991, and Naypyidaw was 
established as the new capital of Myanmar in 2006. Similarly, Malayisa build Putrajaya as the new 
Malaysian federal administrative capital in 1999, South Korea opened a new administrative capital 
in 2012 called Sejong City and Egypt projects a yet-unnamed new capital city just outside Cairo.  
SCCs are a worthwhile object to study not only because they are globally distributed, but because 
they also feature a remarkable type of political economies: 
 “though all cities experience the interaction – both cooperative and conflicting – of government and 
private interests, nowhere do these interests intersect with such power as in a capital: the government-
market interactions are more complicated in a capital, and the national government has greater 
influence over the local economy, labor markets, and land markets. This creates a distinctive political 
economy of capital cities” (Campbell 2000, 10).  
This strong influence of the national government shapes local economic interactions, the local 
governance regimes as well as the formulated local policies in distinctive ways. Thus, only in SCCs 
it is possible to get a hold of the effects of the capital city function on local policy-making and local 
politics. In primary capital cities, the capital city function would be much harder to detect or to 
distinguish because primary capitals often incorporate international economic functions that go 
beyond those associated with a capital city (Zimmermann 2010, 764).  
Against the background of this specific political economy of SCCs, this thesis studies the policy 
endeavors, i.e. the formulated locational policies, of SCCs to position themselves in globalized and 
increasingly knowledge-intense interurban competition. Locational policies aim at enhancing the 
economic competiveness of localities by identifying, developing and exploiting their place-specific 
assets that are considered most competitive. Locational politics and specific locational policies have 
been studied in a varieties of cities or regions of global importance (Brenner 1999; Jessop and Sum 
2000; Savitch and Kantor 2002; van der Heiden 2010). What is missing so far is a framework that 
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allows to systematically assess a variety of locational policies. The locational policies framework 
proposed in this thesis fills this this gap. This conceptual advancement allows me to study the ways 
in which SCCs positioning themselves in global interurban competition. Policy endeavors of SCCs 
to sustain in interurban competition have not scrutinized systematically yet. Thus, this thesis aims 
to push forward the conceptual understanding of locational policies formulation as well to gather 
empirical accounts of locational policies from a type of city that is ‘off the map’ in urban studies.  
The analytical framework of this thesis is embedded in the neo-institutional literature because this 
theoretical lens emphasizes place-based resources and constrains in the formulation of policy 
choices. Locational policies are dependent on a variety “institutional and/or territorial structures 
as well as on broader economic, political and sociocultural factors” (Jessop and Sum 2000, 2291). 
Varieties of capitalism suggests that the economic orientation and the political-institutional setting 
of a political economy are the two crucial explanatory factors for strategic decisions of localities 
(Hall and Soskice 2001). The economic orientation is approached with the Regional Innovation 
System concept (Cooke 2001; Doloreux and Parto 2005; Asheim, Smith, and Oughton 2011) 
stemming from economic geography literature. The political-institutional setting of SCCs is 
captured by the Multilevel Governance concept (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2003; adapted to urban 
politics see Kübler and Pagano 2012; Horak and Young 2012). In line with neo-institutional 
theories, I assume that these two explanatory factors constrain or enable the formulation of 
different types of locational policies. I furthermore incorporate agency in my analytical framework, 
to capture how local decision makers may draft locational policies that aim at the very structures 
that simultaneously enable or restrict them (Abrams 1982; Giddens 1984; Imbroscio 1999). Hence, 
the analytical framework of this thesis is interdisciplinarily informed by theories from political 
science, urban studies, and economic geography and incorporates the simultaneity of structure and 
agency. The thesis is guided by four research questions 
• First, I want to investigate what kind of locational policies are being formulated in SCCs. To capture 
the wide range of possible locational policies, I present a self-developed locational policies 
framework that features six categories of locational policies. These locational policies 
constitute the phenomena to be explained. I will examine the concrete manifestations of 
locational policies for all six categories.  
• Second, I am interested in what explains the formulation of these locational policies in SCCs. 
Locational policies aim to develop and present local assets that seem most competitive for 
engaging in interurban competition. Thus, locational policies are formulated based on 
place-specific and path-dependent assets. As a consequence, I assume that the regional 
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innovation system and the multilevel governance setting constrain or enable the 
formulation of locational policies in specific ways.  
• Third, I examine how singular locational policies are connected to a locational policies agenda. 
In order to study locational policies agendas, I look at links between the different locational 
policies categories and extract explanatory factors that are important to understand the 
formulation of multiple locational policies. Answering this third research question is mainly 
a summarizing exercise based on the findings of the former two research questions.  
• Fourth, I study the different actors who are involved in formulating locational policies in in SCCs. The 
interplay between local public and local private actors in local governance regimes or urban 
regimes will be of particular interest (Stone 1989; Stone 1993). This interplay is worth 
studying because the specific political economy of SCCs produces a different configuration 
of actors that engage in the formulation of locational policies.  
To answer the four research questions, this thesis compares four SCCs: Bern, The Hague, Ottawa 
and Washington, D.C.. I juxtapose within-case analyses with a comparative case study research 
design that offers a solid base to evaluate causal claims (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2010, 10). 
The backbone of this thesis consists of 91 semi-structured, in-person interviews with 103 interview 
partners. The interview partners were carefully selected to ensure sufficient variety within the cases 
and necessary consistency between the cases. I triangulated these reactive data with non-reactive 
data by studying secondary sources as well as publicly available primary sources. The data collection 
was realized during three months of field study in each of the four SCCs. The dissertation 
incorporates several aspects that the debate by Ward et al. (2011) outlined as productive and 
relevant for contemporary urban studies: The interdisciplinary research characteristic, the 
incorporation of a variety of actors into the analysis of urban politics, the comparative case-study 
design and the simultaneity of structure and agency.  
More specifically, the dissertation contributes to the literature in urban studies, political science and 
economic geography in multiple ways. Three contributions are highlighted at this part of the thesis. 
Frist, the thesis reveals how institutional factors influence locational policies formulated in different 
SCCs and, therefore, it takes a stance against deterministic perspectives in studying city strategies 
in globalization. Second, the concept of ‘structuring’ (Abrams 1982; Giddens 1984; Imbroscio 
1999, 46–47) is integrated in a neo-institutional analytical framework. Thus, the analytical 
framework shows how structure and agency can be fruitfully combined. And third, this thesis 
pushes forward the conceptual understanding of locational policies by outlining and applying a 
locational policies framework. This framework contains added value for a systematic study of urban 
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strategies devised to face interurban competition and may be of use for scholars interested in 
studying cities’ economic development policies more generally.  
This thesis should also give guidance to local decision makers how to better prepare SCCs to sustain 
and prosper in interurban competition. SCCs are advised to focus on a two-dimensional position 
strategy: as the capital city and as a business city. This thesis showed that such a positioning strategy 
may be realized by strategically implement locational policies and by exploiting the potential of the 
‘triple helix’ (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1995) via innovation policies. SCCs possess local assets 
suitable to sustain in the increasingly knowledge-intensive interurban competition. SCCs unify 
economic secondarity and political primacy what translate into a specific political economy. In 
today’s economic globalization, this specific political economy can be leveraged by positioning 
itself with a distinctive profile in interurban competition. SCCs cannot escape their destinies as 
government towns but they can formulate a variety of locational policies in order to supplement 
their capital city function with an economic promising profile.  
The thesis proceeds as follow: The first chapter defines SCCs, identifies the population of SCCs 
and reviews existing literature about SCCs. In the theoretical chapter, I approach the phenomena 
to be explained by presenting a self-developed locational policies framework. The next subchapters 
discuss the two explanatory factors, namely Regional Innovation Systems and Multilevel 
Governance arrangements. The last subchapter in the theoretical chapter integrates all the concepts 
into an analytical framework. The next chapter outlines the research design. The empirical part of 
this thesis starts with the case study of Bern, followed by the case study accounts of The Hague, 
Ottawa, and Washington, D.C.. All case study chapters start by giving an overview of the city and 
then explain the formulation of locational policies category by category followed by a summarizing 
discussion of the locational policies agenda. The comparative discussion chapter summarizes the 
findings of the four case studies, integrates the findings into the literature, discusses local 
governance regimes in SCCs and finally attempts to generalize the findings to other cities. The last 
chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing the main findings and point to theoretical, empirical 
and practical implications of the findings.  
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2. What do we know about secondary capital cities? 
The first part of this chapter defines and identifies SCCs and discusses the rationales to establish a 
SCC. The second part of this chapter reviews the body of capital city research and identifies 
research gaps in the existing literature.  
2.1. Defining and identifying secondary capital cities  
The word capital itself is based on the Latin word caput “meaning head and denotes a certain 
primacy status associated with the very idea of a capital” (Gilliland 2013, 25). Gottman and Harper 
(1990, 63) define capital cities as the  
“seat of power and a place of decision-making processes that affect the lives and future of the nation 
ruled, and that may influence trends and events beyond its borders. Capitals differ from other cities: the 
capital function secures strong and lasting centrality; it calls for a special hosting environment to provide 
what is required for the safe and efficient performance of the functions of government and decision-
making characteristics of the place”. 
While Gottman and Harper (1990) establish the unique characteristics of a capital city in 
comparison to other cities in the national urban system, they did not categorized different types of 
capital cities. Hall (2006) offers the most famous categorization of capital cities. He distinguishes 
between seven types that are not mutually exclusive:  
1) Multi-Function Capitals (e.g. London, Paris, Madrid, Stockholm, Tokyo) 
2) Global Capitals as a special case of the first type (e.g. London, Tokyo) 
3) Political Capitals (e.g. The Hague ,Washington D.C., Ottawa, Canberra, Brasilia) 
4) Former Capitals (e.g. St. Petersburg, Philadelphia, Rio de Janeiro) 
5) Ex-Imperial Capitals (e.g. London, Madrid, Lisbon, Vienna) 
6) Provincial Capitals (e.g. Milan, Stuttgart, Toronto) 
7) Super Capitals which are centers of international organizations (e.g. Brussels, Geneva, 
Nairobi) 
Another capital city categorization by Campbell (2000) incorporates additional characteristics such 
as the size of the city, the form of the national government or the timing of the capital’s 
establishment. Among others, he distinguishes between “the capital as dominant economic city in 
the nation” (such as Montevideo, Paris, London, Copenhagen) and “the capital as secondary city” 
(such as Ottawa, Bonn, Canberra, Ankara) defined by the economic status and relative position of 
the capital within the respective nation’s city network (Campbell 2000, 4). Similarly, Zimmermann 
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(2010, 761–62) distinguishes between two types of capital cities which “may or may not be the 
major economic agglomeration”. 
Thus, all major capital city categorizations differentiate between the political and the economic role 
a capital city can exert. Whilst the political role is attached to the capital city status “there is no rule 
that a political capital automatically attracts concomitant economic functions” (P. Hall 2006, 10). 
Following these categorizations, I use the differentiation between the economic status and the 
political status as the crucial element in my definition of a SCC. In line with Mayer et al. (2016), I 
define a SCC as the capital city of a nation where at least one city within the respective nation is 
economically more important to the country than the capital city.  
SCCs can be found on every continent. Famous examples of SCCs are located in Africa (e.g. 
Pretoria, Abuja), Asia (e.g. Jerusalem, Karachi), Australia (e.g. Wellington, Canberra), Europe (e.g. 
Berlin, The Hague) North-America (e.g. Washington D.C., Ottawa), and South-America (e.g. 
Brasilia). For reasons of comparability and data availability, this thesis concentrates on SCCs in 
OECD countries (see subchapter 4.1). To identify SCCs based on the aforementioned definition, 
I will use the nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as it best displays the economic power and 
size of a city. Ten out of 34 OECD countries feature a SCC (see Table 1). Whereas Ankara, Bern, 
Canberra, Ottawa, The Hague, Washington D.C. and Wellington are classic examples of SCCs, 
Berlin, Jerusalem and Rome are secondary regarding their economic performance but by no means 
secondary regarding their symbolic importance for their nation.  
The OECD database does not have complete data for Switzerland and Australia and no data for 
Israel. However, alternative economic indicators show that all three countries feature a SCCs. In 
Australia, the Greater Sydney Area is an economic powerhouse with a labor force of 2.189 Million 
persons and a total employee income of AU$ 134 million. The Australian Capital Territory is 10 
times smaller with a labor force of 202’877 persons and a total employee income of AU$ 13 million 
(Australian Bureau of Statistic 2016). In Israel, 11% of all employees work in Jerusalem whereas 
16% of all employees work in Tel Aviv (Choshen and Korach 2010, 38–40). For Switzerland, 
297’320 person are employed in the agglomeration of Bern, whereas the agglomeration of Zurich 
employed 889’307 persons (Swiss Federal Statistical Office 2015d).  
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Table 1: Cases belonging to the population of SCCs in OECD countries 
Country Capital City GDP Metropolitan 
region 
US$ 
% of national GDP 
Primary City GDP Metropolitan 
region 
US$ 
% of national GDP 
Australia Canberra n/a Sydney 199’970 20.10% 
Canada Ottawa 56’323 
3.94% 
Toronto 271’449 
18.99% 
Germany Berlin 165’376 
4.92% 
Munich 184’701 
5.49% 
Israel Jerusalem n/a Tel Aviv n/a 
Italy Rome 189’919 
9.44% 
Milano 234’523 
11.65% 
Netherlands Den Haag 39’517 
5.31% 
Amsterdam 121’289 
16.31% 
New Zealand Wellington 15’423 
13.51% 
Auckland 39’792 
34.87% 
Switzerland Bern n/a Zurich 77'011 18.63% 
Turkey Ankara 74‘936 
8.52% 
Istanbul 243’277 
27.65% 
United States Washington D.C. 442’758 
2.86% 
New York 1’215’233 
7.86% 
Source: OECD GDP Metropolitan Areas for Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, and United 
States. Data from 2012 in million US$. Australia and Switzerland only data for the primary city available. OECD GDP 
Regional database TL3 regions for New Zealand and Turkey. Data from 2012 in million US$. Turkey data from 2008. 
Israel no available data found.  
The rationale for establishing a new SCC or rewarding the capital city status to a secondary city is 
often connected to a federalist state organization. Elazar (1987, 75) argues that “true federal 
systems do not have capitals, they have seats of government”. Such considerations lead to an often 
formulated assumption that SCCs are more likely to be found in federal cities because the location 
choice of capital cities was often a compromise, to balance power relationships, but also to separate 
economic and political power or to serve as independent, alternative sites to the traditional 
commercial centers (Gottmann 1977; Harris 1995; Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009; Nagel 2013b; 
Mayer et al. 2016; Mayer et al. 2018).  
However, looking at the set of SCCs in OECD countries, the relationship between federalism and 
SCCs is not that clear. Out of the ten OECD countries that feature a SCC, only five are 
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federations.1 Consequentially, five countries in the OECD feature a SCC but are not organized as 
federations (Israel, Jerusalem; Italy, Rome; New Zealand, Wellington; The Netherlands, The 
Hague; Turkey, Ankara). Furthermore, four federal states that are members of the OECD – 
Belgium, Brussels; Spain, Madrid; Mexico, Mexico City; Austria, Vienna – have a primary city as 
their capital.  
Varying reasons explain the establishment of SCCs in the four non-federal OECD states. The 
historical importance of The Hague as the place for resolving conflicts accounts for its capital city 
status (see chapter 7). Jerusalem failed to keep its economic superiority mainly due to military 
conflicts. The establishment of Ankara as the new capital city in 1923 can be explained as a symbol 
for the Turkish republican modernization (Batuman 2013). Wellington has been made the capital 
of New Zealand in 1841 because it was feared that the more populated South Island may secede if 
New Zealand does not chose a more central location for its capital (Levine 2012). In contrary, 
federal OECD countries that feature no SCCs are former empires (Belgium, Brussels; Spain, 
Madrid; Mexico, Mexico City; Austria, Vienna). Thus, there might be some truth in the observation 
that especially federations that were created by a deliberative ‘coming together’ of relatively 
autonomous units pooling their sovereignty (Stepan 1999, 23) seem to choose secondary cities as 
their capitals (Gilliland 2013, 25). 
The worldwide system of capital cities is dynamic. New capital cities have been established from 
scratch or capital cities relocated to smaller cities what thus created SCCs. A famous example is the 
relocation of the Brazilian capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia in 1960. Brasilia was built from 
scratch to serve as the new federal capital that should herald the start of a new era of development, 
peace and prosperity for Brazil (Madaleno 1996, 273). Also Abuja, the new capital city of Nigeria 
was a planned project and became the capital city in 1991 (Elaigwu 2009). Other examples are the 
development of the small Ottoman town Ankara to the capital of the new Turkish republic, the 
establishment of Putrajaya as the new Malaysian federal administrative capital in 1999 or the 
establishment of Naypyidaw as the new capital of Myanmar in 2006. South Korea opened its new 
administrative capital in 2012 called Sejong City. This planned city hosts almost all national 
government organizations as well as public organizations, research units and a university. In Egypt, 
a project of building a yet-unnamed new capital city just outside Cairo is under discussion.  
Four main reasons justify the relocation of a capital city or the establishment of new capital. First, 
the central location of a capital city should ensure equal access of citizens to their capital. James 
Madison, co-author of the seminal ’Federalist Papers’ (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1982) and 
                                                            
1 I use the dataset by Armingeon et al. (2016) to determine if an OECD member country is a federation. 
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fourth President of the United States (1809-1817), formulated a theory of representation arguing 
that the republican principle of ’equal right’ should matter when determining the location of the 
capital (Engstrom, Hammond, and Scott 2013, 225). Such a ‘Madisonian argumentation’ was put 
forward when building Brasilia (Madaleno 1996, 273–74) and Washington, D.C. (see chapter 8) 
from scratch as well as when relocating the New Zealandia capital from Auckland to Wellington 
(Levine 2012). Second, infrastructure needs of a capital city and especially the congestions of old 
capitals have played a role, for instance in relocating the Nigerian capital from Lagos to Abuja 
(Elaigwu 2009, 201; Abubakar 2014, 82) as well as in the discussion about the new capital city 
project in Egypt (The Capital Cairo 2015). Third, military and defense considerations are 
sometimes brought forward to justify the relocation of a capital or the establishment of a new 
capital. Such reasoning played a role in the establishment of Ottawa (see subchapter 6.1.1). It was 
stressed in favoring the relocation to Abuja (Abubakar 2014, 82). Fourth and arguably most 
importantly, the capital city serves as a nationalistic symbol. Especially, former colonized nations 
want to break with their colonial ties by building a new capital city on a tabula rasa (Moser 2010, 
285). This was the case in Turkey, where Ankara was established as the symbol of the Turkish 
republican modernization and secularism, i.e. Kemalism (Batuman 2013). Similarly, Putrajaya 
should function as a symbol for the Malaysian ambitious modernization agenda and its new 
‘progressive Muslim’ identity (Moser 2010). Also the relocation of the German capital from Bonn 
to Berlin was symbolically connected to the German reunification and the political integration 
project of the former German Democratic Republic (Zimmermann 2009). 
2.2. Research about secondary capital cities 
No coherent body of literature about secondary capital cities exists. One reason for this lack of 
scholarly attention may be the megalomania tendencies of urban research. Research about high 
profile cities such as global or world cities (e.g. Sassen 1991), global city-regions (e.g. Scott 2001), 
metropolitan regions (e.g. Hall and Pain 2006) and, megaregions (Florida, Gulden, and Mellander 
2008) dominated since beginning of the 1990s. SCCs simply lack the intensity of international 
connectivity to the global scale of capital accumulation. As a consequence, the category of SCCs is 
reduced to its secondary economic importance and remains rather understudied.2 This is 
unsatisfactory since ‘the urban’ is fare away from being a homogenous category (Brenner and 
Schmid 2014). 
                                                            
2 In that regard faces the category of capital cities the same fate as smaller cities that are not receiving much scholarly 
attention and are analyzed with theories that have been developed by studying high profile cities (Robinson 2002; Bell 
and Jayne 2006; Kaufmann and Arnold 2017). 
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Research about capital cities is fragmented between the disciplines and mostly dominated by 
individual case study accounts without much attempt to generalize findings (Mayer et al. 2016, 12). 
Some scholars have examined issues regarding urban planning, architecture and history of capital 
cities, particularly as they relate to the representation of power (Clark and Lepetit 1996; Gordon 
2006; Thomas Hall 2010; Sohn and Weber 2000). Other authors have focused on the symbolic 
representation of capital cities as places of national identity and where a nation’s memory and 
symbols are staged (Cochrane 2006; De Frantz 2006; Till 2006). Economic geography approaches 
the political economy of capital cities as ‘information cities’ (Castells 1989), ‘national information 
brokers’ (Abbott 1999; Abbott 2005) or ‘transactional cities’ (Gottmann 1977). This strand of 
research focuses on spatially manifested interaction between government organizations, private 
sector and knowledge institutions which produces information and knowledge in a distinctive 
regional economy (Abbott 1999; Feldman 2001; Gerhard 2007; Markusen et al. 1991).  
Donald Rowat (1968; 1973) set the direction for the political science and public administration 
literature by comparing governing arrangements in seventeen federal capitals. He focused on the 
relationship between the national and the local level with the underlying conflict of serving both 
the interests of the nation as a whole but as well and the interests of the local residents. This conflict 
was later named the classical capital city conflict, the challenge of dual democracy or simply the 
Rowat thesis (Nagel 2013b; Harris 1995). Rowat’s comparative research interest stemmed from the 
concern that the discussions about revising Ottawa’s governing arrangements are too heavily 
influenced by debates about creating a federal district due to the spatial proximity to the United 
States and the cultural proximity to Australia. His comparison aimed at presenting other examples 
of how to govern a capital city in a federation.  
Building on the legacy of Donald Rowat, Canadian political scientists have become active in 
discussing questions of governing, planning and developing capital cities. Three international 
conferences in the last 25 years congregated academics and practitioners. Each conference resulted 
in an edited volume (Taylor, Lengellé, and Andrew 1993; Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009; 
Chattopadhyay and Paquet 2011). Especially the volume of Slack and Chattopadyay (2009) offers 
a rigid comparison of the funding mechanisms and governing arrangements in eleven federal 
capitals.3 
In a similar vein, the research in Washington, D.C. displays a distinctive research tradition focusing 
on the organization of the federal district with its restricted local autonomy. The contributions that 
                                                            
3 This edited volume covers and compares Canberra, Brussels, Ottawa, Addis Ababa, Berlin, New Delhi, Mexico 
City Abuja, Cape Town & Pretoria, Bern and Washington D.C.. 
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cover Washington D.C. are rather advocacy-driven as they argue for more autonomy of the district 
authorities regarding policy-making and levying taxes. Two early contributions are very influential. 
Charles Harris (1995), inspired by Rowat, was primarily concerned about the domination of 
national interest in local politics over the interests of the local citizens. Carol O’Cleireacain’s (1997) 
research was driven by the financial problems of Washington, D.C.. She focused on taxation and 
representation issues that may ease some of the structural problems of the district. Following this 
legacy, studies and reports of Washington, D.C. argue for more fiscal and governing autonomy as 
well as financial support for the district infrastructure (Boyd and Fauntroy 2002; Wolman et al. 
2007; G. Young 2008). Taking a different lens, a more sociological strand of research focuses on 
the huge wealth inequalities in the district and the consequential of problems of segregation, race 
and gentrification (Sturtevant 2014; Hyra and Prince 2016).  
Whereas Canada and the United States both feature a rather coherent capital city research tradition, 
the European body of capital city literature is rather diverse. Similar to the research on the other 
side of the Atlantic, the political theorist Klaus-Jürgen Nagel (2013b) reflects about the role of 
capital cities in federations. He uses the literature about asymmetric federalism to study the local 
autonomy of federal capital cities and thus studies the classical capital city conflict. Furthermore, 
the relocation of the German capital from Bonn to Berlin triggered reflections about capital cities 
(Zimmermann 2009; Zimmermann 2010). Another comparative volume studies the socio-
economic segregation of neighborhoods in European capital cities (Tammaru et al. 2015). 
However, this kind of research does not reflect about the capital city function. Motivated by the 
moderate economic performance of Bern (Kaufmann et al. 2016), scholars from the University of 
Bern launched a new interdisciplinary and comparative research initiative – this dissertation is a 
part of it – that tackles the political economy of capital cities from an economic geography and 
political science perspective (see also Mayer et al. 2013; Mayer et al. 2016, Mayer et al. 2018).  
All in all, this brief literature review shows a distinctive political science and public administration 
research strand that emerged by studying the Canadian and US SCCs. The research focus lies on 
the local autonomy of SCCs as well as the intergovernmental organization of governing SCCs. Few 
research tackles policy-formulation of SCCs in other policy fields and so far, no study addressed 
the question of locational policies formulation in SCCs. This thesis fills this research gap. In the 
next chapter, I discuss the analytical framework that allows me to fill this research gap by answering 
the four research questions proposed above.  
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3. Theory 
In this theoretical chapter, I outline the analytical framework of this thesis step by step (see Table 
2). The analytical framework is embedded in the neo-institutionalism literature. I especially borrow 
from the varieties of capitalism theory which states that the economic orientation and the political-
institutional setting of a political economy are the two crucial explanatory factors for strategic 
decisions of localities (Hall and Soskice 2001). The economic orientation is captured by the 
Regional Innovation System concept (Cooke 2001; Doloreux and Parto 2005; Asheim, Smith, and 
Oughton 2011) and the political-institutional setting by the Multilevel Governance concept (e.g. 
Hooghe and Marks 2003; adapted to urban politics see Kübler and Pagano 2012; Horak and Young 
2012). The phenomena to be explained are locational policies formulated in SCCs that I capture 
with a self-developed locational policies framework consisting of six categories. I link the whole 
analytical framework with the help of two causal mechanisms that aim at incorporating the 
simultaneity of structure and agency. First, the causal mechanism ‘enabling/constraining’ stems 
from neo-institutional theories and proposes that purposive actors operate within an institutional 
setting that enables and constrains their strategic actions. Second, the causal mechanism 
‘structuring’ proposes that actions can be directly aimed at the very structures that are 
simultaneously enabling and constraining them. The chapter ends by summarizing the expectations 
as well as the analytical framework. 
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Table 2: Analytical framework 
Overarching 
Theory 
Neo-institutionalism 
Varieties of capitalism 
Variables Explanatory factor 1: Economic orientation 
Explanatory factor 2: 
Political-institutional 
setting 
Phenomena to be explained 
Locational Policies 
Concepts Regional Innovation System  Multilevel Governance Locational Policies Framework 
Configurations 
of the concepts 
Three stages 
- Weakly developed 
- Moderately developed 
- Highly developed 
Three dimensions 
- Public-vertical 
- Public-horizontal 
- Local governance 
Six types of locational 
policies 
- Innovation policies 
- Image building 
- Business prerequisites  
- Acquisitions 
- Coordination  
- Funds and 
compensation payments 
Causal 
mechanisms 
Structure and agency 
− Structure: ‘Enabling/constraining’ 
The Regional Innovation System and the Multilevel Governance arrangements enable 
and constrain the formulation of locational policies 
− Agency: ‘Structuring’ 
Inward-oriented locational policies aim to modify reinforce/reproduce or 
transform/modify the very structure that enable and constrain them 
 
3.1. Varieties of Capitalism 
The institutional strand of the varieties of capitalism (VOC) theory serves as the overarching theory 
of the analytical framework.4 By referring to Fritz Scharpf’s (1997) influential actor-centered 
institutionalism, the VOC theory approaches the political economy as a terrain populated by 
multiple actors, each of whom seeks to advance his interest in a rational way in strategic interactions 
with others (Hall and Soskice 2001, 6). The original version of the VOC theory by Hall and Soskice 
(2001) brings firms back into the center of analysis because firms are seen as prototypes of 
autonomous, rational actors in a globalized economy. A central observation is that firms show a 
variety of different reactions to the pressures of economic globalization because their reactions are 
influenced by the different political economies they are embedded in. “Firms are not just going 
offshore based on cheaper labor cost, they derive the competitive advantage from the institutions 
in their home country” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 56). The VOC theory establishes the concept of 
                                                            
4 There exists a neo-Marxist and a neo-institutional strand of the VOC theory (Coates 2005). In the following, I focus 
on the neo-institutional strand of the VOC approach. 
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the comparative institutional advantage which proposes “that the institutional structure of a 
particular political economy provides firms with advantages for engaging in specific types of 
activities there” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 37).  
The VOC theory mainly discusses national institutional differences of political economies. This is 
justified by an understanding that many of the most important institutional structures – such as 
labor market regulations, education and training, corporate governance – depend on regulatory 
regimes that are the preserve of the nation state. Following this spatial fix on the nation state, the 
VOC theory distinguishes between two ideal types of political economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
First, the Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) such as the US or Canada which coordinate their 
activities via hierarchies and competitive market arrangements. Market-logic measures such as 
competition, trade, demand and supply, and formal contracting are the primary tools, but if the 
market fails to solve a problem, hierarchy comes into play. The second types are the Coordinated 
Market Economies (CMEs) such as the Netherlands or Switzerland which coordinate their 
activities through non-market relationship, networks, and collaborative arrangements.  
I will adopt two well-established adjustments to the above discussed original version of the VOC 
theory in order to do justice to the context of SCCs. First, the set of actors can be expanded beyond 
firms. Although Hall and Soskice illustrate their arguments by mainly referring to firms, they note 
that the relevant actors may as well be individuals, producer groups, or governments (Hall and 
Soskice 2001a,). Second, I apply a scalar refinement because regional and local authorities are 
similarly important as the national level in shaping the political economy of a place (Hollingsworth 
1998, 493). The mechanisms of institutional entanglements that are responsible for specific 
economic advantages are similar at the local level and at the national level (Hollingsworth and 
Boyer 1997; Jonas and Ward 2007; van der Heiden 2010). 
Neo-institutionalism and consequentially the VOC theory call into question the convergence 
hypothesis of globalization that underlies some urban neo-Marxist theories (e.g. urban 
entrepreneurialism, growth machine, re-scaling) but as well to an extent the global city theory. All 
these theories argue that cities respond rather uniformly to international economic pressures. On 
the contrary, the VOC theory argues for a diversity of responses to global economic pressures and 
especially asks for empirical accounts to illustrate this diversity (van der Heiden 2010, 17). Hence, 
the fundamental logic of the VOC theory lies in diversity rather than uniformity. While 
acknowledging that the globalized economy pressures cities in a similar way, this thesis argues that 
the policy responses are diverse given the specificities of diverse localities 
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In order to theorize the diversity of policy responses, Hall and Soskice (2001) put forward that the 
political-institutional setting and the economic orientation of a political economy are the two crucial 
explanatory factors for strategic decisions of localities. This assumes a necessary coherence between 
the economic and political setting of a locality. Path-dependent and place-specific processes lead 
to monopolies of place, which can be conceptualized as place-specific assets that are not to imitate 
easily elsewhere. This specificity is the basis of the comparative advantage5 (van der Heiden 2010, 
18–19). The competitive economic pressures will lead to a further development of this place-bound 
and path-dependent comparative advantage because local authorities are concerned to make use, 
further develop and promote their comparative advantages by formulating locational policies. Alan 
Harding (1997, 295) sums up nicely the situation of cities in interurban competition: “localities 
have something to play for and something to compete with”. Neglecting the specificities of a 
political economy would consequentially rather hinder than foster economic growth 
(Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997, 36). These ideas of the VOC theory follow the tradition of what 
Granovetter (1985) calls embeddedness in a specific social system of production. These locally 
fixed systems of production keep economic processes place-bound in an area of globalization. The 
embeddedness hence ‘keeps the state in the game’ of competition (Jessop 1998). 
In sum, this analytical framework acknowledges the integration of SCCs in a globalized economy, 
a fact that demands to take powerful structural economic effects into consideration. 
Simultaneously, the analytical framework accounts for place-specific economic and political 
characteristics that mediate these structural economic effects. Since all SCCs face similar globalized 
economic pressures, I propose that the decisive factors in explaining the variety of locational 
policies are the economic and political-institutional characteristic in which a locality is embedded.  
A few related studies support the assumptions of place-specific and path-dependent policy 
responses to the pressure of economic globalization. Savitch and Kantor (2002, 32) highlight in 
their seminal book that urban development policies are not formulated on a green field, they “are 
undertaken within a complex set of economic and political interactions” (Savitch and Kantor 2002, 
32). Malecki (2007) discusses how the motivation to draft local economic development policies is 
similar in different locations but that the concrete policy choices are shaped by place-based 
                                                            
5 Wolman et al. (2008, 2) distinguish between ‘comparative advantage’ and ‘competitive advantage’. An area has a 
competitive advantage i.e. an absolute advantage for a particular type of activity, if a firm engaged in that activity can 
produce and bring to market its product at greater profit than it can elsewhere. Comparative advantage, on the other hand, 
is a term that relates the competitiveness of two or more places with respect to two or more types of economic activity. 
Competitive advantage implies an absolute advantage, while comparative advantage implies a relative one. 
 17 
resources and constraints. Uyarra (2010) studies economic development policies in regional 
innovation systems. She finds that these policies are not drafted “on a tabula rasa, but in a context 
of pre-existing policy mixes and institutional frameworks that have been shaped through successive 
policy changes. Past policy decisions would constrain the range of options available for current 
decision makers” (Uyarra 2010, 132; emphasis in the original Kay 2006). Van der Heiden (2010, 
10) examines urban external relations in a set of medium-sized European cities. He finds that the 
concrete forms of these endeavors are dependent on the respective place specific needs and 
characteristics.  
The VOC theory does not further specify how the economic orientation and political-institutional 
setting may be operationalized. To fill these gaps, I propose to capture economic orientation by 
the Regional Innovation System concept – an approach that I borrow from economic geography. 
The political-institutional setting of a locality is captured by the Multilevel Governance approach. 
The economic orientation and the political-institutional setting should together explain the 
formulation of locational policies. Locational policies as the phenomena to be explained are 
captured by a self-developed framework which will be presented in the following subchapter.6  
3.2. Phenomena to be explained: Locational policies 
Locational policies as a concept emerged within the urban entrepreneurialism literature in the 1980s 
(e.g. Cochrane 1987; Harvey 1989). In this context, locational policies were described as 
competiveness enhancing strategies and were problematized because they have emerged at the 
expense of territorial equalization polices (Begg 1999, 805). The urban entrepreneurial literature 
was not concerned with specific characteristics of locational policies as this literature was merely a 
critique of emerging urban neo-liberal strategies. Following the urban entrepreneurialism literature, 
Brenner (2000) relates the term locational policy to the German notion of Standort which “refers 
to a location for capital investment, and implicitly, to the structural competitiveness of that location 
relative to other possible locations within and beyond the national territory” (Brenner 2000, 319). 
Locational policies have later been adapted by the optimistic, neo-classic view on interurban 
competition. This strand of literature assumes that each city-region has the potential to identify its 
own competitive niche (Porter 1990; Porter 1995). According to this perspective, locational policies 
should aim at enhancing the economic competiveness of the targeted locality by identifying, 
developing and exploiting place-specific assets. In this strand of research, locational policies are 
being discussed within the theory of comparative advantage, i.e. Ricardo’s theorem (Ricardo 1817), 
                                                            
6 A simpler version of the locational policies framework is presented in Mayer et al. (2016). In Kaufmann and Arnold 
(2017), we discuss the locational policies framework and apply it to small and medium-sized cities.  
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which suggests that regions should focus their production on domains in which they are 
comparatively most competitive. In this logic, local governments should “adapt to this place-
specific logic of competitiveness and push political institutions towards the place-specific economic 
assets of their respective city-regions” (van der Heiden 2010, 21). 
In this dissertation, I seek to explain the formulation of locational policies. I have no intention to 
engage in the debate between the neo-classical and the neo-Marxist strand of urban studies because 
both traditions agree on the very purpose of locational policies: to enhance the capital flow into 
the region. More precisely, ”the goal of such [locational] policies is clearly to position the city on 
the global scale of capital circulation by enhancing and presenting its attributes that are considered 
to be most competitive” (van der Heiden 2010, 10; based on Gordon 1999; Ohmae 2001; Brenner 
2004). Place-specific advantages are essential in interurban competition, because they allow for 
escaping from a fully competitive, and therefore level, global market. In sum, locational policies 
rely on the identification, the development and the promotion of place-specific assets. Andrew and 
Doloreux (2012, 1289–90) point out in a study about Ottawa that “developing strategies to build 
regional attractiveness and foster regional competitiveness are currently high on the political 
agenda” because there is “a desire on the part of every local government to promote the 
comparative advantage of their city over other cities”. The concept of locational policies subscribes 
an active role to local governments. Local government have an enabling role as they can ‘connect 
and cluster’ multiple actors to address cross-cutting challenges (Bradford and Wolfe 2013; Bradford 
and Bramwell 2014). 
During the course of this subchapter, I propose and discuss an analytical framework of locational 
policies (see Table 3) that helps to systematically approach the phenomena to be explained. Such 
an analytical framework is essential because it should do justice to the diverse strategies that cities 
formulate. Jonas and Ward (2007) highlight that local governments try to enhance the economic 
competiveness of their localities by various strategies such as job creation, supporting the growth 
of small companies, attracting outside investments and new urban governance arrangements. Also 
political initiatives have the potential to enhance the welfare of a region by coordinating actors, 
policies and processes (Scharpf 1997; Sager 2005; Sager 2006). Such descriptions of broad ranges 
of policies highlights that locational policies appear in complex bundles, do not occupy a narrow 
policy domain and are not operating isolated from each other as they are often mutually dependent 
(Uyarra 2010, 132). Enhancing the economic competiveness of a locality can be done by a broad 
range of policies. These policies which can be subscribed as oriented towards economic-
development expanded substantially (R. Young 2012, 18). 
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As I have outlined, locational policies are not easy to identify, distinguish and categorize. As a 
consequence, the concept of locational policies is undertheorized. To my knowledge, no research 
tradition or scholar did systematically approach locational policies. Therefore, I suggest a relatively 
rich catalogue of possible locational policies that simultaneously brings some order into the 
concept. 7 I will apply a policy analysis perspective that is interdisciplinarily informed by theories 
of economic geography and political science. The locational policies framework consists of six 
distinctive categories, namely innovation policies, image building, business prerequisites, acquisition, 
coordination, and public funds and compensation payments. The categories are distinguished by policy 
orientation (inward vs. outward) and policy domain (economic vs. political). The economic 
category is furthermore divided into soft vs. hard factors. Inward and outward oriented policies 
differ in their function. Whereas inward oriented policies are strategic tools to develop the local 
assets of the political economy, the outward oriented locational policies try to promote and market 
the locality, attract various outside-produced resources and generally strategically position a city in 
the interurban competition.  
 
                                                            
7 I am aware that the locational policies framework does not cover all possible locational policies For example, the 
locational policies framework does not include human capital oriented policies such as creative class theory suggested 
by Florida (2005) or place-based development policies (Neumark and Simpson 2014). 
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Table 3 : Locational policies framework 
 Policy orientation 
Policy 
domain Inward Outward 
Economic 
Soft 
factors 
Innovation policies 
Recipient: Regional Innovation System 
Tools: Clusters, start-up promotion, investing in the 
knowledge infrastructure, venture capital 
Aim: Developing and diversification of the Regional 
Innovation System by fostering interaction of all actors 
Image building 
Recipient: wide audience, everybody who listens 
Tools: Place branding, location marketing and promotion 
Aim: Improving the reputation of the region, attraction of talent 
and guests 
Hard 
factors 
Business prerequisites (taxes and infrastructure) 
Recipient: Local/regional economy 
Tools: Taxes, land and real estate 
Aim: Creating a favorable business environment 
Acquisition 
Recipient: Firms, investors, residents, and research institutes 
Tools: Acquisition of investment, firms, residents 
universities/research institutes 
Aim: Attracting mobile capital, jobs, taxes and innovation 
Political 
Coordination 
Recipient: Agglomeration jurisdictions, higher-tier political entities, local 
business elites 
Tools: Coordination organizations, networks, and platforms 
Aim: Coordinated locational policies, creating positive synergies 
Public funds and compensations payments  
Recipient: Higher-tier political entities 
Tools: Compensation payments, applying for public funds 
Aim: Justifying and increasing public funds and compensation 
payments 
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3.2.1. Innovation policies 
Innovation policies are an essential feature of the Regional Innovation Systems concept (see 
subchapter 3.4). The overall aim of innovation policies is to improve the capabilities and 
performances of local firms as well as the general business environment (Doloreux and Parto 2005, 
135). Especially the transfer and share of knowledge between relevant industries, knowledge 
generating institutions (e.g. universities, research institutes) and public actors are crucial in fostering 
innovation. These three types of actors are also known under the concept ‘triple helix’ (Etzkowitz 
and Leydesdorff 1995). Consequentially, innovation policies aim to strengthen linkages between 
these actors within a region and thereby foster knowledge spillovers. According to Doloreux 
(Doloreux 2002) innovation policies “are intended to improve interactions between the knowledge 
infrastructures, firms, and institutions”. Thereby, local governments may act as “local brokers to 
‘connect and cluster’ researchers, firms and talent” (Bradford and Wolfe 2013, 11).  
Cluster strategies are classic examples of innovation policies. The aim of clusters is to create spatial 
concentrated networks of firms that produce similar or related products or practice Research & 
Development (R&D) in similar areas (Porter 2000, 254). The presence of a cluster does not 
automatically stimulate economic development. “Many of the competitive advantage of clusters 
depend on the free flow of information, the discovery of value-adding exchanges or transactions, 
the willingness to align agendas and to work across organizations, and strong motivations for 
improvement” (Porter 2000, 264). Local governments may stimulate knowledge interaction within 
a cluster. Cluster-oriented innovation policies may support and incentives R&D, organized specific 
training, create cooperative networks, foster knowledge exchange between cluster entities and so 
on (Martin and Sunley 2003, 23–24; Cumbers and MacKinnon 2004, 959).  
Further examples of innovation polices are the support of start-ups by setting-up incubators and 
accelerators. Incubators offer an ideal environment for start-ups by providing office space below 
market-rates, consulting services in legal and administrative tasks, providing access to networks of 
investor and by stimulating knowledge exchange with bigger firms and other start-ups. Similarly, 
so-called accelerators support young firms that outgrew the start-up phase tailored to their level of 
development before they operate fully independent. In this regard, accelerators usually act as early-
stage investors that provide seed capital to growing firms. Another innovation policy is the 
provision of public venture capital. When venture capital is lacking, different governmental entities 
may step in by providing public funds. Public funds may set specific sector requirements or may 
have other kinds of strings attached. An often used practice to minimize the risk in these kinds of 
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innovation investments is that public funds only step in if private investors are providing matching 
funds.  
Innovation policies are also concerned with developing knowledge infrastructures. The role of 
universities in economic development is nuanced and complex. Universities are not direct engines 
of economic development (Florida and Cohen 1999). Universities can certainly be drivers for 
innovation but more indirectly by educating talent than by producing inventions. Thus, the research 
function of universities has generally been overstated by academics and practitioners while the 
teaching function i.e. the role in educating talent, has been underappreciated (Motoyama and Mayer 
forthcoming). The establishment of research universities enriched with science parks, technology 
transfer and commercialization programs, and university-based venture capital funds is helpful but 
not sufficient in promoting economic development. Universities should be considered as important 
underlying components of the regional knowledge-creation infrastructure and not as direct drivers 
of innovation (Mayer 2007, 50).  
3.2.2. Image building 
Image building strategies “include branding exercises, hosting cultural initiatives, tourism 
promotion, and even immigration campaigns” (Harvey 2012, 4). Image building and place-
marketing are tools to increase the competitiveness of places and are often tailored to specific target 
groups such as tourists, prospective residents, talent and investors (Eshuis, Braun, and Klijn 2013, 
507; Harvey 2012, 3). Image building has nowadays become almost a necessity for public authorities 
in order to position their city in a global market by projecting specific images about the locality to 
the world (Harvey 2012, 8; Eshuis, Braun, and Klijn 2013, 507). Hannigan (2003, 353) links image 
building to the “new entrepreneurial style of local economic development in which image 
promotion was privileged as being central by planners and politicians”. Jean Harvey and Robert 
Young (Harvey and Young 2012) conclude in their book about image building in Canadian 
municipalities that the force of globalization with its economic restructuring and fiscal crises of 
cities may explain the increasing branding activities of cities, smaller towns and even rural villages.  
Whereas place branding is about creating and promoting a unique and positive image about a place, 
place marketing as a broader tool refers to the application of marketing instruments to geographic 
locations (Eshuis, Braun, and Klijn 2013, 508). Braun (2003, 43) defines place marketing as “the 
coordinated use of marketing tools supported by a shared customer oriented philosophy, for 
creating, communicating, delivering, and exchanging urban offerings that have value for the city’s 
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customers and the city’s community at large”. In that sense, marketing is more about 
responsiveness to target groups than persuasion (Eshuis, Braun, and Klijn 2013, 508).  
When formulating image building strategies, it is essential to position the localities with attributes 
that are hard to imitate elsewhere in order to avoid a level playing field with other potentially more 
powerful cities. Thus, image building should be guided by considerations of locational 
substitutability. “The lower the locational substitutability of these place-bound assets, the harder 
they can be imitated by others and the stronger the region's position is in the (…) global economy” 
(van der Heiden and Terhorst 2007, 242).  
Image building in SCCs may be pursued along two dimensions if it is guided by considerations of 
locational substitutability. First, the capital city status is probably the most obvious attribute to be 
exploited by an image building campaign because it guarantees singularity on the national level. 
Given the target group of the image building campaign, SCCs for example may link the capital city 
status to the quality of life, the presence of historical sites, monuments and parks. Second, SCCs 
may also try to build an image as a specific sort of business towns. Such an image building strategy 
would not target guests and tourists, but rather firms in highly regulated and knowledge-intensive 
sectors that profit from the unique political economy in a capital city. Hence, SCCs could highlight 
their specific knowledge-intensive economy, the presence of national government organizations 
and its highly educated workforce in economic orientated image building campaigns. 
3.2.3. Business prerequisites 
Compared to the so-called ‘soft’ innovation policies, business prerequisites may be categorized as 
‘hard factors’ as this category is tangible and easier to measure. The optimization of a diverse set 
of taxes (the most important are property taxes and personal and corporate income taxes) as well 
as the availability and cost of land and real estate are seen as prerequisites for a vital regional 
economy.  
Not all local governments have the competences to alter the same set of policies in this category. 
Tax autonomy varies considerably given different national tax regimes (see also subchapter 3.5.1). 
By referring to Mike Goldsmith (1995, 236; 2012, 137), I distinguish between two different 
archetypes of national tax regimes under which local governments operate. On the one hand, local 
governments are allowed to collect corporate and personal income taxes as well as property taxes 
which stands for high local tax autonomy. On the other hand, low local tax autonomy stands for 
national tax regimes that allow local governments to collect taxes only on property and land. In an 
average OECD country, property taxes are the most important raised local tax revenue (43%). 
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Personal income tax makes up 21% of the local tax revenue and corporate income tax makes up 
5%. In countries with a high local tax revenue, personal income tax rises up to 42% of the local tax 
revenue whereas property taxes decreases to 25% and corporate income tax makes up 5% 
(Brülhart, Bucovetsky, and Schmidheiny 2015, 1137).8  
Thus, in a context of low local tax autonomy, property taxes often constitute the biggest 
independent revenue source of municipal budgets. In such a context, the availability and cost of 
land and real estate becomes a major concern of local governments. Local governments are trying 
to increase the availability and value of land through land-use planning, providing databases of 
vacant real estate, incentivizing renovations and infrastructure up-dates and sometimes developing 
and managing own business complexes. An advantage of low fiscal autonomy is the relatively high 
independence upon private capital which can offset business bargaining advantages (Kantor, 
Savitch, and Haddock 1997, 351). On the other hand, such a tax regime generates fewer incentives 
to use local economic development as a generator of supplementary revenues (Kantor, Savitch, 
and Haddock 1997, 356). As a compensation for low local tax autonomy, local governments receive 
substantial transfer payments from higher-tier governments to sustain their budgets (see 
subchapter 3.2.6). 
In regimes with a high local tax autonomy, local governments have the competencies to operate 
with tax abatements and lowering the tax rates in order to lure residents and firms into their 
jurisdictions. Such tax regimes create incentives to engage in local tax competition over mobile tax 
bases. Thus, local tax competition may lead, on the one hand, to beggar-my neighbor behavior vis-
à-vis municipalities in the regions such as poaching firms and targeting residents from neighboring 
localities (Keating 1995). On the other hand, local tax competition may lead to lean and efficient 
public administrations as they feel the pressure to reduce their spending enabling them to lower 
their tax rates (e.g. Tiebout 1956; Tannenwald 1996).  
3.2.4. Acquisitions 
Acquisitions refer to strategies that should enlarge the tax base not by organic growth but by 
acquisition of firms, new residents and mobile capital. Acquisitions are a big business. Local 
development agencies try to actively acquire companies and mobile capital around the globe. Local 
governments may commission the services of specialized brokers. To initiate contacts to potential 
                                                            
8 Additionally, the consumption tax constitutes 21% of the local tax revenue both in the average OECD country and 
in the average OECD country with a high local tax autonomy. In both kind of countries, other types of taxes make up 
7-8% of the local tax revenue (Brülhart, Bucovetsky, and Schmidheiny 2015, 1137). 
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relocating firms, local governments or their contractors may directly approach firms with inquiries 
or already tailored propositions. Such contacts may be initiated at exhibits or trade shows. 
Sometimes brokers initially negotiate with side-locators that work in the mandate of firms. Local 
governments and the potentially relocating firms may only come into play in the further steps of 
negotiations. Often, specific tax incentives, land deals or reduced real estate costs are part of the 
‘acquisitions package’. The rationale behind acquisitions may be to lure companies into the region 
that fit to the already existing clusters and industries because the cluster should grow qualitatively 
and quantitatively. Ideally, acquisition benefits already existing firms. However, there is no doubt 
the some acquisitions simply aim for increasing their tax bases or job growth without intentions to 
substantially strengthen their clusters.  
In SCCs, such acquisition strategies may highlight the unique characteristics of a capital city 
economy for firms that operate in highly regulated and knowledge-intensive markets such as 
biotechnology, education, aerospace, and security. Such firms need spatial proximity to federal 
institutions to be close to the regulators or to further develop and streamline their products. Federal 
institutions for their part need private expertise to develop and implement high-technological 
projects and services (Mayer, 2013; Mayer and Cowell, 2014). This mutual pull effect may be a 
decisive argument in the strategies of acquiring firms to SCCs. The same logic applies to the 
acquisition of universities and research institutes, but they are not as mobile as firms because public 
funds are part of a funding mix that make the interests more diverse and more complex in 
relocation negotiations.  
3.2.5. Coordination 
Coordination aims to ensure policy coherence between different actors that engage in policy 
formulation. As Sager (2005; 2005) demonstrates, coordination can be theoretically approached 
with Fritz Scharpf’s (1994) welfare theoretical concept. “[Coordination] is considered desirable 
whenever the level of aggregate welfare obtained through the unilateral choices of interdependent 
actors is lower than the level which could be obtained through choices that are jointly considered” 
(Scharpf 1994, 27). A distinction between three manifestations of coordination helps to approach 
this locational policies category (see also Kaufmann and Sager 2018). Positive coordination 
describes the proactive search for synergies higher than achieved by individual action. The synergies 
of positive coordination should allow for the compensation of losses of negatively affected actors 
(Scharpf 1994). Negative coordination means the mere avoidance of contradictory action and 
redundancies without actively generating synergies (Scharpf 1994). Competition or beggar-my-
neighbor policies would be the worst case scenario of coordination (Keating 1995, 120). I consider 
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competition or beggar-my-neighbor behavior as well as the absence of coordination as a failure of 
coordination. 
Effective coordination is often not achieved through top-down institutional consolidations but 
rather through cooperative arrangements, mostly ad-hoc sometimes institutionalized, that stabilizes 
networks of policy-relevant actors (Kübler and Heinelt 2005; Sager 2005; Sager 2006). Such 
coordination forms are based on the voluntary involvement of its members without any effective 
way of policy enforcement. Examples are regional coordination platforms, policy networks, 
interlocal service agreements and public-private partnership that often occur as alternatives to 
formal coordination bodies. These examples show that coordination efforts target a wide range of 
actors and are not limited to public actors.  
Regional coordination, as a central element of this locational policies category, studies coordination 
of policies between jurisdictions within a functional urban area (FUA). Regional coordination in 
FUAs is conditioned by the mismatch between functional regions and jurisdictional territories as 
reforms of the jurisdictional boundaries are not keeping up with the accelerated pace of urban 
sprawl (Kübler 2012, 403). According to Frederickson (1999, 706), the interdependency of 
jurisdiction, organizations and institutions is the densest in metropolitan areas that makes 
coordination necessary and meaningful.  
Morgan (2014, 314) points out that the agenda mostly contains the policy fields of economic 
development, transportation and spatial planning issues. In a comparative analysis, Kübler and 
Piliutyte (2007, 365) suggest that a metropolitan-wide commonality of interest regarding its 
economic promotion is likely to exist. Feiock, Steinacker and Park (2009, 256) point to large 
potential benefits of cooperation in economic development. Local governments engage in 
interaction to capture spillover effects from growth if the gains of cooperation are likely to 
outweigh the transaction costs necessary to achieve it (e.g. Ostrom 1990; Feiock, Steinacker, and 
Park 2009; Kwon and Feiock 2010). However, the transaction costs are correspondingly high and 
collective action problems such as incentives to free-ride and opportunistic defections from 
voluntary agreements exist. Furthermore, the two step logic of a firm’s locational choice – the first 
step consisting of a regional choice and the second and later step consisting of deciding on a specific 
location within the chosen region (Cohen 2000) – aggravates regional coordination. This reveals 
the double logic of competition: Competition within a region is a threat for economic 
competitiveness in the competition between regions.  
3.2.6. Public funds and compensation payments 
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This locational policy type aims at justifying and increasing monetary transfers within a nation state. 
Important instruments are intergovernmental monetary transfers that may be unconditional or 
earmarked for a specific policy field. Local governments also have the opportunity to tap into 
national or regional public funds that for example support big infrastructure project or specific 
industries.9 National fiscal equalization schemes are also part of this category, however, they mostly 
base on non-negotiable allocation formulas.  
In the context of SCCs, compensation payments based on restrictions ensuing from the capital city 
status are particularly relevant. Studies distinguish between two types of compensation payments 
in the context of capital cities (G. Young 2008; Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009). First, some capital 
cities have negotiated compensation arrangements regarding specific additional expenses of capital 
cities such as additional policing due to more special events, preserving objects of national 
representations, hosting cultural events and maintaining a high-quality infrastructure. In some 
capital cities, these additional services of national importance are directly rendered by national 
governmental organizations such as national planning committees. Second, some capital cities are 
being compensated for lost revenues due to extraordinary constraints on their local tax autonomy. 
The most important compensation is payments in lieu of tax-exempted property. Local 
governments are not allowed to levy taxes on land and buildings belonging to the national 
government as well as land and buildings of foreign governments (such as embassies or consulates). 
This restriction affects capital cities in a more profound manner than other local governments in a 
country. To compensate for these lost taxes, some nation states know payments in lieu of property 
taxes (the so-called PILTs) while other nation states compensate via lump sum payments.  
Given that this locational policy targets public funds, a local government has to bring political 
arguments into play, i.e. to emphasis its importance for the whole political system. Cities are able 
to claim national importance in different ways. Larger cities can simply refer to their economic 
importance for the whole country. Smaller cities may highlight their role as regional centers for 
peripheral areas or as secondary centers in metropolitan areas (Kaufmann and Arnold 2017, 11). 
SCCs, for their part, are able to claim national importance by referring to their functional role as 
the political center. They can claim a special status in the national urban competition by arguing 
that the capital city should not be measured by economic success only, but by its function as the 
place where the political decisions are being made and implemented, which in turn help other 
metropolitan areas to prosper. However, such strategies feature a preservative rather than a 
                                                            
9 For European cities exists as well EU funds. An example is the European Regional Development Fund that supports 
modernization projects in order to increase regional competiveness. A newer funding instrument is the Smart Cities 
and Communities European Innovation Partnership that supports technology-intense projects. 
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proactive development logic and thus may leave SCCs dependent on the nation state. Jessop and 
Sum (2000, 2293) asses such strategies as being unsustainably in the long term and furthermore 
“pose an awkward dilemma over the trade-off between maintaining local autonomy and accepting 
resources that come with restrictive strings attached”. Especially if we additionally consider the 
‘flypaper effect’ suggesting that intergovernmental transfer payments are stimulating local 
government spending to a greater degree than the increase of locally raised income would “since 
the money that the government sends out ‘stick where it hits’” (Hines and Thaler 1995, 218; Good 
et al. 2012). As a consequence, these attracting public funds or compensation payments strategies 
should be accompanied by other locational policies.  
3.3. Causal mechanisms 
Before I turn to discuss the two explanatory factors (RIS and MLG setting), I will outline the two 
causal mechanism that should explain the formulation of locational policies. I name the causal 
mechanisms ‘enabling/constraining’ and ‘structuring’. These two causal mechanism underlie the 
expectations that I will derive in the two following subchapters and therefore should be addressed 
before the discussion of the two explanatory factors.  
Generally speaking, the urban politics literature offers three broad causal mechanisms reflected in 
the three main analytical approaches of urban political studies. First, the structural-institutional 
tradition, also labeled as neo-Marxist, emphasizes the pressures and coercive forces of a globalized 
economy that converges urban forms, urban governance and urban policies. Cities are forced into 
certain configurations of activities which are seen as constitutive of the capitalist dynamic and/or 
part of the neoliberal offensive to dismantle redistributive state institutions (Harvey 1989, 15; 
Lovering 1999, 392).10 Second, agency-based studies contrast structural explanations as they 
highlight the importance of individual or group actions when explaining urban politics and urban 
policies. This strand of literature focuses on urban power structures and asks how such power 
arrangements are being produced, maintained and could be transformed.11 Third, the urban 
governance literature incorporates both structural and agency-based explanations (Devecchi 2016, 
57–58). In that sense, structure and agency based studies are a compromise, or positively formulate 
an advancement as they bridge two opposing camps in urban political studies. The urban 
governance literature is relatively newer and is for the most part based on comparative case 
                                                            
10 This tradition features prominent scholars such as Lefebvre (1991 [1974]), Logan and Moltoch (1987), and Harvey 
(1989). Newer contributions in this tradition seem to emerge under the label of critical urban theory (Brenner, Marcuse, 
and Mayer 2012) or critical urban studies (Imbroscio and Davies 2010). 
11 Influential are studies by Hunter (1953), Dahl (1961) and Stone (1989)  which all analyze the interplay between local 
public and local private actors in cities. I discuss the importance of these studies in subchapter 3.5.3. 
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studies.12 To incorporate the simultaneity of structure and agency became the state of the art in 
urban political studies. 
To acknowledge the simultaneity of structure and agency, I propose to incorporate two causal 
mechanisms into the analytical framework that I call ‘enabling/constraining’ and ‘structuring’. The 
former mechanism is influenced by neo-institutional theories such as the actor-centered 
institutionalism (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 1997) or the institutional analysis and 
development framework (Ostrom 1990; Polski and Ostrom 1999). The ‘enabling/constraining’ 
mechanism highlights that institutions are enabling and constraining actors’ actions but are not 
determining them. For example, Fritz Scharpf (1997, 36) stresses that “political interaction is driven 
by the interactive strategies of purposive actors operating within institutional settings that, at the 
same time, enable and constrain these strategies”. This neo-institutional mechanism also influences 
the VOC theory as it emphasizes “that (institutional) structure conditions (corporate) strategy, not 
that it fully determines it” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 15). Translated to the context of this thesis, the 
economic structure (i.e. the RIS) and the political-institutional structure (i.e. the MLG setting) 
enable and constrain the formulation of locational policies choices.  
The first causal mechanism leaves us so far with a rather static and deterministic analytical 
framework because the causal mechanism assumes an unidirectional influence between structures 
and actors’ choices. This is unsatisfactory, as local policy makers would not be equipped with 
agency. Therefore, in order to theoretically approach local action, I suggest incorporating a second 
causal mechanism that is called ‘structuring’ (Giddens 1984). The structuration theory proposes a 
dualistic view of the structure-agency relationship. The dualistic view argues that “the broader 
structural context shapes individual action, but also contends that these actions in turn shape that 
structural context” (Imbroscio 1999, 46). The dualistic view follows Abrams (1982) and Giddens 
(1984) who both refer to a reciprocal and constant process between structure and agency. Also 
Clarence Stone (Stone 1989, 10) draws on Abrams (1982) when he states that “action does not 
simply occur within the bounds set by structures but is sometimes aimed at the structures 
themselves”. ‘Structuring’ highlights that actors’ actions can be directly aimed at the very structures 
that are simultaneously enabling and constraining them. Imbroscio (1999, 49) points out that 
agency can have two effects on structures: “they can either reproduce/reinforce structures or they 
can modify/transform structures”.  
                                                            
12 The urban governance stand of literature features studies such as Kantor, Savitch and Haddock  (1997), Di Geaetano 
and Klemansiki (1999)(1999), Pierre (1999; 2011), Sellers (2002), and Savitch and Kantor (2002). See Devecchi (2016, 
57–66) for a good overview of urban governance studies.  
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Thus, I incorporate agency into the analytical framework by formulating expectations based on the 
‘structuring’ as their causal mechanism. Locational policies may aim at specific parts of the RIS and 
the MLG setting that are modifiable by policies of local governments. I expect that local 
governments try to reproduce or reinforce enabling parts of the RIS and the MLG setting. On the 
other hand, local governments try to modify or transform constraining parts of RIS or MLG 
setting. In sum, I expect that local governments are able to influence parts of the structures that 
are constraining or enabling them by formulating and implementing locational policies.  
Inward-oriented locational policies are able ‘to structure’. These types of locational policies are 
strategic and anticipatory policy options. However, just few inward-oriented locational policies 
have the potential for ‘structuring’. In the following subchapters, I will outline that innovation 
policies have the potential ‘to structure’ the RIS and coordination has the potential ‘to structure’ 
the MLG setting. This is a problem-oriented approach on public policy because innovation policies 
aim at RIS failures and coordination tries to overcome constraints ensuing from the MLG 
structure. The inward-orientated locational policy ‘business prerequisites’ is not able ‘to structure’. 
These locational policy manifestation, i.e. taxes and land and real estate, are not able modify or 
reinforce the MLG setting.  
3.4. Explanatory factor 1: Regional innovation system 
The regional innovation system (RIS) concept evolved in the economic geography literature 
(Cooke 2001; Doloreux and Parto 2005; Asheim, Smith, and Oughton 2011). A RIS is typically 
understood as “a set of interacting private and public interests, formal institutions, and other 
organizations that function according to organizational and institutional arrangements and 
relationships conducive to the generation, use, and dissemination of knowledge” (Doloreux and 
Parto 2005, 134–35). Two subsystems constitute a RIS (Autio 1998; Tödtling and Trippl 2005). 
First, the knowledge application and exploitation subsystem “compromised out of companies, their 
clients, suppliers, competitors as well as their industrial cooperation partners. These constellations 
are usually referred to as industrial clusters of a region” (Tödtling and Trippl 2005, 1205). In this 
regard, the RIS literature points out that a RIS may encompass several clusters (Asheim, Smith, 
and Oughton 2011). Second, the knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem is constituted by 
various organizations that engage in the production and diffusion of knowledge and skills such as 
research institutions, technology mediating organizations, as well as universities. A basic 
assumption of the RIS concept states that the better a RIS is developed, the more intense the flow 
or exchange of knowledge, resources and human capital within and between the subsystems 
(Tödtling and Trippl 2005, 1206).  
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Locational policies are unknown to the RIS literature. Quite generally, the RIS concept remains 
vague about potential policies that aim at enhancing the competiveness of regions and takes a rather 
conservative stand on policy interventions by (local) governments (Mayer et al. 2016, 14). Some 
authors argue that public policies should only be adopted to overcome market and system failures 
(Asheim, Smith, and Oughton 2011; Cooke 2001; Martin and Trippl 2014). As a result, private 
actors must fail first in order to legitimate state interventions. In this regard, Tödtling and Trippl 
(2005) argue that systemic failures ought to be the foundation for policy interventions but they 
simultaneously highlight that policy actors, such as local governments or economic development 
agencies, may have a powerful role in shaping a RIS if they are provided with enough autonomy 
and resources. The economic geography literature labels such policy instruments innovation 
policies (Cooke, Boekholt, and Tödtling 2000; Martin and Trippl 2014; see also subchapter 3.2.1).  
To integrate the RIS literature into the analytical framework, I will first describe how a RIS in a 
SCC may look like. In a next step, I propose three development stages of a RIS which are based 
on potential RIS failures. In the following, I will theorize the relationship between the RIS and 
different categories of locational policies and formulate expectations how the RIS enables and 
constrains the formulation of these locational policies categories. 
3.4.1. How does a RIS in a SCC look like? 
SCCs should display a distinctive type of RIS in which government institutions such as ministries, 
departments or public agencies constitute an additional type of actor that interacts with both RIS 
subsystems. Warland (2016c) argues that public procurement processes are a specific feature that 
shape the knowledge dynamics in SCC-RISs. In the knowledge-based SCC-RISs, central 
government organizations heavily rely on products and services that are provided by private sector 
firms. The provision of such products and services creates complex interaction patterns between 
public demand and private supply. Whereas government actors are associated with constrained 
procedures, risk-aversion, an innovation obstructing culture of bureaucracy and arm’s-length 
relationships, the private sectors is usually grasped as innovative, risk-taking and technology 
embracing. In SCCs, this two cultures meet and thus, according to Warland (2016c, 2), a RIS in a 
SCC “need[s] to function as bridges between both sectors and need[s] to help to overcome gaps 
between both paradigms.” Such a RIS description fits Markusen’s (1999) conceptualization of 
‘state-anchored industrial districts’. In such districts, government entities such as military 
installations or clusters of government offices and agencies operate as anchors for private sector 
firms that interact with these entities (Markusen 1999). 
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The setting of actors within the two RIS subsystems are unique in a SCC compared to other 
regional economies (Warland 2016c). First, actors in the knowledge application and exploitation 
subsystem are firms that seek spatial proximity to governmental actors. In particular, firms that 
provide so-called knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) benefit from being close to their 
public sector clients (Vence Deza and González López 2014).13 Such KIBS firms tend to locate in 
SCCs because they seek spatial proximity to governmental actors and similar firms, competitors 
and anchor organizations resulting in cluster-building. Spatial proximity facilitates intended and 
unintended interactions that are conducive for the development of trusted relationships in which 
knowledge is shared (Feldman 2001). Besides the importance of public procurement, a RIS in a 
SCC features specific sectors that are linked to the federal presence which I call ‘highly regulated 
sectors’. Examples are the energy sector, defense and security, health and medicine, education and 
so on. In these sectors the governmental organizations are important as regulators but may as well 
be buyers of products and services via public procurement processes.  
Second, the actors in the knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem take over intermediary 
functions or knowledge generation functions. The former functions are conducted by 
intermediators such as national sector associations, chambers of commerce, or public or semi-
public development agencies which organize cumulative knowledge sharing among different actors 
and coordinate collective actions (Maennig and Ölschläger 2011). Whereas the contribution of 
more privately orientated associations or chambers of commerce relies on stimulating systemic 
knowledge flows rather than linking individual actors (Edler and Yeow 2016), public oriented 
economic development agencies may initiate linkages between the important actors in a sector and 
thus can offer bridging functions (Lagendijk and Cornford 2000). The knowledge generating actors 
are public research institutes, think tanks, and university institutes. Such knowledge organizations 
are important for creating iterative knowledge processes (Caniëls and van den Bosch 2011) but as 
well for educating talent, a function that may be most important for a region (Motoyama and Mayer 
forthcoming).  
 
3.4.2. Stages of a SCC-RIS 
In line with neo-institutional theories, I grasp the development of a RIS as a path-dependent 
process which is based on the preexisting economic-sector mix, the interactions and knowledge 
                                                            
13 KIBS are defined as “services that involve economic activities which are intended to result in the creation, 
accumulation or dissemination of knowledge” (Miles 2005).  
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flows between the actors within and between the subsystems, the public procurement processes in 
the case of a SCC and, last but not least, locational policies. Whereas the RIS literature offers many 
descriptive insights about collective learning processes and mechanisms within a RIS, relatively 
little is known about the overall development and evolution of RIS (Boschma and Fornahl 2011). 
In the following, I outline a model of RIS development by building on three different RIS failures, 
namely (1) organizational thinness, (2) fragmentation and (3) lock-in (Isaksen 2001; Nauwelaers 
and Wintjes 2003; Tödtling and Trippl 2005). 
First, organizational thinness refers to an imperfect or underdeveloped organizational set up. Such 
a lack of relevant actors in the two RIS subsystems has negative effects on the innovation potential 
of the region (Tödtling and Trippl 2005, 1207). Second, fragmentation refers to the lack of 
knowledge flows within a region (Blažek et al. 2011). The very definition of a RIS emphasis the 
need for intensive interactions between and within the RIS subsystems in order to generate, use 
and disseminate knowledge (Doloreux and Parto 2005; Tödtling and Trippl 2005). 14 Third, lock-
in refers to a too narrow focus on regional knowledge sources in regional knowledge flows. Actors 
in such a setting would be too strongly orientated towards activities that take place within a RIS, 
ignore relevant external developments and are thus ‘overembedded’. Warland (2016c) shows that 
knowledge dynamics in SCC-RISs differ, but all are threatened by a regional lock-in. Knowledge 
dynamics are limited between a rather stable set of actors within the region because public 
procurement processes creates several barriers for new firms to enter the marketplace. New firms 
that want to engage in public procurement would have to invest in workforce training to cope with 
the complexity of procurement processes, may obtain security clearances and are likely to have 
some unsuccessful bids before they win the first federal procurement contract. Thus, RIS in SCCs 
do not vary regarding the failure lock-in. 
Given these three criteria, I construct three RIS development stages – weakly developed, 
moderately developed, highly developed – in the context of SCCs (see also Mayer et al. 2016). 15 In 
a weakly developed RIS, all RIS failures can be detected. In a moderately developed RIS only one 
RIS failure is present whereas a highly developed RIS is not concerned with organizational thinness 
or fragmentation (see Table 4). 
                                                            
14 The RIS concept is based on a system of innovation approach (Edquist 1997) that emphasizes the evolutionary, 
non-linear and interactive process of innovation and requires intensive communication and collaboration between 
different actors (Tödtling and Trippl 2005, 1205). 
15 However, such a development is by no means linear in nature. Spigel (2011) uses Ottawa as an example to 
demonstrate how capital regions can be thrown back due to external shocks. 
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Table 4: Conceptualization of RIS stages in SCCs 
RIS failures Weakly developed RIS Moderately developed RIS Highly developed RIS 
Organizational thinness Yes One of the two RIS failures 
present 
No 
Fragmentation Yes No 
Lock-in Yes Yes Yes 
3.4.3. Expectations 
Generally, I expect that the different RIS stages constrain or enable the formulation of innovation 
policies, image building strategies and acquisition strategies. Additionally, innovation policies may 
be tailored to the specific needs resulting from the RIS by reinforcing/reproducing enabling parts 
of the RIS or by modifying/transforming constraining parts of the RIS. Table 5 summarizes the 
expectations based on the RIS as the explanatory factor. 
Table 5: Expectations based on RISs 
Locational 
policy 
Causal 
mechanism 
Expectations 
Image building 
 
Enabling/ 
constraining 
A moderately or highly developed RIS enables the formulation of both a 
capital city image building strategy and a business town image building 
strategy. 
A weakly developed RIS enables the formulation of a capital city image 
building strategy, but constrains the formulation of a business town image 
building strategy. 
Acquisition 
 
Enabling/ 
constraining 
A moderately or highly developed RIS enables the adaption of a profound and 
large-scale acquisition strategy. 
A weakly developed RIS constrains the adaptation of a profound and large-
scale acquisition strategy. 
Innovation 
policies  
Enabling/ 
constraining 
A moderately or highly developed RIS enables the formulation of innovation 
policies. 
A weakly developed RIS restricts the formulation of innovation policies. 
Innovation 
policies  
Structuring Innovation policies aim at modifying and transforming the constraining parts 
of the RIS. 
 
• Image building in a capital city happens along two dimensions that are not mutually 
exclusive. On the one hand, SCCs may rely on their uniqueness as the capital of a nation 
state, on the other hand, they may highlight their specific capital city economy. I expect 
that if a RIS in a SCC is only weakly developed, the image building strategy centers around 
the capital city status because an image as a vibrant and competitive economy is simply not 
credible. This strategy guarantees singularity in the national urban system and moves the 
focus away from its economic inferiority and towards its political superiority. On the other 
hand, if a RIS in a SCC is moderately or highly developed, image building strategies on 
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both dimensions are likely to be enabled: Towards the central government but as well 
towards guest and tourist, SCCs may present itself as the nation’s capital. Towards firms 
and organizations that have an interest to tap into the knowledge flows of a SCC-RIS, local 
governments may refer to its unique regional economy. 
• The expectation regarding acquisition strategies is similar. This make sense as image 
building and acquisition are both outward-economic locational policies. Only if a RIS is 
moderately or highly developed, SCCs may formulate profound and large-scale acquisition 
strategies. On the contrary, when a RIS is weakly developed, SCCs might not be able to 
compete in acquisitions with top-tier cities. Thus, I expect that if a RIS is moderately or 
highly developed, I will detect profound and large-scale acquisition strategies. 
Consequentially, I expect that a weakly developed RIS constrains the formulation of 
profound and large-scale acquisition strategies.  
Regarding innovation policies, I formulate two rather opposing expectations. The difference 
lies in the underlying causal mechanisms (‘enabling/constraining’ vs. ‘structuring’) and thus in 
the direction of causality.  
• On the one hand, the formulation of innovation polices may be constrained or enabled by 
the development of the RIS. This expectation is derived from the system of innovation 
approach (Edquist 1997) that emphasizes the evolutionary, but non-linear and interactive 
process of innovation that requires intensive communication and collaboration between 
different actors (Tödtling and Trippl 2005, 1205). Thus, I expect that only in moderately 
or highly developed RISs, innovation policies may be enabled whereas in a weakly 
developed RISs, the formulation of innovation policies may be constrained.  
• On the other hand, innovation policies may be strategic locational policies as they aim to 
develop the local economy. Innovation polices can directly aim at the needs and problems 
resulting from a RIS, i.e. they may directly address RIS failures (Cooke 2001; Tödtling and 
Trippl 2005; Martin and Trippl 2014). Different innovation policies may be able to launch, 
initiate and stimulate the development process of a RIS, i.e. to elevate the RIS to the next 
stage as they help to overcome RIS failures. Thus, I expect that innovation policies aim at 
modifying and transforming the constraining parts of the RIS.  
The above outlined expectations are interdependent. Only a well-developed RIS enables to take 
full advantage of both outward-economic locational policies. If a SCCs features only a weak 
developed RIS, I expect that the only outward-economic locational policy left is to rely on the 
capital city image. However, if we incorporate innovation policies, the expectations become more 
dynamic. Innovation policies as strategic, inward-oriented locational policies may have the potential 
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to overcome the constraints ensuing from the RIS. Thus by helping to develop the RIS, innovation 
policies may foster the economic conditions necessary to enable the formulation of both 
dimensions of an image building strategy as well as a profound and large-scale acquisition strategy.  
3.5. Explanatory factor 2: Multilevel governance 
I apply the multilevel governance (MLG) theory to tackle the political-institutional setting in which 
a locality is embedded in. The multilevel part of the term MLG is important in the context of capital 
cities as it enables to incorporate the different layers of governments that intersect in a capital city 
like in no other type of city (Campbell 2000, 10). The governance part of the term MLG allows to 
capture the interactions between local governments and private actors that engage in locational 
politics and locational policies formulation.  
Hooghe and Marks (2003) article has been important in pushing forward the MLG theory. They 
theorized decision-making with multiple intervening actors on multiple scales without a structuring 
authority.16 Following Hooghe and Marks (2003), Kübler and Pagano (2012) and Horak and Young 
(2012) adapt the MLG concept to urban political studies. Kübler and Pagano (2012) highlight three 
dimensions on which local governments may operate: Vertical, horizontal, and international. The 
vertical nesting of cities is especially important for comparative studies because it allows to 
incorporate contextual elements and national variations into the analysis (see also Denters and 
Mossberger 2006). The horizontal nesting of cities within wider agglomerations or metropolitan 
areas capture how “individual cities have increasingly become entwined in functional 
interdependencies that contribute to the shaping of politics and governance within them” (Kübler 
2012, 115). The international dimension looks at international relations of cities that aim at 
strengthening the economic competiveness of cities by tapping into international markets and by 
trying to influence decision-making in multilateral organizations. Horak and Young (2012) use a 
similar conceptualization in their volume of multilevel governance arrangements in Canadian cities. 
They propose two dimensions to tackle MLG. On the one hand, a vertical dimension that analyzes 
the interactions between multiple governmental levels in policy-making. On the other hand, the 
governance dimension that refers to the involvement of non-governmental actors in the policy-
making process (Young 2012, 5 -6). Consequentially, MLG is defined in the same volume as “a 
                                                            
16 Hooghe and Marks (2003) suggest two basic types of MLG. Type 1 MLG conceptualizes jurisdictions on multiple 
levels as a set of nested levels that do not intersect. In type 2 MLG, fragmented task-specific jurisdictions operate on 
different levels and they come and go as demands for governance change (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 236). Type 2 MLG 
is more suitable for analyzing the MLG setting in my research context because multiple governmental levels and private 
interest intersect in the policy-making of locational policies.  
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mode of policy making that involves complex interactions among multiple levels of government 
and social forces” (Horak 2012, 339).  
By combining Kübler and Pagano (2012) with Horak and Young (2012), I propose three analytical 
dimensions that structure the MLG setting in SCCs. The dimensions are labelled public-vertical, 
public-horizontal and local governance (see Table 6). The international dimension is dismissed 
because I apply MLG as the political-institutional setting in which local governments formulate 
their locational policies. Activities on the international level are rather outward-orientated locational 
policies than constraining or enabling elements that influence the formulation of locational policies.  
Table 6: Dimensions of multilevel governance  
Kübler and Pagano 
(2012) 
Horak and Young 
(2012) 
MLG-dimensions 
applied in this thesis 
Vertical Vertical Public-vertical 
Horizontal - Public-horizontal 
International - Dismissed 
- Governance Local governance 
 
Martin Horak (2012, 349) stresses that the formulation and implementation of urban policies 
incorporates a wide array of actors. Different layers of governments may be involved in creating 
innovation and economic development. Thus, economic development and locational policies’ 
formulation operate on different spatial scales rather than on a fixed spatial scale (Swyngedouw 
1997; Bradford and Wolfe 2013). The distribution of jurisdictional authority does not solely 
determine which actors are involved. Control over resources plays an equal if not more important 
role. Especially, “control over financial resources allows agents to insert themselves into (or even 
dominate) policy processes over which they have no formal jurisdiction” (Horak 2012, 349). 
Based on these observations, I theorize local governments as the central actors in the formulation 
of locational policies. However, all three dimensions of MLG feature particular sets of actors that 
have an interests in engaging in locational policies formulation. In the public-vertical dimension, 
actors such as national government organizations with a formal mandate for financing and carrying 
out services of national importance (e.g. policing, monuments, parks) occupy a strong role in local 
politics.  
The public-horizontal dimension incorporates municipalities that are part of the functional 
economic region. These municipalities should have, at least theoretically, an interest in pushing 
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forward the economic competiveness of the whole region. On the local-governance dimension, I 
incorporate important businesses, universities, private sectors organizations, and similar actors that 
show an interest in locational politics and locational policies. All actors on the three MLG-
dimensions may cooperate, abstain from cooperation or trying to hinder the formulation of 
locational policies, i.e. they are either enabling or constraining the formulation of specific locational 
policies. In the following sections, I discuss the three dimensions of the MLG setting in greater 
detail.  
3.5.1. Public-vertical dimension 
In the urban politics literature, the vertical dimension is typically assessed with the concept of local 
autonomy (e.g. Gurr and King 1987; Page and Goldsmith 1987; Sellers and Lidström 2007). 
Thereby it is assumed that local governments operate within a MLG setting that can be more or 
less constrained by higher-tier governments. Straightforwardly, the less constrained local 
governments are, the more autonomy local governments have in practice (Goldsmith 1995). 
“Hence, a very prominent approach to conceptualize the vertical nesting of urban politics and 
policy has consisted in account for the nature and the extent of the limits impose on cities by higher 
–level governments” (Kübler and Pagano 2012, 116). Page and Goldsmith (Page and Goldsmith 
1987, 5–7) suggest a fourfold classification of local autonomy for comparative studies. First, there 
is discretion in the constitutional position and legal status of municipalities. Second, municipalities 
have to perform different kinds and ranges of services and functions. Third, the autonomy differs 
in the amount of discretion local governments possess in determining how they want to perform 
these service and functions. This discretion may vary because some functions are mandatory while 
others are permissive, or because of the amount of administrative oversight exercised by higher 
governmental levels. Fourth, local governments differ regarding their degree of financial and fiscal 
autonomy. Crucial for this thesis is the fourth dimension of local autonomy, i.e. the local tax 
autonomy as well as capital city specific local autonomy constraints that are not covered by the 
classification of Page and Goldsmith (1987). 
Mike Goldsmith (1995, 236; 2012, 137) highlights the importance of the financial regime under 
which local governments operates. According to Goldsmith, the important variables are the 
discretion in raising independent tax revenues of local governments and the degree of public 
transfers that compensate local tax autonomy constraints. By drawing on Goldsmith (1995; 2012), 
I distinguish between two main national tax regimes: On the one hand, local governments are 
allowed to collect corporate and personal income taxes as well as property taxes which stands for 
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high local tax autonomy. On the other hand, low local tax autonomy stands for national tax regimes 
that allow local governments to collect taxes only on property and land.  
The local tax autonomy of capital cities may be further restricted based on their capital city status. 
For example, capital cities are not allowed to levy taxes on land and buildings belonging to the 
national government as well as on land and buildings belonging to foreign governments (such as 
embassies or consulates). Other restrictions may ensue from the specific legal status of a capital 
city. Washington, D.C. as the US federal district, for example, does not enjoy the same tax rights 
as US states regarding taxing commuters that work in the district but reside outside the district. 
Thus, the legal status and the local tax autonomy of a capital city are sometimes intertwined.  
Capital city specific constraints have been studied since the beginning of comparative capital city 
research. Rowat (1968; 1973) compared the governing arrangements and legal statuses of seventeen 
federal capitals. He distinguished between three types governing structures of capital cities: (1) a 
capital city that is located in a special district, (2) a capital city as a city-state that is simultaneously 
a constitutive unit of their nation, and (3) a capital city that is located within a province, state or 
canton with no special status (see also Harris 1995; Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009). Each of these 
governing types attach more or less autonomy to a local government in a capital city (Zimmermann 
2010). 
Important for my thesis is how the local autonomy constrains or enables certain manifestations of 
locational policies. I expect that the local tax autonomy of capital cities influences the 
manifestations of business prerequisite policies, SCCs efforts to tap into public funds as well as 
their regional coordination efforts. Additionally, I expect that capital city specific constraints 
explains the claims for compensation payments. The effects of local tax autonomy on regional 
coordination only appears together with the public-horizontal MLG dimension and thus will be 
discussed in the next subchapter.  
• Local tax autonomy constrains or enables certain types of business prerequisites. If local 
governments enjoy far reaching tax rights, I expect that they will take full advantages of 
their privileges such as lowering tax rates or awarding tax incentives for specific groups. 
Local governments may also engage in tax competition with other local jurisdictions what 
may dominate whole locational policies agendas (Kaufmann and Arnold 2017). In such a 
context, other business prerequisites, such as the provision of land and real estate are at 
hand as well, but the focus is likely to rest on taxes. In that sense, I expect, on the one hand, 
that high local tax autonomy enables local governments to focus on income taxes that 
trump all other possible manifestation of the business prerequisites category. On the other 
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hand, if a local government has low tax autonomy, the focus on taxes is constrained, but 
the focus on the provision of land and real estate is enabled. In such a context, local 
governments try to increase the availability and value of land and real estate because 
property taxes constitute the most important independently-raised tax revenue.  
• Local autonomy of capital cities (both regarding capital city specific constraints as well as 
local tax autonomy) constrains or enables strategies to ask for public funds and 
compensation payments. On the one hand, if SCCs face many capital city specific 
constraints, strategies to ask for compensation payments are enabled. Capital cities can 
highlight their specific role as the capital city and point to their low local autonomy ensuing 
from the capital city status. Few capital city specific constraints make it unlikely that SCCs 
ask for compensation payments. On the other hand, low local tax autonomy enables to 
formulate strategies that aim at attracting public funds. The restricted local taxation rights 
have to be compensated by public funds to sustain the budgets of local governments. Thus, 
in low local tax autonomy settings asking for public funds is enabled, whereas in high local 
autonomy settings asking for public funds is constrained.  
3.5.2. Public-horizontal dimension 
The public-horizontal dimension tackles the relationship between the local governments of capital 
cities and the local governments of neighboring municipalities within the same functional urban 
area (FUA). The institutional landscape of a FUA is often characterized by a high degree of 
institutional fragmentation (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers 2005). Whereas in most cases, the 
capital city is the center of the FUA, polycentric FUAs exists as well. A good example of 
polycentricity is the Randstad region in The Netherlands, in which The Hague is one out of four 
major urban centers (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht).  
Institutional fragmentation measures the quantity of governments that are located in a FUA and is 
thereby capturing the mismatch between the FUA and those jurisdictional boundaries. I distinguish 
between horizontal and vertical dimensions of institutional fragmentation. The horizontal 
dimension captures the quantity of local governments that are present in a FUA. In contrasts, the 
vertical dimension measures whether sub-national boundaries (canton, province or state 
boundaries) cut through the FUA (Kaufmann and Sager 2018). 
Institutional fragmentation matters to explain regional coordination of locational policies. Tosics 
(2007, 791) conducted a large survey of city-regionalism in Europe and concludes that the 
boundaries of administrative areas constitute very strong barriers against policies that aim at 
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optimizing the position of the whole metropolitan region. Also Morgan (2014) highlights in a 
comparative study that municipal boundaries constitute the major barriers to inter-communal 
collaboration. “More than superficial lines on a map, municipal boundaries demarcate turf and 
power within a political space and as such they need to be negotiated away politically not conjured 
away theoretically”(Morgan 2014, 312).  
Especially vertical institutional fragmentation seems to be a bigger issue for FUAs that host a SCCs 
than in other types of FUAs because SCCs often lie in federal districts or in city-states which are 
both rather small in comparison to the other second-tier entities (cantons, provinces or states) 
(Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009). This increases the likelihood that these FUAs span over multiple 
second-tier jurisdictions. Furthermore, federal states are prone to locate their capitals between 
different regions within a country (Gottmann 1983; Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009) what increases 
the likelihood of vertical institutional fragmentation. In the cases of bilingual Canada and 
multilingual Switzerland, their capital cities have been deliberatively located near the linguistic 
frontier which mostly maps second-tier borders. Based on these considerations, I expect that the 
public-horizontal MLG dimensions influences regional coordination only in combination with tax 
autonomy.  
• Regional coordination is likely to be constrained in a setting of both high horizontal 
institutional fragmentation and high vertical institutional fragmentation. I expect that 
horizontal institutional fragmentation increases the transaction costs of coordination 
whereas vertical institutional fragmentation aggravates coordination because the different 
local governments are part of different lines of authority. Regional coordination becomes 
even harder to accomplish if local and second-tier governments enjoy high tax autonomy 
because this may provide incentives for tax competition between jurisdictions. Thus, I 
expect, on the one hand, that regional coordination is constrained by the context of a high 
institutional fragmentation in a FUA and by a high degree of tax autonomy. On the other 
hand, I expect to find positive coordination in the context of a low institutional 
fragmentation in a FUA and low tax autonomy. If the two explanatory factors cause 
contradictory effects on coordination, I expect that I find negative coordination. Given the 
complexity of these expectation, Table 7 sums up the outlined regional coordination 
expectation. 
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Table 7: Regional coordination expectations 
Institutional 
fragmentation 
Local tax 
autonomy 
Regional coordination Expectation 
High 
High Regional tax competition/beggar-
my-neighbor 
High institutional fragmentation 
and high local tax autonomy 
constrain regional coordination. 
Low Negative coordination High institutional fragmentation 
constrains and low local tax 
autonomy enables regional 
coordination what leads to 
negative coordination. 
Low 
High  Negative coordination Low institutional fragmentation 
enables and high local tax 
autonomy constrains regional 
coordination what leads to 
negative coordination. 
Low Positive coordination Low institutional fragmentation 
and low local tax autonomy 
enable regional coordination. 
3.5.3. Local governance dimension 
The local governance dimension addresses the interplay between local public and local private 
actors in urban governing arrangements which is a key aspect of the urban politics literature. The 
analysis of such local power structures characterizes the influential community power debate. Both 
seminal studies – Floyd Hunter’s (1953) reputational analysis of Atlanta and Robert Dahl’s (1961) 
study of New Haven – suggest that local business actors substantially influence local politics.17 
Twenty to thirty years later, the growth machine theory and the urban regime theory – both 
theorizing local political economies – pushed the urban politics literature forward. The growth 
machine theory (Molotch 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987) emphasizes the power of land and 
property owners that are constantly striving to increase the value of their property. Land and 
property owners ally with other local actors that are united under the interests of economic growth 
such as investment firms, developers, construction firms, local utility companies, local media, small 
and self-employed businesses but also universities or cultural institutions (Harding 1995, 42). The 
growth machine theory especially criticizes that economic growth trumps redistributive polices and 
that the exchange-value of property trumps over the use-value of property and land.  
                                                            
17 Floyd (1953) proposed an elitism theory by highlighting the dominance of senior business leaders over local public 
leaders in Atlanta. Dahl (1961) offered a pluralistic picture of local politics in New Haven by concluding that local 
decision-making power is in the hand of various organized business groups. This plurality of private elites forms 
flexible alliances depending on the issue at stake. 
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The urban regime approach has been established by Clarence Stone (1989) and has emerged as one 
of the most prevalent frameworks for the analysis of decision-making processes in cities 
(Mossberger 2009, 40; Pierre 2014). Clarence Stone (Stone 1989; Stone 1993) emphasizes the 
importance of informal arrangements in which public and private actors function together in order 
to have the ‘capacity to govern’ a city. In a nutshell, popular control (votes) and investments in 
local development projects (money) are the two decisive factors that constitute the ‘capacity to 
govern’ in an urban arena. This ‘capacity to govern’ is the foundation of Stone’s ‘social-production 
model’ which suggests a diffuse form of political power: the facilitative ‘power to’ rather than the 
absolutist ‘power over’ (Stone 1993, 229). The ‘social production model’ emphasizes that decision-
making regarding local economic development is not following the formal line of authority but 
does include a wide array of private actors. The incorporation of private actors into local decision-
making becomes especially crucial, when we considering that city-officials strive for more than just 
routine service delivery (Stone 1989, 219).  
Pierre (2014) stresses that a strict application of the classic urban regime theory is anachronistic in 
times of post-industrial globalization: “Urban regime theory does not consider or conceptualize 
several of the societal transformation of the 1990s and early 2000s like continuing globalization, 
the emergence of a postindustrial city with economic growth tied to the service sector; the 
internationalization, vertical integration (…)” (Pierre 2014, 13). This objection is relevant for SCCs 
since capital cities feature a specific political economy based on knowledge-intensive services 
between government actors and KIBS-firms (Mayer et al. 2016). Given the emergence of the urban 
regime theory through inductive theory-building, it is straightforward that the theory fails to 
incorporate economic, politic and societal transformation. What has started as a case study of 
Atlanta has been developed into a set of deterministic urban regime types that tend to be ethno-
centric and became anachronistic (Pierre 2005; Pierre 2014). As a consequence, the urban regime 
concept travels poorly and is in its totality not usable for comparison (Pierre 2005; Morgan 2014, 
303). 
In an in-person interview with Clarence Stone, he stresses that the broader context of economic 
development has changed. The urgency of big development projects – like expressways or a 
business city center which he described in his book about Atlanta (Stone 1989) – has eased away. 
Corporations are not as place-bound anymore and especially their leaders have a more globalized 
ken. A diverse range of non-governmental actors such as universities and knowledge generating 
organizations became important for local economic development. As a consequence, locally 
embedded business actors lost their prime role. Clarence Stone assesses regime politics slightly 
different now: Informal governing arrangements between public and private local actors are much 
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more fragmented, looser and ad-hoc nowadays. Given Pierre’s (2014) objections and Stone’s 
(Interview C. Stone) adjustments, I am not applying the classic urban regimes types as an analytical 
model. Instead, I am drawing on the still relevant ‘social-production model’ and its ‘power to’ in 
order to analyze how non-governmental influence is enabling or constraining certain types of 
locational policies. 
The ‘social-production model’ is still relevant. Business actors are not just concerned about specific 
local economic development projects but are strategic actors who want to influence the general 
locational policies agenda (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez 2002). Horak and Young (2012) 
found in an analysis of governing arrangements in big Canadian cities that resources (money, 
information and expertise) often trump formal decision-making authority. As non-governmental 
actors possess more flexible or different resources compared to local governments, non-
governmental actors can utilize their resources strategically. In line with the urban politics tradition, 
Horak (2012, 349) conclude that actors possessing resources are able to influence policies in a 
direction that reflects their own particular preferences, rather than the preferences of the broader 
public.  
I will compare and examine local governance regimes in SCCs in a separate subchapter in the 
discussion (see subchapter 9.2.2) to do justice to research question number four. However, I do 
not formulate an expectation that would incorporate local governance regimes as the phenomenon 
to be explained.  
I draw on all three dimensions of the MLG setting to formulate another expectation regarding the 
locational policy coordination that is based on the ‘structuring’ causal mechanism.   
• Coordination is an inward-orientated and political locational policy. I expect that 
coordination can directly aim at constraints ensuing from the MLG setting. Coordination 
may pursuit to initiate and stimulate interactions of crucial actors in all three MLG 
dimensions. Coordination does not have the power to modify or transform MLG 
structures but I expect that coordination may aim at overcoming or easing the constraints 
ensuing from the MLG structures. For example, coordination may aim at improving the 
cooperation between actors on multiple governmental levels that have an interest in the 
economic development of capital cities. Alternatively, coordination may improve coherent 
locational policy-making between jurisdictions in the FUA. For example, Chen, Feiock and 
Hsieh (2015) find that regional economic development partnerships serve as an effective 
tool to govern fragmented and densely populated FUAs. Lastly, coordination may also aim 
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at improving the interaction between local governments with crucial local non-
governmental actors within the local governance regime. 
3.5.4. Expectations 
The expectations based on the three dimensions of the MLG setting have been discussed at the 
end of each subchapter. Table 8 summarizes these formulated expectations.  
 
Table 8: Expectations based on MLG settings 
MLG dimension Phenomenon to 
be explained 
Causal 
mechanism 
Expectation 
Public-vertical dimension 
- local tax autonomy 
Business 
prerequisites 
Enabling/ 
constraining 
High local tax autonomy enables to focus 
on income taxes and constrains other 
manifestations of the business 
prerequisites category.  
Low local tax autonomy constrains to 
focus on income taxes and enables to focus 
on the provision of land and real estate. 
Public-horizontal 
- institutional fragmentation 
Public-vertical 
- local tax autonomy 
Regional 
coordination 
Enabling/ 
constraining 
High institutional fragmentation and high 
local tax autonomy constrain regional 
coordination. 
Low institutional fragmentation and low 
local tax autonomy enable regional 
coordination.  
All dimensions Coordination Structuring Coordination aims at overcoming the 
constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
Public-vertical dimension Public funds and 
compensation 
payments 
Enabling/ 
constraining 
Low local autonomy enables to ask for 
public funds and compensation payments. 
High local autonomy constrains to ask for 
public funds and compensation payments. 
 
The eight expectations of both explanatory factors, RIS and MLG stetting is put together to an 
analytical framework in the next subchapter. Especially the two different causal mechanisms that 
underlie the expectations link the expectations to a coherent analytical framework.  
3.6. Putting it all together 
This brief conclusive subchapter summarizes the eight expectations. Furthermore, this subchapter 
explains how the expectations – together with the underlying causal mechanisms – can be put 
together to a coherent analytical framework to study the formulation of locational policies in SCCs.  
The expectations have been outlined and discussed within the subchapters describing the 
explanatory factors. Table 9 summarizes the eight expectations that cover all six locational policies 
categories. The causal mechanism ‘enabling/constraining’ underlies six expectations – one for each 
locational policies category – and the causal mechanism ‘structuring’ underlies two expectations.  
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Table 9: Summary of the expectations 
Nr. Explanatory factor Phenomenon to 
be explained 
Causal 
mechanism 
Expectation 
E.1.1 RIS 
- development stages of RISs 
 
Innovation policies  Enabling/ 
constraining 
A moderately or highly developed RIS enables the formulation of innovation policies. 
A weakly developed RIS restricts the formulation of innovation policies. 
E.1.2 RIS 
- RIS failures 
Innovation policies  Structuring Innovation policies aim at modifying and transforming the constraining parts of the RIS. 
E.2 RIS 
- development stages of RISs 
Image building 
 
Enabling/ 
constraining 
A moderately or highly developed RIS enables the formulation of both a capital city image building 
strategy and a business town image building strategy. 
A weakly developed RIS enables the formulation of a capital city image building strategy, but constrains 
the formulation of a business town image building strategy. 
E.3 MLG 
Public vertical 
-local tax autonomy 
 
Business 
prerequisites 
Enabling/ 
constraining 
High local tax autonomy enables to focus on income taxes and constrains other manifestations of the 
business prerequisites category.  
Low local tax autonomy constrains to focus on income taxes and enables to focus on providing and 
developing land and real estate. 
E.4 RIS 
-development stages of RISs 
Acquisition 
 
Enabling/ 
constraining 
A moderately or highly developed RIS enables the adaption of a profound and large-scale acquisition 
strategy. 
A weakly developed RIS constrains the adaptation of a profound and large-scale acquisition strategy. 
E.5.1 MLG 
Public-horizontal 
- institutional fragmentation 
Public-vertical 
- local tax autonomy 
Regional 
coordination 
Enabling/ 
constraining 
High institutional fragmentation and high local tax autonomy constrain regional coordination. 
Low institutional fragmentation and low local tax autonomy enable regional coordination. 
E.5.2 MLG 
All three MLG dimensions 
Coordination Structuring Coordination aims at overcoming the constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
E.6 MLG 
Public-vertical 
Public funds and 
compensation 
payments 
Enabling/ 
constraining 
Low local autonomy enables to ask for public funds and compensation payments. 
High local autonomy constrains to ask for public funds and compensation payments. 
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The underlying causal mechanisms ‘enabling/constraining’ and ‘structuring’ guarantee for a 
dynamic framework of locational policies formulation in SCCs. Figure 1 highlights the interplay 
between the two explanatory factors, the two causal mechanisms and locational policies as the 
phenomena to be explained.  
Figure 1: Dynamic analytical framework,  
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
As illustrated in Figure 1, I assume that all SCCs have to deal with similar pressures ensuing from 
the globalized, knowledge-intensive interurban competition. SCCs formulate locational policies to 
strengthen their competiveness in this globalized interurban competition. However, the RIS as a 
description of the economic structure and the MLG setting as description of the political-
institutional setting moderate these pressures and thus account for place-based responses to these 
globalized pressures. These local settings, i.e. the RIS and the MLG setting, constrain or enable the 
formulation of specific types of locational policies. But local governments may also target their 
own local settings by formulating ‘structuring’ policies to create more favorable local settings what 
can be regarded as a kind of agency. Furthermore, the illustration of the dynamics behind the 
analytical framework shows that local governments have different locational policy options at hand 
and may apply them strategically. Thus, SCCs “need not be leaves in the wind” (Savitch and Kantor 
2002, 346) as they have a variety of locational policies at hand to prepare themselves for this 
globalized interurban competition.  
The presented analytical framework is a fruitful contribution to the literature of urban policy-
making. The analytical framework incorporates several aspects that the debate by Ward et al. (2011) 
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outlined as productive and relevant for contemporary urban studies: The interdisciplinary research 
characteristic, the incorporation of a variety of actors into the analysis, the comparative case-study 
design and the simultaneity of structure and agency. I furthermore profit from a self-developed 
framework of locational policies that is interdisciplinarily enriched by theories of political science, 
urban studies and economic geography and thereby brings some order into the so far fuzzy concept 
of locational policies.  
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4. Research Design 
This thesis is based on a multiple case study design that includes four SCCs in Western countries, 
namely Bern, Ottawa, The Hague, and Washington D.C.. The case selection from the population 
follows a ‘most similar systems’-design logic (Przeworski and Teune 1970). The backbone of this 
thesis consists of interviews with relevant decision makers and experts in all four SCCs. The 
research strategy follows qualitative research standards (George and Bennett 2005; Blatter and 
Haverland 2012). The research design combines a cross-case analysis with a within-case analysis of 
causal mechanisms that have been deduced from theory. In that sense, I combine two inferential 
strategies what increases the reliability of the inferences (Brady and Collier 2010).  
4.1. Case selection 
In distinction to in-depth, idiographic case studies, a comparative urban research agenda entails by 
necessity some degree of reductionism as empirical observations are prepared for comparative 
assessments (Pierre 2005, 447). Cases were selected from the population following a ‘most similar 
systems’-design logic (Przeworski and Teune 1970) that is based on Mill’s method of difference 
(Mill 1872). The method of difference compares cases that are different in the phenomena to be 
explained and the proposed explanatory factors but are in agreement with many potential additional 
explanatory factors (Seawright and Colier 2010, 337–38). Thus, a theoretical sampling should 
ensure the maximization of the variance of the explanatory factors while minimizing the variance 
of the control factors (Lijphart 1975, 165). I restrict myself to SCCs from OECD countries. This 
allows me to control for important economic and political contextual factors while still allowing 
for variance in the proposed explanatory factors.  
I have theoretically derived the RIS and the MLG setting as the crucial factors for explaining the 
formulation of locational policies in SCCs. Given the logic of the ‘most similar systems’-design, the 
selected cases have to vary in the two explanatory factors. As I will outline, the four selected cases 
vary considerably on the RIS and the MLG dimensions.  
Ten SCCs exist in the 34 OECD countries.18 Out of the nine SCCs in OECD countries, I chose 
Bern, Ottawa, The Hague, and Washington D.C.. These SCCs are four prime examples of 
economically inferior capital cities (see Table 1). Berlin, Jerusalem and Rome were excluded due to 
their symbolic weight for the nation. These three cities fit well the economic definition of SCCs 
                                                            
18 These are Canberra in Australia; Ottawa in Canada; Berlin in Germany; Jerusalem in Israel; Rome in Italy; The 
Hague in The Netherlands; Wellington in New Zealand; Bern in Switzerland; Ankara in Turkey; and Washington 
D.C. in United States. 
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but they are the primary historical, symbolical and cultural cities of their country. Likewise, Ankara 
was excluded because of its rather exceptional political, cultural and religious setting what 
complicates controlling for potential interfering factors. Canberra and Wellington, although fitting 
well the category of SCCs, were primarily excluded for practical reasons given the considerable 
resources necessary to conduct field research there. The selection of Bern, Ottawa, The Hague, 
and Washington D.C. allows to compare two European SCCs with two North-American SCCs. 
The four cases differ in the explanatory factor RIS. Table 10 summarizes the observed RIS stages 
in the selected four SCCs. The four different RISs are described in-depth in the relevant case 
studies. In Bern, I do not find a thick set up of crucial RIS actors. Especially intermediary 
organizations are rare. As a consequence, the RIS in Bern is fragmented. In Ottawa, the RIS is well 
set-up and the sectors are diversified. Besides the federal sector there is high-tech sector that stems 
from the early telecom industries as well as a growing digital high-tech sector. However, the 
different sectors and the different business communities in the region are only loosely connected 
and thus fragmented. The RIS in The Hague is starting to build up organizational thickness as it is 
establishing research organization to supplement its existing clusters. The knowledge interactions 
are specifically intense in the (cyber) security cluster and in the international organizations cluster, 
but the other clusters are rather fragmented. The RIS in Washington, D.C. features no RIS failure 
expect of lock-in. Both RIS subsystems are organizationally thick and many intermediary 
organizations stimulate cooperative and joint activities between KIBS firms, knowledge 
organizations and federal agencies. Especially the (cyber) security and health clusters display intense 
knowledge dynamics and abilities to diversify.  
Table 10: RIS developments in the four SCCs 
RIS failures Bern Ottawa The Hague Washington, D.C. 
Organizational thinness Yes No (Yes) No 
Fragmentation Yes Yes (Yes) No 
Lock-in Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RIS stage Weakly 
developed 
Moderately 
developed 
Moderately 
developed 
Highly developed 
 
The four cases also display varying configuration in the explanatory factor MLG setting. Table 11 
summarizes the observed MLG setting in all four SCCs. The four different MLG settings are 
described in-depth in the relevant case studies.  
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Table 11: MLG settings in the four SCCs 
MLG dimensions Ottawa Washington, D.C. Bern The Hague 
Public vertical 
- capital city specific 
constraints 
- local tax autonomy 
Constraining 
Rather weak 
Rather low 
Rather constraining 
Weak 
High 
Enabling 
Rather high 
High 
Mixed influence 
High 
Low 
Public horizontal 
- Institutional fragmentation 
Constraining 
High 
Constraining 
High 
Enabling 
Low 
Enabling 
Low 
Local governance 
-local governance regime 
Enabling 
- Development-
oriented 
Enabling 
- Development-
oriented 
Constraining 
- Public sector 
dominated 
Enabling 
- Corporatist 
Total Constraining More constraining 
than enabling 
More enabling 
than 
constraining 
Enabling 
 
Bern is treated like any other Swiss municipality and is thus not constrained due to its capital city 
status. Yet, the strong role of the canton constraints the City of Bern in its ability to formulate 
locational policies. Bern enjoys furthermore a high local tax autonomy as around 15% of all tax 
revenue in Switzerland is raised at the local level (OECD 2014a). Swiss municipalities are allowed 
to collect personal and corporate income taxes as well as property taxes. Regarding the public 
vertical dimension, the FUA Bern consists of 38 municipalities. Three municipalities that are 
located at the very margin of the FUA belong to a neighboring canton (Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office 2015b).19 Public actors dominate the local governance regime without much access 
opportunities for the business community what constrains the formulation of locational policies.  
Ottawa is constrained by its capital city status because the federal government is able to pursue its 
interest via the federal land use agency. The local tax autonomy of Ottawa is rather low as around 
9% of all tax revenue is collected at the local level (OECD 2014a). Canadian municipalities are only 
allowed to levy property taxes. The FUA Ottawa-Gatineau features 63 local governments (OECD 
2014b). This FUA is vertically institutional fragmented at its very core between the provinces 
Ontario and Quebec. The local governance regime in Ottawa is development-oriented. The city 
hall facilitates interaction between public and private actors what enables the formulation of 
locational policies in Ottawa. 
                                                            
19 The OECD only incorporates FUAs in its Metropolitan Database (2014b) if they hosts a population of 500’000 or 
more. Hence, the FUA Bern is incorporated in the OECD Metropolitan Database. Thus, I rely on 2000 agglomeration 
definition and the data of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office for the case of Bern. 
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The Hague is treated like any other Dutch municipality and thus does not face constraints ensuing 
from its capital city status. The local tax autonomy of The Hague is low as around 3% of all tax 
revenue is collected at the local level (2014a). Dutch municipalities are only allowed to levy property 
taxes. The FUA The Hague is neither horizontally nor vertically institutionally fragmented. All 11 
local governments in the FUA The Hague belong to the province South Holland (OECD 2014b). 
The local governance regime in The Hague can be described as corporatist what enables the 
formulation of locational policies in The Hague.  
Washington, D.C. faces multiple capital city specific local autonomy constraints due to its specific 
constitutional status as the federal district. The local tax autonomy is generally high in the US as 
around 15% of all tax revenue is raised at the local level (OECD 2014a). US municipalities are 
allowed to collect personal and corporate income taxes as well as property taxes. However, DC’s 
local tax autonomy is severely constrained due to its special role as the federal district. The FUA is 
vertically and horizontally institutional fragmented as it consists of 91 local governments. It spans 
over three states (Maryland, Virginia, and at the very Southwest margin West Virginia) plus the 
District of Columbia (OECD 2014b). The local governance regime in Washington, D.C. is 
development-oriented. Business elites are well organized with informal access to public actors what 
enables the formulation of locational policies. 
Figure 2: Theoretically sampled case selection 
Regional 
Innovation 
System 
Highly 
developed 
 
 
 
 
 
                               Washington D.C 
                                   The Hague 
 
 
 
 
Weakly 
developed 
 
 
             Ottawa  
 
   Bern 
 Constraining Enabling 
Multilevel governance setting 
 
Note: Distances only serve illustrative purposes and do not imply observed values 
Figure 2 shows illustratively that the four cases fit the requirements of the ‘most-similar systems’ 
design given the observed characteristics of the two explanatory factors. Table 12 summarizes the 
four cases and accounts for controlled explanatory factors, partly incorporated potential 
explanatory factors and potential additional explanatory factors. The economic strength of a SCC 
and the type of national economy are partly captured by the RIS concept, whereas the state form 
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as a political-institutional factor is partly covered by the MLG setting. The continent as a potential 
interfering factor is partly captured by both the RIS and the MLG as I assume that continental 
specificities can both be found in the RIS and the MLG setting of a locality. I consider the 
remaining potentially explanatory factors, i.e. inhabitants and country size, as not very relevant for 
explaining the formulation of locational policies. However, when discussing the results, I keep 
these variables in mind as potential interfering factors. 
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Table 12: Summary of all four cases  
Type of factor Factor Bern Ottawa The Hague Washington 
D.C. 
Explanatory factor Regional 
Innovation System 
Early stage Advanced 
stage 
Advanced stage Mature stage 
Explanatory factor Multilevel 
government setting 
More 
enabling than 
constraining 
Constraining Enabling Mixed 
influence 
Phenomena to be 
explained 
Locational policies ? ? ? ? 
Controlled potential 
explanatory factor 
Type of capital city Secondary 
capital city 
Secondary 
capital city 
Secondary 
capital city 
Secondary 
capital city 
Controlled potential 
explanatory factor 
Type of country Western 
OECD 
country 
Western 
OECD country 
Western 
OECD country 
Western 
OECD country 
Partly incorporated 
potential explanatory 
factor 
Economic strength 
- GDP metro area 
35’350  56’323 39’517 442’758 
Partly incorporated 
potential explanatory 
factor 
Type of national 
economy  
Coordinated 
market 
economy 
Liberal market 
economy 
Coordinated 
market 
economy 
Liberal market 
economy 
Partly incorporated 
potential explanatory 
factor 
State form Federal state Federal state Decentralized 
unitary state 
Federal state 
Partly incorporated 
potential explanatory 
factor 
Continent Europe North-America Europe North-America 
Potential additional 
explanatory factor 
Inhabitants 
- City  
- FUA 
- Country  
 
130’015 
365‘238 
8’237’666 
 
957’148 
1’477’881 
35’851’774 
 
514’861 
838’015 
16’900’726 
 
672’228 
6’097’684 
321’418’820 
Potential additional 
explanatory factor 
Country size Small Large Small  Large 
 
Sources: GDP: OECD Metropolitan Areas for Ottawa, The Hague and Washington, D.C.. Data from 2012 in million 
US$. OECD Regional database TL3 regions for Bern. The TL3 region is equal to the Canton of Bern. Data from 2011 
in million US$. Type of national economy: Hall and Soskice (2001). Inhabitants: see sources in the individual case 
studies.  
Note: Table inspired by Blatter and Haverland (2012) 
4.2. Data 
The backbone of this thesis consists of 91 semi-structured, in-person interviews with 103 relevant 
decision makers and experts in the four SCCs. The selection of interview partners is comparable 
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in all cases as they occupy four broad roles: (1) public officials that serve on various governmental 
levels, (2) local and regional economic development agents, (3) business leaders and private interest 
groups representatives, (4) as well as experts and academics. Among those interviewed are some 
high-profile actors such as the mayor of Bern, the state advocate of the Netherlands in The Hague 
(Landsadvocaat), the executive director of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, 
and the CEO of Invest Ottawa.  
Around 80% of the interviews lasted between 40 and 60 minutes.20 The interviews have been 
realized during nine months of field study in Ottawa, The Hague and Washington D.C. as well as 
during the time at my home university in Bern.21 I was embedded in local academic institutions 
during these field studies and took full advantage of the existing contacts and networks to get access 
to interview partners, data and documents. The interview partners were carefully selected to ensure 
sufficient variety within the cases and consistency between the cases. I discussed the selection of 
interview partners and preliminary findings with my local peers. In order to increase the reliability 
of my research, I presented my research framework and preliminary findings in all three academic 
partner institutions.22 Table 13 summarizes the types of interview partners. The interview partners 
are listed in the appendix in Table 56. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
20 Around 40% of the interviews have been conducted together with my research colleague Martin Warland from 
economic geography. 
21 I had the privilege to be a guest researcher at Leiden University, Campus The Hague from September to November 
2014, at Virginia Tech, National Capital Region from December 2014 to February 2015, and at Ottawa University, 
Center on Governance from March to May 2015. 
22 In November 2014, I presented at a brown bag lunch at Leiden University, Campus The Hague. In January 2015, I 
presented at a faculty meeting at Virginia Tech, Campus Alexandria. In May 2015, I presented at the Governance 
Innovation Lecture Series at University of Ottawa. 
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Table 13: Summary of interviews 
Type of interviewees Bern Ottawa The Hague  Washington, 
D.C. 
Total 
- Public Officials 
(local, sub-national, and 
national government) 
6 5 9 8 28 
- Economic development 
agents 
- Regional coordination 
agents 
3 6 4 4 17 
- Business actors 
- Private interest group 
representatives 
7 6 5 8 26 
- Experts 
- Academics 3 4 6 7 20 
Total 19 21 24 27 91 
 
I have chosen to rely on elite interviews out of methodological reasons. Interviewing allowed me 
to ask specific questions about the process (how?) and the causal mechanism (why?) in the 
formulation of locational policies. Without interviewing decision makers, the policy formulation 
process would remain a black box and I could only rely on locational policies that are stated on 
paper. It is the purpose of case studies to peer into the box of causality. In-depth interviews are 
thereby one technique to detect causality (Gerring 2007, 45). This is in line with Rathbun (2008, 
690) who highlights that interviewing is often best suited to tackle agency that is often not written 
down on paper. Interviewing decision makers is especially favorable when few select decision 
makers are involved what creates bottle-necks of political power that is hard to shed light on 
otherwise.  
I was very concerned to triangulate data during the entire data collection process. As suggested by 
Berry (2002, 680) and Rathbun (2008, 695), I exhausted all secondary sources and publicly available 
primary sources before starting to conduct the interviews. The specific locational policies have 
been mostly obtained from strategic papers and reports, but have as well been inquired in the 
interviews. Economic and political context information have been accumulated for each SCC on 
the basis of existing databases, statistical information and the analysis of relevant documents. This 
‘frontloading’ of desk research helped me to pose more targeted and effective questions in the 
interviews. Furthermore, I started the interview process in each locality with a first set of 
explorative interviews that I conducted with academics and experts. I asked for suggestions of 
potential other interview partners at the end of all interviews. I took extensive notes during the 
interview. Immediately after the interview, I wrote down an interview protocol and I traced the 
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sources which have been mentioned in the interviews. Interview protocols and case study databases 
for every city accompanied the data collection process. Interviews with experts and academics were 
helpful to objectify my collected data. I was concerned to especially triangulate between reactive 
and non-reactive data sources what enhances confidence in the observations (Webb et al. 1999, 2; 
Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015, 158). This in-depth analysis of four cases enables data 
triangulation because multiple sources and data types can be analyzed to measure the same 
phenomena for a single unit (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 68). 
4.3. Analytical strategy 
The research strategy applied in this thesis proceeded in six steps: First, the broader historical, 
political and economic context and the dependent variables (locational policies) have been 
identified for each SCC based on the collected non-reactive data. Immersing into the cases prior 
the actual analysis is especially important for unfamiliar cases (George and Bennett 2005, 89). 
Second, the characteristics/configurations of the explanatory factors were assessed. Third, the 
manifestations of locational policies in all six categories of locational policies in all four SCCs have 
been determined by analyzing locational policies agendas on paper. I also asked in the interviews 
specific questions about formulated locational policies. Fourth, I tested for each expectation in all 
four SCCs whether the expectations could predict the locational policy and whether evidence for 
the underlying causal mechanism could be found. Regarding the causal mechanisms, I mostly relied 
on interview data, because the interviews allowed me to pose specific why-questions about the 
causality of formulating locational policies that I have outlined in the expectations. Fifth, in the 
comparative chapter (see chapter 9), I will test the validity of each expectation step by step by 
comparing and discussing the outcome of expectations in the four SCCs. Sixth, possible 
generalizations of the findings to the whole population of SCCs in OECD countries as well as to 
other secondary capital cities are discussed (see subchapter 9.3).  
The inferential strategies in this thesis can be summarized as being twofold. First, the inferential 
strategy in the small-N between-case analysis, concerning research steps number five and six, 
combines the ‘most similar systems’-design (Przeworski and Teune 1970) that is based on Mill’s 
method of difference (Mill 1872). When standing alone, this standard small-N comparative 
approach is a rather weak basis for evaluation causal mechanisms. Thus, I “juxtapose this 
comparative framing with carefully-executed analysis carried out within the cases” (Collier, Brady, 
and Seawright 2010, 10). Therefore is the second inferential strategy a within case analysis, 
concerning research steps number one to four, that analyzes the theoretically derived causal 
mechanism of every expectation base on interview data.  
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To sum up, the research design allows to fulfil the four criteria that guarantee the rigor of 
comparative case study research: internal validity, construct validity, external validity, and reliability 
(Cook and Campbell 1979; Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki 2008). Internal validity is ensured by a 
theory-driven research. The expectations and the anticipated underlying causal mechanisms are 
derived from theory and have been clearly outlined. The incorporation of theories from economic 
geography, urban studies and political science furthermore lead to an application of different lenses 
and bodies of literatures. I am doing justice to construct validity by triangulating data from reactive 
and non-reactive data sources. The tentative conclusions have been reviewed by peers as well as by 
key informants. External validity is ensured by theoretically sampling the four cases from the 
population of cases. Finally, the reliability of this comparative case study design is ensured by 
applying elaborate interview strategies as well as using interview protocols and case study databases.  
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5. Bern 
Switzerland does not know the formal status of a capital city. Bern is the federal city meaning that 
it is the seat of the Swiss government and the Swiss parliament. An important consequence of the 
federal city status is that it allows federal institution to be located anywhere across the whole 
country which leads to the polycentric distribution of capital city functions. The Swiss judicial 
branch is distributed to across different parts of the country. The Federal Criminal Court, for 
example, is located in Bellinzona, a medium-sized city in the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland, 
whereas the Swiss Administrative Court is located in German-speaking St. Gallen and the Federal 
Supreme Court is located in the French-speaking Lausanne. This conscious policy of decentralizing 
the capital city function was mostly concerned with equal linguistic representation especially of the 
French-speaking Swiss regions as most federal government institutions and organizations were 
relocated towards the West (e.g. the Federal Office of Communication to Biel/Bienne, the Federal 
Statistical Office to Neuchâtel, the Federal Office of Housing to Grenchen, and the Federal Water 
Office to Biel/Bienne) (Kübler 2009, 244). In sum, the capital city status in Switzerland does not 
come with opulent benefits and the federal government is rather indifferent towards its capital city 
(Kaufmann et al. 2016, 120-121). 
Table 14 summarizes the case study of Bern. This case study does not support many of the 
formulated expectations. In general Bernese officials rely on political locational policies, especially 
on positioning Bern as the political center of Switzerland, as well as on attracting residents. 
Economic locational policies oriented towards the sluggish economic dynamics of the region are 
largely missing. This can be explained, on the one hand, by an only weak-developed RIS and on 
the other hand by the strong role of the Canton of Bern that has discretionary power in a lot of 
locational policies issues constrains locational policies formulation of the local level.  
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Table 14: Expectations and findings of the case study Bern 
Nr. Explanatory factor Phenomenon 
to be 
explained 
Expectation Results 
E1 RIS 
- Weakly developed  
Innovation 
policies  
A weakly developed RIS restricts the 
formulation of innovation policies. 
Not supported 
E1.2 RIS 
- RIS failure(s): 
Fragmentation, 
organizational thinness, 
lock-in  
Innovation 
policies  
Innovation policies aim at modifying 
and transforming the constraining parts 
of the RIS. 
Partly supported 
E2 RIS 
- Weakly developed  
Image 
building 
 
A weakly developed RIS enables the 
formulation of a capital city image 
building strategy, but constrains the 
formulation of a business town image 
building strategy. 
Supported 
E3 MLG setting 
- high local tax autonomy 
Business 
prerequisites 
High local tax autonomy enables to 
focus on income taxes and constrains 
other manifestations of the business 
prerequisites category. 
Not supported 
E4 RIS 
- Weakly developed  
Acquisition A weakly developed RIS constrains the 
adaptation of a profound and large-
scale acquisition strategy 
Not supported 
E5.1 MLG setting 
- low institutional 
fragmentation 
- high local tax autonomy 
Regional 
coordination 
Agglomeration level: Low institutional 
fragmentation enables and high local 
tax autonomy constrains regional 
coordination what leads to negative 
coordination. 
Regional level: High institutional 
fragmentation and high local tax 
autonomy constrain regional 
coordination. 
Supported 
E5.2 MLG setting 
- constrained in the local 
governance dimension 
Coordination Coordination aims at overcoming the 
constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
Not supported 
E6 MLG setting 
- high local tax autonomy 
 
- No capital city specific 
constraints 
Funds and 
compensation 
payments 
I: High local tax autonomy constrains to 
ask for public funds. 
II: No capital city specific constraints 
constrain to ask for compensation 
payments. 
Partly supported 
 
 
Supported 
 
The remainder of this case study chapter is structured in four subchapters. The first subchapter 
gives a general description of Bern as well as discusses the manifestations of the two explanatory 
factors. The second subchapter addresses the different locational policies categories and tests the 
respective expectation(s) one step at a time. The third subchapter links the different locational 
policies to a locational policies agenda and discusses the results in an integrative manner. The last 
subchapter concludes the case study.  
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5.1. Profile of Bern 
5.1.1. History 
Bern has a long tradition as an influential patrician-governed city-state. At its height (1500-1800), 
Bern was the largest European city-state north of the Alps, and as such the city was an aristocratic 
stronghold within the Old Swiss Confederacy and feudally governed its large territories (Gerber 
2015). Bern’s wealth stemmed from huge land possession and its notorious mercenaries. At that 
time, no capital city existed, as the political representatives from the different confederated states 
used to meet in rotating locations. This glorious era of Bern as a city-state ended when in 1798 the 
French Revolutionary Army occupied Bern. Enforced by Napoleon, the Old Swiss Confederacy 
was transformed into the Helvetic Republic and as such the Republic required a permanent seat 
for the government. During these times of political struggles, the seat of government changed 
between the Swiss cities of Aarau, Lucerne, Bern and Lausanne. Napoleon intervened again in 1803 
to calm down the quarrelling Swiss politics and re-established a federalist state and with it a system 
of six rotating venues for political gatherings namely the cities of Basel, Bern, Fribourg, Lucerne, 
Solothurn, and Zurich. A new federal treaty in 1815 reduced the number of cities for political 
gatherings to Bern, Lucerne and Zurich (Stadler 1971; Holenstein 2012). 
After the short and relatively bloodless Swiss civil war in 1847, the newly established Swiss 
Confederation was in search of a permanent capital city. Given the immediate provision of suitable 
infrastructure, only the three cities Bern, Lucerne and Zurich were an option. Bern was chosen in 
1848 for pragmatic reasons since Lucerne as a conservative, catholic stronghold was still skeptical 
of the new federal state and Zurich was already economically too powerful (Kübler 2009; Stadler 
1971). The choice of Bern as a capital city was furthermore an inclusionary gesture because of 
Bern’s central geographic location and in particularly because of its proximity to the French 
speaking parts of Switzerland (Stadler 1971, 582). Zurich was awarded the opportunity to host the 
new Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, which today is an internationally top-ranked 
university.  
In the last 70 years, Bern has steadily lost ground to the nowadays larger and economically more 
prosperous Swiss cities such as Zurich, Geneva and Basel. As a result, the Swiss urban system tends 
to develop towards a hierarchical system where three metropolitan poles take off, whereas Bern 
and other minor urban centers have only regional importance (Kübler, Schenkel, and Leresche 
2003, 266). This hierarchy is likely to become more profound as federal policymakers and 
politicians have in recent years turned their attention towards the role and importance of large 
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metropolitan regions and have devised strategies to strengthen the position of Zurich, Geneva-
Lausanne and Basel (Kaufmann et al. 2016, 127). 
5.1.2. Geography and population 
Bern and its surrounding agglomeration are significantly smaller in terms of population when 
compared to Zurich, Geneva and Basel and their agglomerations and metropolitan regions. The 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office defines the FUA Bern consisting of 38 municipalities.23The 
agglomeration of Bern is located near location near a vast agricultural and mountainous hinterland 
(e.g. regions like the Emmental or the Bernese Oberland).The City of Bern accounts for 130’000 
residents and is the fifth largest city in Switzerland based on population. The agglomeration of 
Bern is home to 347’000 inhabitants.24 When taking such a larger, agglomeration-oriented 
perspective, Bern ranks fourth among urban agglomerations in Switzerland. However, the 
agglomeration of Bern is third last in respect to population growth out of 56 Swiss agglomerations 
between 1980 and 2010 (Hermann 2013).25. Bern is also the capital of the Canton of Bern, which 
is the largest and territorially most heterogeneous canton in Switzerland. 
Table 15: Population of different relevant perimeters 
Scale 1981 1990 2000 2010 2014 Change (%) 
1981 - 2014 
City of Bern 
(1 municipality) 
145’285 134’629 122’484 123’841 130’015 -10.51 
Agglomeration Bern 
(38 municipalities) 
339’039 
 
341’404 336’134 347’248 365‘238 +7.73 
Canton of Bern  
(356 municipalities) 
900’987 930’747 943'696 978’248 1’009’418 +12.03 
Switzerland 
(26 cantons, 2324 municipalities) 
6’372’904 6’750’693 7’204’055 7’864’012 8’237’666 +29.26 
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2015a): Municipalities Statistic 1981-2014. The data for the agglomeration of 
Bern is aggregated based on municipality data referring to the agglomeration definition 2000. 
Table 15 summarizes the population dynamics in Bern and relates it to other relevant perimeter. 
The population of the City of Bern shrank significantly from 145’000 in 1980 to 122’000 in 2006. 
The population decline can be explained by the tendency of the population – particularly families 
– to move out of the city to smaller jurisdictions in the suburban surroundings attracted by pro-
active development policies of suburban and rural communities. To some extent Bern has shown 
                                                            
23 The FUA Bern is not considered a metropolitan region by terms of the OECD as it features less than 500’000 
inhabitants (OECD 2014b).  
24 This numbers refer to the agglomeration definition 2000 by the Swiss Statistical office. Since 2012 exists an 
alternative agglomeration definition based on morphological and functional criteria. The alternative agglomerations 
definition 2012 for Bern incorporates 75 municipalities home to 398’873 residents in 2012.  
25 The data by Hermann (2013) are calculated using the agglomeration definition 2000 by the Swiss Statistical Office.  
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the same declining population trends as all the big Swiss cities since the 1950s which was further 
accentuated by the establishment of public transport systems in the 1980s. Until the end of the 
1990s, many of Switzerland’s residents chose to live in municipalities in suburban agglomerations 
instead of the urban centers (Kübler 2006). However, this trend was more drastic and longer lasting 
in the case of Bern (Kaufmann et al. 2016, 122). Recent data about the population dynamics in 
Bern show a turnaround and illustrate that the city is also benefitting from a trend towards re-
urbanization: As of 2014, around 130’000 people are living in the City of Bern and this population 
number is likely to grow in the future. 
5.1.3. Regional Innovation System 
The RIS in Bern is only weakly developed because it features all three RIS failures. It display 
organizational thinness and lacks the commitment of actors to stimulate the interaction both within 
and between the RIS subsystems. The RIS is also public sector dependent as the clusters are closely 
linked to the capital city function without much diversification activities.  
Knowledge application and exploitation subsystem  
The economy of the City of Bern accounts for 142’000 full-time equivalent jobs (City of Bern 
2015).26 Quite impressively, Bern features 10’000 more full-time jobs than total inhabitants. 
Neighboring cities such as Köniz, for example, have significantly lower job-housing balances as, in 
the case of Köniz, they count more residents than jobs (40’000 residents to 20’000 jobs). As a 
consequence, on each workday the population of Bern grows by a total of 85’000 people (+68% 
people in the city) (City of Bern 2013). 
The City of Bern has never developed a significant manufacturing base, the tertiary sector accounts 
for a total employment of 90%, the secondary sector 9.8% and the primary sector 0.2% (Swiss 
Federal Statistical Office 2015c). However, the share of people that are employed in the service 
sector declines rapidly with distance to Bern (Kaufmann et al. 2016, 123). The employment is 
largely concentrated in public administration, defense, and social security (17.34%), followed by 
health and social services (14.67%) and scientific and technical services (8.5%) (City of Bern, 
2014a). Although the City of Bern is not an economical thriving Swiss city (Kaufmann et al. 2016), 
Table 16 shows that its RIS features the highest ratio between KIBS jobs and high- and medium-
tech manufacturing jobs. This feature of Bern’s regional economy is arguably a consequence of its 
capital city functions. First, Bern is a crucial location for KIBS firms that are involved in public 
                                                            
26 This 142’000 full-time equivalent jobs are based on a total of 185’132 jobs (City of Bern 2015). 
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procurement. For example, KIBS firms that are involved in complex information technology 
projects establish formal and informal linkages to learn about government specific needs and 
preferences (Warland and Mayer 2016). On the other hand, due to its specialization in capital city 
functions, the region lacks an important manufacturing base.  
Table 16: Ratio between KIBS jobs and manufacturing jobs in Swiss cities 
Sector Bern  Zürich Geneva Basel 
KIBS 30’877 112’074 37’972 36’321 
High-tech industry 8’429 33’402 20’133 41’948 
Ratio 3.7 3.4 1.9 0.9 
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2013) 
Bern’s knowledge-based firms are predominantly clustered in energy & cleantech, health as well as 
ICT (Bern Wirtschaftsraum 2012). The energy & cleantech cluster profits from the spatial 
proximity to the key federal departments and sectors organizations such as the Swiss Federal Office 
of Energy, the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment and the MINERGIE Agency 
(Volkswirtschaftsdirektion des Kantons Bern 2010). Additionally, the medical sector is growing at 
a fast pace. The local hospital, called Inselspital, generates innovation spillovers for the whole region 
(Interview K. Stämpfli). The whole value chain in the medical sector is present in Bern (Interviews: 
Bratschi, Bucher). The plan is to develop the Inselspital in a regional medical hub and put an 
emphasis on positioning the hospital as a center for advanced medical methods (Mayer and Sager 
2013, 12). However, an interviewee assesses the cluster building of medical technology firms as 
being in only in an early stage (Interview Jocham). The ICT cluster is the second biggest in 
Switzerland after Zürich which can be explained by the presence of the federal government and its 
large procurement demands for ICT services (Warland and Mayer 2016). ICT firms locate in spatial 
proximity to the federal government in order to establish trust and being close to the source of 
information about potential new federal tenders services (Warland and Mayer 2016). Moreover, 
ICT firms profit from having public sector clients because it directly enhances their reputation. 
Having a good reference from a federal agency signals competences to both potential public and 
private sector clients services (Warland and Mayer 2016). 
Furthermore, formerly state-owned companies are important actors in the knowledge application 
and exploitation subsystem. The Schweizerische Post (Swiss Post) and Swisscom, the leading telecom 
firm in Switzerland, as well as the national train company Schweizerische Bundesbahnen (SBB, Swiss 
Federal Railways) are headquartered in Bern. Given the increased complexity of products and 
services these companies offer, they rely on external sources of knowledge including suppliers, 
competitors, and research organizations (Kaufmann et al. 2016, 123). Recently, the two Chinese 
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telecommunication firms ZTE Corporation and Huawei, for example, located branch offices in 
Bern to be in close proximity to Swisscom. However, the formerly state-owned companies’ system 
of suppliers and partners are by no means limited to the agglomeration of Bern. Most of the 
formerly state-owned companies cooperate with the technical universities in Zurich or Lausanne 
and they recruit qualified talent from all regions in Switzerland.  
Knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem  
The University of Bern and the Bern University of Applied Sciences are the two most important 
education organizations based in Bern. Warland and Mayer (2016) found in a study of Swiss ICT 
contracting firms that the Bernese universities seem to be more important regarding its educational 
function than in providing research opportunities and technology transfer for KIBS firms that are 
involved in public procurement. Thus government contractors seem not to depend on the kind of 
knowledge that universities supply in research collaboration. Sector organizations are not able to 
step in for the lack of knowledge interaction between the subsystems and within the knowledge 
generation and diffusion subsystem. Local and regional economic development agencies tack a 
passive stance on innovation activities and thus are not able to generate many linkages between the 
actors of the RIS (see subchapter 5.2.1). Only a few sector organizations exist that facilitate 
knowledge interactions between federal agencies and the government contractors’ community 
(Warland 2016c). The Bernese RIS lacks public research organizations as they are tied to the Federal 
Technological Universities (ETH Zürich and EPFL Lausanne) and thus not located in Bern.  
RIS development 
The RIS in Bern features all three RIS failures. The RIS can be characterized as organizational thin. 
Especially organizations in the knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem are missing. This 
leads to insufficient knowledge interaction both within and between the subsystems, i.e. 
fragmentation. Furthermore, the RIS is overspecialized as all sectors are closely linked to the capital 
city function. For example, Warland and Mayer (2016) show that the public procurement activities 
are not able to generate products and services that can be exploited through private sectors clients.  
5.1.4. Multilevel governance setting 
Bern does not face many constraints ensuing from federal level, but its local autonomy is restricted 
by the strong role of the Canton of Bern. The City of Bern enjoys a high level of local tax autonomy. 
The institutional fragmentation of the FUA Bern is low. The FUA Bern consist of 38 municipalities 
and a cantonal border only crosses the FUA at the very margins. Political actors dominate local 
governance but they are taking a rather passive stance on locational policies formulation. 
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Public-vertical dimension 
The Canton of Bern and the Confederation are the two higher-tier governmental levels potentially 
restricting the local autonomy of the City of Bern. Policy-making in the Swiss MLG setting is 
dependent on cooperation of all government levels. This often leads to interlocking politics 
“meaning that the planning, financing, and implementing of governmental task, although formally 
conducted by separate bodies, are in practice intertwined in various ways” (Kübler 2009, 245). 
Compared to other federal states the municipal autonomy in Switzerland can be consider to be 
high as Swiss municipalities enjoy residual powers i.e. they can legislate in areas where the superior 
bodies have not legislated (Kübler 2009, 245). In addition, cantons also have quite strong subsidiary 
powers. The rules of Swiss federalism prohibit direct communication between the federal level and 
the municipal level. Thus, in theory should all contact between the state and the capital transit via 
the cantonal authorities. Thus, the cantons occupy a central role in the Swiss multilevel governance 
setting and they are the most powerful political entities in the formulation and implementation of 
policies (Sager and Zollinger 2011). 
Legally, the capital city is treated like any other Swiss municipality. This would mean that the City 
of Bern has to navigate like any other Swiss municipality trough the MLG setting. Practically, 
however, local decision makers have better access to their federal counterparts given their spatial 
proximity and the federal level coordinates with the Bernese local government rather pragmatically 
and consensus-oriented (Kübler 2009, 253). The specifics of financing the capital city is regulated 
by a legal document from 1875 whose “content is absolutely irrelevant at present” (Kübler 2009, 
252). The City of Bern bears capital city related costs such as security services and cultural activities. 
The federal government agreed in the late 1990s to a lump sum payment to compensate for extras 
security costs in the capital city (around 4.8 Million CHF annually). As the city police merged with 
the cantonal police the security payment is consequentially collected by the canton (Kübler 2009, 
255). Furthermore, Bern receives a lump sum of 1 Million CHF for supporting culture institutions, 
activities and special events that represents the nation state (Tobler 2013, 306). Yet, the loss of tax 
income due to tax exemption on federal infrastructure or embassies is not compensated by 
payments in lieu of taxes.  
The fiscal setting in Switzerland is characterized by extensive taxing powers of all three state levels 
as all levels “are entitled to levy direct taxes on income and the fortunes of physical persons, taxes 
on the yield and capital of legal persons and property taxes” (Kübler 2009, 246). The cantons and 
the municipalities have the power to set their own tax rates. Compared to other OECD countries, 
municipalities and cantons in Switzerland enjoy a high level of tax autonomy. The municipalities 
raise 15.16% of all taxes which is the 8th highest local tax autonomy of 34 OECD countries. The 
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cantons raise 24.21% of all taxes which puts them in second place from the 10 listed OECD 
countries (OECD 2014b). 
Such a high fiscal autonomy may lead to fiscal revenue differences between the municipalities and 
the cantons. The federal level set up a system of fiscal equalization to compensate for the most 
striking differences. The Canton of Bern is the biggest net receiver in the Swiss fiscal equalization 
scheme (CHF 1.3 billion a year) and the seventh largest receiver per capita (CHF 1’250 per capita 
a year) (Kaufmann et al. 2016, 124). A similar fiscal equalization scheme exists among the 
municipalities in the Canton of Bern. The City of Bern is an above average performing municipality 
in the canton and therefore, the city should be a contributor to the cantonal-level equalization 
scheme. However, because core cities are facing disproportionately higher financial burdens than 
suburban municipalities such as policing, culture and leisure, health, transportation and social 
welfare, the City of Bern receives a lump sum of around CHF 63 Million per year. This makes Bern 
a net receiver of CHF 26 million annually in the cantonal fiscal equalization scheme (Kaufmann et 
al. 2016, 124). 
Table 17: Local revenue composition City of Bern 
Budgetary items CHF 
in thousands 
% 
Property taxes 39’771 2.63 
Personal taxes 642’483 42.47 
Corporate taxes 150’058 9.92 
Other taxes 61’223 4.05 
Sales and gross receipt tax1 0 0 
User fees 200’703 13.27 
Patents and concessions 1’654 0.11 
Assets 154’104 10.19 
Federal governmental transfers2 0 0 
Cantonal governmental transfers 167’603 11.08 
Cantonal fiscal equalization scheme 63’254 4.18 
Payments in lieu of taxes 0 0 
Miscellaneous 31’835 2.1 
Total 1’512’689 100 
Sources: Federal Finance Administration (2016), data from 2014. 
Notes: 1 These tax instruments are prerogatives of the federal level. 2The lump sum of 1 Million CHF for cultural 
activities is not recorded in the data of the Federal Finance Administration and thus not displayed in this table. 
Taxes levied on personal income and personal property are by far the highest revenue source in 
Bern (see Table 17). Taxing residents is thus four times more important for the revenue budget of 
Bern than taxing corporations. Despite the lump sum for cultural activities (that is not accounted 
by the Federal Finance Administration), Bern does not receive any compensation from the federal 
level, but receives about 15% of its revenue from the cantonal level. 
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Public-horizontal dimension 
The FUA Bern is horizontally institutionally 
fragmented as the municipalities in the region 
feature small surfaces areas when compared 
internationally. The vertical institutional 
fragmentation is low, because only three 
municipalities belong to the neighboring canton of 
Fribourg (see Figure 3). The municipal 
administrations in the agglomeration of Bern are 
well embedded in an institutionalized cooperation 
called regional conference (Regionalkonferenz) that is 
active in fields of public transport infrastructure, 
land-use and culture. Kübler (2009, 258) assesses 
these attempts to foster inter-municipal 
coordination as progressive tools for tackling 
governance problems in agglomerations. Other 
Swiss cities like Basel, Lausanne and Geneva are 
lacking such an institutionalized cooperation 
(Sager, Kaufmann, and Joye 1999).  
Local governance dimension 
The local governance regime is fragmented between dominating political actors and various, loosely 
connected private interest groups. A comparative analysis by van der Heiden (2010) points to the 
dominance of public actors in the Bernese local governance regime: “The few international 
activities of the City of Bern are clearly in the hands of the city administration. Private actors and 
the public are wholly excluded from Bern’s few international activities” (van der Heiden 2010, 44). 
Van der Heiden’s (2010) observation is corroborated by my interview data. For example, an 
influential business representative assessed the interactions between public and private actors much 
more dynamics in Zürich than in Bern (Interview Bucher). Von Bergen and Steiner (2013, 24–25) 
relate the domination of political actors to a law passed in 1747 that prohibits the Bernese 
aristocrats to be active in commercial trade and industrial companies. This law is an idiosyncrasy 
in the economic history of Switzerland. Another business representative refers to the political 
dominance of the social democratic and the green party that would make it difficult for business 
representatives to bring in their ideas into the political process (Interview Jocham). 
Figure 3: Map of FUA Bern 
 Cartography: Mario Huber 
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The fragmentation of the local governance regime is not limited to the public-private divide. 
Various interests groups operate rather isolated from each other. For example, the influential 
private business leader group called Berner Runde (Circle of Bern) consists of around 12 members 
who keep a low public profile and thus a clandestine image for non-members (Interviews: Messerli, 
Steiner). Another interest group of influential business leaders is called Fokus Bern (Focus Bern). 
Although these two groups share a basic problem understanding, they are not able to produce any 
synergies (Interviews: Gasche, P. Stämpfli). Another organization is Bern Neu Gründen (Refounding 
Bern), a more politically orientated group, with the goal to amalgamate the core municipalities in 
the FUA Bern or at least strengthen the cooperation between them. Besides these three presented 
groups, several more initiatives are present in Bern but they are all rather loosely connected. 
5.2. Locational policies in Bern 
Locational policies are formulated and executed on three levels: local, cantonal, and regional. At 
the local level, the executive economic development agency called Economic Area Bern 
(Wirtschaftsraum Bern, EAB) exists. The EAB is part of the department of security, environment and 
energy of the City of Bern. The EAB provides services not just for the City of Bern, but has as well 
for 33 municipalities in the agglomeration of Bern.27 Each municipality pays annually 0.7 Swiss 
Franc annually per inhabitant to finance the EAB (Interview K. Stämpfli). On the one hand, EAB 
is a broker organization as it fosters and maintains local firm networks. On the other hand, EAB 
serves as the contact point for local firms if they need something from the administration 
(Interview K. Stämpfli). The relevant economic development plan stemming from the EAB is the 
‘Strategy 2020’ (Bern Wirtschaftsraum 2012). 
On the cantonal level the Bern Economic Development Agency (Standortförderung Bern, BEDA) is 
the relevant body involved in formulating and executing locational policies. In 1971 the first 
cantonal economic development agency were established following a report that pointed to the 
unfavorable sector composition – agriculture, machinery and metal industry, service economy only 
in relation to the public administration – as the prime factor for the comparatively low tax revenues 
of the Canton of Bern (von Bergen and Steiner 2013, 66–67). Currently, the BEDA mainly focuses 
on supporting cluster organizations, brokering land and real-estate for firms, and supporting the 
development of crucial infrastructure such as the airport, exhibition sites and international schools 
                                                            
27This 33 municipalities constitute the sub-conference economy (Teilkonferenz Wirtschaft) of the regional conference 
Bern-Mittelland (Regionalkonfernez Bern-Mittelland). Six regional conferences exists in the Canton of Bern.  
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(Interview Gehrig). The relevant cantonal economic development plan is the ‘Economic Strategy 
2025’ (Wirtschaftsstrategie 2025; Volkswirtschaftsdirektion des Kantons Bern 2010) 
On the regional level, the city and the Canton of Bern cooperate with four other cantons and 
eighteen other cities or regions in a non-profit organizations for regional cooperation called Capital 
Region Switzerland (Hauptstadtregion Schweiz, CRS). This regional coordination organizations is 
mainly a political vehicle for coordinating economic development policies, for lobbying on the 
federal level and for positioning the region in the middle of Switzerland in the top-tier of the Swiss 
urban system (Kaufmann et al. 2016, more in subchapter 5.2.5). 
5.2.1. Innovation policies 
Bernese authorities concentrate on cluster policies. Cluster policies mainly focus on highly-
regulated sectors. Two substantial ‘triple helix’ organizations – sitmem Insel and the Innocampus – 
have been developed out of the clusters. Strategies to foster start-ups and to better exploit the 
knowledge infrastructure are largely missing. 
Cluster policies 
Cluster policies are formulated by all three levels (local, cantonal, regional; see Table 18). The 
medical technology cluster and the energy & environmental technology cluster are coherently 
supported by all three levels. Both clusters represent highly regulated sectors. The firms in these 
clusters profit from spatial proximity to regulatory authorities, sector organizations and decision 
makers in Bern. The ICT firms, another typical capital city cluster, stems largely from federal 
procurement demands. The precision industry and the food industry are not present in the city but 
in the rural areas of the canton showing the large heterogeneity of firms present in the wider Bern 
region.  
Table 18: Cluster policies in Bern 
Local: Economic Area Bern Cantonal: Bern Economic 
Development Agency 
Regional: Capital Region 
Switzerland 
Relation to the capital city 
function 
Medicinal technology & 
pharmaceutical products 
Medical technology Medical technology Highly regulated sector 
Energy & environmental 
technology 
Energy & environmental 
technology 
Smart region (energy) Highly regulated sector 
- ICT - Public procurement 
- Precision industry - None  
- - Food industry None 
 
On the local level the EAB aims for building networks of firms in the areas of medicinal technology 
as well as energy and environmental technology. The goal is to foster knowledge transfer between 
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these firms and to further expand these networks (Interview K .Stämpfli; Bern Wirtschaftsraum 
2012). First cluster strategies on the cantonal level had been formulated in the mid-1990s. 
Currently, the BEDA supports four clusters: medical technology, energy & environmental 
technology, ICT, and precision industry (Interview Gehring). The ICT cluster is the oldest cantonal 
cluster. The cluster precision industry gathers rather small firms that are highly export driven and 
located in the rural area of the canton. The CRS identified three economic sectors in which they 
want to launch economic development projects on the regional level. These sectors are medical 
technology, the energy sector (under the label ‘smart region), and food industry (Interviews: Fluri, 
Nietlisbach, Tobler).  
In order to increase the interactions between the crucial ‘triple helix’ actors, two potentially 
interesting organizations starting to emerge in Bern. In the medical sector, sitem-Insel was established 
in 2015 in the local hospital to operate as a public-private partnership for researching, training, 
enabling and promoting translational research. Regarding high-tech innovation, the cantonal 
authorities succeeded in obtaining one of five Swiss innovations parks. The public-private 
partnership Innocampus will be located in the city of Biel that is a secondary city in the Canton of 
Bern. The successful bid contained a portfolio of high-tech solutions for the medical sector, 3D 
metal printing, energy storage and energy mobility (Interview Gehrig).  
Start-up promotion 
Few strategies exist to tackle the lack of start-up promotion or access to venture capital funding. 
In general, the region lacks entrepreneurial spirit and regional-orientated investors (Interview 
Steiner). The absence of a technological university may explain this lack of entrepreneurship 
(Interview Gehrig). A regionally well-known private investor stablished in Thun – a medium-sized 
city 30 minutes train ride away from Bern – an innovation lab with help from the federal 
technological university in Zürich (ETH Zürich) and Stanford University (Interview Müller). The 
Canton of Bern provides a fund of CHF 50’000 annually to support start-ups and small firms 
(Interview Gehrig).  
The presence of the federal government may be another reason for the lack of an entrepreneurial 
dynamic. The federal government, as the largest and arguably one of the most stable employers in 
the region, absorbs much of the talent that may have the potential to take the risk and start their 
own firm (Kaufmann et al. 2016, 123). The weakly developed start-up infrastructure, the lack of 
venture capital and the federal presence manifest itself in low number of start-ups founded in Bern. 
Among the five largest agglomerations in Switzerland, Bern shows the lowest rate of new firm 
formation (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 4: Number of start-ups per 1000 inhabitants in Swiss agglomerations 
 
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2015c): Business Demography 2013; Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2015a): 
Municipalities Statistics 2013. Data from 2013. 
Knowledge infrastructure 
Few strategies tackle the fragmentation between the Bernese universities and other crucial 
economic players in the region such as the state-owned companies, cluster organizations or anchor 
firms. The Bern University of Applied Sciences is active in the Innocampus and the University of 
Bern in the sitem-Insel but both projects are rather marginal in size. Thus, Bern has some un-tapped 
opportunities regarding the interactions between the knowledge infrastructure, the public sector 
and the private sector (Interview Bucher; Mayer and Schnyder 2012; Kaufmann et al. 2016, 127). 
Thus, the knowledge infrastructure may be important in educating a highly-skilled workforce, but 
does not engage much in contract research or technology transfer (Warland 2016c, 13).  
Testing expectation 1.1 
E1.1: A weakly developed RIS restricts the formulation of innovation policies. 
Expectation 1 is not supported. In fact, in Bern only an inadequately developed RIS exists and only 
a few innovation policies have been formulated. However, it seems that it is not the RIS, i.e. the 
regional economy, which restricts the formulation of innovation policies but decision makers that 
are not prioritizing innovation policies.  
The two economic development agencies, EAB and BEDA, take a passive stance on innovation 
policies. For example, the EAB is active in organizing events and network opportunities for firms 
but does link firms to knowledge institutes or federal organizations. The cantonal organization 
BEDA mainly supports cluster organizations (Interview Gehring). Neither the BEDA nor the EAB 
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substantially foster entrepreneurship and start-ups (Interviews: Bucher, Müller). As the Canton of 
Bern features a heterogenic economic sector composition, the BEDA has to formulate a broad 
range economic development policies and thus is not really focused on strengthening the 
innovation potential in the agglomeration Bern. The EAB, on the other hand, is not able to fill this 
vacuum. The CRS, on the regional level, is mostly a political project of high ranking decision makers 
with limited ability and willingness to formulate innovation policies (Interviews: K. Stampfli, 
Tschäppät). 
Testing expectation 1.2 
E1.2: Innovation policies aim at modifying and transforming the constraining parts of the RIS. 
Expectation 1.2 is partly supported. Few innovation policies are formulated in Bern besides cluster 
policies. However, sitem-Insel and Innocampus directly target constraining elements of the RIS. These 
two newer innovation tools try to improve the weak linkages between actors from the ‘triple helix’. 
Both organizations incorporate firms, knowledge institutes as well as federal organizations and are 
thereby exploiting the place-specific advantage of a capital city. Besides these two promising 
initiatives that target the fragmented RIS, no innovation policies aim at the other two Bernese RIS 
failures, i.e. organizational thinness and lock-in.  
5.2.2. Image building 
Decision makers put a lot of effort in positioning Bern as the political center of Switzerland. The 
capital city image strategy is pushed forward on the local and the regional level. Strategies to 
position Bern as a business city are not detectable. Important clusters of Bern, for example medical 
technology or the energy sector, are not exploited in the image building strategies.  
The capital city image building strategy is prominently mentioned in the economic development 
plan ‘Strategy 2020’ by the EAB as one of six core strategies (Bern Wirtschaftsraum 2012, 11–12). 
The ‘Strategy 2020’ does not link image building with either the medical technology sector or the 
energy sector. The Canton of Bern, for its part, only rarely puts forward the image of itself as the 
Swiss political center. The only references to the capital city function are made in the acquisition 
firms in which the spatial proximity to decision makers of all governmental levels is highlighted as 
an asset (Interview Gehrig). However, the canton perceives the CRS as the relevant image building 
platform. Together with the City of Bern, the Canton of Bern has been the driving forces behind 
the establishment of the CRS. The CRS argues that the capital city should not be measured by 
economic success only, but by its function as the place where political decisions are negotiated and 
implemented. 
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Testing expectation 2 
E2: A weakly developed RIS enables the formulation of a capital city image building strategy and constrains the 
formulation of a business town image building strategy 
Expectation 2 is supported. Image building activities are consolidated on the regional level. The 
CRS is an image building vehicle for both the city and the Canton of Bern. The CRS explicitly 
positions and markets the region as the political center of the nation and as such differentiating 
Bern from the three economically stronger metropolitan regions (Mayer et al., 2013, 11). This 
political function after all, as the initiators of the CRS argue, is important for the prosperity of 
whole Switzerland. Thus, the capital city status is a unique selling proposition that allows Bern to 
shift the focus away from its economic inferiority towards its political superiority.  
5.2.3. Business prerequisites 
The City of Bern features high tax rates compared to other Swiss jurisdictions. The Canton of Bern 
has some discretionary power in offering tax breaks for companies. The City of Bern focus mainly 
on providing an attractive environment for residents.  
Taxes 
The fiscal setting in Switzerland is characterized by extensive taxing powers of all three state levels. 
The local as well as the cantonal level enjoy high fiscal autonomy which allows them to set their 
own tax rates for the taxation of residents, property, and corporations. Both the City of Bern and 
the Canton of Bern feature comparably high tax rates for residents as well as for firms. In a Swiss 
comparison, the Canton of Bern features the ninth highest tax rate for residents and the fifth 
highest tax rate for firms out of 26 cantons (Credit Suisse 2014, 13). The Canton of Bern raises 
75% of its taxes from private individuals (65.4% is the Swiss average) and only 9.1% from firms 
(16.7% is the Swiss average) (Credit Suisse 2014, 30). The City of Bern also strongly relies on 
personal income tax as 42% of all local revenue stemming from residents (see Table 17). 
A lot of interview partners assess the comparably high tax rates as one of the main challenges of 
the Bernese regional economy (Interviews: Gehrig, Jocham, Müller, K. Stampfli, Tschäppät). As 
any other Swiss canton, the Canton of Bern has the competence to grant discretionary tax breaks 
for corporations and such tax breaks are granted if a company meets certain criteria (see subchapter 
3.2.4). The Canton of Bern does not grant any tax breaks for start-ups or entrepreneurs (Interview 
Gehrig).  
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Provision of land and real estate 
The showpiece of the City of Bern is the new business park WankdorfCity in the Northeast of Bern 
which became operative in summer 2014. The Swiss Post and the national train company SBB are 
among others headquartered in this business park. WankdorfCity should host about 3’000 jobs and 
further development is planned while the City of Bern searches for investors (Lambelet 2015, 12–
14). However, the business park faced some political opposition in its establishment. For example, 
the cantonal authorities had to mediate between the adjoining municipalities of Ittigen and 
Ostermundigen and the City of Bern in order to save the jeopardized project in its initial phase 
(Sager 2002, 191–92). The plebiscite of the city was always supportive of WankdorfCity. The 
referenda concerning the business park was won with more than 70% approval (Lambelet 2015). 
The efforts regarding provision of land and real estate seem relatively well coordinated between 
the different governmental levels. The lead has the cantonal BEDA as it serves as the contact point 
for firms that want to expand or relocate. In a second step, the BEDA contacts different Bernese 
municipalities to inquire if they could provide suitable land reserves or real estate (Interview Pfyl). 
However, land-use planning in the small-scaled agglomeration of Bern is a difficult task, either 
because few land reserves exist (Interviews: Gasche, Gehrig, K. Stampfli), or because the planning 
and zoning is done rather conservatively (Hermann 2013). Moreover, the different agglomeration 
municipalities seem not to coordinate their land-use plans for the greater good of the whole 
agglomeration (Interviews: Rytz, K. Stampfli, Walter). 
Testing expectation 3 
E3: High tax autonomy enables to focus on income tax and constrains other manifestations of the business 
prerequisites category. 
Expectation 3 is not supported in the case of Bern. First of all, the Canton of Bern has the 
discretionary power to make use of taxes as a locational policy instrument. However, the financial 
difficulties of the canton do not allow for much ‘room to maneuver’ regarding lower tax rates. As 
a consequence, the City of Bern turns to other local assets that makes the city attractive for firms 
and residents.  
On the one hand, Bern is active in developing land and real estate such the business park 
WankdorfCity. However, developable land in the City of Bern is rather scarce. On the other hand, 
the City of Bern focus on so-called soft factors that target residents rather than firms. The strategies 
are to maintain green spaces, ensure cultural activities, preserving the old town or establishing 
international schools for expats children (Interviews: Gehring, Tschäppät). This measures should 
altogether ensure the quality of life in the city what should attract wealthy tax payers. In sum, the 
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City of Bern does not have much capacity to change these ‘hard factors’ of the business prerequisite 
locational policies category. Therefore, the city rather concentrates in quality of life policies. 
The focus on quality of life issues may not only be triggered by constraints in lowering taxes or by 
the scarcity of developable land. The revenue side of the local budget reveals that the personal 
income tax is by far the most important local revenue by making up 42% of the local income. Thus, 
it makes sense to enlarge this particular tax base. Furthermore, the City of Bern is governed by 
Social Democrats in a strong partnership with the Greens. The aforementioned quality of life 
policies fit the political agenda of the ruling parties.  
5.2.4. Acquisition 
The acquisition of firms and investments in top-down organized in a three step process. On the 
international level, either a federal organization or an organization of six Western cantons 
establishes first contact with potential firms and investors. Secondly, the different cantons may 
hand in competitive bids to attract these firms and investments. The different cantons are 
competitors in that step. In the third and final step, the Canton of Bern reaches out to Bernese 
municipalities and inquires if they have suitable land reserves or real estate for the attracted firms.  
Generally, the City of Bern aims to attract firms for their med tech cluster or for the energy and 
clean-tech cluster (Bern Wirtschaftsraum 2012). However, neither one of the economic 
development agencies, i.e. EAB or the BEDA, are directly acquiring firms on the international level 
(Interviews: Gehring, K. Stämpfly, Pfyl). The Canton of Bern is both a member of Swiss Global 
Enterprise (SGE), a mandated agency on the behalf of the Swiss Confederation to strengthen 
Switzerland as a global economic hub, as well as of the Greater Geneva Berne Area (GGBa), an 
initiative of the six cantons in Western Switzerland. Both governmental organizations should 
concentrate the forces of the cantonal economic development agencies in order to be competitive 
in the international competition. The SGE and the GGBA establishes the first contact to firms and 
investors (Interview Gehrig). Thus, neither the Canton of Bern nor the City of Bern directly 
acquires firms or investment on the international level.  
In a second step, it is the responsibility of the Canton of Bern to offer competitive bids and package 
deals to attract firms. As any other Swiss canton, the Canton of Bern has the authority to grant 
discretionary tax breaks for firms. The maximum is ten years exemption from corporate income 
tax and capital gains tax. Companies that want to relocate to Bern or want to invest in Bern may 
be eligible for tax breaks if they meet certain following criteria: They have to be innovative, export-
oriented, job-generating, fitting to the existing cluster and, more generally, they have to be assessed 
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as substantial for the Bernese economy (Interview Gehrig). In a third, step the BEDA reaches out 
to the different Bernese municipalities to ask if they have suitable land reserves or real estate for 
hosting these firms (Interview Pfyl). A recent example is the establishment of a production facility 
of a globally leading bio tech company in a small town in the North of the Canton of Bern. Experts 
are sure that discretionary tax breaks have been part of the package deal whereas they were probably 
not the most decisive argument (Berner Zeitung 2014). 
Testing expectation 4 
E4: A weakly developed RIS constrains the adaption of a profound and large-scale acquisition strategy. 
Expectation 4 is not supported. The whole acquisition strategy in Switzerland is organized top-
down. The City of Bern does not have much discretionary power in acquiring firms or investments, 
at least not on an international level. Thus, the hands of the municipalities are tied. The best they 
can do is to provide suitable infrastructure and to pursue an active land-use zoning. Thus, 
municipalities in the agglomeration of Bern concentrate rather on the development of residential 
infrastructure and quality of life issues because in such policies they have more competences. It is 
thus rather the MLG setting, i.e. the strong role of the canton, which better explains the acquisition 
strategies than the RIS. 
5.2.5. Coordination 
In Bern, coordination efforts taking place on two agglomeration level and the regional level. In the 
agglomeration Bern, the City of Bern and the agglomeration municipalities cooperate in an 
institutionalized organization called Regional Conference Bern-Midland (Regionalkonferenz Bern-
Mittelland, RCBM). On the regional level, the non-profit organization CRS coordinates political 
activities of cantons and cities. Both organizations consist solely of public actors and both 
organizations are not able to substantially coordinate locational policies. While the jurisdictions are 
not actively coordinate their locational policies, they also avoid engaging in direct (tax) competition. 
Thus, in Bern prevails a type of negative coordination.  
85 municipalities in the FUA Bern are part of the RCBM that is mostly active in the policy fields 
of public transport infrastructure, land-use planning, and cultural activities. Other Swiss cities lack 
such institutionalized cooperation. Thus, Kübler (2009, 258) assesses the regional conference as 
progressive tools for tackling regional collective action dilemmas. Regarding locational policies, 33 
municipalities of the RCBM cooperate in the Sub-Conference Economy (Teilkonferenz Wirtschaft). 
However, little willingness can be detected to coordinate locational policies (Interviews: P. 
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Stämpfli, Rytz). For example Köniz, the second biggest municipality in the agglomeration of Bern 
and the twelfth largest city in Switzerland, does not coordinate any locational policy with 
neighboring Bern (Interview Pfyl).  
Also van der Heiden (2010) found no coordination between municipalities in the agglomeration of 
Bern with regard to their international activities because they fear that this would restrict their 
political autonomy (van der Heiden 2010, 45; van der Heiden, Koch, and Kübler 2013, 48). The 
low willingness for coordinating locational policies manifest itself as well in several blocked or 
refused public development projects in the agglomeration of Bern. For example, the cantonal 
authorities mediated between municipalities to save the jeopardized project of a new business park 
(see subchapter 5.2.3).Other examples are popular referenda that rejected projected tram lines 
connecting the core city with the agglomeration of Bern in 2004 (see Sager 2008). In 2015, a 
projected tram line to connect Bern with Köniz was rejected. The electorate of the City of Bern 
has approved the new tram line but the project was terminated because it had no electoral support 
in the two municipalities Köniz and Ostermundigen. 
On the other hand, there is little competition between the municipalities in the FUA Bern. Both 
the Mayor of Bern and the economic development officer of Köniz agree that it is beneficial for 
their municipality if a firm settles anywhere in the agglomeration (Interviews: Pfyl, Tschäppät). In 
sum, the municipalities in the FUA Bern are rather indifferent towards coordinating locational 
polices. These missed coordination opportunities in the agglomeration of Bern is seen by some 
interviewee partners as one of the major causes for Bern’s decreasing importance in the Swiss urban 
system (Interviews: Bucher, Gasche). 
On the regional level, the CRS coordinates activities of five cantons and nineteen cities or regions. 
Thus, it is a multilevel governance project. The perimeter of the CRS is rather large and includes 
areas – such as those in the canton of Valais – that are about an hour train ride from Bern (see 
Figure 5).28The City of Bern is the economic center of the CRS in terms of economic power and 
jobs (INFRAS 2009, 11).  The CRS was established after the decision of the Swiss Federal Office 
for Spatial Development in 2008 to designate three Swiss metropolitan regions as growth centers, 
namely Zurich, Basel and the Geneva/Lausanne region (Bassin Lémanique), and consider Bern as an 
urban agglomeration and thus of secondary importance for Switzerland. As a reaction, the city and 
                                                            
28These rather remote areas showed interest in a CRS membership because a large share of their population commutes 
to Bern for work (INFRAS 2009, 34) and because they would have otherwise not been associated or in close proximity 
to other metropolitan areas. 
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cantonal decision makers became active in recruiting partners for this new organization (Interviews: 
Buchmüller, Tschäppät).  
Figure 5: The perimeter of the CRS and other Swiss metropolitan areas 
 
Cartography: Alexander Hermann, University of Bern 
The aim of the CRS is to cooperate on projects that advances the whole region such as promoting 
Bern as a political center, developing key economic sectors, ensuring the critical role of the capital 
city region as a transportation hub or bridging the different cultures in the French- and German-
speaking part of Switzerland. Yet, the CRS is mainly a political vehicle for lobbying on the federal 
level and for positioning the region in the middle of Switzerland in the top-tier of the Swiss urban 
system (Interview Tobler; Kaufmann et al. 2016, 126–27). As a consequence, the priority rests on 
political locational policies, namely coordination and asking public funds and compensation 
payments.  
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Testing expectation 5.1 
I. Agglomeration level: Low institutional fragmentation enables and high local tax autonomy constrains 
regional coordination what leads to negative coordination. 
II. Regional level: High institutional fragmentation and high local tax autonomy constrain regional 
coordination.  
Expectation 5.1 is supported in the case of the agglomeration Bern, as well as on the regional level. 
Whereas I can detect the counteracting effects in the agglomeration Bern, on the regional level 
hinders vertical institutional fragmentation the coordination of locational policies. In the case of 
the agglomeration of Bern, alternative explanations such as fear of ceding local autonomy and a 
political divide between the city and the agglomeration municipalities may cause this type of 
negative coordination. In the case of the CRS, the vertical institutional fragmentation increases not 
only the complexity in decisions-making but it creates as well an unlevel playing field of tax rates 
what increases the tax competition between the members of the CRS.  
The two proposed explanatory factors plus two additional factors can explain negative 
coordination in the agglomeration Bern. First, low vertical institutional fragmentation and the 
existing coordination bodies of the Canton of Bern restrict harmful beggar my-neighbor behavior. 
Thus, the canton diffuses a consolidating order on the agglomeration Bern. Secondly, due to high 
tax autonomy, the municipalities compete moderately on attracting residents. There is few 
competition regarding attracting firms because acquiring firms and investments is the prerogative 
of higher-tier governmental levels (see subchapter 3.2.4). However, the municipalities do not 
coordinate their policies in, for example, land use planning because zoning is crucial in attracting 
new residents (Interviews: Gasche, Rytz, P. Stämpfli, Walter). Thirdly, there is resistance towards 
anything that could potentially constrain the municipal political autonomy. It seems that the 
decision makers as well as the local population in the agglomeration municipalities are not willingly 
to restrict their political autonomy in favor of collective actions that could enhance the welfare of 
the whole agglomeration. (Interviews: Bratschi, P. Stämpfli, Rytz; van der Heiden 2010, 43-44). 
Finally, the interviewees point at a partisan divide that exists between the agglomeration 
municipalities and the core city. Whereas the City of Bern is politically a stronghold of the social 
democratic and green parties, the agglomeration municipalities are dominated by moderate-right 
and conservative-right parties (Interviews: Bratschi, Gasche, Rytz). 
In the following, I test expectation 5.1 in the case of the regional coordination in the CRS. Because 
the perimeter of the CRS is larger as the agglomeration of Bern, I can test expectation in 5.1 by 
adding vertical and horizontal institutional fragmentation. 
 82 
The large perimeter of the CRS translates itself to a high vertical and horizontal institutional 
fragmentation. Many interviewees are skeptical about such a large perimeter and they recall the 
coordination problems of the CRS’s predecessor organization Espace Mittelland29(e.g. Bratschi 2013; 
Steiner 2013). However, what distinguishes the CRS from Espace Mittelland is the introduction of 
variable geometry, which now allows members to engage only in projects that they are interested 
in (Interviews: Buchmüller, Fluri, Tschäppät). This variable geometry reduces decision-making 
barriers that a more institutionalized coordination form brings with it.  
The vertical institutional fragmentation, i.e. the different cantons, does not just increase the 
complexity in decision-making, but also increases the differences in the tax rates. Vertical 
institutional fragmentation thus creates an unlevel tax competition in which the jurisdictions are 
more likely to compete fiercely (Kaufmann and Sager 2018). In fact, the cantons of Bern and 
Fribourg are heavy competitors in attracting residents (Hermann 2013; Interviews: Bucher, Gasche, 
Tobler, Tschäppät). Thus, the CRS project is a walk on a tightrope. It is a political partnership but 
the different jurisdictions are simultaneously competitors in attracting tax revenue (Interviews: 
Buchmüller, Fluri, Walter). This is reflected by the statement of a high ranking politician in the City 
of Bern: “Whereas we see it beneficial for the whole region if a company relocates to Fribourg, 
where the new residents are going to live is another question and this issue is more competitive” 
(Interview Tschäppät). The unlevel playing field of tax competition seems to explain why the CRS 
is only successful in coordinating locational policies in issues which generate few financial 
consequences (e.g. image building and public funds and compensation payments).  
Testing expectation 5.2 
E5.2: Coordination aims at overcoming the constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
Expectation 5.2 is not supported. Bern is only constrained in the local governance dimension of 
the MLG setting. Local governance is dominated by political actors. The private actors are 
fragmented in various organizations with differing policy priorities (see subchapter 5.1.4). Although 
a lot of interviewees see the fragmentation between the different initiatives as a problem for 
strengthening the economic and political importance of Bern (Interviews: Bratschi, Gasche, 
                                                            
29 In 1994 decision makers from the Canton of Bern together with their counterparts from the neighboring cantons 
of Fribourg, Neuchâtel and Solothurn founded a non-profit organization called Espace Mittelland. The cantonal 
members aimed to cooperate in economic development and ultimately to position a new functional region by focusing 
on key issues such as public transportation, tourism, economic promotion, culture and education (Treina and Zwiauer 
1997, 16). However, the unanimous decision-making procedures the organization adopted turned out to be inflexible 
and Espace Mittelland never reached its goals. As a consequence, the cantonal members gradually reduced their 
involvement and the organization was dissolved in 2009 (Kaufmann et al. 2016, 126). 
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Messerli, P. Stämpfli, Steiner), I could not detect substantial coordination efforts between the 
crucial actors in Bern that would aim to overcome the constraining fragmentation in the local 
governance dimension. 
The dominant political actors in Bern are not seeing themselves in the role of incorporating private 
actors in into locational policies formulation or coordinating the various private sector initiatives 
(Interviews: Buchmüller, Nietlisbach, Tschäppät). An example is the engagement of the Berner 
Runde (Circle of Bern) after the shock in 2008, when Bern was not considered a top-tier Swiss 
metropolitan area in the Federal Spatial Concept. The Berner Runde decided to intensify their 
contacts with Bernese top-executive politicians. However, the political leader favored to establish 
the regional cooperation body CRS with only members from the relevant public administrations. 
The Berner Runde has been skeptical about such a large perimeter and wanted to strengthen Bern as 
the core of the region (Interview Bratschi). This dissonance led to the fizzling out of the initial 
promising contacts (Interviews: Bratschi, Buchmüller, Gasche. Nietlisbach,). By now, the CRS 
consolidated into a primarily political organization with few intentions to include relevant business 
actors (Interviews: Tobler ,Tschäppät, Walter). 
Besides the Berner Runde several other initiatives aim to strengthen the competiveness of the region. 
However, these initiatives have differing policy priorities and vary in their prioritized spatial 
perimeters. Recently, two retired municipal politicians initiated Platform Bern which is, as the name 
suggests, a platform that brings the different public and private organizations together. This 
platform meets only once a year in a public meeting without further initiating coordination 
activities. However, this fragmentation of initiatives is somewhat moderated by the small-scale of 
Bern and especially the small circle of committed public and private leaders. The interview partners 
describe that they know exactly with whom they have to talk given a specific issues and they mostly 
have met this person in a previous instance somewhere (Interviews: Bucher, Nietlisbach, P. 
Stämpfli). 
5.2.6. Public funds and compensation payments 
The City of Bern tries to leverage its capital city status to target public funds. These efforts are 
closely connected to the image building strategy as the political center of the nation. Thus, by 
positioning itself as the political center of Switzerland, Bern claims that this specific role needs 
federal support for the good of the whole of Switzerland. Bern does not invest much in asking for 
federal compensation based on its capital city status. 
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In the beginning of 2000, local decision makers pushed for a new legal document to institutionalize 
capital city compensation payments (Interview Gasche). The legal arrangement between the City 
of Bern and the Confederation stems from an anachronistic document from 1875 in times when 
the City of Bern was not able to and not willing to bear the costs of the expansive capital city 
related infrastructure. The content of this legal arrangement is “absolutely irrelevant at present” 
(Kübler 2009, 252). The federal government agreed to set up a working group of the three Bernese 
governments (federation, canton, and the city). This working group could not agree on a list of 
positive and negative effects for Bern ensuing from the capital city status. As a consequence, the 
working group commissioned an independent analysis (Ecoplan 2004) that concluded: the added 
value and the job growth due to the federal presence has overall a positive effect for the region of 
Bern and therefore outweighs the tax losses. Given these findings, the federal government 
unilaterally terminated the negotiation for a new ‘capital-city legislation’ (Kübler 2009, 257). 
After the disadvantageous decision in the Swiss Federal Spatial Concept in 2008, Bern’s decision 
maker reacted remarkably intense in the media as well by formal and informal interventions 
directed at the Federal Office for Spatial Development (Interviews: Poschet and Gilgen, 
Tschäppät) although no direct money is attached to the Swiss Federal Spatial Concept. It seems 
that Bern’s decision makers have interpreted it as a downgrade that harms Bern symbolically that 
may also come along with tangible negative implications for future infrastructure funding decisions 
by the federal government (Interview Tschäppät). This includes federal funding for big 
infrastructure projects, such as the expansion of the train system which is a major concern for 
Bern’s decision makers (Interviews: Tobler, Tschäppät). 
Subsequently, the CRS have been established as a powerful image building vehicle by reframing 
Bern’s capital city status into an argumentative strategy that a strong capital city is in the interest of 
the whole nation state as illustrated in the discussion about image building (see subchapter 5.2.2). 
Thus, the locational policies – image building strategy and asking for public funds and 
compensation payments – are combined by leveraging the capital city status rather than by directly 
asking for compensation. This strategy worked out insofar as in the revised Swiss Federal Spatial 
Concept of 2012, Bern placed in the top tier of metropolitan regions albeit with an addendum 
regarding its function as Switzerland’s political center because Bern does not fulfill the formal 
requirements to be a metropolitan region such as gateway or corporate functions. It is now referred 
to the so-called ‘3 + 1 formula’, which indicates that Bern and the wider region was added as an 
additional metropolitan region albeit with a different function. At the end it seems to be that this 
positioning strategy was the decisive factor to promote the CRS in to the highest-tier of Swiss 
metropolitan regions as “The city-region Lucerne would have probably as well been promoted if it 
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would be the capital city” (Interview Gilgen and Poschet). This suggests that a main function of 
the CRS is to increase the political leverage of the region vis-à-vis the federal government 
(Interviews: Gasche, Tobler, Tschäppät).  
Testing expectation 6 
I. High local tax autonomy constrains to ask for public funds.  
II. No capital city specific constraints constrain to ask for compensation payments. 
The first part of expectation 6 is partly supported. In general, the availability of public funds is 
limited in Switzerland compared to other political-institutional settings. Nevertheless, Bern tries to 
tap into public funds by stressing the political importance of Bern for whole Switzerland. This 
strategy was successful in putting Bern back in the top tier of Swiss metropolitan regions but it 
remains to be seen whether this capital city based strategy will be successful to tap into federal 
funds such as the important infrastructure funds. 
The second part of expectation 6 is supported. The federal government agreed to set up a working 
group to negotiate potential compensation payments. When an independent evaluation concluded 
that Bern and its agglomeration profit from federal presence, the federal government unilaterally 
terminated the negotiation for a new ‘capital-city legislation’. Thus, given that the City of Bern does 
not face capital city specific constraints and given that it profit from federal presence, the possibility 
to ask for compensation payments is constrained. 
5.3. Explaining locational policies in Bern 
In this subchapter, I will first summarize the manifestations of locational policies in order to depict 
the locational policies agenda of Bern (see Table 19). Flowingly, I will discuss the tested 
expectations (see Table 20) and try to connect them in order understand the interdependencies of 
formulating locational policies. In a nutshell, Bern’s discretional power in formulating locational 
policies is restricted by the canton. The city takes a rather passive stance on locational policies 
(especially regarding innovation policies) and focuses on softer locational policies such as putting 
forward the image as the capital city and increasing the quality of life for its residents.  
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Table 19: Locational policies agenda of Bern 
Locational policies Manifestations of locational policies 
Innovation policies - Support of cluster organizations in medical technology and energy & environmental 
technology 
- Few activities regarding start-ups and venture capital 
- Two promising tripe-helix organizations 
Image building - Positioning Bern as the political center of Switzerland  
Business prerequisites - Central role of the Canton of Bern 
- Maintaining and increasing quality of life important 
Acquisition - Central role of the Canton of Bern 
- Three step acquisition strategy in which the City of Bern may engage in the last and 
least important step 
Coordination - Coordination organizations in the agglomeration Bern and on the regional level 
- Few coordination of locational policies 
Public funds and 
compensation payments 
- No compensation regarding capital city specific costs or loss of income  
- Reframing of the classical capital city argumentation to tap into federal funds 
Locational policies 
agenda 
- Canton of Bern constrains locational policies formulation 
- Support of cluster in medical technology and energy & environmental technology 
- Maintaining and increasing quality of life important 
- Positioning strategy as the capital city important for image building as well as for 
tapping into federal funds 
The Canton of Bern dominates the formulation of locational policies. Regarding taxes or 
acquisitions, the canton has the sole discretionary power. In other locational policies like innovation 
policies or image building the canton and the City of Bern work together. Given these constraints 
in locational policies formulation ensuing from cantonal influence, the City of Bern focuses on the 
provision of land and real estate as well as on being attractive for residents by formulating so-called 
‘softer’ locational policies that should enhance the quality of life, educational opportunities and 
cultural activities. Regarding innovation policies, the City of Bern mainly concentrates on cluster 
policies in the medical technology and energy & environmental technology sectors. These two 
sectors constitute highly regulated sectors, i.e. typical sectors for capital cities. Neither the Canton 
of Bern nor the City of Bern tackle start-up promotion or fostering of entrepreneurship. The city 
is active in two coordination organizations that are both dominated by political actors. The 
members in both coordination organizations do not intensively engage in locational policies 
formulation because it seems that too much fiscal revenue is at stake in this policy field. The 
regional coordination platform CRS is active in putting forward the image of Bern as the political 
center of Switzerland. Bern links this image building to ask for public funds arguing that a strong 
capital city is in the interest of the whole nation.  
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Table 20: Expectation testing Bern 
Expectations Expectation 
testing 
Specifications 
E1.1: A weakly developed RIS restricts the 
formulation of innovation policies. 
Not 
supported 
Generally, Bernese economic development 
agencies take a passive stance on innovation 
policies 
E1.2: Innovation policies aim at modifying and 
transforming the constraining parts of the RIS. 
Partly 
supported 
Only few promising innovation policies that 
are explicitly targeting a higher interaction of 
crucial actors in the RIS 
E2: A weakly developed RIS enables the 
formulation of capital city image building strategy 
and constrains the formulation of a business town 
image building strategy  
Supported - 
E3: High local tax autonomy enables to focus on 
income taxes and constrains other manifestations 
of the business prerequisites category.  
Not 
supported 
The City of Bern does not have much 
discretionary power regarding taxes and thus 
concentrates itself on the provision of land 
and real estate and the attraction of residents. 
E4: A weakly developed RIS constrains the 
adaption of a profound and large-scale acquisition 
strategy. 
Not 
supported 
The City of Bern does not have discretionary 
power regarding acquisition. 
E5.1:  
Agglomeration level: Low institutional fragmentation 
enables and high local tax autonomy constrains 
regional coordination what leads to negative 
coordination. 
Regional level: High institutional fragmentation and 
high local tax autonomy constrain regional 
coordination. 
Supported - 
E5.2: Coordination aims at overcoming the 
constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
Not 
supported 
Coordination only exists among political 
actors. Private actors are fragmented 
E6: 
I: High local tax autonomy constrains to ask for 
public funds. 
II: No capital city specific constraints constrain to 
ask for compensation payments. 
 
Partly 
supported 
Supported 
Bern has reframed its argumentative strategy 
to tap into public funds 
 
Table 20 summarizes the tested expectations in the case of Bern. In the following paragraph, I 
discuss the expectation stemming from the RIS as an explanatory variable whereas in the next 
paragraph I discuss the expectations stemming from the MLG setting.  
Innovation policies are not restricted by the weakly developed RIS but rather because innovation 
policies are not a priority of Bern’s economic development organizations (E 1.1). However, the 
few innovation policies – mainly cluster approaches and establishing ‘triple helix’ organizations– 
aim at improving the knowledge interactions between actors from the ‘triple helix’ (E 1.2). The 
weakly developed RIS constrains an image building campaign based on the economic dynamics. 
As an alternative, Bern highlights its political importance and it that way differentiates itself from 
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the Swiss economic powerhouses like Zürich, Geneva or Basle (E2). The strategy was a success, at 
least in the short-run, as Bern positioned itself back in the top-tier of Swiss metropolitan areas. 
Bern’s limited acquisition acitivites are not explained by the weakly developed RIS, but by the 
strong role of the canton regarding tax breaks and the acquisition of firms. Thus, E4 is better 
explained by the MLG setting, as an explanatory factor, than the RIS.  
Similarly to expectation 4, the City of Bern does not have much discretionary power regarding tax 
reductions for companies and thus concentrates on the provision of land and real estate (E3). 
However, developable land is rather scarce. As an alternative, the City of Bern concentrates on 
improving the quality of life. Generally the jurisdictions in the FUA Bern show low enthusiasm in 
coordinating or even formulating locational policies. It seems that improving the quality of life for 
their residents is more important for decision makers in the agglomeration of Bern than 
formulating locational policies that would enhance the international competiveness of Bern (E5.1). 
Coordination is also not able to improve the interactions between public and private actors in the 
local governance regime (E5.2). The local governance regime is dominated by political actors that 
show little intention to integrate private actors. Yet Bern is active in attracting federal funds by 
leveraging its capital city status. Thus, decision makers link asking for public funds with image 
building strategy and coordination on the regional level within the CRS (E6).  
5.4. Conclusion 
Bern’s locational policies agenda is dominated by three main topics. First, cluster policies in the 
medical technology and energy & environmental technology sectors are formulated as well as a 
promising ‘triple helix’ organization in the medical sector was established. These rather rare 
innovation policies should enhance the knowledge interactions of firms, knowledge institutes, and 
public actors. Second, Bern concentrates on increasing the quality of life by protecting green spaces, 
preserving its old town, organizing cultural activities and ensuring educational opportunities. Third, 
Bern positions itself as the political center of Switzerland and thereby differentiate itself from the 
Swiss urban powerhouses.  
In sum, Bern’s city officials take a rather passive stance on economic-orientated locational policies 
but are active in political locational policies and increasing the quality of life. This finding is 
supported by van der Heiden (2010, 42–43) who describes that policymakers in the City of Bern 
orientated themselves primarily towards the national level, while interurban competition on an 
international level is largely ignored. As a consequence of the weakly developed RIS, Bern avoids 
to compete on the economic playing field but stresses its political importance and invest in quality 
of life factors. Thus, economic locational policies oriented towards the sluggish economic dynamics 
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of the region are largely missing and most locational polices are in a way or another connected to 
the capital city status or they aim at attracting residents.  
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6. Ottawa 
Ottawa features an impressive development from a sub-arctic farming and lumber town to a 
modern metropolitan region. However, the Canadian capital city has to face a two-dimensional 
fragmentation: A horizontal one in its FUA between Ottawa in Ontario and Gatineau in Quebec 
and a vertical one between the ‘town and the crown’. The FUA Ottawa-Gatineau is divided in the 
very middle by the Ottawa River which marks the political sensitive frontier between Ontario and 
Quebec. This specific location was one major reason to choose Ottawa as the capital city but it 
tends to cause a lot of problems in this fragmented FUA. Today, the notion of the capital city 
legally speaking only applies to Ottawa but the ‘seat of the government’ could be expanded 
geographically and metaphorically to Gatineau (Paquet 2011, 11–12). The vertical fragmentation 
refers to the potential conflicting priorities to serve the nation state as a whole as well as its local 
citizens (Rowat 1968; Rowat 1973). In the context of Ottawa this fragmentation is summarized as 
“town and crown” (e.g. Gordon 2016). 
Table 21 summarizes the case study Ottawa. In general, the locational policies agenda aims at 
fostering innovation, simultaneously position Ottawa as a government town and business town, 
developing the local property tax base, as well as attracting public funds. Most of the expectations 
can explain the formulation of locational policies in Ottawa. Especially low local tax autonomy 
explains locational policies formulation.  
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Table 21: Expectations and findings of the case study Ottawa 
Nr. Explanatory factor Phenomenon 
to be 
explained 
Expectation Result 
E1 RIS 
- moderately developed 
Innovation 
policies  
A moderately developed RIS enables the 
formulation of innovation policies. 
Not 
supported 
E1.2 RIS 
- RIS failure(s): 
Fragmentation, lock-in 
Innovation 
policies  
Innovation policies aim at modifying and 
transforming the constraining parts of the 
RIS. 
Supported 
E2 RIS 
- moderately developed 
Image 
building 
 
A moderately developed RIS enables the 
formulation of both a capital city image 
building strategy and a business town 
image building strategy. 
Supported 
E3 MLG 
- Low local tax autonomy 
Business 
prerequisites 
Low local tax autonomy constrains to 
focus on income taxes and enables to focus 
on the provision of land and real estate. 
Supported 
E4 RIS 
- moderately developed 
Acquisition 
 
A moderately developed RIS enables the 
adaption of a profound and large-scale 
acquisition strategy. 
Not 
supported 
E5.1 MLG 
- high institutional 
fragmentation 
- low local tax autonomy 
Regional 
coordination 
High institutional fragmentation 
constrains and low local tax autonomy 
enables regional coordination what leads to 
negative coordination. 
Supported 
E5.2 MLG 
- Capital city specific 
constraints 
-low local tax autonomy, - 
- institutional 
fragmentation in the FUA 
Coordination Coordination aims at overcoming the 
constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
Partly 
supported? 
E6 MLG 
- low local tax autonomy 
- capital city specific 
constraints 
Funds and 
compensation 
payments 
I: Low local tax autonomy enables to ask 
for public funds.  
II: Capital city specific constraints enable 
to ask for compensation payments. 
Supported 
 
Supported 
 
The remainder of this case study chapter is structured in four subchapters. The first subchapter 
gives a general description of Ottawa as well as discusses the manifestations of the explanatory 
factors. The second subchapter addresses the different locational policies categories and tests the 
respective expectation(s) one step at a time. The third subchapter links the different locational 
policies to a locational policies agenda and discusses the results in an integrative manner. The last 
subchapter concludes the case study.  
6.1. Profile of Ottawa  
6.1.1. History 
After uniting Upper and Lower Canada to the Province of Canada in 1841, the capital city status 
moved between the cities of Montreal, Kingston, Quebec City, and Toronto. Since the legislators 
did not find a consensus regarding the location of the Canadian capital city, the parliament officially 
asked Queen Victoria in 1857 to select one capital city site. The Queen chose Ottawa as the capital 
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of the Province of Canada, but “the Canadian legislators rejected this decision in 1858 and then, 
early in 1859, finally accepted it, but only by a majority of 64 to 59” (Knight 1977, 1).  
The choice for Ottawa was reputedly made for political and military reasons but was in its essence 
a compromise (Andrew 2013, 86–87). For political reasons since Ottawa is located between the 
primarily French-speaking Canada East and the primarily English-speaking Canada West. 
Furthermore, there were some legislators who were reluctant to place the capital city in a large 
commercial center. These legislators thereby referred to the United States’ decision to establish 
their capital city in Washington D.C. having not even considered New York or Philadelphia 
(Knight 1977, 11). For military reasons since Ottawa lies several days march away from the US 
border, but was still connected through the Rideau Canal with Kingston (Tassonyi 2009, 57). 
However, Egglestone (1961, 102; see also Andrew 2013, 86–87) reviewed the private 
correspondence between the British Governor General Sir Edmund Head and the Queen in which 
the Governor General argues that “Ottawa is the only place which will be accepted by the majority 
of Upper and Lower Canada as a fair compromise. With the expectation of Ottawa, every one of 
the cities proposed is an object of jealousy to each of the others”. 
Ottawa was described as the ‘forest city’ or ‘the city in the woods’ with only about 12’000 
inhabitants before the decision to establish the Canadian capital in Ottawa (Andrew and Doloreux 
2012, 1293). With the establishment of the Canadian Confederation in 1867, Ottawa became the 
federal capital (Tassonyi 2009, 57). The forestry industry continued to be the dominant economic 
base. The government remained a rather small organization (Andrew and Doloreux 2012, 1293). 
The cities of Toronto and Montreal experienced rapid expansion whereas Ottawa was until the 
beginning of the 20th century still a lumber town (Knight 1977, 15). With the outbreak of the 
Second World War, the federal bureaucracy started to grow rapidly and became the most important 
economic driver of the region (Andrew and Doloreux 2014, 1293). 
In 1950, the General Report on the Plan for the National Capital by the French urban planner 
Jaques Gréber suggested physical transformation of Ottawa but as well to changes in the national 
oversight over the capital city. The option of a federal district was discussed but Gréber favored 
the establishment of a federal agency which represents the interests of the national state in its 
capital (Interview Lapointe). In 1959, the National Capital Commission (NCC) had been created 
based on the National Capital Act. The NCC has planning authority over land owned by the federal 
government and represents in this way the interests of the federal government in the capital. The 
NCC possesses a lot of land. In the 1990s, the land possession of the NCC was sold since it was 
evaluated as not of ‘national significance’ (Interview Lapointe). The land possessions of the NCC, 
uncoordinated spatial planning of the two cities of Ottawa and Gatineau as well as underlying 
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aboriginal land claims makes governing the Canadian capital a difficult task (Interviews: 
Kristmanson, Lapointe, Paquet).  
The National Capital Act designated the National Capital Region (NCR) which is an area that spans 
over the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. This spatial definition of the NCR had consequences 
for the distribution of the capital city function. Whereas there is limited decentralization of federal 
institutions outside the NCR (only some museums, regional offices etc. and of course military 
bases), within the NCR the federal institutions are decentralized (Interview Kristmanson). 
However, within the NCR the ‘75/25 initiative’ of 1968 located a quarter of all federal jobs and 
federal investments on the Quebec side of the NCR with the goal to create a bilingual and bicultural 
capital region. This regional decentralization was motivated by the Quebec separatism threat and 
the wish to enhance economic development on the Quebec side of the NCR (Tassonyi 2009, 55). 
Thus, Gilles Paquet (2011, 11–12) concluded that the capital city, legally speaking, only applies to 
Ottawa but that the ‘seat of the government’ could be expanded geographically and metaphorically 
to Gatineau. However, the political economy of Ottawa and Gatineau developed similarly as both 
transformed from lumber and farming economies in a sub-arctic wilderness into public-sector 
dominated economies (Taylor 2011, 30–31). 
6.1.2. Geography and population 
Ottawa is located at the Southern bank of the Ottawa River in the south-east of the Province 
Ontario. The Ottawa River defines for most of its length the border between the Province of 
Ontario and Quebec. Thus, Ottawa is directly located at the most symbolically and politically 
charged border in Canada (Veronis 2013). After the amalgamations in 2001/2002 (see subchapter 
6.1.4), the City of Ottawa comprises of a huge territory of approximately 2’796 square kilometers. 
As a consequence, 80% of the city’s territory can be considered as rural (Tassonyi 2009, 56). 
Table 22 shows how the population of Canada has constantly grown over the last 35 years. Canada 
is still a country of immigration. This is especially the case for Canadian cities as they are 
experiencing population growth. Ottawa is the fourth largest city in Canada and the second city in 
the Province of Ontario. The population censuses of 2006 and 2011 (Statistics Canada 2016a) show 
that the City of Ottawa and FUA grow at the same pace as the booming metropolitan area Toronto. 
Both the City of Ottawa and the City of Gatineau almost grew 10% between 2006 and 2011, but 
Ottawa is with 883’391 inhabitants 3.3 times bigger than Gatineau with 265’349 inhabitants in 2011. 
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Table 22: Population of different relevant perimeters 
Scale 1980 1990 2000 2010 2015 Change (%) 
1980-2015 
City of Ottawa 557’829 687’825 786’975 911’985 957’148 +71,58 
FUA Ottawa-Gatineau 
(15 jurisdictions) 
- - 1’110’3441 1’250’553 1’332’001 +19,971 
Province Ontario 8’746’013 10’295’832 11’683’290 13’135’063 13’792’052 +50,18 
Canada 24’515’667 27’691’138 30’685’730 34’005’274 35’851’774 +46.24 
Source: Statistic Canada (2016a). This population data are estimates based on population censuses. FUA Ottawa-
Gatineau equals Metropolitan area code 505. Note: 1Earliest data from 2001 on FUA level.  
Ottawa has a diverse population. Half of the inhabitants of the FUA Ottawa-Gatineau grew up 
speaking English, almost a third of the populations’ mother tongue is French and the rest speaks a 
non-official Canadian language. 44% of the population in the FUA are fully English-French 
bilingual (Statistics Canada 2011). This population diversity is linked to the Ontario-Quebec border 
location but also to immigration. The City of Ottawa has the fourth largest immigration rate 
following Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary (Andrew and Doloreux 2012, 1297). 
6.1.3. Regional Innovation System 
The RIS in Ottawa can be characterized as being moderately developed because it shows 
organizational thickness in both subsystems but is fragmented since linkages between actors within 
and between both subsystems are weakly developed. The regional economy has experienced 
massive changes over the past decades due to the burst of the dot.com bubble in the early 2000s 
resulting in a crisis of Ottawa’s high-tech sectors as well as due to the financial crisis and the 
following federal government downsizing. Whereas these crises hit Ottawa hard, its effect may be 
attenuated, by the rather diversified RIS.  
Knowledge application and exploitation subsystem  
In general, Ottawa’s RIS relies on knowledge-based interactions with a strong concentration on 
KIBS (Doloreux, Freel, and Shearmur 2010).  In 2015, 89.49% of all jobs in the FUA Ottawa-
Gatineau are associated with the service sector (Warland 2016a). The ratio between KIBS jobs and 
high- and medium-tech manufacturing jobs is much higher in Ottawa-Gatineau compared to the 
three biggest Canadian FUAs (see Table 23). While in Ottawa-Gatineau, about 10 KIBS jobs exist 
for every high-tech manufacturing job, in Toronto the number of KIBS jobs for every high-tech 
manufacturing job amounts to 2.4 (Statistics Canada 2013). Also the public administration thrives 
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towards knowledge-intensive activities and these activities predominantly happen in the FUA 
Ottawa-Gatineau (Warland 2016a).  
Table 23: Ratio between KIBS jobs and manufacturing jobs in Canadian cities  
Sector Ottawa Toronto Montreal Vancouver 
KIBS 93’271 251’752 426’115 166’795 
High-tech industry 9’241 106’032 120’909 30’195 
Ratio 10.1 2.4 3.5 5.5 
Source: Statistics Canada (2013), data from 2011 
Given the knowledge-intensive RIS, Ottawa is attractive for a highly educated workforce. 
Compared to other Canadian FUAs, the region gathers the second highest proportion of workforce 
with a post-secondary degree (61.63%), and the highest proportion of master’s degree (7.64%) and 
doctorate degrees (1.67%) (Statistics Canada 2016b). In the City of Ottawa, the public 
administration accounts for about 101’100 jobs or 19 % of all jobs in 2015 (City of Ottawa 2016a, 
iv). Following from this federal presence, the region is the national center for defense, security and 
aerospace with various knowledge-intensive clusters such as cyber security or robotics (Interview 
Terry). Around 17’000 people are employed by a slightly over than 300 companies in these sectors 
(Invest Ottawa 2016). 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Ottawa was for a short time a world-class ICT technology center 
nicknamed the ‘Silicon Valley North’ (Andrew and Doloreux 2012, 1292). The Ottawa ICT 
industry primarily produced telecommunications equipment and software. This ICT cluster 
displayed a clear clustering of firms in the suburban setting of Kanata in the West of Ottawa 
(Andrew and Doloreux 2012, 1295). These economic dynamics in the ICT sector were initially a 
result of federal government decisions to privatize sectors of its communications technology 
functions (Andrew and Doloreux 2012, 1295). The bursting of the dot.com bubble in 2001 hit the 
region dramatically. The following demise of Northel Networks that once accounted for half of 
the private sector R&D in whole country (Taylor 2011, 32) impaired the whole RIS deeply. This 
crisis marked the sharp end of the short economic rise of Ottawa and made the federal sector the 
region’s largest employer (Andrew and Doloreux 2014, 142). However, the ICT sector seems to 
slowly recover. The number of ICT jobs has been increasing again since 2009 reaching a total of 
68,300 workers in this sector in 2014, which comes close to the maximum of 72,700 in 2000 
(Ottawa Business Journal 2014). Moreover, Warland (Warland 2016c) describes how the Ottawa 
based companies are mostly part of multi-branch, internationally competing firms what ensures the 
global connectivity of the ICT cluster. 
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In addition to the recovering high-tech sector in Kanata, a cluster of firms active in web 2.0 
software products gather around downtown Ottawa. A bit exaggerated, Ottawa features two high-
tech business communities. On the one hand, firms originating or closely linked to the old telecom 
industry located in Kanata (Interviews: Lazenby, Variano). On the other hand, younger 
entrepreneurs develop web 2.0 software products and they gather in the inner city. The latter are 
active in diverse sectors and more prone to attract the attention of international venture capitalists 
(Interviews: Saric, Variano). Although both develop ICT products, the linkages between these 
clusters are weak (Interviews: Ritonja; Variano). Despite ICT and software development, the two 
other rather big industry clusters are aerospace and security & defense (Interview Terry). 
Knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem  
Doloreux (2004) characterizes the knowledge generation and diffusion system as organizationally 
thick. Two universities (University of Ottawa, Carleton University) and two colleges enroll around 
100’000 students (Interview Dale). Universities are assessed as crucial, not just for talent 
development but also for generating innovation (Interview Rijonja). Federally funded research 
organizations such as the National Research Council of Canada, the Defence Research 
Development Canada and the Communications Research Centre Canada operate most of the 44 
federal research laboratories in Ottawa (Warland 2016a, 10). Yet, these federal research laboratories 
display only weak links to actors in the knowledge application and exploitation subsystem 
(Interviews: Faris, Ritonja, Cameron-Nunes and Temsamani). National industry associations are 
present and firms assess them as important to stimulate the knowledge interactions in the region 
(Warland 2016a). However, Warland (2016c) finds that the knowledge generation and diffusion 
subsystem plays only a minor role in diversification from public procurement to services and 
products for private clients.  
RIS development 
The RIS in Ottawa shows organizational thickness in both subsystems. However, the actors and 
organizations within the RIS are fourfold fragmented: Firstly, there is a fragmentation between the 
industries that are related to the federal presence and the export orientated industries that operate 
in the high-tech sector. The only hybrid seems to be the defense sectors. (Interview Dale) Secondly, 
the old telecom industry in Kanata and the young entrepreneurs located Downtown do not display 
much interaction (Interviews: Saric, Sudds, Variano). Thirdly, the business communities in Ottawa 
and in Gatineau are fragmented despite being functionally connected. The vertical institutional 
fragmentation, i.e. being located in different provinces, hinders interaction not just between public 
actors but also with the business communities. And finally, the linkages to federal research labs are 
weak and thus the presence of federal research labs is not exploited (Interviews: Faris, Ritonja, 
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Cameron-Nunes and Temsamani). The RIS in Ottawa is not fully dependent on the federal 
presence. The high-tech sectors, although stemming from governmental privatization, developed 
into a distinct and autonomous cluster. 
6.1.4. Multilevel governance setting 
Ottawa is constrained on the public vertical and the public horizontal MLG dimensions. The 
federal government exerts direct control over its land and thus the local autonomy of Ottawa is 
constrained to a greater degree than in other Canadian municipalities. Furthermore, Canadian 
municipalities do not enjoy a high local tax autonomy. On the horizontal dimension, the FUA 
Ottawa is vertically institutional fragmented at its very heart. On the local governance dimension, 
developers are the important business agents in the formulation of locational policies.  
Public vertical dimension 
Municipalities are not recognized in the Constitution of Canada. Reference to municipalities is only 
made as ‘creatures of the provinces’ (Tassonyi 2009, 60). Thus, Canadian municipalities have long 
been seen as policy-takers, not policy makers (Horak 2012, 350). When people refer to MLG in 
Canada, they often mean only the federal-provincial interplay (Interview Champagne). However, 
Horak and Young (2012) found practices of multilevel governance in Canadian cities that are 
similar to the ‘type II multi-level governance’ (Hooghe and Marks 2003) which means fluid, 
problem-driven, task-specific interaction among a varying set of governmental and non-
governmental actors. Bradford and Wolfe (2013, 1) assess the policy field of (regional) economic 
development in Canada as densely populated of a wide range of intertwined actors.  
Given the absence of municipalities in the Canadian constitution, the City of Ottawa operates 
under the statutory framework of the Province of Ontario. The Municipal Act, 2001 of the 
Province of Ontario gives municipalities more autonomy than its predecessor acts. In many policy 
spheres municipalities have been given ‘natural person powers’ i.e. the rights and powers to conduct 
their administrative and organizational affairs on a day to day basis without specific legislative 
authority (Tassonyi 2009, 61). This is in line with a general trend in Canada that provinces equip 
municipalities with more governing autonomy not at least because provinces have started to see 
urban areas as pivotal places of economic development (Horak 2012, 350–51). 
However, the local autonomy of Ottawa is constrained in comparison to other Canadian 
municipalities because the NCC exerts direct control over land that is owned by the federal 
government with respect to planning, zoning and building. “This means that neither the provincial 
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nor the local authority has any rights of taxation, legislation, or regulation over such property, 
except what the national authority chooses to give it” (Taylor 2011, 28). The NCC has even the 
right to acquire property, with compensation, when the land is evaluated as being of ‘national 
significance’ (Taylor 2011, 28). As the single-largest property-owner in the NCR with direct control 
over approximately 10 percent of all land in Ottawa, including some very prominent spots, the 
NCC is an important player in the MLG setting of Ottawa (Champagne 2011, 46; Interviews: 
Kristmansson, Lapointe, Paquet). Normally, the NCC complies with municipal official plans, but 
the agency is not required to do so (Tassonyi 2009, 62). This strong position of the NCC puts the 
city hall in an ambivalent position. On the one hand, the NCC constrains the local autonomy of 
Ottawa (Interview Paquet) which makes city hall feel like its being dictated by the federal 
government in some instances (Andrew and Doloreux 2014). On the other hand, city hall depends 
on federal expenditures to sustain its budget (Andrew and Chiasson 2012). 
Provinces play an important role in the Canadian MLG system. They enjoy high tax power as they 
raise the highest share of taxes (39.68 %) of all sub-national entities in OECD countries. Local 
governments, on the other hand, have restricted tax autonomy as they are raising 9.69 % of all 
Canadian taxes. The local tax bases are constrained as Canadian municipalities are only allowed to 
collect property taxes. The other two major revenue categories are user charges and transfers from 
higher-tier governmental levels (mostly from the provincial government) (Siegel 2009, 50–51). 
Property taxes are levied on taxable properties on an annual basis. User fees are paid for example 
for water supply, sewage treatment, and transit services. Regarding the governmental money 
transfers, it can be distinguished between four categories: (1) conditional grants, (2) unconditional 
grants, (3) payments in lieu of taxes (PILTs), and (4) revenue sharing which is sometimes part of 
the unconditional grants category (Tindal and Nobes Tindal 2009, 213). PILTs compensate 
municipalities for a loss of parts of the property tax bases given that federal and provincial premises 
and diplomatic properties are tax exempted.  
Table 24 summarizes the revenue of the City of Ottawa. The property taxes are extremely 
important for Ottawa as they make up 47% of the revenue. User fees account for another 24% of 
the revenue and together with 4% miscellaneous budgetary items,30 the City of Ottawa raises 75% 
of the budget independently. Governmental grants (19%) and payments in lieu of taxes (6%) add 
up to 25 % of revenue stemming from higher-tier governments. Especially governmental transfers 
from the Province of Ontario are important for the local budget in Ottawa. 
                                                            
30 Under miscellaneous revenue are own funds, fines, investment income, development charges and other income 
summarized. 
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Table 24: Local revenue composition City of Ottawa 
Budgetary items CAD 
in Millions 
% 
Property tax 1’455.26 47.08 
Fees and services 735.78 23.8 
Federal transfers 499.81 16.17 
Provincial transfers 79.56 2.57 
Payments in lieu of taxes 191.88 6.21 
Miscellaneous 128.98 4.17 
Total 3091.27 100 
Source: City of Ottawa (2016b), data from 2015. 
Thus, the local tax autonomy of Ottawa is constrained regarding tax bases, i.e. no local taxes on 
personal and corporate income, but not so much constrained on the amount of money stemming 
from independently raised revenue. Thus property taxes are extremely important for Ottawa. 
Nevertheless higher-tier governmental transfers account for a quarter of the revenue. Some 
conditional grants come with strings attached, i.e. strong conditionalities of how to use this public 
money. An expert explains the consequences of these conditionalities:  
“It starts on the federal level. The federal level is an enormous redistribution apparatus. The federal 
level does not provide a lot of services. Only 18% of the federal budget goes into operations. 
Approximately 80% is for transfer payments. The provinces are delivering a lot of services. So the 
federal level can use that money to attach some strings or create incentives. The federal level has the 
spending power. This is a steering mechanism. The municipality are big receivers of federal and 
provincial transfers (…) Also the provinces steer the municipalities with a variety of fiscal 
instruments” (Interview Champagne) 
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Public horizontal dimension 
The two most important characteristics on the 
public horizontal dimension are the 
amalgamation in 2001 that drastically enlarged 
the territory of Ottawa and the provincial border 
that cuts the FUA trough the very middle. 
Between 1996 and 2006 the Conservative Party 
of Ontario pursued a municipal consolidation 
strategy. The number of local governments was 
almost reduced to half, from 850 to 445 (Siegel 
2009, 28). The regional municipalities of Ottawa 
and Carleton amalgamated in 2001. This was a 
merger of two upper-tier local governments 
(regional municipalities) and eleven lower-tier 
local governments (municipalities).31 In 2002, an 
amalgamation of five municipalities formed the 
today City of Gatineau.32 After the 
amalgamation, the City of Ottawa now consisted 
of a small urban core and huge rural territories 
(around 80 % of city territory) (Tassonyi 2009, 56).  
The amalgamation constructed a City of Ottawa with more power and autonomy and was thus able 
to improve coherent policy implementation in different areas, among others as well economic 
development (Siegel 2009, 30). On the other side of the Ottawa River, the City of Gatineau also 
gained size so that the FUA Ottawa-Gatineau is dominated by two cities that belong to different 
provinces. This is an extreme case of vertical institutional fragmentation (Kaufmann and Sager 
2018). In other words, Ottawa and Gatineau overcame challenges of institutional fragmentation 
within their province but the FUA is fragmented across two provinces (Chattopadhyay 2011, iv). 
Local governance dimension 
In a comparative study of Canadian cities, Horak (2012, 356) points to the importance of business 
agents in the local governance dimension, especially to large employers and property developers 
                                                            
31 The eleven municipalities were Cumberland, Gloucester, Goulbourn, Kanata, Nepean, Osgoode, Ottawa, Rideau, 
Rockcliffe Park, Vanier, and West Carleton. 
32 The five municipalities were Aylmer, Buckingham, Gatineau, Hull and Masson-Angers. 
Figure 6: Map of FUA Ottawa-Gatineau 
Cartography: Mario Huber 
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who were deemed influential. The influence of business interests can be found in policy fields such 
as image building (Harvey and Young 2012) or re-developments of brown field’s (Ircha and Young 
2013, 168)(Ircha and Young 2013, 168). Martin Horak theorizes these business influences by 
linking them to the social production model of the urban regime theory: “The most obvious 
reasons for such business influence is that business agents have significant material resources and 
often relevant knowledge and expertise. (…) [T]he concentration of resources that business elites 
possess places them in a position to strongly influence governance processes, if they so desire” 
(Horak 2012, 356–57). 
Furthermore, Horak (2012, 357) highlights the importance of the chambers of commerce as the 
uniting organization for local business actors in Canadian cities. According to my interview 
partners, the chambers of commerce do not exercise much influence in Ottawa out of two reasons: 
First, four different chambers of commerce are active in Ottawa that are historically more 
competitors than partners (Interview Sudds). And secondly, Ottawa does not feature a strong 
industry anymore which accounts for the lack of money and power of the chambers of commerce. 
As a consequence “(…) here in Ottawa no urban regime exists, except for the developers” 
(Interview Paquet). Another expert is similarly trenchant in describing the role of the developers 
in Ottawa: “Developers are the only people that have an influence on city hall. It is not the chamber 
of commerce or other organized business interests” (Interview Light).  
Developers are not politically organized because they do not want to be recognized as important 
players and they are often direct competitors (Interviews: Bird, Normand, Paquet). However, 
developers are able to form ad-hoc coalitions when pushing for certain issues (Interview Bird). An 
expert describes the role of developers: “Local developers in Ottawa are very important in running 
the city. There are about 50 influential developers that have something to say. They do not want 
to be organized because than will be recognized as a political player. It is a diffuse form of power” 
(Interview Paquet). As a consequence, the influence of developers on city hall is informal by 
ensuring good relations to people in the administration and the city council (Interviews: Bird, 
Light). An economic development officer highlights the importance of developers “because they 
get things done” (Interview Sudds). Especially if companies are in need of infrastructure or if side 
locators are interested in brining companies to Ottawa, direct links to developers are important 
(Interview Sudds).  
Generally, the city hall and its arm-length agencies take an active role in formulating and 
implementing locational policies. Yet these organizations reach out to local business leaders, local 
business interest groups and to individual firms (Interviews: Bashir, Lazenby, Ritonja). Both of the 
latest economic development plans have been formulated within an extensive consultation process 
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with the major stakeholders concerned with economic development in Ottawa (Interviews: Bashir, 
Ritonja, Sudds). Another example is that representatives from local businesses and local knowledge 
institutes sit on the board of Invest Ottawa. Thus, it is relatively easy for business actors to get 
access to the locational policies formulation process despite the comparatively weak influence of 
the chambers of commerce. 
6.2. Locational policies in Ottawa 
Economic development plans and the organizational structure to implement these locational 
policies changed several times in Ottawa. In the early 1980s the economic development agency 
OCRI (Ottawa Centre for Research and Innovation) was created as a public-private partnership 
between the high-tech sector, federal laboratories, and post-secondary institutions (Andrew and 
Doloreux 2014, 146–47). OCRI was primarily a member based organization with support from the 
city and the region (Interview Dale). OCRI formed itself around the then booming telecom service 
sector but it enlarged its economic sector profile to incorporate the ICT, the health, and the defense 
sectors (Interview Dale). Andrew and Doloreux (2012, 1295–96) described a gradual development 
of OCRI towards becoming a “knowledge broker and a knowledge translator, interested in 
promoting high-tech development with strong connections to the post-secondary and post-
doctoral level, but also in building the base by developing the capacity of the elementary and 
secondary education system to meet the challenges of the knowledge-based society”.  
OCRI initiated the establishment of The Ottawa Partnership (TOP) in 1999. TOP served as a meta 
governance structure to coordinate the activities of the city hall, the high-tech sector, the life 
sciences sector, the tourism sector, and of the big universities in Ottawa, namely Carleton 
University and University of Ottawa (Andrew and Doloreux 2014, 147). The troubles of the high-
tech sectors and the amalgamation in 2001 preoccupied local decision makers with other tasks than 
the coordination of locational policies what led to a gradual inactivity of TOP (Andrew and 
Doloreux 2012, 1296). 
After the turn of the millennium, the City of Ottawa initiated on its behalf the Ottawa 20/20 
initiative, a participatory planning process with the aim to create sustainable development. This 
initiative produced five plans (so-called growth management plans) each with a thematic focus and 
formulated policy directions. The Economic Strategy was one of these five growth management 
plans.33 The whole Ottawa 20/20 process enjoyed wide engagement, but the economic downturn 
                                                            
33 The other four growth management plans were the Official Plan, the Human Services Plan, the Arts and Heritage 
Plan and the Environmental Strategy.  
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of the high-tech sector and more conservative political ideas on the provincial level that led to a 
decline of interest in this collaborative planning initiative (Andrew and Doloreux 2014, 144). 
In 2009, the City of Ottawa launched a five year economic development plan called Partnership 
for Prosperity. The economic development plan ‘Partnerships for Innovation: Economic 
Development Strategy Update 2015-2018’ continues direction of its predecessor plan. Both latest 
economic development plans have been formulated within an extensive consultation process with 
major stakeholders that engage in economic development in Ottawa (Interviews: Bashir, Ritonja, 
Sudds).  
The substantive focus of these economic development plans are compared in Table 25. Each of 
these plans feature four key aspects. This comparison reveals that the locational policies underwent 
significant changes. The 20/20 process was focused on the development of knowledge institutions, 
clusters, fostering start-ups and on image building. The latter Partnership for Prosperity agenda 
concentrated on governance questions, a holistic model of economic development including a 
focus on the knowledge economy and image building. The current economic development plan 
focuses on fostering entrepreneurship, attracting tourists, gathering of data and information for 
strategic decisions and acquisition and retention of investment and companies. All economic 
development plans contain some elements of image building strategies. Regarding innovation 
policies, the focus changed from classical cluster approaches, to a more general development of 
the knowledge economy to a fostering of start-ups and entrepreneurship via incubators and 
accelerators. In a nutshell, Ottawa formulated locational policies since the turn of the millennium 
with the aim to become an innovative business city as well as to promote the image of Ottawa as 
an attractive place for business as well as for tourists.  
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Table 25: Comparison of economic development plans in Ottawa 
Economic Strategy  
(20/20 process) (2001-2020) 
Partnership for Prosperity 
(2009-2015) 
The Partnerships for Innovation 
(2015-2018) 
Development of knowledge 
institutions and professional training 
Strengthening the knowledge 
economy 
- 
Cluster development and 
improvement of knowledge transfer 
and learning within Ottawa’s cluster 
- - 
Supporting start-ups and 
entrepreneurs 
- Fostering an entrepreneurship 
ecosystem 
Image building of Ottawa as a place 
for business and investment 
International branding of the city  Development of tourism and 
hosting events 
- Balancing business prosperity with 
social, environmental and cultural 
goals 
- 
- More proactive leadership of the city 
in economic development 
Research and information tools on 
economic development to make 
informed strategic decisions 
- - Investment attraction and business 
expansion and retention 
Source(s): City of Ottawa (2003) and 
Andrew and Doloreux (2012, 1292–
93) 
Source(s): City of Ottawa (2011) Source(s): City of Ottawa (2015) 
The two newest economic development plans explicitly position the city hall as the coordinating 
and central actor in a collaborative locational policies decision-making process. The Partnerships 
for Prosperity agenda sketched out an economic development governance model in which the city 
hall would coordinate the activities of three different partnerships that would act as arms-length 
agencies.34 This exact locational policies governance model was not implemented, but it led to the 
establishment of the current economic development agency Invest Ottawa that superseded OCRI 
and it led to a strengthening of Ottawa Tourism. 
Invest Ottawa is the central economic development agency and as such important in the 
formulation and implementation of various locational policies. The City Hall steers Invest Ottawa 
with multi-year agreements and annual operating plans. Invest Ottawa is completely funded by 
public money from all levels of government, but the aim is to attract as well private money in future 
                                                            
34 The following three partnerships would govern locational policies in Ottawa according to the Partnerships for 
Prosperity agenda. First, Innovation Ottawa would manage the economic clusters. Second, Destination Ottawa would 
be active in image building, touristic attraction and cultural events. And third, Quality Ottawa would represent a wide 
spectrum of business organizations as well as community, environmental and cultural organizations (City of Ottawa 
2009: 11-14). 
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(Interview Lazenby). Invest Ottawa bases on seven vertical pillars, i.e. seven different economic 
sectors (see section 6.2.1), that are cut through by two vertical dimensions, i.e. the local BIAs and 
the activities in foreign markets mainly in China and Brazil (Interview Lazenby).  
The locational policies of Invest Ottawa should lead to job creation. An interview partner states 
that “the overall goal of Invest Ottawa’s activities is to contribute to the creation of jobs” (Interview 
Lazenby). For sure, job creation has multiple positive impacts for the local economy. However, it 
seems that the focus on job creation can be explained by the impossibility to tax personal and 
corporate income as well the provincial-municipal co-funding of social assistance (Interviews: 
Bashir, La Flamme). The Province of Ontario obliges its municipalities to contribute to social 
assistance expenditures which constitutes a significant budgetary item. “One of the major 
complaints of municipalities is not just the magnitude of these expenditures but their volatility (…) 
Everyone involved in the system (even provincial public servants in private conversations) 
recognizes that this a problem and that social-assistance expenditure needs to be moved to the 
provincial level” (Siegel 2009, 57). In 2010, Ontarian municipalities payed about 19.4 % of the total 
cost of social assistance and 50 % of administrative costs. The municipal share of these costs should 
gradually phase out until 2018 and the share of administration costs is currently being renegotiated 
(Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services 2012). 
6.2.1. Innovation policies 
Invest Ottawa does not apply a mainstream cluster approach but it follows a sectorial approach. 
The targeted sectors are technology-intensive and knowledge-intensive because they are most likely 
to generate jobs. Ottawa features a vibrant start-up scene that is supported by incubators and 
specialized training courses for entrepreneurs. Public funds try to compensate for the lack of 
venture capital. Innovation policies furthermore aim to create better linkages between the well-
developed knowledge infrastructure and other relevant actors in the local economy. 
Cluster policies 
During the 2000s, OCRI pursued a cluster approach to develop the health, defense and ICT sectors 
(Interview Dale). Today, Invest Ottawa concentrates on seven knowledge-intensive and 
technology-intensive industries: aerospace, security & defense, clean-tech, digital media, film & TV, 
communication technologies, software, and life sciences. The focus on film & TV is also motivated 
by its ability to promote and brand the city nationally and international (City of Ottawa 2015, 26). 
Invest Ottawa interprets its role in these key industries as “connecting the dots. We facilitate and 
coordinate. For example, we are doing match-making and bring local firms together. When 
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someone searches for a specific service, we provide them with lists of companies in Ottawa (…) A 
database helps establishing this match-making” (Interview Terry). Invest Ottawa especially helps 
smaller companies in the supply chain by linking them to bigger companies and to the large system 
integrators (Interview Terry).  
Start-up promotion 
Ottawa features a vibrant start-up scene but mostly regarding software innovation that is largely 
detached from the capital city economy (Interview Variano). A few incubators and accelerators 
operate in Ottawa. Invest Ottawa manages its own incubator. A new incubator opened in fall 2016 
called Innovation Center at Bayview Yard operated by Invest Ottawa (Interview Bashir). Invest 
Ottawa offers an intensive 120 training program for entrepreneurs under the name GrindSpace 
XL. Furthermore, the local universities offer mentorship programs for spin-offs that stem from 
their research activities (Interview Variano).  
Generally, Canada does not feature the same venture capital intensity as the US. One interviewee 
estimated that Canada lags about 10 years behind the US because the US has more successful exits 
which increases the amount of venture capital (Interview Fielding). In 2015, only two venture 
capital firms were located in Ottawa. However, venture capital is assessed as being available but 
mostly for products and innovations in the ICT sector (Interview Variano). And of course, a lot of 
entrepreneurs glance around in other Canadian cities or the US for venture capital (Interview 
Variano). Some public funds have been established to compensate for the lack of venture capital 
(Interviews: Dale, Faris, Variano). However, public venture capital is assessed as rather slow and 
attached to a lot of requirements. Private venture capital, on the other hand, is characterized as 
faster and its requirements are mostly limited to the idea and its commercialization (Interview 
Variano). 
Knowledge infrastructure 
The knowledge infrastructure is well developed in Ottawa. Universities and the federal labs are 
seen as crucial in generating innovations (Interview Ritonja). Especially the Carleton University 
which has a strong research focus in the fields of software engineering, network security and 
pervasive computing (Warland 2016a; Warland 2016c). Clear strategies to exploit the potential of 
the federal research labs are missing. The linkages between the local firms and the federal research 
lab are assessed as poor what constrains the commercialization of technology from these federal 
labs (Interviews: Faris, Ritonja, Cameron-Nunes and Temsamani). 
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Testing expectation 1.1 
E 1.1: A moderately developed RIS enables the formulation of innovation policies..  
Expectation 1.1 is not supported. The direction of causality seems rather reversed. The newest 
economic development plan explicitly focuses on innovation. The formulated innovation policies 
seem to mainly target innovation and the fragmentation of the RIS and the business community. 
Thus, innovation policies in Ottawa are not constrained or enabled by the RIS but aim at the very 
weaknesses of the RIS. The discussion of expectation 1.2 develops this insight further. 
Testing expectation 1.2 
E1.2: Innovation policies aim at modifying and transforming the constraining parts of the RIS. 
Expectation 1.2 is supported. Innovation policies especially aim at the fragmentation of the RIS 
subsystems and the fragmented business communities. Furthermore, innovation policies try to 
create a fruitful environment for start-ups. 
Innovation policies in Ottawa mainly try to improve the linkages between the relevant actors in the 
RIS. The city hall and Invest Ottawa act like brokers. The main goal of Ottawa’s innovation policies 
is to improve the linkages between the key actors in Ottawa’s RIS such as the different business 
communities, business interest organizations, the research institutions and the universities. These 
linkages are currently not exploited to the full potential (Interviews: Lazenby, Ritonja). Regarding 
the fragmented ICT business communities in Kanata and Downtown, Invest Ottawa established 
first contacts between key persons of the different entrepreneurial communities (Interviews: 
Bashir, Rionja). The goal is “to break down the barriers and establish first linkages” (Interview 
Ritonja).  
Regarding the weaknesses of the start-up scene, Invest Ottawa offers specific courses for new 
entrepreneurs to address legal, financial and strategic issues of start-up firms. Furthermore Invest 
Ottawa links entrepreneurs with venture capital firms. The new Innovation Center at Bayview 
Yards is likely to significantly improve the entrepreneurial system in Ottawa and should as well 
“bring industries together and serve as a melting pot” (Interview Bashir).  However, I did not detect 
any strategy to establish better linkages to the federal research labs although this is pointed out as 
a distinctive weakness (Interviews: Faris, Temsamani). 
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6.2.2. Image building 
Jean Harvey (2012) detects increasing image building activities of Canadian local governments 
aiming at attracting tourists, investors and new residents. Ottawa features a relatively long history 
of branding exercises, where most of them had the aim to overcome the image of a government 
town (see Andrew and Doloreux 2012). The turn of the millennium marked the “zenith moment 
of Ottawa no longer being perceived as a government town” (Andrew and Doloreux 2012, 1296). 
The tagline Silicon Valley of the North was used to describe the innovation dynamics in Ottawa 
(Interviews: Lazenby, Saric; Shavinina 2004; Spigel 2011). In 2001 the branding slogan ‘technically 
beautiful’ was proposed, “supposedly linking nature with high-tech; received with a mixture of 
amusement and dismay, it was rapidly discarded” (Andrew and Doloreux 2012, 1296). The fact 
that the City of Ottawa had felt patronized by the federal government and that local elites reflects 
the value of the private sector seem to explain the triumphant tone which proclaimed the end of 
Ottawa as a government town (Andrew and Doloreux 2012, 1295). The crash of the high-tech 
sector obsoleted these branding exercises. 
Currently, Ottawa is trying to position itself as a “G7 capital and high-tech town. We are fully 
playing this card. We are not using ‘either or’” (Interview Lazenby). According to city officials, it 
took some time to understand that Ottawa will always be associated with its capital city function. 
The new emphasis on innovation – both in government and in the private sector – should be 
reflected in the image of Ottawa (Interview Bashir). Besides innovation, Ottawa is making use of 
the 150 anniversary of the Canadian Confederation to showcase itself on the national stage. Ottawa, 
as the capital city, should be “the epicenter of this 2017 anniversary (…). With our activities, we 
want to change the perception that people have about Ottawa. We want to change the image of a 
being a conservative government town. We want to demonstrate the level of vibrancy and creativity 
the industries in Ottawa can offer” (Interview La Flamme). In a similar vein, the neighboring City 
of Gatineau also tries to position itself as a business city (Ville d’affair) because of the perception 
that Gatineau is only a city for and by public servants (Interview Temsamani). 
Testing expectation 2 
E. 2: A moderately developed RIS enables the formulation of both a capital city image building strategy and a 
business town image building strategy. 
Expectation 2 is supported. The development of the RIS and its most vibrant economic sectors 
are crucial in the image building endeavors of Ottawa. The underlying assumptions of expectation 
2 are well traceable over time in the case of Ottawa because of the massive ups and downs of its 
economy. Before the crash in 2001, Ottawa was able to build an image around its vibrant high-tech 
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sector to the extreme that Ottawa was branded as ‘the Silicon Valley of the North’ and that local 
elites rejoiced that the end of government town has come. After the crisis of the high-tech sector, 
Ottawa struggled for a long time with building an image because it wanted to copy the business 
town image of the 1990s and early 2000s (Interview Bashir). The officials of Ottawa formulated a 
twofold image building strategy around the capital city status and its economic sectors. 
6.2.3. Business prerequisites 
The local tax autonomy is constrained in Canada as local governments are only allowed to collect 
property taxes. Hence, the policy instruments at hand in the business prerequisites category are 
limited. Thus, the City of Ottawa focus on the provision of land and real estate; and it does this 
extensively. 
Property taxes are extremely important for the City of Ottawa as they constitute almost half of the 
annual revenue (see subchapter 6.1.4). The amount of property tax is based on the value of the 
property determined by Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, a non-profit corporation 
created by the Province of Ontario. The Value of the property is multiplied by the municipal tax 
rate which is determined by the City Council. The City of Ottawa knows 13 property classes such 
as residential, office building, commercial, multi-residential, farmland and so on. The tax rate may 
differ for each property class. For example, the residential property tax rate was 0.5 % in 2015. The 
tax rate for office buildings was 1.16% and the tax rate for commercial use of property was 0.96%. 
A representative of a business interest group criticizes the high tax rates for commercial and 
business properties in Ottawa compared to the residential property tax rate (Interview Sudds).  
The City of Ottawa pursues an active strategy regarding the provision and development of land 
and real estate. The city is especially busy trying to ensure low commercial vacancy rates Downtown 
because of its high property value and the federal intention to consolidate federal office space 
outside the Downtown core (City of Ottawa 2015, 31). The city hall expects that 10’000 federal 
jobs will move out of Downtown Ottawa in the next five years. Real estate vacancies and a 
consequential decrease of property value should be countered with three strategies. Firstly, side 
locators are informed and possible collaborations are established. These collaborations are part of 
a general initiative called ‘Site Selector Engagement Program’ to handle real estate vacancies and to 
acquire companies to Ottawa (City of Ottawa 2015, 30–31). Thus, this initiative is also part of the 
acquisition locational policies category (see subchapter 6.2.4). Secondly, financial incentives in the 
form of tax reductions are provided if property owners renovate their real estate in Downtown. 
And finally, reals estate renovations in Downtown are automatically eligible for the ‘Capital 
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Investment Track’. This track is a fast-track procedure for all aspects of municipal approvals and 
requirements that are evaluated as a priority for the economic development of Ottawa (Interview 
Bashir).  
Testing expectation 3 
E3: Low local tax autonomy constrains to focus on income taxes and enables to focus on the provision of land and 
real estate.  
Expectation 3 is supported. The City of Ottawa is very active in the provision and development of 
land and real estate. This may be explained by the factors. On the one hand, the range of local taxes 
is constrained for the City of Ottawa and, on the other hand, the allowed local tax, i.e. property 
tax, makes up half of the annual of the City of Ottawa. Thus it makes sense to develop the tax base 
of this important local tax. Thus, the endeavors to fill the vacant real estate Downtown can be 
interpreted as measures to maintain the value of their most valuable real estate assets. The City of 
Ottawa states that rising commercial vacancy rates can result in decreasing city revenues (City of 
Ottawa 2015, 31). An expert confirms the causal link between local property taxes and the huge 
efforts of Canadian cities to increase the value of land and real estate (Interview Champagne). This 
huge efforts to develop land and real estate may be explained by its direct economic implications. 
The development of land and real estate enlarges the local property tax base and has thus a direct 
impact on the city budget whereas most other locational polices are not as tangible with only 
indirect implications. 
6.2.4. Acquisition 
Invest Ottawa is the entity responsible for acquiring firms. Its acquisition strategy bases on three 
pillars: Firstly, Ottawa is praised as a ‘soft-landing’ spot to tap into the North American market. 
Canada signed the Free Trade Agreement with the US. For example, Invest Ottawa operates a 
small incubator for Chinese firms to start their activities in North America. China has been 
specifically selected as a partner because the Beijing municipality and the City of Ottawa signed a 
cooperation agreement that is, among others, concerned with strengthening the mutual business 
relations (City of Ottawa 2015, 29). Another example which is interesting for my research is the 
cooperation with The Hague in issues regarding the cyber security sector. Invest Ottawa uses such 
international business relations two-dimensionally as they help as well Ottawa-based firms to tap 
into overseas markets (Interview Lazenby). Secondly, the key industries are promoted as an 
argument to relocate to Ottawa. Invest Ottawa especially targets firms that engage in R&D intense 
activities. Invest Ottawa helps firms to get access to competitive governmental funding schemes 
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(Interview Lazenby) such as tax reductions based on a firm’s R&D intensity (Interview Terry). 
Finally, the high share of well-educated workforce is promoted as an opportunity to access a large 
talent pool. Invest Ottawa not only targets firms, but it tries to attract talent by promoting itself as 
a city with high quality living conditions (Interviews: Dale, Lazenby, Ritonja, Terry).  
Besides these specific acquisition strategies, Invest Ottawa also pursues mainstream acquisition 
approaches such as welcoming trade delegations, going to trade missions and visiting exhibitions 
or the aforementioned collaborations with side locators. In some instances the Province of Ontario 
attracts a company, and in a second step, the different Ontarian municipalities compete to attract 
the company into their jurisdiction (Interview Bashir). If a firm decides to relocate to Ottawa, 
Invest Ottawa offers to accompany the firm through the whole set-up process. 
Testing expectation 4 
E4: A moderately developed RIS enables the adaption of a profound and large-scale acquisition strategy. 
Expectation 4 is not supported. Invest Ottawa is very active in acquiring firms based on other 
advantages than its RIS. Only one out of three pillars of Ottawa’s acquisition strategy is based on 
the local economic sectors. The two additional pillars highlight other local assets such as its location 
in North America and its large talent pool. As an example, the utilization of the Bejing-Ottawa 
partnerships as an acquisition tool shows that Ottawa searches for ways to be attractive beyond its 
RIS. Thus, Ottawa compensates it’s not fully developed RIS with other local assets. 
6.2.5. Coordination  
Ottawa is vertically institutionally fragmented. This provincial border at the very heart of the FUA 
seems to be a too big obstacle for regional coordination. A business man described this 
fragmentation metaphorically: “The Ottawa river is wider politically than it is physically (Interview 
Bird). Ottawa was chosen as the capital city to bridge the Anglophone and the Francophone 
Canada, but it cannot live up to this task (Interview Lapointe). It goes as far as “people are talking 
about Ottawa and Gatineau as the two solitudes” (Interview La Flamme). 
I did not find any coordinated locational policies between Ottawa and Gatineau. The economic 
development agencies at both sides of the river – Invest Ottawa and Développement économique 
CLD Gatineau – are not coordinating their efforts (Interviews: Lazenby, Temsamani). Business 
interest organizations like the different Chambers of Commerce only talk to each other without 
any coordination commitment or do not cooperate at all as it is the case for the Business 
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Improvement Districts (Interviews: Faris, Normand, Sudds). A public servant stated that “the lack 
of coordination is holding Ottawa and Gatineau back” (Interview Bashir). Neither the 
establishment of federal offices and institutions in Gatineau nor the amalgamations in the early 
2000s have encouraged coordination between Ottawa and Gatineau (Interviews: Chattopadhyay, 
Lapointe). However, the current mayors have begun to meet periodically which has been facilitated 
by the NCC (Interviews: Faris, Kristmanson, Lapointe).  
A vivid example of the inability to coordinate relevant policies is the public transport system that 
is loosely connected between Ottawa and Gatineau and in general rather poorly developed. To 
change this public transport dilemma, the City of Ottawa pushed forward its very own 
transportation plan without the integration of Gatineau. (Interview Lapointe). As a consequence, 
the public transportation system is segregated in the middle of the metropolitan region where about 
60’000 people are commuting every day to the other side of the Ottawa River (Champagne 2011). 
Thus, the public transportation system is not meeting the needs of the growing population and can 
be seen as a coordination failure. 
Testing expectation 5.1 
E5.1: High institutional fragmentation constrains and low local tax autonomy enables regional coordination what 
leads to negative coordination.  
Expectation 5.1 is partly supported. The interviews reveal that it is mainly the vertical institutional 
fragmentation that constrains horizontal coordination. Vertical institutional fragmentation trumps 
the favorable low tax autonomy in explaining regional coordination. Local tax autonomy does not 
enable constraints but it constrains beggar-my-neighbor behavior and harmful regional 
competition. There is also no coordination on the Ontarian side of the FUA Ottawa-Gatineau. In 
this Ontarian case, coordination in economic development makes no much sense because of the 
urban-rural divide.  
The vertical institutional fragmentation in the FUA Ottawa-Gatineau brings along different 
political systems and issues of Quebec’s status within Canada. In General, Quebec has a more 
centralized political system whereas the municipalities in Ontario enjoy more autonomy 
(Interviews: Kristmanson, Lapointe). Ottawa and Gatineau cannot cooperate in activities that 
would involve spending taxpayers’ dollars from one jurisdiction that would benefit the other 
jurisdiction. Consequentially, it is difficult to create a strategic alliance over provincial borders 
(Interview Lazenby). Furthermore, there are different languages and law systems – common law in 
Ontario and the civil law in Quebec – aggravating coordination (Interviews: Brid, Paquet, Saad.) 
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Thus, the very political struggles of Canada manifest itself in its National Capital Region (Veronis 
2013). These problems caused by vertical institutional fragmentation leads an expert to conclude 
that “Ottawa is probably the hardest capital city-region to govern” (Interview Paquet).  
Low local tax autonomy does not enable coordination, however, it may moderate negative effects 
of non-coordination because I did not find any beggar-my neighbor behavior. Ottawa and Gatineau 
have different tax rates and Gatineau is for example able to offer more specific tax incentives 
(Tassonyi 2009, 58,  Interviews: Lazenby, Temsamani). Yet, these different tax settings does not 
lead to much competition in firm acquisition because tax competition between municipalities only 
occurs around the property tax base. Thus, it seems that vertical institutional fragmentation 
constrains coordination, and in a second step, low local tax autonomy does constrain competition 
between Ottawa and Gatineau.  
This lack of coordination in the FUA is not limited to inter-provincial coordination. The two core 
municipalities of the FUA – Ottawa and Gatineau – see no need to cooperate with the other smaller 
municipalities in their respective province. This can be explained by geography and more precisely 
by the urban-rural divide (Taylor 2011, 30). The economic bases of the two core municipalities and 
the remaining rural municipalities are so diverse that coordination in locational policies makes not 
much sense.  
Testing expectation 5.2 
E 5.2: Coordination aims at overcoming the constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
Expectation 5.2 is partly supported. Ottawa is constrained in its local autonomy because of federal 
influence via the NCC and low local tax autonomy. Furthermore, Ottawa is vertically institutionally 
fragmented and thus constrained on the public horizontal dimension. The new governance model 
between the NCC and the two cities Ottawa and Gatineau may overcome the governance problem 
of the past and thus for Ottawa a better way to deal with the local autonomy constraints ensuing 
from the NCC.  
The influence of the NCC is based on its authority over large areas of federal land in Ottawa. Since 
2014 the relationships between the City of Ottawa and the NCC became more institutionalized. In 
past the governance model between the NCC and the city halls in Ottawa and Gatineau was ad-
hoc and mostly informal (Interviews: Kristmanson, Lapointe). Now there is an agreement that the 
two mayors and the CEO of the NCC meet all four months. Additionally, the CEO of the NCC 
meets the mayors bilaterally all four months (Interview Kristmanson). Thus, this new governance 
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model may be interpreted as a way to overcome the governance problem of the past with the NCC 
and thus a better way to deal with the local autonomy constraints ensuing from the NCC.  
Coordination is not able to overcome low local tax autonomy. As any other Canadian municipality, 
Ottawa has to accept these constraints of local tax bases. As I have outlined in E5.1, the cities of 
Ottawa and Gatineau make few attempts to overcome vertical institutional fragmentation. 
However, the new, more institutionalized governance model between the NCC and the cities of 
Ottawa and Gatineau may also function in future as a coordination platform that possible help to 
overcome the divide between Ottawa and Gatineau. 
6.2.6. Public funds and compensation payments 
Public funds are an important revenue source for the City of Ottawa as they constitute a quarter 
of the annual revenue. In 2015, 19% of the local budget was from conditional and unconditional 
higher-tier governmental grants and the payments in lieu of taxes (PILTs) accounted for 6% of the 
local budget (City of Ottawa 2016b; see subchapter 6.1.4). 
Horak (2012, 342–43) traced two basic forms that explain how Canadian local governments are 
trying to tap into public funds. First, they form alliances to lobby provincial and federal 
governments to set up such funding schemes. Secondly, individual cities, often supported by local 
business elites, compete vigorously for support from existing funding sources. I found the latter 
form of local government intervention in Ottawa. Invest Ottawa is responsible to attract public 
funds in the policy field of economic development (Interview Lazenby). These economic 
development funds from higher-tier governments are mostly project-based or program-based. 
Some of them require matching contributions either from other public actors or from the private 
sector to diversify the risk (Interviews: Fielding, Light, McNabb). Invest Ottawa competes 
vigorously for these funds. Furthermore Invest Ottawa does help firms that are eligible for 
governmental funding to get access to these funding possibilities (Interviews: Lazenby, Terry). 
Since 1950 the federal government pays PILTs based on valued assessments of the tax-exempted 
properties. The PILT Act of 2000 organizes the establishment of a PILT Dispute Advisory Panel 
with the mandate to resolve differences between the federal government and local taxing 
authorities because the exceptional nature of these properties often poses difficulties in calculating 
the appropriate value (Tassonyi 2009, 68–70). The PILTs do not cover the exact same amount that 
property tax would and they do not cover extra services (Ircha and Young 2013, 159). Thus, “in 
the City of Ottawa, for example, there appears to be a considerable gap between PILTs and the 
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amount of property taxes that would be paid, based on the property values set by the Ontario 
Municipal Assessment Corporation” (Ircha and Young 2013, 159).  
These PILTs are remarkable from a comparative perspective on financing capital cities because 
only few countries established such compensation payments. Thus, Ottawa is relatively better off 
than most other capital cities because of these rather generous PILTs (Slack and Chattopadhyay 
2009; Chattopadhyay 2011, vi). Besides these PILTs, the federal authorities do not compensate for 
capital city related costs, such as increasing policing services (Tassonyi 2009, 72).  
Testing expectation 6 
I: Low local tax autonomy enables to ask for public funds.  
II: Capital city specific constraints enable to ask for compensation payments. 
Expectation 6 is supported. Low local tax autonomy explains the importance of public funds and 
how they influence the formulation of locational policies on the local level. The capital city specific 
constraints of the local autonomy of Ottawa explains the existence of PILTS. 
Constrains in the local tax autonomy of Canadian municipalities led to a dependency on public 
funds. Public funds have to step in to compensate for constrains in the local tax bases. Ottawa is 
very active and strategic about tapping into public funds. For example, the whole public private 
partnership set-up of Invest Ottawa can be seen as a strategy to tap into provincial public funds 
(Interview Light) because these public economic development funds often need matching funds 
or other types of private sector involvement. An economic development agent explains: “[T]he 
evolution of the ‘triple helix’ model or public private partnership models is stimulated by the 
requirements of the federal or provincial funds to match these funds. It is mostly the private sector 
that matches those funds. (Interview Fielding). The same mechanism is at work regarding 
incubators or accelerators. The higher-tier governmental money is incentivizing the establishment 
of such incubators. Consequentially, the city establishes such start-up tools to be interesting for 
governmental investment (Interview Saric). Another example is the provincial economic 
development policy shift. The Province of Ontario used to apply a cluster approach but rather 
recently they are more interested in fostering technologies than clusters (Interview Fielding). As a 
consequence, Ottawa shifted its economic development policy from a classical cluster approach in 
times of OCRI towards a concentration on technology-intense industries of Invest Ottawa. Thus, 
the public funds are important for Ottawa in that it adjusts its locational policies to the economic 
development paradigms of the governmental entities that award these funds.  
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The PILTs have been established in the context of the Gréber plan in 1950 that reorganized the 
relationship between the federal and the municipal level in Ottawa. The same plan led to the 
creation of the NCC from its predecessor organization Federal District Commission. The land 
covered by the NCC was greatly expanded by a very active program of property acquisition 
(Andrew 2013, 92). Thus, I would argue that the establishment of PILTs may be interpreted as a 
kind of compensation for the capital city specific constraints of Ottawa’s local autonomy.  
6.3. Explaining locational policies in Ottawa 
In this subchapter, I will firstly summarize the manifestations of locational policies in order to 
depict the locational policies agenda of Ottawa (see Table 26). In the following, I will discuss the 
tested expectations (see Table 27) and try to connect them in order understand the 
interdependencies in formulating locational policies.  
Table 26: Locational policies agenda of Ottawa 
Locational policies Manifestations of locational policies 
Innovation policies - Focus on technology-intense key industries 
- Support for start-ups and entrepreneurs 
Image building - Two-dimensional strategy: “G7 capital and high-tech town” 
Business prerequisites - Focus on developing land and real estate, especially ensuring office occupancy in 
Downtown 
Acquisition - Threefold acquisition strategy based on:  
1)Soft-landing spot in the North American market 
2) Local key industries 
3) Local talent pool 
Coordination - No coordination with Gatineau nor with neighboring Ontarian municipalities 
Public funds 
compensation payments 
- Payments in lieu of taxes 
- Importance of public funds  
Locational policies 
agenda 
- Focus on fostering innovation 
- Two-dimensional image building as a government city and business city 
- Developing land and real estate to increase property tax base 
- Attracting public funds 
 
The locational policies agenda of Ottawa is dominated by four topics. First, the overarching topic 
of the newest local economic development plan is innovation. The two main strategies to foster 
innovation are increasing the linkages between key actors in the local economy and providing 
services for start-ups. Second, Ottawa tries to position itself simultaneously as a government town 
and as a business hub. This is best detectable in image building with its strategy to present itself as 
a G7 capital and a high-tech town. Third, the city hall is active in ensuring and increasing the value 
of the property tax base. These activities are concentrated Downtown because of its rather high 
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land and real estate value, i.e. the stakes are the highest Downtown. Fourth, the centrality of public 
funds for the budget of local government in the Canadian MLG system leads to a systematic 
attraction of public funds. These funds come with strings attached, i.e. certain conditionalities that 
are tied to this governmental money. Similarly to The Hague, the importance of these funds for 
the local budget may explain why these conditionalities lead to a diffusion of economic 
development paradigms from the federal and the provincial level into locational policies in Ottawa. 
Thus, in a setting with limited local tax autonomy, these conditionalities are a strong policy 
diffusion mechanism.  
Table 27: Expectation testing Ottawa 
Expectation Expectation 
testing 
 Specifications 
E1.1: A moderately developed RIS enables 
the formulation of innovation policies. 
Not supported -Reversed causality 
E1.2: Innovation policies aim at modifying 
and transforming the constraining parts of 
the RIS. 
Supported - 
E2: A moderately developed RIS enables 
the formulation of both a capital city image 
building strategy and a business town image 
building strategy. 
Supported - 
E3: Low local tax autonomy constrains to 
focus on income taxes and enables to focus 
on the provision of land and real estate. 
Supported - 
E4: A moderately developed RIS enables 
the adaption of a profound and large-scale 
acquisition strategy. 
Not supported Acquisition strategy is based on other assets 
than its RIS such as being a ‘soft-landing’ 
spot to the North American market and its 
highly-educated working force 
E5.1: High institutional fragmentation 
constrains and low local tax autonomy 
enables regional coordination what leads to 
negative coordination. 
Partly supported Vertical institutional fragmentation 
constrains regional coordination 
Low tax autonomy rather constrains tax 
competition than enabling coordination 
E5.2: Coordination aims at overcoming the 
constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
Partly supported The new governance model to coordinate 
with the NCC may be a way to better deal 
with the capital city specific constraints 
Coordination does not aim to overcome low 
local tax autonomy 
Coordination does not aim to overcome the 
vertical institutional fragmentation 
E6: 
I: Low local tax autonomy enables to ask 
for public funds.  
II: Capital city specific constraints enable 
to ask for compensation payments. 
 
Supported 
Supported 
- 
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Table 27 summarizes the tested expectations in the case of Ottawa. In the following paragraph, I 
discuss the expectations stemming from the RIS as the explanatory variable whereas in the next 
paragraph I discuss the expectations stemming from the MLG setting. 
Expectation 1.1 is not supported whereas expectation 1.2 is supported. It seems that innovation 
policies are not constrained or enabled by a moderately developed RIS but that innovation policies 
are rather strategic policy tools that target the weaknesses of a RIS. The development of the image 
building strategy in the last 15 years strongly supports expectation 2. Only when the RIS was 
dynamic, was Ottawa able to put forward an image of a business town. Contrary to the expectation 
4, the RIS does not influence the acquisition strategy of Ottawa. Invest Ottawa tries to acquire 
firms with alternative arguments such as being a ‘soft-landing spot into the North-American 
market’ or by pointing to its highly educated population.  
Low local tax autonomy has, as expected, a constraining influence on the formulation of business 
prerequisites (E3) and an enabling influence on the attraction of public funds and compensation 
payments (E6). Given that the limited discretion in tax instruments, locational policy instruments 
in the business prerequisites category focus on increasing the value of land and real estate. Ottawa 
does it extensively because these activities have rather direct implications on the local budget. On 
the other hand, low local tax autonomy leads to a dependence on public funds and compensation 
payments. Through the conditionalities of these public funds, the federal and provincial economic 
development policy paradigm diffuse into locational policies formulation on the local level. The 
horizontal coordination in the FUA Ottawa-Gatineau is constrained by the vertical institutional 
fragmentation, i.e. provincial border, at the very heart of the region (E5.1). Furthermore, 
coordination is not able to overcome low local tax autonomy. However, a new governance model 
between the NCC and the cities of Ottawa and Gatineau may overcome some of the capital city 
specific constraints (E5.2). 
6.4. Conclusion 
Generally, the city officials take an active role in locational policies formulation. They perceive the 
city as a central actor that coordinates and facilitates the formulation and implementation of 
locational policies. This observation is supported by Andrew and Doloreux (2014, 138) who 
described the local governance of economic development as two-dimensional: On the one hand, 
local officials try to engage private-sector leaders in economic development organizations, but on 
the other hand city hall prefers to play an active and leading role in these locational policies 
formulation.  
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The locational policies agenda is dominated by four main topics. Firstly, innovation is fostered by 
aiming to increase the linkages between the local key economic actors as well as by providing 
services for start-ups. Secondly, Ottawa positions itself simultaneously as a government town and 
a business hub. Thirdly, the city hall is active in developing the real estate property base and fourth, 
the city hall aims to attract public funds. 
The MLG setting and especially low local tax autonomy is a better predictor of locational policies 
than the moderately developed RIS. Low local autonomy constrains some locational policies (such 
as income taxes) but is enabling to ask for public funds and compensation payments. Low local tax 
autonomy causes a schizophrenic orientation of some locational policies. On the one hand, they 
are output-oriented, i.e. should help to develop the local economy, on the other hand, they are 
simultaneously input-orientated, i.e. they target public funds that should co-finance these economic 
development policies. Thus, the conditionsalities of central governmental funds are strong steering 
mechanisms in a setting of low local tax autonomy.  
Low local autonomy causes a locational policies agenda that operates with an avoiding spending 
logic. More precisely, locational policies aim to create jobs in Ottawa. Among other factors, jobs 
reduce local social assistance spending. It is currently under negotiation what proportions of social 
assistance is funded by the Province of Ontario and thus how much local governments have to 
contribute to social assistance. This case study suggests that if local governments contribute less to 
social assistance in future, the focus on job growth will attenuate, and vice versa.  
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7. The Hague 
The Hague is also known as ‘The Residence’ (Meijers et al. 2014). The term refers to The Hague 
as the seat of the Dutch royal family and all three branches of political power. ‘The Residence’ also 
reflects that The Hague exerts the capital city function but is not the constitutional capital city 
because this title is reserved to Amsterdam. The Hague does not only host most of the major 
national government organizations but it is also home to an impressive number of international 
organizations that are active in the field of international law and security. The Hague is also called 
the ‘Second United Nation (UN) City’ as it hosts, among others, the only UN body outside of New 
York, namely the International Court of Justice. Given this international importance, The Hague 
is mostly described and studied in the context of its international organizations (van Krieken and 
McKay 2005b; van der Wusten 2006; Groen 2014; Meijers et al. 2014). 
The importance of the public sector organizations gives The Hague a distinct economic profile 
that is complementary to the other major Dutch cities such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht 
(Meijers 2007; Meijers et al. 2014, 92). Thus, The Hague fits the category of SCCs: It is economically 
inferior compared to the main economic centers such as the buzzing Amsterdam and near-by 
harbor city Rotterdam, but it is the political center of the Netherlands as the current Mayor of The 
Hague Jozias van Aartsen states: “For many people in the Netherlands, the name of our city is 
synonymous with government, politics and parliament” (City of The Hague 2014g, 3).  
Table 28 summarizes the case study The Hague. The locational policies meet most of the 
expectations. In general, the locational policies mainly target the cluster of international 
organizations and the emerging (cyber) security sector. This resembles the overall economic 
development plan that is to leverage its international status as the city of peace and justice while 
simultaneously developing towards an international business city. Especially the restricted local tax 
autonomy has consequences for locational policies formulation. Low local tax autonomy incentives 
infrastructure development and leads to a focus on attracting public funds.  
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Table 28: Expectations and findings of the case study The Hague 
Nr. Explanatory factor Phenomenon 
to be 
explained 
Expectation Result 
E1 RIS 
- Moderately developed 
Innovation 
policies  
A moderately developed RIS enables 
the formulation of innovation policies. 
Not supported 
E1.2 RIS 
- RIS failure(s): 
(Organizational thinness), 
(fragmentation), lock-in 
Innovation 
policies  
Innovation policies aim at modifying 
and transforming the constraining parts 
of the RIS. 
Supported 
E2 RIS 
- Moderately developed 
Image 
building 
A moderately developed RIS enables 
the formulation of both a capital city 
image building strategy and a business 
town image building strategy. 
Supported 
E3 MLG setting 
- low local tax autonomy 
Business 
prerequisites 
Low local tax autonomy constrains to 
focus on income taxes and enables to 
focus on the provision of land and real 
estate. 
Supported 
E4 RIS 
- Moderately developed 
Acquisition A moderately developed RIS enables 
the adaption of a profound and large-
scale acquisition strategy. 
Partly supported 
E5.1 MLG setting 
- low institutional 
fragmentation 
- low local tax autonomy 
Regional 
coordination 
Low institutional fragmentation and 
low local tax autonomy enable regional 
coordination. 
Partly supported 
E5.2 MLG setting 
- constrained in local tax 
autonomy 
Coordination Coordination aims at overcoming the 
constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
Not supported 
E6 MLG setting 
- low local tax autonomy 
- No capital city specific 
constraints 
 
Public funds 
and 
compensation 
payments 
I: Low local tax autonomy enables to 
ask for public funds. 
II: No capital city specific constraints 
constrain to ask for compensation 
payments. 
Supported 
Supported 
 
The remainder of this case study chapter is structured in four subchapters. The first subchapter 
gives a general description of The Hague as well as discusses the manifestations of the explanatory 
factors. The second subchapter addresses the different locational policies categories and tests the 
respective expectation(s) one step at a time. The third subchapter links the different locational 
policies to a locational policies agenda and discusses the results in an integrative manner. Finally, 
the last subchapter concludes the case study.  
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7.1. Profile of The Hague  
7.1.1. History 
The Hague was never an economic or military center. Instead it served since the Early Middle Age 
as a neutral meeting place, a site for negotiations and a venue for arbitration for the powerful Dutch 
city-states of the late Middle Ages, namely Amsterdam, Delft, Dordrecht, Gouda, Haarlem and 
Leyden (van Krieken and McKay 2005a, 3). It was therefore a straightforward decision to place the 
Dutch political and judicial organizations in The Hague which was done by Prince Maurice in 1585. 
Since then, The Hague has functioned for most of the time as the political seat of various Dutch 
and occupying governments. During the Dutch Golden Age, the City flourished “due to the 
presence of the government, the court and judicial bodies, in spite of the fact that it was not a 
trading city” (Lagerwood 2005, 49). The Hague never obtained official Dutch city-rights which 
may be explained by the reluctance of the Dutch political leaders to subordinate the government 
under the rule of powerful Middle Age city magistrates (Meijers et al. 2014, 93). 
The reason why Amsterdam has obtained the capital city status is connected to the French 
occupation of The Netherlands. During the rule of French King Louis as the King of Holland 
(1806–1810), the capital city status switched from The Hague to Utrecht and then to Amsterdam. 
Napoleon Bonaparte took over the leadership from his brother Louis in 1810. He preferred to 
settle in Amsterdam and thus made it his permanent capital. After the withdrawal of Napoleon in 
1813, the Dutch decision makers returned the seat of government to The Hague but left the capital 
city status to Amsterdam, as it was not considered to be very important (Meijers et al. 2014, 93) 
and/or it was a compromise because it “met both the feelings of self-esteem of the burghers of 
Amsterdam and the fears of other provinces of a renewed dominance by Holland and Amsterdam 
in particular” (Donner 2008, 201). Since then, the Netherlands has known a divide between the 
constitutional capital city status and the actual capital city function. 
The Hague’s rise as the location of prominent international legal organizations is often described 
as a legacy of the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius. The Hague was home to Grotius when he wrote his 
influential Mare liberum (The Free Sea). However, he wrote his master piece De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On 
the Law of War and Peace) that made him the ‘father of international law’ in the French exile in 
1625 (van Krieken and McKay 2005a, 5; Donner 2008, 201).35 The first Peace Conference in 1899 
                                                            
35Hugo Grotius or Huigh de Groot was born in Delft in 1583. Grotius advocated for an international legal order that is 
no longer rested on divine law or dynastic traditions but on the notion of a worldwide community of law and the 
natural rights of individuals. Dutch political leader sentenced him to life imprisonment due to his political beliefs. He 
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initiated by the Russian Czar Nicholas II made The Hague truly a reference point for international 
law (Eyffinger 2005). One direct outcome of the first Peace Conferences was the establishment of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899 which has been the first institution for settling 
interstate disputes (van Krieken and McKay 2005a, 17). The following building of the Peace Palace 
was important to symbolically denote The Hague to international law which has been made 
possible by the donations of the steel magnate and philanthropist Andrew Carnegie. 
In 1920, the first assembly of the League of Nations adopted the Statute of a Permanent Court of 
Justice of the League of Nations which should be established in the Peace Palace alongside the 
existing Permanent Court of Arbitration. After the Second World War these institutions were 
reorganized under the International Court of Justice – which is an official UN organ. The Dutch 
government in this period was benevolent but not active in acquiring such organizations (van der 
Wusten 2006). The Cold War was then freezing global multilateral cooperation what stopped the 
creation of international organizations. However, within the Western block major international 
legal institutions emerged that were not located in The Hague such as the Court of Justice in 
Luxembourg or the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The end of the bipolar world 
order triggered a sprawl of new multilateral organizations and in that wave The Hague managed to 
further enlarge and diversify its international cluster by successfully biding for organizations such 
as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPWC), the High Commissioner 
of National Minorities, the International Criminal Court of Former Yugoslavia, the International 
Criminal Court, Europol and Eurojust. Lagerwaard (2005) describes the period after the end of the 
Cold Wars as the ‘renaissance’ of The Hague.  
Regarding national government organizations, the national spatial planning policies in the 1970s 
did not favor a further concentration of functions in the major Dutch cities but rather strived for 
regional equalization. The aim was to create jobs in peripheral regions of the country by 
decentralizing government organizations (Meijers et al. 2014, 93). In the 1970s and 1980s, The 
Hague lost some ministries and governmental agencies to the neighboring municipalities of Rijswijk 
and Voorburg, but also to some more peripheral regions of the country. In that time, even the 
state-owned telecom company KPN (Koninklijke KPN NV) relocated to Groningen. The pendulum 
swung back in the 1990s as the central government paradigm shifted to a strengthening of Dutch 
cities in order to increase their international competitiveness (Meijers et al. 2014, 93). These policy 
shifts allowed the ministries and KPN a return to The Hague.  
                                                            
was able to escape from his prison in Loevestein Castle and what makes the claim of The Hague to be the home of 
Grotius somewhat presumptuous (Donner 2008, 197).  
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7.1.2. Geography and population 
The Netherlands is a densely populated country that mostly features small or medium-sized cities. 
The Hague is located in the Randstad that is an archetypal example of a polycentric urban region 
located in the Western part of the Netherlands. The name Randstad comes from the Dutch word 
Rand which means rim and refers to the horseshoe-shaped encircling of a green open area called 
the Green Heart (Meijers 2005, 771). The Hague is besides Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht 
one of the four urban centers in the Randstad. The Randstad can be further divided into a north 
wing which includes Amsterdam, Utrecht and surrounding cities and a south wing. The South Wing 
is the part of the Randstad that belongs to the province South Holland (Zuid Holland) and includes 
Rotterdam, The Hague and surrounding cities such as Delft or Leiden. Around 7.8 million people 
live in the Randstad (equal to 46 % of the Dutch population), an area constituting less than 20 per 
cent of Dutch territory (Randstadtmonitor 2014). The province South Holland covers about a third 
of the whole Randstad and features 3.5 million inhabitants. The FUA consists of the City of The 
Hague and five more neighboring municipalities.36 The FUA grew constantly over the last 35 years. 
Generally, the small-scale of The Netherlands and overlapping spheres of influences in the 
Randstad complicates the identifications of FUAs resulting in varying circulating delimitations with 
varying degrees of functional coherence (Meijers et al. 2014, 93). 
Table 29: Population of different relevant perimeters 
Scale 1980 1990 2000 2010 2015 Change (%) 
1980-2015 
Municipality The Hague 
(s-Gravenhage) 
(1 municipality) 
456’886 441’506 441’094 488’553 514’861 +12,69 
Agglomeration The Hague 
(9 municipalities) 
681’045 691’872 715‘300 802’746 838’015 +23,05 
Province South-Holland 
(Zuid-Holland) 
(60 municipalities) 
3’083’555  3’219’839  3‘397‘744  3’505’611  3’600’011 +16,75 
Netherlands 14’091’014 14’892’574 15’863’950 16’574’989 16’900’726 +19,94 
Source: Statistics Netherlands (2014). For Agglomeration definition: COROP region (Agglomeratie ‘s-Greavenhage). 
In 1960, The Hague had about 600’000 inhabitants. In the following years the population 
constantly dropped until it stagnated at around 450’000 from the year 1986 to 2003. It is projected 
that The Hague will grow to about 575’000 inhabitants by 2040 (Meijers et al. 2014, 93). The 
population decrease in the 1970s and 1980s can be explained by the out-movement of white 
                                                            
36 The OECD defines the FUA The Hague as consisting of eleven local governments with a total population of 906 
897 in 2014 (OECD 2015). 
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middle-class families to neighboring towns such as the newly created satellite town of Zoetermeer 
(Meijers et al. 2014, 93) which explains the constant growth of the FUA The Hague. This is a classic 
suburbanization pattern that many cities in Western democracies experienced in the last three 
decades of the Twentieth century. 
7.1.3. Regional Innovation System 
The RIS in The Hague can be characterized as being in an advanced stage. It is organizationally 
thick because it exhibits various clusters and research organizations stemming from the capital city 
function as well as The Hague’s international role as the platform for discussing international law 
issues. The knowledge interactions vary given the different clusters. The knowledge dynamics are 
accelerating in the security cluster and are high in the international organization cluster, whereas in 
the other three clusters the knowledge dynamics are rather low. Although the capital city function 
was crucial in the development of these clusters, nowadays they are operating rather independently 
from central government organizations.  
Knowledge application and exploitation subsystem  
The tertiary sector makes up 88% of all employment in The Hague. Governmental organizations 
on the international, national, provincial and municipal level are the most important employers in 
The Hague by providing about 20% of all jobs in the city (City of The Hague 2014e, 49). The ratio 
between KIBS jobs and high- and medium-tech manufacturing jobs is similarly high in The Hague, 
Amsterdam and Utrecht (see Table 30). The fact that three out of the four major Dutch cities have 
such a high KIBS/manufacturing jobs ratio highlights the knowledge-intensive Dutch economy. 
Only Rotterdam with its huge harbor features a very different economic base.  
Table 30: Ratio between KIBS jobs and manufacturing jobs in Dutch cities  
Sector The Hague Amsterdam Utrecht Rotterdam 
KIBS 50'098 123‘606 109‘193 56‘645 
High-tech industry 3‘642 9‘665 9‘312 15‘401 
Ratio 13.8 12.8 11.7 3.68 
Source: LISA (Landelijk Informatiesysteem van Arbeidsplaatsen) (2016). Proprietary data, COROP 2012. 
The RIS in The Hague features five major clusters that are all related to the capital city function or 
to The Hague’s role as birthplace of international law and peace negotiations. Table 31 describes 
the four private sector clusters. Out of comparability difficulties, the international organization 
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cluster is left aside. I will outline in the following paragraphs that these clusters are similar regarding 
the number of jobs, but the knowledge dynamics within these sectors vary considerably.  
Table 31: Private sector clusters in The Hague 
Cluster Security Telecom & ICT Oil & Gas Finance 
Number of jobs 10’000 14’000, thereof 
10’000 in telecom 
12’000  13’000 
Knowledge 
application and 
exploitation  
- Important firms 
Innovative, big 
growth-potential 
- Siemens 
- Thales 
- Fox-IT 
Under pressure from 
new technologies 
- KPN 
- T-Mobile 
Under pressure from 
new technologies 
- Shell 
- Q8 
Limited growth-
potential 
- Natinonale-
Nederlanden 
- ING 
Knowledge 
generation and 
diffusion 
- Important 
organizations 
Intensive cooperation  
- TU Delft 
- National Forensic 
Institute 
- TNO 
Sparse cooperation 
- TU Delft 
- The Hague 
University of Applied 
Science 
Sparse cooperation 
- TU Delft 
- TNO 
Sparse cooperation 
- Erasmus University 
Rotterdam 
Governmental 
organizations 
- Important 
governmental 
organizations 
Government as a 
regulator and buyer 
- Ministry of Defense 
- Ministry of Security 
and Justice 
Government as a 
regulator (and buyer) 
- Ministry of 
Economic Affairs 
Government as a 
regulator  
- Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Government as a 
regulator 
- Ministry of 
Economic Affairs 
- Ministry of Finance 
Knowledge 
dynamics 
High Low, no common 
ground for 
cooperation 
Low, no common 
ground for 
cooperation 
Low, no common 
ground for 
cooperation 
Outlook Big growth potential, 
ambition to be the 
number one cyber 
security hub in 
Europe 
Search for a new 
business model 
Search for new 
energy technologies 
Limited growth-
potential, 
competition with the 
financial cluster in 
Amsterdam 
 
Source: Own compilation, Job numbers from The Hague (2014a; 2014b; 2014c; 2014d). 
The security cluster is a prime example of an innovative sector that connects firms with research 
institutes and public sector organizations. In the first place, security firms have established 
themselves in The Hague because of the spatial proximity to international organizations that are 
specialized in the area of security and conflict resolution such as Europol, Eurojust, and the 
International Criminal Court. As the dependency on digital technology has increased, it has been 
primarily the Dutch public security organizations that have started to demand cyber security 
products (Interview den Bruijnen). The fast-moving nature of cyber technologies requires 
governments to stay in touch with recent innovations regardless if these innovation have been 
developed in the public or the private sector. As a consequence, governmental organizations act as 
buyers as well as innovation partners because they constantly request innovative technologies but 
do as well accompany the whole product development process (Interview den Bruijnen). The 
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Hague managed to set-up a physical center, called The Hague Security Delta Campus, to foster the 
knowledge exchange between the important actors in the ‘triple helix’. This cluster has grown to 
the largest European security cluster. It managed to overcome the fragmentation once prevailing 
in The Hague’s security sector (see subchapter 7.2.1).  
The telecom & ICT cluster originates from the formerly state-owned telecom company KPN. 
Other big telecom players like T-Mobile and Huawei chose to settle in The Hague because they 
wanted to avoid locational disadvantages by not having spatial proximity to government agencies 
who regulate the telecom market (Interview Adarghal). KPN, T-Mobile and Huawei are all in the 
top ten of firms providing employment in The Hague (City of The Hague 2014c). Small and 
medium sized supplier firms gather around these big anchor companies. The dynamics in this 
cluster are driven by competition between the big anchor companies rather than cooperation what 
obstructs knowledge interactions (Interviews: Krol and Kok, Oliver).  
The ecosystem of the oil & gas cluster resembles the telecom & ICT cluster (Interview Krol and 
Kok). The anchor organization Royal Dutch Shell, the world’s largest corporation in terms of 
turnover (Meijers et al. 2014, 92) is located in The Hague because the first oil extractions in the 
former Dutch colony Indonesia needed authorization and support from the colonial 
administration. Similarly to KPN, the presence of Shell attracted other major oil companies like 
Kuwait Petroleum (Q8) as well as operators, engineering firms and suppliers. The oil & gas cluster 
features inter-regional linkages especially with Rotterdam. Whereas Rotterdam concentrates on 
‘downstream’ technologies – refining, processing and purifying of crude oil and natural gas plus 
the harbor as an important transportation hub, The Hague concentrates on ‘upstream’ technologies 
such as the exploration and production of crude oil and natural gas as well as headquarter functions 
(Interviews: Dencher, Krol and Kok).  
The finance cluster is home to a large variety of pension funds, asset management companies and 
insurances. Thus, the finance cluster in The Hague is sometimes labeled as ‘slow finance’ to 
distinguish the financial activities to the stock exchange markets of, for example, Amsterdam 
(Interview Oliver). ‘Slow finance’ should indicate financial activities with a focus on sustainability, 
social responsibility and long-term rewards. These kinds of companies are dependent on the state 
as a regulator what may explain the development of such a finance cluster in The Hague. However, 
this sector is more a geographical concentrated assemblage of similar financial firms than an 
interconnected and interactive cluster (Interview Oliver). 
Lastly, the international organization cluster is home to 240 international organizations and 129 
embassies and consulates which accounts for around 19’500 jobs. The direct employment triggers 
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another 18’000 indirect jobs, of which, 75% are staffed with people with secondary or lower 
education (Decisio 2011, xi). Despite the cluster is often labeled peace and justice cluster (see 
subchapter 7.2.2), only 53 of 310 international organizations operate in this specific area (Meijers 
et al. 2014, 95). The cluster of international organizations displays fruitful within interaction but it 
lacks economic potential as it is merely budget-driven and does not offer concrete product 
innovations (Interviews: Van Ommeren and Wijnen).  
Knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem  
The Hague was never known as a city of education. The city’s need for an educated work force has 
always been supplied by other Dutch university towns such as the neighboring Leiden or Delft 
(Interviews: J. de Vries, Shimson, van Ommeren and Wijnen). The Hague may be even the largest 
European city without its own university (Interview Meijers). This lack of tertiary education is only 
partly compensated by a large University of Applied Science with about 20’000 enrolled students. 
An important technical knowledge organization is the Netherlands Organization of Applied 
Scientific Research (TNO) which is devoted to provide technical expertise in various policy fields. 
Furthermore, The Hague hosts several knowledge organizations in the fields of international law, 
conflict resolution and security.37 The Hague Academic Coalition (HAC) is a network of academic 
institutions in the fields of peace, justice and security with the goal to join forces between these 
diverse research institutes(Wusten 2006, 258). This bulk of organizations is embedded in the global 
security community but also display intra-regional linkages with federal agencies and contractors as 
well as university institutes and other research organizations. In that way, these internationally-
oriented knowledge organizations enable The Hague to function as a global knowledge hub for 
security (Warland 2016c). 
RIS development 
The knowledge application and exploitation subsystem is organizationally thick whereas the 
knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem is thin regarding educational organizations, but 
thick regarding international knowledge institutes in the field of security and international law. The 
clusters differ much in respect to their knowledge dynamics. Whereas the knowledge diffusion is 
sophisticated in the (cyber) security cluster and to some extent in the international organizations 
cluster, the other three clusters are rather simple geographical concentrations of firms in the same 
                                                            
37 Examples are the The Hague Center for Strategic Studies, the T.M.C. Asser Institute, or the Netherlands Institute 
of International Relations Clingendael. 
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sector but they do not have the required knowledge linkages in order to consider them as dynamic 
clusters. The relevant anchor companies for these latter clusters were originally settled in The 
Hague because of proximity to the national government in its role as a regulator. Nowadays, the 
big players in these sectors operate as competitors which limits fruitful interaction. While 
fragmentation was never an issue in the international organization cluster, fragmentation is starting 
to alleviate in the security cluster. In the telecom & ICT, the oil & gas, and the finance cluster, 
fragmentation is still hindering knowledge interactions. 
7.1.4. Multilevel governance setting 
The Dutch political system is described as a decentralized unitary state (Bos 2013). but with 
uniform public services across the whole country (Allers and Vermeulen 2014, 4). The Hague has 
only limited local tax autonomy but does not face constraints due to its capital city function. The 
FUA The Hague is not institutionally fragmented. Local governance processes are influenced by 
the corporatist tradition of the Netherlands meaning that a few privileged private sector 
organizations have access to the local policy-making process (Andeweg and Irwin 2014). 
Public vertical dimension 
The Dutch Republic of the United Seven Provinces (1581 – 1795) was the first federal state in 
modern history. Cities and provinces enjoyed high autonomy (van Krieken and McKay 2005a, 3). 
In the aftermath of Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat and in times of the first wave of democratization, 
Prime Minister Johan Rudolph Thorbecke drastically limited the power of the royal house, 
increased the power of the parliament, introduced elections and vertical power-sharing. In 
honoring the father of the Dutch constitution, the vertical governance system in the Netherland is 
referred to as the ‘Thorebecke’s house’.  
In 2016, ‘Thorebecke’s house’ consists of three state levels: the central government, twelve 
provinces and 390 municipalities (Statistic Netherlands 2014). The provinces are the least powerful 
level in the Dutch MLG system (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 212). The most important tasks of the 
provinces is the provision of public transport as it accounts for about a third of the provincial 
expenditures and the supervision of municipalities (Bos 2013, 42). ‘Thorebecke’s house’ drastically 
extended the tasks of the municipal governments. This additional expenditures were mostly 
financed by increasing municipal taxes that varied substantially between municipalities. This led to 
a migration of rich inhabitants in low-tax municipalities and subsequently in a segregation of richer 
and poorer regions. This process was stopped in 1929 through harsh policy measures: The local 
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income taxes were abolished and a municipal fund and money transfer system from the central 
government to the municipalities was introduced. “The purpose was not only to reduce the major 
differences between municipal income tax rates, but also to ensure the same level of public services 
in each municipality” (Bos 2013, 35). 38  
Since the early 1980s, the Dutch central government has been transferring a variety of policies to 
the local governments (e.g. library service, sports and recreation, public housing, social and cultural 
work, the preservation of monuments). As a consequence, the power structure of the Dutch MLG 
system shifted towards municipalities at the expense of the provinces (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 
214). Since the decentralization of social assistance to the local level in 2004, welfare and social 
services are by far the most important budgetary item as it accounts for about a third of municipal 
budgets (Bos 2013, 42). 
Local governments in the Netherlands have three main sources of income: (1) local taxes (mainly 
on property) and local user fees, (2) unconditional government grants (also called not earmarked 
revenue-sharing) and (3) conditional government grants (also called earmarked grants-in-aid) 
(Derksen and Schaap 2010). In the mid-1980s only about 7 per cent of the budget is raised by local 
taxes, primarily through real estate tax (onroerendezaakbelastingen, OZB). The rest of the budget 
consisted of central government funds which accounted for the saying that Dutch municipalities 
are tied to the central government by ‘golden ropes’ ” (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 219). The 
proportions of local taxes and user fees have multiplied by 3 between 1985 and 2009. Municipalities 
started increasing the real estate tax rates in order to gain more independently raised revenue. 
However, in 2006, the Dutch government capped the local real estate tax rates to stop these tax 
increases. As a compensation, local governments received bigger sums of unconditional 
governmental grants, but municipalities have started simultaneously to increase user fees such as 
sewage tax, garbage collection, or fees for building and permits (Dersken and Schaap 2010, 17). 
In a comparative perspective of OECD countries the local tax autonomy is limited. Only 3.6% of 
all Dutch taxes are raised on the local level. This ranks the Netherlands in 28 out of the 34 listed 
OECD countries (OECD 2014a). Thus, Dutch local governments in the Netherlands have to rely 
considerably on central government grants. The unconditional grants are allocated based on a 
complex revenue-sharing formula of 28 variables. The formula does “not only take account of the 
number of inhabitants, but also corrects for differences in tax-earning capacity (real estate value of 
dwellings and business property) and external circumstances, like a regional function or the social 
and physical structure” (Bos 2013, 44). The conditional grant shrank from 70 to 33 percentage 
                                                            
38 Bos (2013, chapter 3) offers a good overview over history of the Dutch vertical power-sharing. 
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points, which increases the spending autonomy of municipalities. About 62% of all conditional 
grants are earmarked for social affairs and employment in 2009 (Bos 2013, 43), which again shows 
the importance of this decentralization in 2004. Thus, local governments are in a position in which 
they have to carry out more services, especially welfare services, and are thereby pressured to find 
new independent revenue. However, this allows them to simultaneously enjoy more autonomy in 
spending governmental grants. 
Table 32: Local revenue composition City of The Hague 
Budgetary items EUR 
in Millions 
% 
Property tax (OZB) 80.5 3.23 
Other local taxes 24.7 0.99 
Unconditional government grants 1129.6 45.31 
Conditional government grants 455.8 18.28 
Other income (user fees, interests, 
dividends and leases) 
802.6 32.19 
Total  2493.2 100 
Source: City of The Hague (2014f, 242–44). Outlook data for 2015. 
The constrained local tax autonomy manifests itself in the budget of the City of The Hague (see 
Table 32). The local taxes make up 4% of the budget. The property tax constitutes 3.2% of the 
budget and other taxes such as dog tax or tourist tax make up another 1%. Consequentially, the 
unconditional government grants (about 45% of the budget) and he conditional government grants 
(about 18% of the budget) are important to sustain the budget of The Hague. Other income such 
as user fees, interests, dividends and leases make up 32.2% of the income.  
Whereas the local tax autonomy is constrained, The Hague does not face additional constraints due 
to its capital city function. However, the presence of central governmental organizations such as 
the ministries, international organizations and the embassies diminishes the local property tax base 
because they are tax-exempt. The Dutch political system does not offer payments in lieu of 
property taxes that would compensate for these tax losses. 
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Public horizontal dimension 
 
The Netherlands are often described as highly 
institutionally fragmented. This is especially the 
case in the small-scaled Randstad where a lot of 
administrative boundaries cutting through FUAs 
(Meijers 2005). The small-scale of the Randstad 
and the close proximity of cities leads to 
overlapping FUAs which complicates the 
identification of FUAs in the Randstad region. 
Thus, varying circulating delimitations of FUAs 
exist with varying degrees of functional 
coherence (Meijers, Hollander, and 
Hoogerbrugge 2012, 6; Meijers et al. 2014, 93). 
Statistics Netherlands (2014) defines the FUA 
The Hague consisting of nine municipalities 
whereas the OECD (2014b) defines the FUA The 
Hague as consisting of eleven local governments. 
The neighboring FUA Rotterdam is very close and 
functionally connected to the FUA The Hague (Meijers, Hollander, and Hoogerbrugge 2012). Thus 
one can also speak of a FUA Rotterdam- The Hague. Yet in all those definitions of the FUA no 
vertical fragmentation exist because all municipalities belong to the Province of South Holland 
which covers the whole South Wing of the Randstad. 
Local governance dimension  
Gladdish (1991, 144) famously described the Dutch governance system as an “orchestra with no 
conductor”. For Andeweg and Irwin (2014) consociationalism and corporatism are the two most 
important features of the Dutch policy-making process. Consociationalism is important because 
it handles and stabilizes major internal divisions along ethnic, religious and language lines. 
Meanwhile, corporatism is important because interest groups and the government have a 
relationship that is based on exchange (influence for support) and cooperation rather than 
competition.  
Cartography. Mario Huber 
Figure 7: Map of FUA The Hague 
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The Netherlands features a high level of corporatism in a comparative perspective (Siaroff 1999). 
The ‘polder model’ is often used to describe Dutch policy-making. The ‘polder model’ refers to a 
cooperation of employers’ organization, labor unions and the governmental entities to address 
labor issues in a consensus-based, non-institutionalized and non-confrontational way (Andeweg 
and Irwin 2014, 198). On the national level, the ‘polder model’ is institutionalized in the Sociaal-
Economische Raad (Social-Economic Council) the major economic advisory council of the Dutch 
government which compromises of an equal share of employer’s organizations representatives, 
labor unions members and government-appointed experts. This corporatism tradition of the 
Netherlands leads to various ‘policy networks’ and ‘policy communities’ on different levels and in 
different policy fields (Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 198). 
This corporatist tradition emulated on the local level. In The Hague talks between labor unions, 
employer organizations and the city are institutionalized in the so-called Administrate 
Consultations for Economic Affairs (Bestuurlijk Overleg Economische Zaken abbreviated as BOEZ). 
The BOEZ is a local counterpart to the Social-Economic Council. In the BOEZ, local employers’ 
organization representatives, local labor unions members discuss the economic agenda together 
with municipal council members (aldermen) and department officials of the City of The Hague 
(Interview Schuttenbeld). In the Coalition agreement 2014-2018 (Coalitionakkoord 2014-2018) the 
political parties have indicated their intention to establish an international and economic 
development board on the metropolitan level Rotterdam-The Hague (City of The Hague 2014h, 
9). The goal is to incorporate important private actors and knowledge institutions, i.e. ‘triple helix’ 
actors, into the formulation of locational policies (Interview Schiebroek).  
7.2. Locational policies in The Hague 
The Hague’s most recent economic development agenda is called ‘Quality is key’ (City of The 
Hague 2011; also Interview: van Vondel and M. de Vries). It outlines for areas of future 
development: First, the cluster of international organizations should be extended by mainly 
fostering growth in the area of (cyber) security. Second, a focus on quality of life aspects should 
increase the attractiveness of The Hague for high-qualified workforce but as well for visitors. Third, 
a cluster focus for all existing economic sectors should internally strengthen these clusters, foster 
the interactions within the clusters, and help to attract new companies to these clusters. And fourth, 
highly skilled workforce should be locally educated what should be achieved by developing 
knowledge institutions. Additionally, The Hague formulated its own agenda for its interactional 
sector under the term ‘The Hague International City’. This agenda aims to strengthen the 
knowledge infrastructure, spatially cluster the international organizations in the ‘International 
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Zone’, improving the hospitality and creating and maintaining attractive living and working 
environment (Interviews: Van Ommeren and Wijnen, van Loon; Meijers et al. 2014, 97). 
The main goal of these specific economic development agendas and the overall locational policies 
efforts in The Hague are to create jobs with the underlying rationale that these should decrease the 
spending on unemployment benefits and social assistance (Interviews: Adarghal, Olliver, Vorkurka 
and Nijhof). One city official formulated it very straightforward: “Employment is the only thing 
that counts” (Interview Adarghal). The City of The Hague started to become more active in 
formulating locational policies during the mid-2000s (Interview van Vondel and M. de Vries). This 
point in time corresponds with the decentralization of the unemployment and social benefit 
assistance in 2004. The WSA act (work and social assistant act) decrees that if a municipality spends 
less on social benefits than the amount it received from this specific budget, the municipality can 
keep these funds. However, if there is a deficit the municipality must fund this deficit with own 
resources (Blommesteijn and Geuns 2012). Thus, the economic development plan is driven by an 
avoiding spending rationale (Interviews: Oliver; Vorkurka and Nijhof; Blommesteijn and Geuns 
2012).  
The strategy of The Hague is to indirectly create low and middle-skilled jobs by attracting high-
skilled jobs (Interviews: Oliver, Vorkurka and Nijhof). A study by the economic consulting 
company Decisio (2011) calculates that the international organizations in The Hague account 
directly for 11’329 jobs and indirectly for another 5’707 jobs. In the surrounding region of The 
Hague another 6’844 direct jobs and 3’448 indirect jobs depend on international organizations. 
This is insofar interesting for the City of The Hague as most of the indirect jobs are for low and 
middle-skilled workers (Interview van Ommeren and Wijnen). However, all Dutch local 
government are exposed to this avoid spending incentives what creates a competition in creating 
and attracting jobs (Interview Oliver). 
On the regional and provincial scale two new actors have been established in 2014-2015 that engage 
in formulating locational policies. The Metropolitan region Rotterdam The Hague (MRTH) was 
established in the beginning of 2015. The driving forces behind MRTH are the cities of Rotterdam 
and The Hague. This new coordination body captures 2.2 Mio inhabitants, consists of 23 
municipalities, employs around 100 staff members and represents an economic region of 
international importance (Interviews: Mejiers, Nijhof and Vorkurka, J. de Vries). The main priority 
of the MRTH is public transportation, but of second priority are investments in regional economic 
development (Interview Nijhof and Vokurka). The Province of South Holland established its own 
economic development agency called InnovationQuarter (IQ) in 2014 with the initial goal to 
consolidate or at least coordinate economic development efforts in its territory (Interview Kok and 
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Krol). However, IQ stands in competition with MRTH which reflects the competition between 
the Province of South Holland and its two biggest cities (more subchapter 7.2.5).  
7.2.1. Innovation policies 
The Hague puts a strong emphasis on innovation polices by mainly applying three different 
innovation policy tools. First, The Hague adopts cluster policies that should foster knowledge 
interactions between firms, research institutes and public actors within the clusters. Second, public 
funds should compensate for the lack of venture capital. And third, the City of The Hague tries 
enlarge the pool of knowledge institutes by attracting research institutes and brining private R&D 
into the city.  
Clusters policies 
All Dutch governmental levels rely on cluster policies. This Dutch economic development policy 
paradigm diffused downward from the national level which started in 2006 a nationwide cluster 
program called Peaks in the Delta (Pieken in de Delta). In 2010 (ongoing), the top sectors program 
has been established as a further development and adjustment of Peaks in the Delta.39 The top 
sectors program requires all actors of the ‘triple helix’ (governments, business and knowledge and 
research institutes) to be active in regional clusters in order to be supported from the national level 
(Interview van der Linden). Also IQ – the economic development agency of the Province of South 
Holland – pursues a cluster approach.40 The City of The Hague applied cluster policies on all its 
economic sectors. The economic department hired account managers for each economic sector. 
However, companies in the sectors telecom & IT, Oil & gas and finance showed little interest in 
engaging in clusters activities. The ecosystem of these clusters consists mainly of a few big anchor 
companies that are competitors and several small and medium-sized companies that are specialized 
suppliers for these big anchor companies. In such a context knowledge diffusion is rather seen as 
a threat to a company than as a potential driver for innovation (Interview Oliver). An example is 
KPN that prefers intra-organizational innovation and is reluctant to add innovation from outside 
the company (Interview Blokmaker).  
                                                            
39 The Netherlands identifies nine top sectors: Horticulture and propagation materials, agri-food, water, life sciences 
and health, chemicals, high-tech, energy, logistics, creative industries. The Hague does not feature one of these sectors, 
but the (cyber) security cluster is incorporated in the high-tech top sector (Interview van der Linden). 
40 IQ focuses on six clusters: life sciences & health, cleantech, security, horticulture & agrifood, high-tech systems, and 
maritime industry. 
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The security sector, on the other hand, and to some extent the international organizations are more 
open towards knowledge sharing. The cluster of international organizations displays fruitful within 
interaction but it lacks economic potential as it is merely budget-driven and does not offer concrete 
product innovations (Interview Van Ommeren and Wijnen). Hence, the City of The Hague does 
not pursue a cluster approach in the international organization but focuses primarily on the (cyber) 
security sector when applying cluster policies.  
In 2010, the City of The Hague conducted a potential analysis of their local economy triggered by 
reorganizations of the national economy development policy (top sectors program) and cutbacks 
in the telecom sector. The economic development officials in The Hague searched for highly 
innovative sectors that are related to already existing clusters. The analysis has revealed that some 
present ICT companies focus on security issues but were only very loosely connected and lack links 
with potential governmental partner and research institutes (Interview Adarghal). The first cluster 
attempts focused on “security & safety, then only in security and now they sharpened their profile 
to cyber security and became Europe’s leader in cyber security” (Interview Krol and Kok).  
In a sense, the City of The Hague jumped on a bandwagon, as in 2010 a loose consortium of firms, 
research institutes and public actors started to organize themselves in a security network in The 
Hague. The consortium got subsidized by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs with the idea 
to strengthen research in cyber security, forensic research, national security, protection of critical 
infrastructure and urban security. Only in 2012 did the Municipality of The Hague start to support 
the project under the label The Hague Security Delta (HSD) whereby delta is the Dutch version for 
(silicon) valley. However, over the last three years (2014-2016) the City of The Hague invested 
about 5 Million Euro into the HSD. 2.5 Million Euro were invested in HSD operations, 1.5 Million 
Euro in the HSD campus, and 1.5 Million Euro in the HSD development fund (Interview de 
Bruijnen).  
In the beginning of 2014, a new building called the HSD campus opened its doors. The HSD 
campus should operate as a facilitator for (face-to-face) interactions between researchers, students 
and innovation managers. The HSD established a Cyber Security Academy in cooperation with various 
research institutes in the region such as the Delft University of Technology, University of Leiden 
(The Hague Campus) and the Hague University of Applied Sciences. The HSD grows on various 
ends with a fast pace. As a publicly recognized success, NATO has decided to concentrate all its 
activities in the field of information technology, digital security of private networks and missile 
defense in The Hague (The Hague Security Delta 2014). Furthermore, around 500 jobs in cyber 
security have been created, the HSD campus grew to 44 organizations that are renting offices and 
18 companies which have been acquired (Interview de Bruijnen). By focusing on cyber security, 
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The Hague is investing in a rapidly growing market with intense research activities (Interviews: de 
Bruijnen, Meijers). 
Cyber security is a typical highly regulated sector that profits from the capital city function in The 
Hague. The state is traditionally at the forefront in the field of security. In this technology-intense 
sector the nation state has to remain on the cutting-edge of digital technology development. Thus, 
public cyber security organization are dependent to keep in touch with research activities of 
companies and research institutes. However, the public sector is also important as a buyer and 
contracting authority (Warland 2016c). Given this role of the state, the proximities to public bodies 
like the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Security and Justice and the Netherlands Forensic 
Institutes is crucial for the cyber security companies (Interview de Bruijnen). In such a context 
sharing knowledge between public actors and companies seems fruitful what makes cyber security 
an optimal sector for applying cluster policies. 
Start-up promotion 
Neither does an established entrepreneurial culture exist in The Hague, nor is much venture capital 
available (Interviews: Genet and van der Klaauw, Kok and Krol). A little bit of public money flows 
to incubators. The City of The Hague contributes to the Connectivity Accelerator that focuses on the 
development of start-ups in telecom & IT. Another incubator specialized on the creative sector is 
the Caballero factory (Interview Oliver). The Center for Innovation, an innovation coordination 
platform associated with the Campus The Hague University of Leiden, focus on technological 
trends in education and research in the areas of peace, justice, security and prosperity and thus tries 
to connect innovation activities to local competences in international law and conflict resolution.  
The City of The Hague provides a public fund with the goal to support start-ups, research projects 
and small and medium-sized companies (Interview van Vondel and M. de Vries). A newer version 
of the fund may spend EUR 6 million over the period 2015-2018 with the requirement that start-
ups and companies have to focus on societal and technological innovations. Another public fund 
is established and managed by IQ (provincial level) with additional contributions from the central 
government and municipalities in the province South Holland. The Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the Province of South Holland each paid 10 Million Euro in this fund. Different cities 
in the Province of South Holland contributed a total of 7-8 Million Euro. Whereas the city of 
Rotterdam paid 3 Million Euro, City of The Hague contributed with 500’000 Euro. There is public 
commitment to invest more in this IQ fund. The goal is to have a 100 Million Euro strong fund in 
some years (Interview van Geelen).  
Knowledge infrastructure 
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To compensate for the lack of tertiary educational organizations, the city hall seized the opportunity 
when the neighboring Leiden University was searching for ways to counter the declining number 
of students (de Vries 2008, 58). To increase the attractiveness of their programs and its international 
visibility, Leiden University as the oldest university in the Netherlands wanted to tap into the 
international profile of The Hague. With substantial support of the City of The Hague, the Campus 
The Hague Leiden University opened its doors in 2010 (Interview Genet and van der Klaauw). 
The Campus The Hague is now one of seven faculties of Leiden University. Programs that match the 
economic profile of The Hague were transferred to this new campus including public 
administration, terrorism and counterterrorism, and international legal studies. By providing 
education for over 1000 students it is so far a success story for both the City of The Hague and 
Leiden University (Interview J. de Vries). 
The City of The Hague also fosters inter-university cooperation in the South Wing of the Randstad. 
Vague ideas circulated to merge the big three regional universities – Delft University of 
Technology, Leiden University and Erasmus University Rotterdam –to a highly competitive 
international university. These ideas have never been pushed forward. However, efforts for ‘soft 
cooperation’ (Interview J. de Vries) has resulted so far in the establishment of an inter-university 
center to apply ‘big data’ research for urban issues called BOLD (standing for Big, Open and 
Linked Data). In such inter-university cooperation, The Hague is positioning itself as a ‘local and 
neutral ground’ in which the three universities could connect (Interview Shimshon). The efforts to 
link the extra-university knowledge institutes and think thanks by for example leveraging the The 
Hague Academic Coalition (HAC) never gained momentum. In any case, the City of The Hague is 
very much interested in further strengthening its knowledge infrastructure (Interview Genet and 
van der Klaauw). 
Testing expectation 1.1 
E 1.1: A moderately developed RIS enables the formulation of innovation policies. 
Expectation 1.1 cannot be supported. It seems that the direction of causality is reversed. Innovation 
policies in The Hague are formulated rather independently from the RIS but they are aiming at the 
very weakness of the RIS such as overcoming fragmentation in some clusters and developing the 
knowledge infrastructure.  
The following interview statement describes the standard procedure when formulating economic 
strategies in The Hague.  
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“When we are formulating strategies, we first look at the DNA of The Hague. That means we first 
analyze which firms are actually present. We are then trying to find the economic niche within a sector 
in which The Hague has a comparative advantage. We are willing to spend money in promising niches 
and priorities them. Than we facilitate talks and interaction between the companies so that they can 
find common ground. Than we search for matching knowledge institutions. We always going for the 
‘triple helix’ ”(Interview Oliver). 
The statement highlights how innovation policies deliberatively target RIS weaknesses and 
opportunities ensuing from the RIS. The discussion of expectation 1.2 develops this insight further.  
Testing expectation 1.2 
E1.2: Innovation policies aim at modifying and transforming the constraining parts of the RIS 
Expectation 1.2 can be supported. A lot of interviewees point to the causality between the 
innovation policies and specific RIS failures. Three types of innovation policies focus on modifying 
and transforming the RIS. (1) The stimulation of crossovers between existing clusters, (2) the 
enlarging of the knowledge pool and the (3) compensation for the lack of venture capital by 
providing public funds. The first type tackles RIS fragmentation, the second organizational thinness 
and the third the absence of an important innovation feature. 
A lot of interview partners emphasize the importance of fostering interaction within crucial actors 
in the RIS, i.e. the so-called ‘triple helix’. Astonishingly, some interview partners were aware of the 
actual academic concept and mentioned it to us. Furthermore, the stimulation of cluster crossovers 
is a new innovation policy as two economic development officials explain: “It is not always useful 
to stick to the cluster approach. Crossover of clusters seem now more promising for us in triggering 
innovation” (Interview van Vondel and M. de Vries). Especially potential crossovers between the 
fast-growing security cluster and the prestigious international organizations are examined 
(Interview Genet and van der Klaauw). The intention is to capitalize on The Hague’s position as 
the seat of international organizations and, at the same time, to become somewhat less dependent 
on these organizations since substantial growth in this area is not expected (Meijers et al. 2014, 97). 
More crossovers could be established between security firms and the telecom & IT cluster by 
aiming to create a ‘smart city’ (Interview Oliver). This interview data indicate that city officials are 
aware of their RIS shortcomings and that they formulate innovation policies to transform and 
modify these shortcomings.  
The second stream of innovation policies tackle the organizational thinness of the knowledge 
generation and diffusion subsystem. The efforts of adding tertiary education institutions to the 
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knowledge infrastructure, such as The Campus The Hague Leiden University, are strategic moves 
to overcome the constraining lack of knowledge institutions and to better prepare the city for the 
increasingly knowledge-intensive interurban competition. Another example is the HSD that is not 
interested in linking purchasers and vendors but to build up a knowledge pool: “We are not luring 
sales offices to us in the HSD. Not the number of cyber security companies that are moving to our 
region is the relevant criteria for us, but to attract R&D into our region (Interview de Bruijnen).  
Finally, the City of The Hague and the Province of South Holland try to compensate for the lack 
of venture capital funding by providing own public venture capital funds. Whereas the fund of The 
Hague is rather small and oriented towards start-ups, the fund of the IQ has a substantially larger 
volume and tries to invest with a longer time frame and rather larger sums. The IQ fund was 
deliberatively established to compensate for the lack of venture capital (Interviews: Kok and Krol, 
van Geelen).  
7.2.2. Image building 
To present itself as the city of peace and justice is a very prestigious and powerful image. To 
accompany such a branding strategy, The Hague tries to position itself as an international business 
town by mainly relying on the emerging (cyber) security sector.  
The Hague’s image building underwent several transformations over the last twenty years. Besides 
being traditionally referred to as ‘The Residence’, the City of The Hague has adopted several 
different brands. It once labelled itself as the ‘World City by the Sea’, but this expression has not 
left much traces. Later, The Hague was quick in adopting the famous quote of the then UN 
Secretary General Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali. He called The Hague in 1997 ‘the legal capital of the 
world’ at the inauguration process of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
The City of The Hague translated this quote into an agenda for developing The Hague as an 
international city of Law, Peace and Security (de Vries 2008, 57). This agenda established the brand 
‘International City of Peace, Justice and Security’ – a brand that was supposed to last. However, 
the brand was considered to be too long (Meijers et al. 2014, 97) and/or security was negatively 
connoted whereas peace and justice are positive keywords (Interview Shimson). Whatever the exact 
reason(s) were, the word security got excluded which resulted in the brand ‘The International City 
of Peace and Justice’. The City of The Hague even included the words peace (vrede) and justice (echt) 
in its city seal which needed the approval of the Dutch king (Interview van Loon; Meijers et al. 
2014, 97). Today, this brand is well established (Interviews: Sanders, van Loon).  
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The international organizations are perceived as the source of the city’s prestige (Meijers et al. 2014, 
97). The city established a Municipal Department of International Affairs (Bureau Internationale 
Zaken). Among other efforts, this municipal department takes over the promotion activities of 
some international organizations especially when they do not have an own communication 
department (Interview van Loon).  
Whereas the brand ‘The International City of Peace and Justice’ is mainly directed towards 
international organizations, The Hague aims to formulate an image building strategy that should 
address the international business community. Activities in that regard started in the early 2000s. 
The idea was to build on the image of the national and international government city and to 
gradually develop towards an international business city (Interview van Vondel and M. de Vries). 
Today, especially the HSD and the buzz around (cyber) security is actively marketed. The topic of 
cyber security fits the existing ‘Peace and Justice’ image and has the potential to address the 
international business sector. Hence, The Hague pursues a two-dimensional image building strategy 
stemming from being a government city. Interestingly The Hague does purely target the 
international level and does not invest in strategies to promote its status as the Dutch political 
center.  
Testing expectation 2 
E2: A moderately developed RIS enables the formulation of both a capital city image building strategy and a business 
town image building strategy. 
Expectation 2 can be supported. The strong international sector, developed for more than a 
century, provides The Hague with the prestigious image of the International City of Peace and 
Justice. The emerging security sector enables to establish a two-dimensional image building 
strategy. Only with the development of a strong (cyber) security sector, The Hague could position 
itself as a place for business. This sector plays a dominant role in the ‘business-town’ image building 
strategy because it is a thriving and international competitive sector (Interviews: Oliver, van 
Ommeren and Wijnen), has thus a clear link to the international business community (Interviews: 
de Bruijnen, Oliver) and nevertheless features some links to The Hague’s international 
organizations (Interviews: de Bruijnen, Oliver). Thus, the case of The Hague shows that a 
‘business-town’ image building strategy ideally needs to be backed up by a well-developed RIS or 
at least by thriving and international visible sectors.  
7.2.3. Business prerequisites 
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Local governments in the Netherlands do not enjoy much autonomy. As a consequence, their 
competences to alter business prerequisites are limited. Especially the restricted local tax autonomy 
constraints to formulate tax strategies because corporate and personal income taxes are collected 
on the national level. The local level is only allowed to levy taxes on real estate (OZB). 41 Given that 
the land and real estate are the most important local tax base, the provision of land and real estate 
is of crucial importance.  
Taxes 
The average annual real estate tax in the Netherlands for residential property is about 0.09% of the 
officially estimated real estate market value and 0.3% of the value of non-residential property such 
as business premises, shops or offices (Bos 2013, 45). In 2016, the real estate tax in The Hague 
amounted to 0.0677% for residential real estate owners, 0.2445% for non-residential real estate 
owners, and 0.2063% for non-residential real estate users (City of The Hague 2016). These tax rates 
are determined each year by the Town Council (Allers and Vermeulen 2014, 5). However, a national 
tax reform capped the property tax rate in 2006 and forbade the taxation of residential real estate 
users. This tax reform aims to stop ever increasing real estate tax rates that seem to be caused by 
the constrained availability of local tax bases. 
As an instrument to support entrepreneurs, the City of The Hague waves the real estate tax for 
start-ups for a maximum period of five years. This move is expected to benefit up to 1.500 
entrepreneurs. The Hague was in 2012 the first Dutch municipality that implemented such a tax 
waiving policy (Shaw 2012). 
Provision of land and real estate 
The city The Hague is active in providing and facilitating the construction and maintenance of 
modern real estate. The Hague in partnership with a Dutch real estate investor invested much in a 
new business district near the train station van NOI. As the iconic center of the business park, a 
modern world trade center opened in 2012. The City of The Hague actively helps companies and 
international organizations to find suitable facilities (van Loon). When it concerns the real estate 
needs of international organizations, the national government and the Municipal Department of 
International Affairs closely cooperate in organizing suitable real estate (Interviews: Genet and van 
                                                            
41 In addition, taxes are levied on tourists, dogs and the use of public space by bars, restaurants or shops (Bos 2013, 
45). 
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der Klauww, Janssen, Oliver, van Loon). The city is assessed as ready and quick in providing 
suitable facilities (Interview Janssen).  
 
Testing expectation 3 
E3: Low local tax autonomy constrains to focus on income taxes and enables to focus on the provision of land and 
real estate. 
Expectation 3 is supported. Generally, Dutch municipalities are busy enhancing the value of their 
local property tax bases by constructing, upgrading and maintaining modern infrastructure. Local 
officials’ state that the Dutch tax system causes a focus on the physical infrastructure of a locality: 
“The Dutch municipalities are largely focusing on developing its physical infrastructure (…) It can 
be explained with the locally raised real estate taxes” (Interview Genet and van der Klaauw). An 
expert mentioned in a somewhat sarcastic manner that building real estate and business 
infrastructure “is all that local governments do in the Netherlands” (Interview Meijers). On the 
downside of these efforts, the Dutch business real estate market produced around 18% of property 
vacancies in 2011- the highest in Europe (Seebus 2012). The Hague had in 2014 a non-residential 
vacancy rate of 13.8%  (NL Real Estate 2015). 
7.2.4. Acquisition 
Acquisition of firms is mainly the task of the regional economic development agency West Holland 
Foreign Investment Agency (WFIA) that operates with a cluster approach. Regarding the 
acquisition of international organizations, the City of The Hague is a junior partner of the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Acquisition of firms 
The WFIA is a partnership of the municipalities The Hague, Leiden, Delft, Zoetermeer, 
Langsingerland, Haaglanden, and the Chamber of Commerce The Hague with the goal to attract 
international firms and investments (Interviews: van Vondel and M. de Vries, Kok and Krol). The 
WIFA operates with standard acquisition instruments such as going to trade fairs, acquiring via 
brokers but is as well the point of contact for practical tasks such as visa applications, school 
enrollment, or searching for real estate (Interview Kok and Krol). The WFIA is part of the 
Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA) – a national network of regional economic 
development agencies. For example, the agglomeration of Rotterdam has its own agency – the 
 144 
Rotterdam Foreign Investment Agency (RFIA) which competes with the WFIA in attracting firms 
(Interviews: van Vondel and M. de Vries, Kok and Krol; van der Linden). The Province of South 
Holland tried to consolidate the two investment agencies in its own economic development agency 
IQ, but The Hague and Rotterdam resisted to consolidate (Interview: van Vondel and M. de Vries, 
Kok and Krol, van Geelen).  
Acquisition of international organizations 
For a long time, The Hague was competing with other European cities such as Brussels, Geneva 
and Vienna in attracting international organizations (Meijers et al. 2014, 97; Groen 2014). Recently, 
big cities in Africa, in Eastern Europe and increasingly in Asia (such as the globally connected cities 
of Dubai, Singapore and Seoul) have become attractive for international organizations not at least 
because of the desire to fairly distribute international organizations worldwide (Manninen 2008; 
Groen 2014; Interviews: Groen, Janssen, van Loon). 
The Netherlands implemented the first interdepartmental structures for the acquisition, care and 
maintenance of international organizations in 1988 after the European Court and the Human 
Rights Court have been established outside the Netherlands (van der Wusten 2006, 262). The first 
successful bid in which these new interdepartmental structures took the lead was during the 
acquisition of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPWC) which was 
founded in 1997 (Groen 2014). The City of The Hague assisted the central government financially 
and practically in its campaign (Groen 2014). The acquisition of The High Commissioner of 
National Minorities, the International Criminal Court of Former Yugoslavia, International Criminal 
Court, Europol and Eurojust followed in the next years is described by Lagerwaard (2005) as the 
‘renaissance’ of The Hague. 
Since 2002 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains permanent structures for the acquisition and 
support of international organizations (van der Wusten 2006, 262) and since 2005 a coordinating 
governmental entity called Steering Group Netherlands Host Country exists (Stuurgroep Nederland 
Gastland) (Meijers et al. 2014, 96). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs formulates the general acquisition 
strategy and decides on a case-by-case basis for which international organizations it wants to place 
a bid. The central government contributes most of the funds (e.g. the rent of real estate) and has 
room to maneuver to customize specific arrangements for a bid. In its essence, bidding and 
negotiations with international organizations is a diplomatic task (Interview Janssen). Thus, the 
Municipal Department of International Affairs joins in a later stage (Interview Janssen). The city 
hall mainly helps in solving practical problems such as logistics and the provision of facilities 
(Interviews: Janssen, van Loon). The Municipal Department of International Affairs is assessed as 
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on top of their tasks and very supportive (Interview Janssen). Sometimes the city is a bit impatient 
as it is not used to the slow processes of international relations (Interviews: Janssen, van Loon).  
Whereas The Hague’s competences in attracting international organizations is limited, it actively 
acquires NGOs that may profit from the spatial proximity to international organizations (van der 
Wusten 2006, 260). As an important asset, the city manages an office building for NGOs within 
the ‘international zone’ (Interviews: van Loon, Oliver). The city The Hague also runs the ‘The 
Hague International Center’ which facilitates administrative tasks for international organizations, 
international businesses and their staff such as residential registration or health care and insurances 
consultations.  
Testing expectation 4 
E4: A moderately developed RIS enables the adaption of a profound and large-scale acquisition strategy. 
Expectation 4 is partly supported. The RIS and more specifically the clusters are important to 
explain the acquisition strategies. However, low local tax autonomy constrains the acquisitions 
strategies that are for example based on tax deals.  
Regarding attracting international organizations and NGOs, the main advantage is the existing 
international cluster in The Hague as well as the capital city function (Decisio 2011; Meijers et al. 
2014, 96). For example, the “cluster of judicial organisations was a strategic asset in the acquisition 
of Europol, the International Criminal Court and Eurojust” (Meijers et al. 2014, 96). Another 
example, the NATO concentrates all its activities in the field of information technology, digital 
security of private networks and missile defense in The Hague. International organizations such as 
Europol and Eurojust alongside with the emerging specialized cyber security cluster was an 
important asset in attracting the NATO presence. (Interviews: de Bruijnen, Kok and Kol, HSD 
2014). 
Regarding acquisitions of firms, all economic development agencies – WFIA, RFIA, and IQ – 
apply a cluster focus (Interview Kok and Krol). This means that firms are targeted “that already 
have a strong foothold in The Hague: energy, telecom, business services and particularly the 
security cluster” (Meijers et al. 2014, 97). An alternative explanation of the strong influence of 
clusters in acquisition may be that cluster policies are the central economic development paradigm 
of the Dutch government that has diffused from the national level to lower-tier Dutch 
governments (see subchapter 7.2.1). Given that Dutch local governments have a low local tax 
autonomy, the clusters may become the main argument of local government and their economic 
development agencies in attracting new firms. Thus, the profound and large-scale acquisition 
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strategy is enabled by well-developed clusters but low local tax autonomy simultaneously constrains 
other acquisition strategies such as tax deals.  
 
7.2.5. Coordination  
The City of The Hague coordinates some locational policies on the coordination platform MRTH 
which is an organization mainly pushed forward by The Hague and Rotterdam. The establishment 
of the MRTH trigged conflicts between the two cities and the Province of South Holland about 
the appropriate scale and governmental level that should be responsible for formulating locational 
policies. 
Until its termination at the end of 2014, the City-Region Haaglanden served as the coordination 
platform for environmental issues, economic development policies and spatial planning in the FUA 
The Hague. However, the City of The Hague was not very active in the City-Region Haaglanden 
as it mostly formulated and pursued their locational policies autonomously. For example, it took a 
long time until The Hague started to join forces with other municipalities in the FUA to coordinate 
the efforts regarding hosting international organizations and providing specialized services to its 
international staff (Meijers et al. 2014, 100).  
On the regional level, the MRTH is a powerful player in policy fields of public transportation and 
economic development. For example, the Dutch government redirected parts of its transportation 
funds from the province to the metropolitan area (Interview Nijhof and Vokurka; Meijers et al. 
2014, 93). The national government supports the MRTH because it favors the strengthening of the 
international competiveness of cites or city-regions (Interview van der Linden). This increases the 
leverage of the MRTH and weakens the position of the province. Obviously, this leads to conflicts 
between the Province of South Holland and the MRTH. Another potential source of conflict is 
the presence of three economic development agencies, namely The Hague’s WFIA, Rotterdam’s 
RFIA and the provincial IQ. The idea of the province was to create a holistic economic 
development agency that should be responsible for innovation policies as well as acquisition of 
companies and investments (Interview Kok and Krol). However, the cities of The Hague and 
Rotterdam refrained from coordinating with the province but they also do not coordinate their 
own acquisition strategies (see also subchapter 7.2.4).  
Testing expectation 5.1 
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E5.1: Low institutional fragmentation and low local tax autonomy enable regional coordination.  
Expectation 5.1 can be partly supported. Low local tax autonomy plus low vertical institutional 
fragmentation enables the coordination efforts in the MRTH. An alternative explanation, 
coordination may be enabled by the polycentric structure of the Randstad area that provides 
opportunities to ‘borrow size’. 
Three reasons may explain the success of coordination on the metropolitan level between 
Rotterdam and The Hague. First, all municipalities that cooperate within the MRTH belong to the 
Province of South Holland. The establishment of the MRTH was a strategic move from Rotterdam 
and The Hague to gain more autonomy from the Province of South Holland (Interviews: Meijers, 
Schuttenbeld). The economic development director of the MRTH explains the intention: “We have 
to redefine the relationship with the province. The hierarchical structure of the three state levels 
does not match the realities anymore” (Interview Nijhof and Nijhof). Indeed, the provinces are the 
least powerful of all three state levels in the Netherlands and the major Dutch cities “often view 
the provinces as unwelcome representatives of the smaller municipalities that surround them” 
(Andeweg and Irwin 2014, 212–13). As a consequence, the MRTH is an initiative of the two big 
cities with noticeable less political commitment from the mayors of the smaller municipalities 
(Meijers, Hollander, and Hoogerbrugge 2012, 18). 
Secondly, low local tax autonomy helps to build partnerships in economic development policies. 
The two big cities are not seeing each other primarily as competitors but rather as complementary 
parts (Interview van Loon). However, the two cities still compete in acquiring firms because they 
can levy property taxes on land and buildings and job creation is the main economic development 
rational of Dutch municipalities. However, compared to other cases with high local tax autonomy, 
the competition is transparent, based on mostly complementary clusters of firms. In addition, there 
is even a gentlemen agreement that forbids poaching (Interviews: Oliver, van Vondel and M. de 
Vries, Vorkurka and Nijhof).  
And finally, the polycentric setting of the Randstad makes coordination very attractive because it 
provides ample opportunities to ‘borrow size’ (Burger et al. 2015). The FUA The Hague is not 
functionally independent as it does not have a labor market or knowledge institutions of its own 
(Interview Meijers). Yet, this observation is probably true for all cities in the Randstad (Interview 
Meijers). Interestingly, regarding the MRTH, is that The Hague and Rotterdam feature 
complementary economic sectors which offers potential coordinating locational policies: 
“Complementarity is considered to be more efficient and more competitive, since it leads to 
diversity and avoids the duplication of services (…) The diversity in the region offers opportunities 
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for spin-offs between different economic sectors.” (Meijers, Hollander, and Hoogerbrugge 2012, 
14). Only together with other cities in the Randstad, The Hague is able to provide sufficient critical 
mass to support a wide range of metropolitan functions and to be competitive in the international 
economic scale (Meijers et al. 2014, 98–99).  
Testing expectation 5.2 
E5.2: Coordination aims at overcoming the constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
Expectation 5.2 is not supported. The Hague is only constrained in its MLG setting with regard to 
its low local tax autonomy. Coordination is not able to overcome low local tax autonomy. As any 
other Dutch municipality, The Hague has to accept these tax constraints and find ways to formulate 
locational policies in areas in which its autonomy is not restricted. An example would be the 
concentration on cluster policies in acquisition because The Hague has not ability to offer tax deals.  
7.2.6. Public funds and compensation payments 
Local governments in the Netherlands are dependent on inter-governmental money transfers. 
These transfers constitute an important budgetary item of any Dutch local government (see 
subchapter 7.1.4). In addition to these money transfers, the City of The Hague is active in attracting 
Dutch central government funds as well as EU funds. The central government pays no 
compensation for capital city related costs or capital city related lost income.  
Important for the city are various Dutch central government funds and EU funds. In 2015, 63% 
of the municipal budget (about 1.585 billion Euros) in The Hague consists of public funds City of 
(City of The Hague 2014f, 242–44). The City of The Hague runs a desk that is specialized for 
tapping into various funds (Interview van Vondel and M. de Vries).For example, The Hague is 
trying to tap into Dutch public funds via the top sectors cluster programs of the Dutch Ministry 
of Economic Affairs (see also subchapter 7.2.1). The Ministry of Economic Affairs stated 
requirements to be eligible for funding. With regard to cyber securities governmental funding was 
justified because “[f]urther growth in security must come through interaction between the business 
community, knowledge institutions and government. The Hague region is seen as a breeding 
ground for innovation in security and has a track record in cooperation in the triple helix” (The 
Hague Security Delta 2011). This is an example of the strong conditionalites that come along with 
Dutch public funds. Thus, the HSD is not only an innovation hub, but also an example of how an 
organization may also serve as a tool to tap into various governmental funds. 
 149 
The Hague also tries to attract European public funds. For example, the Center for Innovation, 
Leiden University, Campus The Hague gets funding from the EU regional fund. Horizon 2020 is 
also a target for city officials as they are active in partnering with knowledge institutions related to 
The Hague competencies in peace, justice and security (Interview Genet and van der Klaauw). 
Another idea is to get EU funds by focusing on big societal problems that may be partially solved 
with new digital technologies (Interview Shimson).  
The central government pays no compensation for capital city related costs or capital city related 
lost income. Yet most of the capital city related costs are directly carried out or directly paid by the 
central government. An example are the security costs for state visits or events of the royal families. 
Only in some instances would the Dutch government compensate the local police in The Hague 
for extra services (Interviews: van Hillen, van Loon). No interview partner was aware of extra 
funding for culture activities or for the loss of real estate taxes. Furthermore the central government 
does not account for payments in lieu of property taxes.  
Testing expectation 6 
I: Low local tax autonomy enables to ask for public funds.  
II: No capital city specific constraints constrain to ask for compensation payments. 
Both E6 expectations can be supported. First of all, low local tax autonomy requires The Hague 
to focus on attracting public fund and compensation payments. Secondly, the local autonomy is 
not constrained because of its capital city status. As a consequence, The Hague has no argument 
in hand to ask for compensation because of its capital city status.  
As in all Dutch local governments the local tax autonomy of The Hague is low. As a consequence, 
public funds and intergovernmental transfers are important to sustain the local budget. This may 
explain why The Hague is very active and strategic about tapping into public funds. For example, 
the city has established an own specialized desk for attracting public funds. Furthermore, the focus 
on cyber security can also be explained by the availability of funds from the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (Interview Genet and van der Klaauw). Other economic sectors in The Hague do not 
comply with the Dutch top sector program. Only by focusing on cyber security national 
governmental economic development funds have started to flow into The Hague (Interview van 
Ommeren and Wijnen).  
Given the importance of public funds and the established structures to tap into public funds, it 
seems at first sight astonishing that The Hague is not pursuing strategies to get compensation based 
 150 
on its capital city status. However, security costs are directly paid by the central government and 
The Hague does not face many constraints following from the capital city status. Tax exempted 
property of ministries or embassies diminish the property tax base, but it seems that The Hague is 
satisfied that the central government accounts for a lot of direct and indirect jobs. The importance 
of these jobs outweigh the lost property taxes by far.  
7.3. Explaining locational policies in The Hague 
In this subchapter, I will first summarize the manifestations of locational policies in order to depict 
the locational policies agenda of The Hague (see Table 33). In the following, I will discuss the 
tested expectations (see Table 34) and try to connect them in order understand the 
interdependencies in formulating locational policies.  
Table 33: Locational policies agenda of The Hague 
Locational policies Manifestations of locational policies 
Innovation policies - Focus on cluster policies, cyber (security) as most promising cluster, search for 
cluster crossovers 
- Sparse knowledge infrastructure, The Hague as a neutral ground for inter-university 
cooperation 
- Public funds as a compensation for lack of venture capital 
Image building - The International City of Peace and Justice 
- International business town, mainly by promoting (cyber) security 
Business prerequisites - Focus on developing and maintaining modern infrastructure 
Acquisition - The city is junior partner in acquiring international organizations 
- Acquisitions are based on a cluster approach 
Coordination - Coordination between The Hague and Rotterdam in the MRTH 
- Still regional competition in the acquisition of firms 
Public funds and 
compensation payments 
- Importance of Dutch central government funds 
- No compensation for capital city related costs or capital city related lost income 
Locational policies 
agenda 
- Positioning as international government city and an international business city 
- Focus on cluster policies in cyber security 
- Focus on real estate development 
- Importance of Dutch central government funds 
 
The Hague tries to position itself towards an international business city while still leveraging its 
standing as the ‘International City of Peace and Justice’. The emerging sector of (cyber) security is 
the crucial cornerstone in this transformation. (Cyber) security capitalizes from the presence of 
international organizations such as Eurojust, Europol or national security organizations that are 
the anchors of this cluster. The transition from international organization to (cyber) security is a 
perfect example of the kinds of cluster crossovers that the City of The Hague is actively searching 
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for. The efforts around the (cyber) security sector are reflected in innovation policies, image 
building and as well in attracting public funds.  
Given the limited local tax autonomy, The Hague is forced to formulate similar locational policies 
as other Dutch municipalities such as real estate development and attracting public funds. The 
importance of property tax is the only important locally raised tax which creates incentives to invest 
in the development of modern infrastructure. The constraints in the local tax autonomy are 
compensated by vertical money-transfer from the Dutch central government. Vertical money 
transfers make up 64% of The Hague’s local revenue. Given the importance of these funds to 
sustain the local budget, the conditionalities brought along by these public funds may explain the 
diffusion of economic development paradigms from the central level to local governments. 
Examples are the concept of clusters or ‘triple helix’ that have been put forward by a lot of interview 
partner when talking about economic development (Interviews: Adhargabal, de Bruinen, Krol and 
Kok, Oliver, Schuttenbeld). In a setting with limited local tax autonomy, these conditionalities are 
a strong policy diffusion mechanism. 
Table 34: Expectation testing The Hague 
Expectations Expectation 
testing 
Specifications 
E1.1: A moderately developed RIS enables the 
formulation of innovation policies. 
Not 
supported 
- Reversed causality 
E1.2: Innovation policies aim at modifying and 
transforming the constraining parts of the RIS. 
Supported -  
E2: A moderately developed RIS enables the 
formulation of both a capital city image building 
strategy and a business town image building 
strategy. 
Supported - Clusters, not whole RIS, are important in 
image building 
E3: Low local tax autonomy constrains to focus 
on income taxes and enables to focus on the 
provision of land and real estate. 
Supported - 
E4: A moderately developed RIS enables the 
adaption of a profound and large-scale 
acquisition strategy. 
Partly 
supported 
- Clusters, not whole RIS, are important in 
acquisition 
- Acquisition based on tax deals is constrained 
by low local tax autonomy 
E5.1: Low institutional fragmentation and low 
local tax autonomy enable regional 
coordination. 
Partly 
supported 
- Polycentric Randstad region provides 
opportunities to ‘borrow size’ 
E5.2: Coordination aims at overcoming the 
constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
Not 
supported 
- Coordination is not able to overcome the 
constrained local tax autonomy 
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E6: 
I: Low local tax autonomy enables to ask for 
public funds. 
II: No capital city specific constraints constrains 
to ask for compensation payments. 
 
Supported 
Supported 
- 
 
Table 34 summarizes the tested expectations in the case of The Hague. In the following paragraph, 
I discuss the expectation stemming from the RIS as an explanatory variable whereas in the next 
paragraph I discuss the expectations stemming from the MLG setting. The causality of expectation 
1.1 is reversed. Innovation polices are not restricted by the development of the RIS but innovation 
policies, in fact, try to develop the RIS. Thus, innovation policies are used to modify/transform 
RIS failures, i.e. fragmentation within the clusters and the organizational thinness of the knowledge 
infrastructure (E1.2). The testing of expectations E2 and E4 reveals that rather the clusters than 
the RIS in its totality explain image building and acquisition. Especially the internationally 
competitive clusters (international organizations and (cyber) security) are leveraged in these two 
outward-oriented locational policies.  
Low local tax autonomy, i.e. property tax as the only important locally raised tax, incentives 
developments of land and real estate (E3). Because of low local tax autonomy, the competition 
between jurisdictions is moderate and mostly about attracting jobs. Low local tax autonomy is one 
reasons that enables regional coordination between Rotterdam and The Hague (E5.1). 
Coordination is furthermore enabled by the absence of vertical institutional fragmentation and the 
polycentric urban structure in the Randstad. However, coordination is not able to overcome low 
local tax autonomy as postulated in expectation 5.2. Low local tax autonomy enables the city hall 
to ask for public funds (E6). The absence of capital city specific local autonomy restrictions 
constrains The Hague to ask for compensation payments.  
7.4. Conclusion 
Generally, The Hague is very active in formulating locational policies. The local government in The 
Hague is interpreting its role proactively. The municipal Ministry of Economic Affairs claims that 
it operates almost like a private business (Interview Oliver). The overall aim of the locational 
policies agenda is to become an international business city while still leveraging the ‘International 
City of Peace and Justices’-image. As a consequence, locational policies mainly target the cluster of 
international organizations and the emerging (cyber) security sector whereas the other three 
economic sectors gets fewer attention from city hall.  
Restricted local tax autonomy has three important consequences for the locational policies agenda 
of The Hague. Firstly, it constrains certain locational policies and enables other locational policies. 
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For example, The Hague is restricted in the business prerequisites category by its limited tax 
autonomy. As alternatives, the City of The Hague concentrates on the provision of suitable real 
estate and on attracting of public funds. Secondly, the locational policies agenda operates based on 
an avoiding spending logic in contrast to other SCCs that operate with an increasing income logic. 
More precisely, Dutch local governments are incentivized to avoid social assistance spending 
because they have to fund excess spending from their own budgets but can use the surpluses for 
other policy areas. To avoid excess spending, the locational policies of The Hague try to indirectly 
or directly create jobs. Finally, the central government exerts influence on locational policies 
formulation by public funds that come along with strings attached, i.e. conditoinalities. These 
public funds constitute an important budgetary item for local governments and thus the 
conditionalities of these funds are strong steering mechanism. 
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8. Washington D.C. 
Washington D.C. (DC)42 represents a unique case in the urban system of the US because of its 
constitutional status and its many capital city specific constraints. The US Constitution gives 
Congress in the so-called ‘District Clause’ full authority over the national capital city “to exercise 
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District” (Article 1, section 8, clause 17). 
DC is by intention neither a state nor a city within a state. As a consequence, DC does not have 
representation in the legislative branch. But DC bears responsibilities of a state as well as those of 
a county, a city, and a school district, yet it does not have the authority to raise revenue in the way 
all other states can (Ghandi et al. 2009, 265; more in subchapter 8.1.4). The political science 
literature about DC is, thus, mostly concerned with examining the local autonomy constraints and 
their fiscal and political consequences (e.g. Harris 1995; O’Cleireacain 1997). 
Table 35 summarizes the case study of DC. I find that the locational policies agenda in DC aims at 
fostering innovation policies in the medical and the digital high-tech sector and creating an image 
and an acquisition strategy that leverages both the capital city status and its innovative sectors. 
Furthermore, DC concentrates on large real estate projects as well as place-based neighborhood 
development and constantly asks for federal compensation for its capital city specific constraints.  
                                                            
42 Formally, Washington, D.C. is named the District of Columbia. In the following, I abbreviate Washington, D.C. to 
DC or the district. 
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Table 35: Expectations and findings of the case study Washington, D.C. 
Nr. Explanatory factor Phenomenon to 
be explained 
Expectation Result 
E1 RIS 
- highly developed 
Innovation 
policies  
A highly developed RIS enables the 
formulation of innovation policies. 
Not 
supported 
E1.2 RIS 
- RIS failure(s): lock-in 
Innovation 
policies  
Innovation policies aim at modifying and 
transforming the constraining parts of the 
RIS. 
Supported 
E2 RIS 
- highly developed 
Image building A highly developed RIS enables the 
formulation of both a capital city image 
building strategy and a business town 
image building strategy. 
Supported 
E3 MLG setting 
- High local tax autonomy 
Business 
prerequisites 
High local tax autonomy enables to focus 
on income taxes and constrains other 
manifestations of the business 
prerequisites category.  
Not 
supported 
E4 RIS 
- highly developed 
Acquisition A highly developed RIS enables the 
adaption of a profound and large-scale 
acquisition strategy. 
Partly 
supported 
E5.1 MLG setting 
- high institutional 
fragmentation 
- high local tax autonomy 
Regional 
coordination 
High institutional fragmentation and high 
local tax autonomy constrain regional 
coordination. 
Supported 
E5.2 MLG setting 
- Capital city specific 
constraints 
- Institutional 
fragmentation in the FUA 
Coordination Coordination aims at overcoming the 
constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
Not 
supported 
E6 MLG setting 
- High local tax autonomy 
- Capital city specific 
constraints 
Public funds and 
compensation 
payments 
I: High local tax autonomy constrains to 
ask for public funds. 
II: Capital city specific constraints enable 
to ask compensation payments. 
Supported 
 
Supported 
 
The remainder of this case study chapter is structured into four subchapters. The first subchapter 
gives a general description of DC as well as discusses the manifestations of the explanatory factors. 
The second subchapter addresses the different locational policies categories and tests the respective 
expectation(s) one step at a time. The third subchapter links the different locational policies to a 
locational policies agenda and discusses the results in an integrative manner. The last subchapter 
concludes the case study.  
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8.1. Profile of Washington, D.C.  
8.1.1. History 
The establishment of a new permanent US capital city under federal authority is a product of the 
US Constitution that came into force in 1789. James Madison elaborated in The Federalist Papers, 
no. 43 (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1982, 217–25) that in order to ensure the independence from 
any city, state or commercial interest the US capital should be under exclusive authority of 
Congress. For the same reason the size of the city should be limited that it allows only hosting all 
necessary federal government functions and to serve as a symbolic national city. This size limit 
should prevent that the new capital become a cultural, social or economic powerhouse (Gilliland 
2013, 31). Madison’s main fear was an encroachment of the federal government by any state. 
However, he did not envisage problems for local residents living under Congressional authority 
because they can elect their own local government (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1982, 218; Nagel 
2013a, 63). 
The US constitution does not specify a location of the district. Gilliland (2013) argues that the 
decision to move the US capital southwestwards was a compromise comprising of the Northern 
States succeeded in having their war debts nationalized, while the debt-free Southerners liberated 
the capital from the influence of Pennsylvanian Northerners.43 Finally, it was President George 
Washington who had the right to decide the exact location of the new federal capital and he chose 
an area close to his own home which was located at Mount Vernon, Virginia (Hazelton Jr 1914, 7; 
Gilliland 2013, 35). Engstrom, Hammond, and Scott (2013) computed that this rather remote 
location was about 60 miles away from the US population centroid at that time and thus met the 
Madisonian principle of equal representation of citizens, i.e. the location was close to ensure equal 
access of US citizens to the capital.44  
DC was founded in 1791 and was initiated as the US capital in 1800. At this time, DC had a 
population of 14’103 inhabitants (Ghandi et al. 2009, 266). In the 19th century, DC was a poorly 
developed city with no paved roads, hardly any street lighting and no sewage system. The district 
                                                            
43 See Gilligan (2013, 34-35) for a discussion of a number of other raised explanations why the new capital city was 
established at the Potomac River. 
44 Engström et al. (2013) found that the Madisonian principle of equal representation of citizens also hold true 
regarding US state capitals. Decision-makers tend to locate and especially relocate the seat of government as near as 
possible to the population centroid of the relevant jurisdiction. 
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certainly did not meet the standards of a capital city compared with European counterparts. As a 
reaction, some Congressmen intended to relocate the capital city to a better developed US city 
(Ghandi et al. 2009, 266). To counter such relocation endeavours and to develop the infrastructure 
of the district, President Ulysses S. Grant appointed in 1871 a new territorial government instead 
of the locally elected governing structure. This territorial government was tasked with developing 
the district. However, these infrastructure updates costed US$ 20 Million – more than US$ 1.5 
billion in today’s prices – which led to the abolishment of the territorial government. To have a 
better control over expenses the US president appointed three temporary commissioners and a 
subordinated military engineer to run the district. This top-down appointed governance structure 
was institutionalized and lasted until 1973 (Ghandi et al. 2009, 266). 
The District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (or Home Rule 
Act) of 1973 brought some degree of self-governance to DC. The act established a local 
government of an elected mayor and thirteen City Council members. The district’s politics, 
especially under the second elected mayor Marion Barry (in office from 1979-1991 and from 1995-
1999), have been described as a system of patronage which led to financial woes of the district 
(Interviews: Clinton, Rivlin, Tregoning). Mayor Barry pushed heavily a social agenda for the poor 
in the district, most of whom were Afro-American. An expert assessed this social agenda “as 
probably needed at that time, but together with the not very professional administration this led to 
high spending and at the end to bankruptcy and the fiscal oversight of DC” (Interview Rivlin). 
Other interview partners relate these local political troubles to the immature DC local government 
that had to start from scratch in 1973 and which only slowly developed to a professional 
administration (Interviews: Clinton, Tregoning, Zhadradnik). 
In 1995, US President Clinton signed a law that created a Financial Control Board and an 
independent Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) to deal with the financial issues of the 
district (Ghandi et al. 2009, 275). The Financial Control Board succeeded in reducing the payroll 
of the city, improving the tax collection system while trying to maintain the public services which 
thus modernized the local DC government (Interview Rivlin). In 1997, the National Capital 
Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997 (also called Revitalization Act) 
aimed to create a sustainable financial base for DC. The Revitalization Act brought a lot of changes 
regarding financing the district (see subchapter 8.1.4). The financial turnaround came quickly. The 
two federal oversight institutions managed to present the first balanced budget in 1997. This 
financial stabilization was certainly positively influenced by the reforms but DC also profited from 
a strong performing US economy at that time (Interview Rivlin). In 2001 the Financial Control 
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Board got dissolved after a consecutive four years of balanced budgets. The OCFO became a 
permanent fixture of the Districts government structure (Ghandi et al. 2009, 267).  
8.1.2. Geography and population 
DC is a rotated rectangle carved out of the states of Maryland and Virginia. In 1846, congress 
retroceded the entire district territory southwest of the Potomac River to the state Virginia which 
explains its current shape (Richards 2004). The FUA DC spans over three states (Maryland, 
Virginia, at the margin also to West Virginia) as well as the district as its very core. Thus, the DC 
region is vertically and horizontally institutionally fragmented.  
DC faced a decline of residents from 1950 to 2006. This decline was severe between 1970 and 2000 
as the district lost about a quarter of its population while the suburban population doubled 
(O’Cleireacain and Rivlin 2001, 2–3). Population losses were most drastic among middle-class 
families with children making seven out of ten residents African Americans (Sturtevant 2014, 280). 
To counter the population loss, the DC administration under mayor Anthony Williams made in 
2003 “attracting 100’000 new residents to the District of Columbia over 10 years one of his primary 
goals” (Sturtevant 2014, 279). The administration looked to target both middle-income and high-
income new residents. This strategy seemed to be successful as DC achieved a remarkable 
turnaround in the population dynamics. Between 2000 and 2010, the DC displayed a population 
surplus of nearly 30’000 people (5.2% population growth) (Sturtevant 2014, 279). “The year 2006 
marked the beginning of the domestic migration turnaround, and about 900 more households 
moved into the District than moved out in that year. (…) The trend accelerated in the final years 
of the decade so that, between 2009 and 2010, nearly 5’000 more households moved into the city 
than moved out” (Sturtevant 2014, 280). The turnover in population dynamics has been achieved 
due to improvements of the school system, combating crime and place-based investments 
(Interviews: Khan, C. Stone, Tregoing). 
Table 36 summarizes the population dynamics on different perimeters. The district accounts only 
for a bit more than 10% of the whole population in FUA. The suburbs beyond the limits of the 
district are to large parts under the jurisdiction of Virginia and to a smaller extent under the 
jurisdiction of Maryland. In 2015, the FUA DC was the sixth largest metropolitan region in the US 
following New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas and Houston (United States Census Bureau 
2015a). The district’s population has grown only since 2006, whereas the FUA DC, and the states 
Maryland and Virginia display a rather constant population grow. 
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Table 36: Population on different perimeters 
Scale 1980 1990 2000 2010 2015 Change (%) 
1980-2015 
District of Columbia 638’333 606’900 572’086 601’723 672’228 +5,04 
FUA D.C.  - 4’122’914 4’796’183 5’582’170 6’097’684 +32,39 
(1990-2015) 
State of Maryland 4’216’975 4’781’468 5’296’647 5’773’552 6’006’401 +29,79 
State of Virginia 5’346’818 6’187’358 7’079’057 8’001’024 8’382’993 +36,22 
United States of America 226’545’805 248’709’873 281’424’600 308’745’538 321’418’820 +29,52 
 
Source: United States Census Bureau (2015). This population data are estimates based on population censuses.  
FUA Washington, D.C. = Washington-Arlington-Alexandria (DC-VA-MD-WV Metro Area). District plus 17 
counties and 6 cities. FIPS PMSA Code 8840.  
 
“Despite the population growth and the families that moved into DC, there are two Washington, 
D.C.’s” (Interview Zahdradnik). The income distribution peaks at highest-income earners and at 
the very poor (Ghandi et al. 2009, 269). In fact, the median income is US$ 101’000 for DC’s white 
population and US$ 39’000 for DC African Americans (Ruble 2016, 333). This disparity of incomes 
constantly challenges the district’s policy-making as it is confronted “with balancing the needs of 
its residents for services such as education, healthcare, transportation, housing, parks and 
recreation, and others” (Ghandi et al. 2009, 265). The unemployment rate in DC was 7.6 % in 2013 
whereas the other jurisdictions in the FUA had an average unemployment rate of 4.3% (Downtown 
DC BID 2013). The districts poverty rate (19%) remained persistently high since the turn of the 
millennium. The poverty rate for African Americans was 26%, for Hispanics 22% and for Whites 
7% in 2012 (Ghandi, Spaulding, and McDonald 2016, 177). 
This disparity is also reflected in the duality of workforce. The residents in DC have the highest 
college debts in the whole country which points to a lot of graduates from good, i.e. expensive, 
universities. Furthermore, DC has the second lowest rate of college debt defaults which points to 
the potential of the DC region to absorb these talents (Interview Tregoning). On the other hand, 
DC has an equal high share of low-educate workers. Experts anticipates the integration of the low-
educated workforce into the DC’s knowledge economy as a big future challenge (Interviews: 
Lazere, Rubble). In sum, DC is “a divided region between high income residents and low-income 
residents. DC still has not uniformly good schools, high unemployment rates and poverty 
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associated problems. Plus, is now the problem of affordable housing salient” (Interviews: Rivlin, 
Smith). 
8.1.3. Regional Innovation System 
The RIS in Washington, D.C. can be described as highly developed. Both RIS subsystems feature 
a high organizational thickness. Many intermediary organizations stimulate cooperative and joint 
activities between KIBS firms, knowledge organizations and federal agencies. Especially the 
clusters in (cyber) security and the health sector display intense knowledge dynamics which results 
into bustling and innovative clusters. In that regard, these two clusters diversified into own 
economic ecosystems which reduces their dependency from national governmental organizations.  
Knowledge application and exploitation subsystem  
The FUA DC is the fifth largest regional economy of the US in 201045 (OECD 2014b). The 
economy of the DC region changed from a government company town to a postindustrial 
powerhouse (Ruble 2016, 334–35). To a large extent, the regional economy has developed in 
lockstep with the development of federal expenditures (Feldman 2001, 866). This has fostered the 
emergence of a RIS that is specialized in the KIBS sector. The ratio between KIBS jobs and high- 
and medium-tech manufacturing jobs is 4 times higher in DC than in New York, however, this 
ratio has been put in perspective due to the low number of high-tech jobs in the DC region (see 
Table 37).  
Table 37: Ratio between KIBS jobs and manufacturing jobs in US cities  
Sector Washington, D.C. New York Los Angeles Chicago 
KIBS 517’949 710’316 633’648 322’567 
High-tech industry 21’353 123’111 195’111 125’272 
Ratio 24.3 5.8 3.2 2.6 
Source: United States Census Bureau (2016), data from 2012 
In 1970, around two-thirds of the regional economy was directly or indirectly dependent on federal 
expenditures and half of the workforce was employed in the government sector (Feldman 2001, 
866). Triggered through public procurement, outsourcing of federal services and knowledge 
                                                            
45 The top five US economic region measured by the regional GDP in 2010 are New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, San 
Francisco and Washington, D.C. (OECD 2014a). 
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spillovers from the public to the private sector, innovative clusters developed in the last 45 years 
which focused on technology intensive services mostly in the defense and health sector (Feldman 
2001; Ceruzzi 2008). The different cluster in the DC-RIS are geographically dispersed. To describe 
it simply, whereas the district is basically a service town for the federal government (Interviews: 
Clinton, Turner), in Maryland has developed a medical cluster around the National Health Institute 
in Bethesda and in Virginia cluster firms that are active in the defense and security industry that are 
also known as the beltway bandits (Interviews: Levine, Turner; see also Ceruzzi 2008). 
The district’s job composition resembles the capital city function (see Table 38). Firstly, the districts 
employment base are federal jobs as around 28% (205’000 jobs) are directly on federal payroll (DC 
2014, 31). Secondly, a large share of the private sector caters for the federal government which is 
indicated by the high number of jobs in the KIBS sector and the hospitality sector. Specific for the 
‘government town’ DC are KIBS firms such as law firms, think thanks and research organizations 
that offer the “traditional DC practice” (Interview Turner), i.e. lobbyism and consultancy. This 
assemblage of firms “must have a DC address on their door sign in order to be a player on the 
Capitol Hill” (Interview Turner). Around 91’000 jobs are associated with those kind of 
organizations adding up to 12% of the jobs in DC. Given the large numbers of visitors that the 
district welcomes every year –almost 18 million visitors in 2011, of which around 1.8 million 
international visitors (The District of Columbia 2012, 32) – the hospitality sectors accounts for 
92’000 jobs or 12% of all DC jobs.  
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Table 38: Employment in DC 
Sectors Total jobs, 1997 Total jobs, 2013 Change, 1997- 2013 
Federal government  192’000 
31% 
205’000 
28% 
+13’000 
+7% 
Local government 41’000 
7% 
35’000 
5% 
-6’000 
-15% 
KIBS 210’000 
34% 
261’000 
35% 
+31’000 
+24% 
Hospitality 65’000 
11% 
92’000 
12% 
+27’000 
+42% 
Education 35’000 
6% 
58’000 
8% 
+23’000 
+66% 
Health Care 48’000 
8% 
66’000 
9% 
+18’000 
+38% 
Construction 9’000 
1% 
14’000 
2% 
+5’000 
+56% 
Others 18’000 
3% 
13’000 
2% 
-5’000 
-28% 
Total 618’000 
101% 
744’000 
101% 
+126’000 
+20% 
Sources: Simplified illustration from DC Tax Revision Commission (2014, 31).  
Note: The KIBS category consist out of the following sectors: legal, professional services, employment services, 
business services, information, finance, and organizations. The hospitality sector consist out following sectors: food 
services, accommodations, amusement & recreation, retail, and wholesale. Percentages does not add to total 100% due 
to rounding. 
Around 70% of the jobs in the district are held by commuters from Virginia and Maryland (Ghandi 
et al. 2009, 268). In the suburban jurisdictions gather firms that sell and develop knowledge 
intensive products and services most of them to governmental organizations in the medical and 
defense sector. The defense sector has experienced a rapid growth since 9/11. Private expertise is 
needed in the knowledge intensive counter-terrorism machinery which is mostly based on cyber 
security and cyber intelligence. Private firms in this sector rely on high-qualified employees and 
spatial proximity to decision makers (Mayer 2013, 140). The cyber security cluster develop in the 
whole RIS and not just around the Pentagon. Examples are firms around Fort Meade in Maryland 
(halfway between the district and Baltimore) or the establishment of datacenters in Loudoun 
County and Prince William County (also in Maryland) (Interviews: Buchanan, White). 
The medical cluster started around 30 years ago and is sometimes described as the ‘medical belt’ 
covering the National Health Institute (NHI) in Bethesda, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) in Silver Spring all the way up north to the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore 
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(Interview Boyer). This medical cluster diversified and got mostly independent from the NHI and 
the FDA, expect from the federal role as a regulator (Interview Boyer). 
Federal money has been decisive for the development of these clusters. Federal spending rose from 
around US$ 32billion in 1980 to US$ 166 billion in 2008 (Greater Washington Initiative 2010). An 
expert, sees a direct correlation between the regions GDP and federal spending as “40 % of the 
region’s economy consists either of federal salaries or federal public procurement” (Interview 
Fuller). Policy makers in the region are in agreement that the big problem looming over the DC-
RIS is the decline in federal spending that peaked in 2009 (Interviews: Bean, Loescher, Tregoning). 
Between 2010 and 2013 federal procurement declined by US$ 13.3 billion or 16.1% and additionally 
federal employment dropped by around 22’000 jobs erasing another US$ 2.4billion from the region 
(Washington Buisness Journal 2015). 
As a consequence, companies have started to glance around for private sector diversification 
(Interview Richmond and Winn). The development of the Internet is the most prominent example 
of the region’s ability to translate knowledge derived from federal procurement to the private sector 
(Mowery and Simcoe 2002; Ceruzzi 2008). Such a dual use may be successful in cyber security and 
health IT as both sectors are endowed with risk-taking and innovation prone agencies such as 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Homeland Security, National 
Institutes of Health, National Telecommunications and Information Administration (Warland 
2016c).46 However, exploitation by private sector clients often takes place outside of DC. Spin-offs 
that have demonstrated their innovation capacity tend to get bought from external firms what 
suggests that the RIS in DC may not be well equipped with the appropriate environment and actors 
for private market growth (Warland 2016c).  
Knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem  
Educational organizations mushroom all over the region. Prestigious universities are, among 
others, the three George’s: Georgetown University, George Washington University, and George 
Mason University. But also high ranking universities from the neighboring states established a 
physical presence in the DC region. Best examples are Johns Hopkins University from Baltimore 
and Virginia Tech that is headquartered in Blacksburg. The presence of universities is enriched by 
a vast amount of research organizations and think tanks such as Brookings Institution or the Pew 
                                                            
46 The US federal government is not uniform in terms of federal procurement and the commitment to innovation 
differs radically across federal agencies (Warland 2016c). 
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Research Center as well as international governmental organizations such as the World Bank or 
the International Monetary Fund.  
In DC there is an abundance of national sector associations that act as knowledge mediators 
between federal agencies and member firms  (Warland 2016c). These national sector associations 
launch diverse programs with a focus on a wide range of innovation activities such as diversification 
and fostering entrepreneurship. This stimulation of knowledge interaction is furthermore enhance 
by local and regional development agencies (see subchapter 8.2.1). 
RIS development 
Summarizing, the RIS in DC is well developed. Especially compared to the other three RISs in this 
thesis, its organizational thickness, its interactions between and within the subsystems and its ability 
to diversify are exceptional. Both subsystems are organizationally thick and no actor category is 
missing. Many specialized private and public sector organizations stimulate cooperative and joint 
activities between KIBS firms, knowledge organizations and federal agencies, i.e. the actors of the 
‘triple helix’. Knowledge interactions are dynamic in various economic clusters but mostly related 
to the security sector and the health sector. Whereas the RIS in its totality is without a doubt 
dependent on federal spending, these clusters have developed their own ecosystem gradually 
reducing the dependency from governmental organizations. However, observers stress the 
economic dependency of the region on federal spending: “There is a direct correlation between the 
regions GDP and federal spending” (Interview Fuller). Since federal spending peaked in 2010, the 
public sector dependency is an issue looming over DC (Interviews: Fuller, Loescher). 
8.1.4. Multilevel governance setting 
The MLG setting of DC is rather complex. First, the district has to face capital city specific 
constraints and bears responsibility of a state as well as those of a county, a city, and a school 
district. Yet the district is not allowed to raise revenue in the way all other states are allowed to 
(Ghandi et al. 2009, 265). In no other SCC are capital city specific local autonomy constraints as 
intense as in DC (Boyd and Fauntroy 2002; Wolman et al. 2007). Secondly, the FUA DC is 
institutional fragmented as it spans over three US states and the district. And finally, the business 
communities are well-organized with informal access points to local public leaders. The developers 
seem especially powerful agents in the governance of locational policies.  
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Public-vertical 
The current governance system of the district could be described as Home Rule under 
Congressional supervision (Nagel 2013a). District residents have no representation in the legislative 
branch of the US. They are only represented by an observant delegate in the US House of 
Representative who may vote in the committee without a right to vote on the floor of the House. 
As courtesy, the DC delegate is always allowed to serve in the Committee concerned with DC 
issues (Nagel 2013a, 64–65).47 DC residents are allowed to participate in presidential elections since 
1961 (Ghandi et al. 2009, 272). 
Congressional oversight hampers profoundly the local decision-making autonomy of DC. The 
Congress can influence local policy-making of the district by either block the spending on particular 
budgetary items or directly on vetoing DC laws (Nagel 2013a, 64–65). And the Congress used this 
power extensively (Fauntroy 2003; Fauntroy 2009; Nagel 2013a, 71). Congressional oversight is 
currently a very controversial issue because the DC local government wanted to implement 
contested societal policies concerning abortion, Marihuana, needles exchange program and fire 
arms. (Interviews: Lazere, Rivlin, Smith, Tregoing, Young and Wolman). These policies are 
contemporary hotly debated throughout the US. The republican majority of the congress made use 
of its “authority over locally generated funds as a means to enact its own legislative provision 
through so-called ‘social riders’ (…). These ‘social riders’ specifically impact district policy but 
actually reflect broader political debates” (Ghandi et al. 2009, 279). Thus, the deep partisan divide 
in the US impacts local policy-making in DC.  
Furthermore, the federal level can intervene in local matters via The National Capital Planning 
Commission (NCPC) that represents federal interest over federal land and buildings in the whole 
DC region established in 1924 (Ghandi et al. 2009, 272). The NCPC steers the development of 
federal land in DC and the surrounding region via the Comprehensive Plan. According to this 
Comprehensive Plan, the NCPC also reviews and approves the planning of DC’s local government 
(Interview Koster and Staudigl). However, DC’s local government is well-informed about the 
NCPC’s decisions and strategies because four members of the local government sit in the board of 
the NCPC (Interview Koster and Staudigl). One controversial issue is the height limit of buildings 
in DC – not more than five stories or not higher than the capitol – what makes the land in the 
                                                            
47 The relevant committee in the House for DC issues is the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform – 
Subcommittee on Health Care, District of Columbia, Census and National Archives. The relevant committee in the 
Senate for DC issues is the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs - Subcommittee on Oversight 
of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia (Nagel 2013a, 65). 
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District scarce. Thus, the limited vertical growth costs DC tax revenue (Interviews: Anonymous, 
Tregoning). As a consequence “DC is horizontally and vertically landlocked” (Interview 
Tregoning). Thus, the NCPC brings another layer of complexity to the region (Interview Khan). 
The Home Rule Act of 1973 and the Revitalization Act of 1997 are important milestones in shaping 
the relationship between the District and the federal level. Before 1973, “the district received 
federal budged assistance that was either a lump sum payment determined by the Congress or a 
sum calculated by a proportion of the DC’s budget that varied between 40% to 50%” (Ghandi et 
al. 2009, 273). The Home Role Act implicitly acknowledged the unique fiscal role of the District 
and linked the local tax autonomy constraints to federal compensation payments (Ghandi et al. 
2009, 274). A lump sum of US$ 230 Million annually in 1975 was determined to compensate for 
the limited local tax autonomy. The lump sum increased to US$ 660 Million annually when it was 
paid for the last time in 1998 (Ghandi et al. 2009, 274; 278). The financial troubles of the District 
in the early 1990s led to the Revitalization Act that can be described as a big compromise 
(Interviews: Rivlin, Zahdradnik). In fact, several compromises has been reached to compensate for 
the different state services that DC has to carry out and for the constraints in local tax autonomy. 
In sum, the Revitalization Act increased the federal payments from around US$ 660 Million to US$ 
1.3 Billion annually (Interviews: Anonymous, Rivlin, Smith).48 Furthermore, a US$ 105 Million 
annual special payment for federal district related costs is paid by the federal level composed of 
US$ 15 Million for security and protection, US$ 30 million tuition grant because DC has only one 
public university, and another US$ 60 Million for public schools, public charter schools and school 
vouchers (Interviews: Anonymous, Lazere). In addition, the federal government “sometimes 
provide special payments to the District for burdens associated with special events, such as 
presidential inaugurations. However, these payments are ad hoc, often unpredictable, and 
unreliable” (Young 2008, 70). 
Generally, US local governments enjoy a high fiscal autonomy. In 2014, US local governments 
raised 15.9% of all taxes (OECD 2014a). Local governments are allowed to levy personal and 
corporate income taxes. US states raised 20.9 % of all taxes (OECD 2014a). However, DC’s tax 
                                                            
48 Quantitatively most importantly are the federal Medicaid contributions that accounts for about US$ 700 Million 
annually (Interview Anonymous). Normally the matching rate between the state and the federal level is 50/50. In the 
case of DC, the matching rate is 30/70, i.e. the federal level pays 70% of the Medicaid contributions (Interviews: 
Anonymous, Rivlin, Smith). 
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bases are severely constrained because of its capital city status and because it is not treated as state 
(O’Cleireacain 1997). There are two tax constraints which fiscally harms the district.49  
Firstly, the Home Rule Act of 1973 prohibits DC to levy the so-called Commuter Tax on income 
of non-residents that work in the district. US states normally tax non-residents (Nagel 2013a, 78). 
This fiscally harms the District because about two thirds of the income in the capital is earned by 
non-residents (Ghandi et al. 2009, 279–80). O’Cleireacain (1997, 9) calculates that taxing non-
residential workforce would account for about US$ 1 billion revenue. Yilmaz (2009) calculated that 
taxing non-residential workforce would account for an additional US$ 2.26 billion revenue in 2005. 
Thus, the employees in the district contribute to the district’s budget in the form of sales taxes but 
tax revenues on personal income escapes to Maryland and Virginia (O’Cleireacain 1997, 9; Ghandi 
et al. 2009, 286).  
Secondly, federal property is tax exempted in the whole US. Unsurprisingly, this tax exemption has 
the most financial consequences for the DC region (Interviews: Anonymous, Lazare). Federally 
owned properties and others tax exempted property such as embassies make up 41% of the 
district’s tax base (O’Cleireacain 1997, 9). For most of the federal property, the DC government 
does not receive payments in lieu of taxes (Ghandi et al. 2009, 280). Yilmaz (2009) calculated that 
this tax loss would account for about US$ 540 million in 2005.  
In sum, the constrained local tax autonomy creates a structural income deficit which is seen as a 
reason for DC’s historically high taxes (Interviews: Clinton, Zahdradnik; O’Cleireacain 1997, 6–
10). Or vice versa, DC features lower quality in public services than the surrounding jurisdictions 
(Interview Wolmann and Young). After the compromises in the Revitalization Act in 1997, the 
strategy of the DC local government has been to push for a relaxation of the congressional 
oversight instead of pointing to the structural revenue deficit (Interview Zahdradnik). 
This limited local tax autonomy plus the federal compensation payments manifest itself in DC’s 
budget. Table 39 list the big revenues category of DC in 2013 and compares it to the average local 
government in the US. Roughly, DC’s budget is composed in the following manner: 28% federal 
governmental transfers 44% locally raised taxes and 28% charges, utility revenues and 
miscellaneous revenue (United States Census Bureau 2015b). 
 
                                                            
49 O’Cleireacain (1997, 155–56) highlights two more local tax autonomy constraints. First, the district is not allowed 
to collect taxes on the purchase or income of military personnel and foreign diplomats. Second, the federal government 
does not pay sales tax on purchases or personal property taxes on its equipment.  
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Table 39: Comparison of revenues between DC and the average US local government  
Type of revenue DC Average US local government  
Amount 
(in US$ million) 
Percentage 
% 
Percentage 
% 
Federal governmental transfers 3’982 28.26 4.16 
State governmental transfers 0 0 27.45 
Property tax 1’970 13.98 25.88 
Sales and gross receipt tax 1’511 10.72 5.99 
Individual income tax 1’641 11.64 1.69 
Corporate income tax 453 3.21 0.47 
Other taxes 605 4.3 1.54 
Charges, utility revenue and 
miscellaneous revenue 
3’931 27.89 32.81 
Total 14’093 100 99.99 
Source: United States Census Bureau, (2015b): State and Local Government Finance, data from 2013. 
DC’s revenue composition looks different than the revenue composition of the average US local 
government. Federal governmental grants are higher in DC because DC has to perform state 
functions as well as local functions. The total governmental transfer (state and federal) are a bit 
higher in the average US local government than in the district. Furthermore, the property tax 
constitutes in DC not an as important local revenue source than in other US local jurisdictions. 
This reveals the high share of property that is tax exempted in the district. It seems that DC 
compensates the constrained property tax base by tax money generated in the sales and gross 
receipt tax, in the individual income tax, as well as in the corporate income tax. This may explain 
the comparably high tax rates of the district (O’Cleireacain 1997, 6–10). It is important to note that 
the US$ 1.3 billion that have been negotiated in Revitalization Act are not reflected in the budget 
because the federal government directly carries out certain functions, i.e. prisons, or directly funds 
certain functions, i.e. courts (Nagel 2013a, 65). 
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Public-horizontal 
The small-scale district is embedded in a region 
that is vertically and horizontally fragmented (see 
Figure 8). 91 local governments are present in the 
FUA Washington, D.C. spanning over three states 
and the district. In the North-East of the district 
lies Maryland what is a Northern State mostly 
governed by Democrats. In the South-West lies 
Virginia which is a Southern State mostly governed 
by Republicans. The district features a traditional 
democratic majority and a significant African 
American population. Thus, the institutional 
fragmentation comes along with different political 
cultures (Interviews: Buchanan, Fuller). West-
Virginia lies at the very margin of the FUA 
Washington D.C. and is thus not very important 
for the FUA. The federal level as an additional 
level adds up to the governing complexity of the 
region (Interviews: Khan, Young and Wolman).  
Local governance 
The local business communities in the District and FUA DC seem well organized. Business 
organizations have access to local public leaders not via formalized coordination bodies but via 
their own network channels. This is especially true for developers who have been mentioned in the 
interviews as powerful agents in the local governance of locational policies. 
The Federal City Council (FCC) is a DC centric organization that unites the most important DC 
business leaders and leaders of non-profit organizations such as universities or hospitals. The FCC 
perceives itself as a catalyst for progressive initiatives mostly in the areas of infrastructure 
development as well as education (Interview Clinton). In the case of big infrastructure projects like 
the renovation of the Union Station, the building of the Convention center, or the Verizon center 
the FCC activated its network to bring together federal public actors, local public actors and 
business elites in order to advance the projects and ensure their funding (Interview Clinton). The 
FCC operates rather quietly and relies on its network (Interview Fuller). The FCC became more 
powerful by hiring the former mayor of DC Anthony A. Williams as its CEO who is well respected 
Cartography: Mario Huber 
   
Figure 8: Map of FUA Washington, D.C. 
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for modernizing the public administration in DC and pushing economic development initiatives 
forward (Interviews: Clinton, C. Stone). Furthermore, ten Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) 
focus on neighborhood economic development in their own relatively small perimeter. These BIDs 
articulate the interest of the industries present in their perimeter, mobilize private resources and 
act as mediators between land owners, developers and the local government (Interview Watkins; 
Schaller 2016). The BIDs are organized in the DC Business Improvement Districts Council (DC 
BID Council) to collaborate on city wide issues. A further important business organizations is the 
DC Chamber of Commerce that has around 1’500 members.  
On the regional level, two business interest groups seem to be especially relevant. The Greater 
Washington Board of Trade (GWBoT) is the chamber of commerce of the region. It is a network 
of business leaders representing all economic sectors (Interview White). The GWBoT initiated The 
Greater Washington Initiative (GWI) – a public-private partnership – that was concerned with 
regional horizontal coordination of locational policies but was terminated in 2010 (more in 
subchapter 8.2.5). This lack of regionalism created a vacuum that the 2030 group, established in 
2007, tries to fill. The 2030 consists of about 25 wealthy and influential regional business leaders. 
A lot of their members are developers (Interview Buchanan). The 2030 group finance studies and 
evaluations with the aim to have an impact on the economic development agenda. However, they 
seem to be most influential when they activate their networks because they have access to the top 
regional decision makers such as the DC mayor as well as the governors of Virginia and Maryland 
(Interviews: Buchanan, Fuller).  
These different organizations meet each other informally and sporadically to find common ground 
and share their priorities (Interview White). Similarly, these organizations meet regularly with the 
different governments in the region to discuss economic development issues but there is no-
institutionalized way of communication (Interviews: Loescher, Zipper). Most of these business 
interest groups have their own networks and in DC there operate a lot of hired lobbyists that are 
representing business interests. Thus, the business interest in the DC region are well heard despite 
not having formalized communication channels with public leaders (Interview Lazere).  
Since the determination of the GWI, no stable partnerships between the individual business 
organizations and the local governments have been established. Ad-hoc coalitions are formed given 
the issues at stake. Thus, there is no urban regime present in DC (Interviews: Lazere, Loescher, 
Young and Wolman, Zipper). A reason for the lack of an urban regime may be the lack of an 
industrial tradition in DC. The only branch of business that are influential are the developers 
(Interviews: Clinton, Ruble, C. Stone, Young and Wolman). Thus, an expert calls the local 
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governance arrangement “rather a growth machine type than an urban regime. It applies more, 
because DC has no industries, but it has land to develop” (Interview Young and Wolman).  
8.2. Locational policies in Washington, D.C. 
Locational policies are integrated in the Comprehensive Plan that is a general policy document that 
shall provide guidance for future planning and development of the city required by The Home Rule 
Act (Interview Khan). The DC Office of Planning is responsible for formulating the 
Comprehensive Plan. The first Comprehensive Plan was adopted in 1984, the current one became 
effective in 2011 and a future one is in its amendment cycle in 2016-2017. The economic 
development agenda – The Five Year Economic Development Strategy for the District of 
Columbia (5yEDS) – originated from a collaborative policy formulation process (The District of 
Columbia 2012). The 5yEDS should be a paradigm shift towards being perceived as a business city 
as an economic development agent explains:  
“If you want to do a paradigm shift you need to do a big project and bring people behind the ideas. We wanted 
to gain legitimacy with the design of the economic development plan (…) The challenge was the old economic 
development strategies were not reflecting DC’s economy anymore. Health care, high-tech and hospitality were 
booming industries but not reflected in the old strategies” (Interview Zipper).  
The Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development coordinated the 
formulation of the 5yEDS in collaboration with the Georgetown University and the George Mason 
University. Advisory groups were formed compositing of business and civic leaders as well as 
officials from other departments of the district. 16 MBA students conducted about 200 interviews 
with local leaders. The aim of such a design was that the business sector would take ownership of 
the plan which should enhance the legitimacy while helping implement the plan (Interviews: Khan, 
Zipper). The district government interpreted its role as coordinator and facilitator in the 
formulation process (Interview Loescher). 
The 5yEDS applied a so-called sector-based approach that is an attenuated version of cluster 
policies. Seven sectors have been identified as targets for economic development policies. These 
sectors are federal government and federal contractors, professional services, high-tech, hospitality, 
retail, real estate and construction, higher education and health care. Especially the sectors high-
tech, health care, retail and hospitality should decrease the dependency on the federal sector. 
The strategic goal of the 5yEDS is to diversify DC’s economy and to educate and prepare the local 
workforce. Among others, the 5yEDS aims for establishing the most business-friendly economy 
in the nation, creating the largest technology center on the East Coast, building a world class 
medical hub and positioning DC as a top North American destination for foreign investors, 
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businesses and tourists (The District of Columbia 2012, 11–12). The 5yEDS explicitly stated that 
a tangible goal is to generate 100’000 jobs and US$ 1 Billion new tax revenue until end of 2017 
(The District of Columbia 2012, 12). Astonishingly, 55’000 of these jobs should be established in 
the construction and real estate sector (The District of Columbia 2012, 12). These jobs should 
favor the low-educated workforce. The new administration under mayor Muriel Browser (from 
2015 ongoing) is likely to invest even more in creating jobs for low-educated workforce, but also 
in neighborhood development and quality of life questions (Interview Loescher). Feedbacks to the 
5yEDS are rather positive. Positive assessed is that the 5yEDS sets goals to diversify from a 
government town (Interview Tregoning) and that it was well received because of its collaborative 
structure (Interview Clinton). On the downside, the 5yEDS was criticized because it is rather 
complicated and is not a “bible that people can refer to” (Interview Lazere). 
On the metropolitan level, the formulation of locational policies is fragmented. Each jurisdiction 
has their own economic development board (Interview Fuller). A coordination platform 
Commission of Economic Development Officials (CEDO) exists that brings together the 
economic development agents of the different jurisdictions. However, the purpose of the CEDO 
is sharing of information and best practices and not coordinating locational policies in the region 
(Interview Boyer). Since 1957 there is a regional governance structure called the Metropolitan 
Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG), a non-profit organization in which 22 local 
governments are cooperating in regional issues. The main policy focuses are transportation, land-
use planning and environmental issues whereas regional economic development is of minor 
importance (more in subchapter 8.2.5).  
8.2.1. Innovation policies 
Innovation policies in DC try to stimulate the interaction between the crucial actors in the local 
economy, i.e. the ‘triple helix’. These kind of innovation policies are mainly applied in the medical 
and the high-tech sectors. Only few innovation polices try to stimulate entrepreneurial activities. 
The knowledge infrastructure is well developed but only loosely connected. 
Cluster policies 
The 5yEDS formulated innovation policies mostly in the medical and high-tech sectors. The idea 
is to make use of the presence of KIBS firms, universities and public research institutes by fostering 
technology and knowledge transfers between these crucial actors. For the medical sector, the plan 
is to position itself as globally top medical hub by linking the 16 hospitals and the over 10 major 
universities and colleges (The District of Columbia 2012, 32). On the regional level, this medical 
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hub should leverage the spatial proximity to important anchor organizations such as the John 
Hopkins University, the NHI and the FDA (Interview Loescher). Thus, in the medical sectors, DC 
applies a classical cluster strategy as it aims to stimulated interactions of all actors from the ‘triple 
helix’.  
Regarding high-tech firms, the district establishes an innovation campus in the east of the St. 
Elizabeths hospital by creating a shared environment for academic institutions and technology 
firms (Cowell and Mayer 2016). Simultaneously, the innovation campus in St. Elizabeths should 
bring internship and training opportunities to residents in in one of the most underdeveloped 
neighborhoods in the district (The District of Columbia 2012, 26). As an anchor should serve the 
headquarters of the Department of Homeland Security. Another project is a high-tech corridor 
between the Convention Center up northwards to Petworth for start-ups and entrepreneurs in the 
digital sector. Financial incentives for high-tech companies (see subchapter 8.2.4) should attract 
such companies to settle in this corridor. This tech corridor strategy was not very successful yet, 
however (Interview Loescher). Both sectors, medical and high-tech are highly regulated sectors. 
Firms in these sectors are not just oriented towards other firms in their clusters but as well to 
regulating governmental organizations and knowledge brokers such as the Brooking Institute 
(Interview Zipper). Thus, the district is able to offer such companies a stimulating environment.  
Generally, the DC government pursues a rather holistic innovation approach. A public servant 
explains “We are not trying to be narrow when thinking about innovation. For us it is as well about 
the creative economy, the maker-economy such as local food producing and not just about digital 
tech innovation” (Interview Khan). For example, the high numbers of tourists, business travelers 
and public servants that come into the district should be leveraged to create job opportunities for 
low-educated workforce in hospitality and retail. A hospitality academy should help local residents 
to get employed in these sectors. Thus, DC applies innovation policies mainly in the medical and 
high-tech sector, but these kinds of innovations should as well benefit local residents mainly 
through secondary job growth in retail and hospitality. The innovation hub in St. Elizabeths should 
unite both strategies (Cowell and Mayer 2016). 
Other jurisdictions in the region also formulate innovation policies in the high-tech and medical 
sector. For example, Arlington County, the neighboring jurisdiction in the West of the district 
belonging to Virginia, focuses on the technological-intense security industry. A good innovation 
policies example in this regard is the Tandem National Security Innovations (TandemNSI) program 
that provides a platform for innovative firms to showcase their solutions to security challenges and 
invites federal agencies to present security challenges they are facing. Thus, TandemNSI links 
innovative firms with program managers of the relevant federal agencies (Warland 2016a, 26; 
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Interviews: Barros, Richmond and Winn). Similarly, Montgomery County, the neighboring 
jurisdiction in the North the district belonging to Maryland, supports cluster activities in the area 
of biotech (Interview Boyer).  
Start-up and entrepreneurship 
The entrepreneurial community in the DC region differs from start-up scenes in the Silicon Valley 
or Boston. Most of the entrepreneurs in the DC region have already 15 to 20 years of working 
experience before becoming an entrepreneur (Interviews: Boyer, Levine, Richmond and Winn). A 
venture capitalist explains that such entrepreneurs “worked in the public sector where they were 
the top technical guys. They feel more connected to their technical field than to the government. 
They become entrepreneurs when they grasp a business opportunity that they are not able to try 
out in their public organizations” (Interview Levine). This entrepreneurs are experienced and 
already embedded in a network, and thus they are not really in need of an incubator (Interview 
Levine).  
As a consequence, incubators are not as aggressively established in DC as for example in Boston 
(Interview Clinton). An example of a well-functioning incubator is 1776 that is showcased by the 
local government (Interview Levine). The 1776 is a private initiative with financial support of 
technological companies. The DC government is as well a founding partner. Furthermore, 1776 
furthermore enjoys support of the Montgomery County government and local universities such as 
the American University or the Georgetown University. Interestingly, 1776 is an incubator 
specialized on a capital city economy because they only support start-ups in highly-regulated sectors 
such as education, energy & sustainability, health, transportation and urban issues (Interview 
Zipper). In Montgomery County five incubators exist in the sectors of ICT, cyber security and bio 
technology (Interview Boyer). The city of Alexandria in the Southwest of the district is building up 
a small incubator for veterans another typical capital city actor (Interview Hawkins and Landrum).  
A couple of venture capital funds are present in the DC region. However, the availability of venture 
capital is limited compared to the US entrepreneurial powerhouses such as the Silicon Valley or 
the Boston area (Interviews: Levine, Zahdradnik). Venture capitalists and equity firms in the DC 
region are specialized in long-term investments and are not experienced with rather short term 
holding periods and aggressive growth accelerations (Warland 2016c, 30). The states of Maryland 
and Virginia both have their own venture capital funds and even different federal governmental 
agencies established their own funds (Interview Levine). Thus, the start-up initiatives in the DC 
region are less intense as in US entrepreneurial powerhouses but some of them are focused on the 
capital city economy.  
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Knowledge infrastructure  
The knowledge infrastructure in the DC region is well developed. Examples are the Georgetown 
University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. The district was 
successful in initiating a collaboration of these knowledge institutes in their economic development 
strategy (5yEDS). However, these universities seldom cooperate on regional issues and “they 
represent more the ivory tower model universities” (Interview N. Stone). Important research 
universities from neighboring states established as well a presence in the DC region with the aim 
to get a foothold in the place where decisions are being made. Best examples are John Hopkins 
University from Baltimore and Virginia Tech from Blacksburg. Virginia Tech’s presence in the 
capital region aims to link its research in societal problems to national decision makers in order to 
transform ideas into concrete policies (Interview N. Stone).  
Testing expectation 1.1 
E 1.1: A highly developed RIS enables the formulation of innovation policies. 
Expectation 1.1 is not supported. There is co-variance between a fully developed RIS and a wide 
range of formulated innovation policies, but the causal mechanism stated in E1.1 seem rather 
reversed. Innovation policies try to foster the interaction between the crucial actors in the economy 
in order to enable innovation. The discussion of expectation 1.2 develops this insight further. 
Testing expectation 1.2 
E1.2: Innovation policies aim at modifying and transforming the constraining parts of the RIS. 
Expectation 1.2 is supported. Innovation policies aim at to enhance the interactions of crucial 
actors in technology intense sectors. Local policy makers state that these innovation policies should 
diversify the RIS that is public sector dependent. Thus, these innovation policies address the RIS 
failure in DC. 
Before 2012, innovation policies in the district were largely missing. The fear of DC’s decision 
makers was that the regional technology ecosystem would become like a Donut where the district 
in the middle would feature a low-innovation economy (Interview Khan). The 5yEDS is seen as 
paradigm change from an old economic development paradigm meaning attracting firms and 
workforce towards an innovation-based paradigm that aims at enhancing knowledge transfers and 
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fostering start-ups in order to establish vital sectors and entrepreneurial eco-systems (Interview 
Loescher).  
Innovation policies especially target technology intense sectors because they profit most from 
enhanced interactions. Examples are the innovation hub in St. Elizabeth, the high-tech corridor or 
TandemNSI in Arlington. The focus on technological intense sectors that already have a foothold 
in DC stems from the recognition that the long term decline in federal spending calls for 
diversification of economic sectors (Interviews: Bean, Loescher, Tregoning). Thus, innovation 
policies target, at least since 2012, the constraining parts of the RIS. 
8.2.2. Image building 
DC unites a two-dimensional image building strategy: On the one hand, DC position itself as the 
US capital city, not just within the US urban system but also towards international businesses, 
investors and guests. On the other hand, DC increased its efforts to lose the image of a government 
town by showcasing the innovation potential of its highly regulated sectors.  
On the international scale, DC is market itself very strategically to the extent that DC is labeled the 
“capital city of the free world” (Interview Zipper). Thereby stresses DC the presence of the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, global companies and over 170 embassies (The District of 
Columbia 2012, 32). For DC’s decision makers this is equally a political and an economic 
positioning strategy because it opens the perspective to attract international capital (Interviews: 
Loescher, Zipper). The singular role of DC, to be the US capital but a truly international city as 
well, is “leveraged to the maximum. It’s all about how and when to play the capital city card” 
(Interview Zipper). 
This aggressive labelling is part of a broader strategy to become a top North American destination 
for foreign investors, businesses and tourists (The District of Columbia 2012, 32–33). The 
economic implications of DC’s singular status are impressive as DC welcomes around 1.8 million 
international visitors. The Chinese tourists are explicitly interesting for the district as they are 
spending more money in DC (around US$ 716 per stay) than an average overseas visitor (US$ 551 
per stay) (The District of Columbia 2012, 32). This results in an aggressive China strategy: “the 
District aims to attract Chinese tourists and identify channels to market the city aggressively”(The 
District of Columbia 2012, 33). A DC-China Center was established in Shanghai in 2012 as a public-
private partnership that should help DC firms entering the Chinese market and should also attract 
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI). An incubator for Chinese firms in DC is also in planning 
(Interview Loescher). DC pairs up with North Virginian jurisdictions to incentives Air China 
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having direct flights from Beijing to the Dulles Airport in the FUA DC (Interview Loescher). 
Besides this strong focus on China, DC targets as well other emerging markets such as Qatar, Brazil 
and South Africa but I could not detect any explicit initiatives so far (The District of Columbia 
2012, 32).  
On the national market, DC want to showcase its potential as a technological hub. This image 
building strategy should attract well-educated workforce by emphasizing quality of life aspects as 
well as DC’s entrepreneurial ecosystem (The District of Columbia 2012, 27). DC also tries to attract 
national visitors by increasing marketing and promotion activities (The District of Columbia 2012, 
29). Furthermore, hosting of special events and conventions should be streamlined. In that regard, 
the district sees itself in competition with cities like San Francisco or Chicago (The District of 
Columbia 2012, 28). 
The jurisdictions in the FUA DC also formulate image building strategies based on the capital city 
status. An expert summarizes that “every jurisdiction in the region is selling the capital city status. 
In a second step, they want to distinguish themselves” (Interview Fuller). They refer to the capital 
city status of DC, because it is a singular status in the US urban system. Arlington focuses on the 
US market by promoting itself as “the only place in the US to do high-tech security business” 
(Interview Richmond and Winn). Alexandria highlight its connectivity within the national capital 
region via Metro, Beltway and airport (Interview Hawkins and Landrum). Rockville, north of the 
District in Maryland, uses the district as a geographic locator but highlights its local assets such as 
cheaper prices of land and real estate and its amenities (Interview Boyer).  
Testing expectation 2 
E2: A highly developed RIS enables the formulation of both a capital city image building strategy and a business 
town image building strategy. 
Expectation 2 is supported. DC strategically employs a two-fold image building strategy. DC is 
leveraging both assets, i.e. the capital city status and its RIS that is based on highly regulated sectors, 
to the full extend (Interview Zipper). The image building strategy unites these two local assets to 
one coherent image building strategy. For DC decision makers, it is not an either-or question 
(Interview Loescher). The jurisdictions in the region also draw on the capital city status and their 
local assets. They use the brand DC for their own purposes as they highlight specific aspects in 
which they outperform the district (e.g. spatial proximity to the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia or 
cheaper prices in Rockville, Maryland). 
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8.2.3. Business prerequisites 
The district is not competitive in regional tax competition when only taking the corporate tax rate 
into account. Furthermore, DC’s real estate market is under supplied which increases the land and 
real estate prices. Thus, DC features unfavorable business conditions. As an alternative, the district 
tries to attract or residents by heavily developing its infrastructure, real estate and neighborhoods.  
DC’s capital city specific local autonomy constraints and its specific constitutional status (see 
subchapter 8.1.4), creates a unique tax setting. The District is allowed to levy taxes typically 
collected by local governments, such property taxes, as well as taxes usually imposed by US states, 
such as individual and corporate income taxes. The Districts tax revenue is made up about one 
third of usually locally generated taxes and two thirds from taxes usually collected by a state (The 
District of Columbia 2015, 2). Table 40 compares the personal income tax rate, the corporate 
income tax rate and the property tax rate between jurisdictions in the FUA DC. 
Table 40: Comparison of tax rates in the FUA DC 
Jurisdictions Personal income tax Corporate 
income tax 
Property tax 
DC Under $ 10’000: 4% 
$ 10’001 - $ 40’000: 6% 
$40’001- $60’000: 7% 
$ 60’001 - $ 350’000: 8.5% 
Over $ 350’000: 8.95 % 
9.975 % 
Residential: 0.85% 
Commercial: 1.85% 
Vacant: 5% 
Blighted: 10% 
State of Maryland Under $3’000: 2-4% 
$ 3’000 to $ 150’000: 4.75 % 
Over $ 150’000: 5-5.75% 
8.25 % - 
- Charles County 
- Montgomery County 
- Prince George County 
+ 3.03%1 
+ 3.2%1 
+ 3.2%1 
- 
1.317% 
1.1% 
1.072% 
State of Virginia Under $ 17’000: 2-5% 
Over $ 17’000: 5.75% 6% - 
- Alexandria 
- Arlington County  
- Fairfax 
- Fairfax County  
- Falls Church  
- Loudoun County  
- Prince William County 
- - 
1.043 % 
0.996 % 
1.040 % 
1.114 % 
1.305 % 
1.155 % 
1.221 % 
Source: District of Columbia (2015). 
Note: 1These are additional local personal income tax rates. Sometimes they are called piggyback taxes. 
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This comparison of tax rates plus the interview statements sketches the regional tax competition 
as follows50: DC is friendly for residents, especially for families with lower incomes but features 
high corporate taxes (Interviews: Lazere, White, Zahdradnik).51 Maryland features rather high 
personal income tax rates because the counties can levy additional taxes, the so-called piggyback 
taxes. However, jurisdictions in Maryland invest more in creating favorable living environment for 
residents (Interviews: Buchanan, Wolman and Young). Virginia’s tax settings are business friendly 
and favorable for high-income residents (Interviews: Boyer, Buchanan, Clinton, White, Wolman 
and Young). A business actor explains the dynamics following in these different tax settings:  
“Due to the lack of any piggy back taxes on personal income such as Suburban Maryland counties 
have, the jurisdictions in Northern Virginia need to be very aggressive with economic development 
incentives so that their tax base can benefit from the growth of establishments filling commercial 
space and those facilities paying increased real estate taxes” (Interview Buchanan).  
From the moment of self-government (1973) to the turnaround in the District Finances (around 
2000), the district was perceived as not providing a business friendly environment. However, the 
stabilization of the district’s finances and professionalization of the district’s administration 
changed this perception (Interviews: Buchanan. Lazere). DC was furthermore able to lower their 
tax rates and is now more competitive in the regional tax competition (Interviews: Clinton, Lazere, 
Watkins, Zahdradnik). Since 2010 DC has attracted a lot of new high-income residents which has 
decreased the salience of the high tax rate discussion (Interview Lazere).  
DC is vertically and horizontally landlocked leading to supply issues of real estate that increase land 
and real estate prices as well as rents (Interviews: Lazere, White). In addition, tax-exempted real 
estate furthermore diminishes the property tax base. As a consequence, DC invests heavily in a 
development of neighborhoods and big infrastructure projects to enlarge its property tax base 
(Interview Tregoning). For the same reason, DC’s government increases its activities to convert 
                                                            
50 This tax-centric view on regional competiveness is one-dimensional as it does not incorporated the quality of local 
and sub-national public services (Interview Fuller). DC may have some inequality in public services especially in its 
school system (Interview Wolman and Young) but it is a priority of the district to improve the quality of its schools 
what has been already accomplished to a certain degree (Sturtevant 2014). Furthermore, comparing nominal tax rates 
does not necessarily provide an accurate picture of tax competiveness given the wide array of fees, adjustments, and 
provisions. 
51 A study of the District of Columbia (2015) compares the tax burden of a hypothetical family consisting of two wage-
earning spouses and one school-age child to the tax burden in different jurisdictions of the FUA DC based on 
individual income tax, residential property tax, general sales and use tax, and automobile taxes. Given this setting, DC 
taxes its residents lower than neighboring jurisdictions at various income levels up to US$ 150’000. 
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the shirking federal office demand to mixed-use building to enlarge the real estate demand side 
(Interviews: Loescher, Watkins). The local government tries to mediate between the federal 
government and private real estate developers to better anticipate vacated federal properties (The 
District of Columbia 2012, 24). Similarly, DC pushes for transferring unused federal land to 
developers such as the Wharf waterfront revitalization in the Southwest, the Yards at M-Street in 
the South of the district and St. Elizabeths in the South of the district east of the Anacostia river 
(Interview Anonymous). Also the strikingly high tax rates for vacant and blighted real estate (see 
Table 40) shows that developing unused or outdated real estate development is a priority for the 
district. 
Such a development agenda should not only enlarge the property tax base but also the personal 
income tax base. By focusing on so-called place-based development, DC tries to lure wealthy 
residents as well as talent into the district. Neighborhoods should be transformed to high quality 
of life areas by incentivizing the establishment of small retail businesses as well as cultural 
institutions, improving schools, and decreasing crime rates (Interview Khan; Sturtevant 2014). For 
example, DC facilitates the use of vacant or underutilized properties for local artists and other 
members of the creative economy with the goal to create an environment attractive for the creative 
class (The District of Columbia 2012, 29; Interview Khan). This development agenda that relies on 
large scale infrastructure projects as well as place-based development is, for example, materialized 
and linked in St. Elizabeths. Whereas the innovation campus and the new headquarters of the 
Department of Homeland Security should serve as the anchors for developing the neighborhood, 
long-term residents should profit from training opportunities and new residents should be attracted 
by cultural amenities such as libraries and cafes (Cowell and Mayer 2016). 
A former DC public servant concluded that “the economic development plan in DC heavily relies 
on real estate development” (Interview Tregoning). This also explains, according to the former 
public servant, the strikingly high number of jobs added in the real estate and construction sector 
stated in the 5yEDS (55’000 out of 100’000 added jobs). Similarly, Sturtevant (2014) showed that 
population growth in the district was a priority for the leadership. It seems that this development 
agenda is an outcome not only of this population growth strategy but also fueled by a type of 
growth machine. Asch and Musgrove (2016, 128) critically describe how “real estate agents, 
developers, lenders landlords, and new residents have taken advantage of historic, state-sanctioned 
underdeveloped Black communities to make money off of her homes”. Doubtlessly, the intensity 
of real estate development increasingly leads to gentrification and segregation processes with 
especially negative consequences for poorer long-term local residents (Howell 2016).  
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Testing expectation 3 
E3: High local tax autonomy enables to focus on income taxes and constrains other manifestations of the business 
prerequisites category. 
Expectation 3 is not supported. High local tax autonomy does not lead to a focus on tax rates. DC 
pursues a development and population growth agenda that promotes other local assets than the 
tax rates are promoted.  
DC invests much in neighborhood development and the development of large infrastructure 
projects. The aims are to enlarge its constrained real estate tax base as well as to attract wealthy 
residents. Underused and therefore low value real estate is transferred to developers. To enlarge 
the personal income tax base in the district, the place based development strategy should attract 
the creative class as well as wealthy residents, for example young couples with a double income and 
no kids (so-called DINKS) (see also Sturtevant 2014; Interview C. Stone). An economic 
development agent elaborates that “place specific investments is our key narrative that we are 
following and telling. Thus, DC is also viewed as a talent attractor. DC did a great job and now we 
have to be careful how we avoid the bad symptoms of gentrifications such as unaffordability of 
housing and real estate” (Interview Khan). 
Thus, the district’ strategy to sustain in the regional tax competition is not by lowering its tax rates 
but enlarging its tax bases. Thereby, the district can play out its core city advantages such as a high 
density of amenities or diversity of neighborhoods while constantly developing its neighborhoods 
as well as large scale infrastructure projects. Thus, the locational policy manifestations in the 
business prerequisites category are diametrical opposed than expected in E3.  
8.2.4. Acquisition 
The district actively acquires firms and FDI. Regarding firms, DC liaise with brokers and specific 
side locators in order to be more competitive in luring firms into the district. The different 
jurisdictions in the FUA DC aggressively acquire firms from within and beyond the region which 
leads to a regional competition to the extent of beggar-my-neighbor behavior. Regarding FDI, DC 
is very active in China but also targets other emerging markets.  
DC aims to deepen the cooperation with brokers, accountants and lawyers who play a pivotal role 
in locational decisions of businesses (The District of Columbia 2012, 25) but also to “proactively 
identify and recruit businesses with expiring leases that can benefit from locating in DC” (The 
District of Columbia 2012, 25). To achieve these stated strategies, the district employs a specific 
person for corporate attraction who cooperates with brokers, side locators and directly with 
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companies to lure them into the district (Interviews: Loescher, Zipper). Furthermore, the executive 
economic development agency Washington DC Economic Partnership is present at important 
conferences and trade shows such as CoreNet a corporate real estate conference or SXSW 
focusing, among others, on emerging technologies (The District of Columbia 2012, 23). With a 
more specific focus, DC targets highly technological firms that fits to the high-tech and medical 
technology sectors by offer tax incentives for so-called Qualified High Technology Companies 
(Interview Loescher; The District of Columbia 2012, 33). 
Additionally, the jurisdictions in FUA DC engage in firm acquisition. The Greater Washington 
Initiative (GWI) – a public-private partnership – did acquisition and marketing for the whole region 
until its termination in 2010. Now especially the bigger jurisdictions act rather aggressively on their 
own (Interview: Fuller, Richmond and Winn). This leads to a fierce regional competition regarding 
firm acquisition and attracting tax payers (see subchapter 8.2.5). An example is the relocation of 
the National Science Foundation from Arlington to the neighboring Alexandria in 2017. This 
attraction of a prestigious knowledge organization from a neighbor employing about 1’700 people 
show the high competitiveness regarding acquisitions within the region (Interviews: Hawkins and 
Landrum, Richmond and Winn). Firms and organizations are aware of this competition and 
approach the different jurisdictions directly or via brokers to scan for the best bid (Interviews: 
Hawkins and Landrum, Loescher, Zipper). DC recently started to increase its activities because 
DC wants to be at the table when relocation decisions are being made (Interview Zipper). 
Regarding FDI, the district mainly targets investments from China, but also emerging markets are 
increasingly targeted (The District of Columbia 2012, 33). The DC-China Center has the task to 
acquire FDI into the district (The District of Columbia 2012, 33). Furthermore, the district 
organized a number of trade mission to China and other emerging markets (Interview Loescher). 
DC is especially successful in attracting foreign real estate investment. According to an economic 
development agent, DC is perceived as a fairly safe investment environment and the district 
supports big infrastructure projects such as the Union Station, the Convention Center, the Wharf 
or St. Elizabeths (Interview Loescher). 
Testing expectation 4 
E4: A highly developed RIS enables the adaption of a profound and large-scale acquisition strategy. 
Expectation 4 is partly supported. DC pursues a profound and large-scale acquisition strategy, but 
this acquisition strategy is based on the highly developed RIS and the capital city status.  
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The acquisition strategy is profound because they apply different acquisition tools such as 
cooperating with brokers, offering tax incentives, being present at tradeshows, organizing trade 
mission, and establishing a special DC-China center. The acquisition strategy is large-scale because 
the district targets the national market as well as different international markets. However, this 
acquisition strategy is not only enabled by its highly developed RIS as stated in expectation 4. It is 
the combination of a developed RIS in highly regulated markets, such as cyber technology or 
medical technology, as well as the prestigious US capital city status that enables such a profound 
and large-scale acquisition strategy. Similarly, the big jurisdictions in the FUA DC are active and 
aggressive in acquisition. They also leverage both the highly developed capital city RIS as well as 
the capital city status by highlighting their spatial proximity to the US capital.  
8.2.5. Coordination  
The jurisdictions in the FUA DC rather compete than cooperate in locational politics. Regional 
coordination platforms are terminated or are not able to coordinate locational policies which leads 
to a fierce regional competition and in some instances even beggar-my-neighbor behavior. 
The Greater Washington Initiative (GWI) – a public-private partnership and a product of the 
Greater Washington Board of Trade (GWBoT) – was concerned with marketing and acquisition 
for the whole DC region. The GWI was mostly funded by the different jurisdictions in the region. 
Whereas the smaller jurisdictions appreciated the standardized marketing of the GWI, the larger 
jurisdiction such as Arlington, Alexandria, Fairfax, or Montgomery pursued their own marketing 
and acquisition activities (Interviews: Hawkins and Landrum, Richmond and Winn, White). As a 
consequence, some members stopped the funding of the GWI that led to its dissolution in 2010.  
Following the termination of the GWI, three organizations have been left that tackle some aspects 
of locational policies coordination in the region. Firstly, the GWBoT downscaled its activities after 
the termination of the GWI to transportation, emergency response, environmental technology and 
workforce policies (Interview White). The GWBoT is still an important private sector organization 
but it lost its regional coordination function.  
Secondly, the Commission of Economic Development Officials (CEDO) brings together 
economic development agents from the different jurisdictions plus representatives of the GWBoT. 
However, the purpose of the CEDO is sharing information and best practices. CEDO does not 
have much resources at hand and thus pursues no joint efforts regarding formulating or 
coordinating locational policies (Interviews: Boyer, Hawking and Landrum).  
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Finally, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) is a regional 
coordination body of 22 jurisdictions in the metropolitan region, with the focus on transportation, 
land-use planning and environmental policies. The MWCOG engages in some activities regarding 
locational policies but struggles to get the support of the jurisdictions in this policy area (Interview 
Bean). In 2012, the MWCOG launched a regional economic development vision called Economy 
Forward with the aim to further develop and diversify the private sector in the region what should 
help to cope with decreasing federal spending (Interview Bean). This private sector diversification 
should be achieved in expanding industries such as biotech, cybersecurity, ICT, professional 
services, hospitality as well as shipping and cargo (Metropolitan Washington Council of 
Governments 2012). However, the vision never got real traction because it is assessed as too 
consensus oriented and a bottom-up wish list that gives a piece of cake to every jurisdictions 
(Interviews: Buchanan, Hawkins and Landrum). Neither the MWCOG nor the CEDO nor the 
GWBoT are able to fill in the vacuum that opened up after the termination of the GWI. It seems 
that the jurisdictions are disillusioned regarding formulating or coordinating regional locational 
policies.  
All interviewees agreed that jurisdictions in the DC region fiercely compete to acquire firms and 
tax payers (for example Interviews: Boyer, Hawkins and Landrum, Ruble, White, Richmond and 
Winn, Zipper). Technically, there is a non-poaching agreement, within the FUA DC dating back 
to the predecessor organization of the CEDO, that says that jurisdictions are not allowed to actively 
contact a firm proposing a relocation unless the firm contacts the jurisdiction first (Interviews: 
Boyer, Richmond and Winn). The jurisdictions could not agree on a new non-poaching agreement 
under the auspice of the GWI (Interview White). Even though this so-called poaching is not 
appreciated and condemned in a lot of interviews, the non-poaching agreement has only a very 
limited impact because firms are aware of the obvious competition and approach the different 
jurisdiction directly or indirectly via brokers or side locators (Interviews: Hawkins and Landrum, 
Loescher, Zipper). The within competition is so severe that we can find in some instances beggar-
my-neighbor behavior. Examples are the competitive bids of neighboring jurisdictions for different 
anchor organizations such as the NSF or big companies such as Lockheed Martin (see subchapter 
8.2.4). An economic development agent explains the strategy of jurisdictions in this regional 
competition: 
There is an overlap in the jurisdictions assets and strengths (…). We did an analysis in which we 
identified our strong clusters and potential clusters that are present in other jurisdictions but we do 
not have. We should have our fair share as well in these clusters. So it is a strategy of ‘guarding’ our 
companies and ‘going after’ new firms and organizations (Interview Hawkins and Landrum). 
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A lot of interviewees assess this competition as a zero-sum game that is counterproductive for the 
whole region (Interviews: Boyer, Wolman and Young, Zipper). 
Testing expectation 5.1 
E5.1: High institutional fragmentation and high local tax autonomy constrain regional coordination. 
Expectation 5.1 is supported. The interviewees point out to the two expected explanatory factors 
of this regional competition in the FUA DC.  
The FUA DC features high vertical and horizontal institutional fragmentation. Its core – the 
District of Columbia – only accounts for about 10% of the population. The three states and the 
District of Columbia account for different political settings. Whereas the two Virginias are 
Southern states that only allow limited local autonomy, Maryland is a Northern state in which local 
jurisdictions enjoy more autonomy (Interviews: Fuller, Hawkins and Landrum). The district is a 
very specific political construct with a unique fiscal incentives structures given the district’s many 
tax constraints. These high institutional fragmentation, i.e. the interplay of three states, the District 
and the federal government, makes regional coordination complicated especially if we consider that 
every jurisdiction has their own economic development board (Interviews: Fuller, Young and 
Wolman).  
This institutional fragmentation in combination with high local tax autonomy can explain the 
competition in the DC metropolitan region. The regional competition is primary about taxes but 
this competition is carried out in an unlevel playing field because the different jurisdictions feature 
different tax settings. The jurisdictions in Virginia are assessed as very competitive and aggressive 
in acquiring firms, whereas the jurisdictions in Maryland are allowed to levy piggy back taxes on 
personal income which makes them more focused on creating favorable living conditions for their 
tax payers (Interviews: Buchanan, Fuller, Richmond and Winn, Wolman and Young). Thus, “tax 
competition underpins everything” (Interview Buchanan). 
 Regional tax competition hampers the formulation and coordination of locational policies in the 
region. Thus, there is no impetus of increasing the global competitiveness of the DC region in a 
coordinated manner (Interview Clinton). A regional coordination leader sums it up: “We can’t 
change anything about the institutional fragmentation and the different tax system. So we have to 
accept that and try to work around it” (Interview Bean).  
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Testing expectation 5.2 
E 5.2: Coordination aims at overcoming the constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
Expectation 5.2 is not supported. DC faces many capital city specific constraints. The political 
barriers are too high to amend the constitution-based capital city specific constraints. Yet DC has 
some leeway in lobbying for compensation payments. Furthermore, the FUA DC is institutional 
fragmented and thus constrained on the public horizontal dimension. Regional coordination is not 
able to overcome institutional fragmentation due to high local tax autonomy because too much tax 
revenue is possibly at stake. 
Local decision makers have been trying to overcome the capital city specific constraints in the 
recent years. Since the Home Rule Act of 1973, DC lobbies for full representation in Congress. In 
2006 a failed package deal that would get the DC delegate in congress voting rights in exchange for 
one more congress seat for Utah (Interview Young and Wolman). Since this deal failed, local 
decision makers in DC switched their focus towards lobbying for statehood instead of voting rights 
in the House (Interview Young and Wolman). However, the political feasibility of establishing the 
51st State of New Columbia is low. Since the early 1980s, thirteen statehood bills have been 
introduced and all of them failed because full representation could only be achieved through 
constitutional amendment (Nagel 2013a, 70–71). For sure, an amendment of the Constitution “is 
difficult to achieve when the majority of the states that have to ratify it hold the monopoly of 
representation – why should they share?” (Nagel 2013a, 75). There are political motives in play 
because full representation of DC would potentially result in an urban, progressive, Democratic 
and African American legislator (Nagel 2013a, 75). Furthermore, the neighboring states of 
Maryland and Virginia are against DC representation because DC would get the right to tax the 
non-residential workforce (Interviews: Anonymous, Lazere, Young and Wolman; see also Harris 
1995, 264–65; Nagel 2013a). 
Regarding the congressional blockages of controversial local societal policies via social riders (see 
subchapter 8.1.4), the strategy of the DC government is to make these blocked societal policies a 
US-wide discussion with the intention to raise people’s awareness of the District’s limited local 
autonomy (Interview Anonymous). However, the district has found no pathway yet to overcome 
the constitution-based capital city specific constraints.  
Regarding the capital city specific constraints of the local tax autonomy, the district negotiated 
compensation payments. The Revitalization Act in 1997 is described as a big compromise because 
it established lump sum payments to compensate for the restricted local tax autonomy (see 
subchapter 8.2.6). However, no amendments to alleviate the capital city specific constraints of the 
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local tax autonomy have been made. Thus, it is not able to overcome constitution-based capital 
city specific constraints. However, DC is able in some instance to negotiate compensation 
payments for this capital city specific constraints.  
Efforts to overcome the institutional fragmentation in the region failed. The MWCOG and to a 
certain degree the GWBoT try to act as facilitators to connect the important actors and jurisdictions 
in the region. But their success in coordinating locational policies was marginal (Interview Bean). 
For example, the jurisdictions share a common problem understanding, i.e. dependence on federal 
spending, and a common problem solving approach, i.e. private sector diversification especially in 
the emerging cyber security market (Interview Fuller). Regional coordination platforms like the 
GWBoT and the MWCOG try to build on these commonalties as they try to launch for example a 
regional cyber security strategy. However, the commitment of the jurisdictions for these regional 
cyber security strategy is missing so far (Interviews: Bean, White). It seems that since the 
termination of the GWI, the jurisdictions are disillusioned and “only willing to cooperate on low-
hanging fruits” (Interview Buchanan), i.e. policy areas with few tax revenue at stake such as 
transportation, emergency response and environmental issues (Interviews: Buchanan, Loescher). 
In these policy areas the MWCOG serve as the partnership platform, whereas regarding locational 
policies the jurisdictions perceive themselves as competitors (Interviews: Khan, Morris,). Thus, the 
institutional fragmentation in combination with high local tax autonomy is a too big obstacle for 
coordination to overcome. 
8.2.6. Public funds and compensation payments 
Federal funds and compensation payments are an important financial revenue for the district as 
they make up almost 30% of the annual revenue (see subchapter 8.1.4). After the big compromises 
in the Revitalization Act of 1997 that should attenuate the structural income deficit, DC lobbied 
since the turn of the millennium for a new infrastructure deal as well as successfully attracted federal 
funding for its Metro system.  
The infrastructure debate has been launched in 2008 and is still pending. A coalition of DC centric 
organizations led by DC Appleseed calls for 1 Billion federal dollars that should help funding the 
modernization of the district’s outdated infrastructure (Interviews: Rivlin, Smith, Wolman and 
Young). However, when this debate was launched by the coalition, the financial crisis and the 
following federal budget cuts have prevented this infrastructure debate from getting traction 
(Interviews: Lazere, Rivling and Smith, Wolman and Young).  
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In the case of the Metro public transportation system, the federal level pays US$ 1.5 Billion 
subsidies per year because the federal level has an interest in a functioning Metro system in the DC 
region (Interviews: Anonymous, Bean). If these federal subsidies for the Metro decease, the Metro’s 
funding is not secured because the jurisdictions do not agree on a financing mechanism (Interviews. 
Buchanan, Fuller). 
Testing expectation 6 
I: High local tax autonomy constrains to ask for public funds. 
II: Capital city specific constraints enable to ask for compensation payments. 
Both expressions of expectation 6 are supported. When launching the debate about a new 
infrastructural deal or when asking for federal funding for the Metro, these claims are justified by 
the capital city specific constraints of the district. Regarding the second expression of E6, the US 
political-institutional setting does generally not enable initiatives that ask for public funds because 
municipalities enjoy high local tax autonomy. 
As I have outlined in subchapter 8.1.4, the district is not able to amend its capital city specific 
constraints but the district is successful in some instances to receive compensation payments for 
these capital city specific constraints. In all these negotiations, for example in the revitalization act, 
the debate about a new infrastructure deal and the federal Metro funding, DC decision makers 
explicitly referred to the high political barriers for amending the capital city specific constraints. A 
former local decision maker explains the strategy when launching the campaign for the new 
infrastructure deal:  
“We launched the discussions for the new infrastructure deal because the Obama administration 
came into power. We thought the Clinton administration gave us the Revitalization Act, the Bush 
administration gave us some land that we could develop and so we can also give the Obama 
administration a choice to improve the district. The commuter tax was always the elephant in the 
room over the years because every state can do that. Also because it is a lot of money given the 
amount of commuters. We thought we are probably not getting the commuter tax but we can 
negotiate a compensation for it” (Interview Smith). 
Thus, the capital city status that brings along federally imposed local autonomy restrictions is a 
good argumentative strategy for justifying federal funds and compensation payments. However, 
for an average US local government, the possibilities to attract public funds are rather small because 
local governments enjoy high local tax autonomy. 
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8.3. Explaining locational policies in Washington, D.C. 
In this subchapter, I will first summarize the manifestations of locational policies in order to depict 
the locational policies agenda of DC (see Table 41). In the following, I will discuss the tested 
expectations (see Table 42) and try to connect them in order understand the interdependencies in 
formulating locational policies.  
Table 41: Locational policies agenda of Washington, D.C. 
Locational policies Manifestations of locational policies 
Innovation policies - Stimulating knowledge interactions in the high-tech sector and the medical sector 
- Few strategies to foster start-ups and entrepreneurship 
Image building - Two-dimensional strategy: “Capital city of the free world” and highlighting the 
innovation potential of highly regulated sectors  
Business prerequisites - Enlarging tax bases: Land, real estate and infrastructure development plus place based 
neighborhood development 
Acquisition - Profound acquisition strategy: a wide variety of acquisition tools 
- Large-scale acquisition strategy: National and international markets (mainly in China) 
Coordination - Regional tax competition and beggar-my-neighbor behavior  
Public funds and 
compensation payments 
- Asking for compensation payments based on capital city specific constraints 
Locational policies 
agenda 
- Creating innovation in the medical sector and the high-tech sector 
- Leveraging the US capital city status and the innovative highly regulated sectors, i.e. 
positioning strategy as government city and business city 
- Infrastructure and neighborhood development 
- Asking for compensation payments by referring to capital city specific constraints 
 
The locational policies agenda of Washington, D.C. is dominated by four topics. First, innovation 
policies mainly target the medical sector and the high-tech sector. Both sectors are technology 
intense and highly regulated. In the retail and hospitality sectors the emphasis lies on educating and 
preparing the local low-educated workforce. Second, the DC administration tries to leverage the 
status as the US capital city to the maximum by for example using the catchphrase “capital city of 
the free world” in some instances. By simultaneously highlighting the economic dynamics in its 
highly regulated sectors, DC is able to unite the government city image building with an image of 
an innovative business city. This united positioning strategy can be detected in both outward 
oriented locational policies, i.e. image building and acquisition. Third, the development of large 
infrastructure projects and neighborhoods constitute a main element of the locational policies 
activities. Such physical development strategies are an instrument to directly enlarge the local 
property tax base as well as indirectly enlarge the personal income tax base by becoming more 
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attractive for wealthy residents. Fourth, asking for federal compensation payments based on its 
capital city specific constrained is an ongoing debate in DC. Since the political feasibility to amend 
the constitutional status of the district is very low, DC concentrates on asking for compensation 
payments. 
Table 42: Expectation testing Washington, D.C.  
Expectation Expectation 
testing 
Specifications 
E1.1: A highly developed RIS enables the 
formulation of innovation policies. 
Not supported - Reversed causality 
E1.2: Innovation policies aim at modifying and 
transforming the constraining parts of the RIS. 
Supported - 
E2: A highly developed RIS enables the formulation 
of both a capital city image building strategy and a 
business town image building strategy. 
Supported 
- 
E3: High local tax autonomy enables to focus on 
income taxes and constrains other manifestations of 
the business prerequisites category.  
Not supported - Focus on developing neighborhoods and 
large-scale infrastructure projects 
E4: A highly developed RIS enables the adaption of 
a profound and large-scale acquisition strategy. 
Partly 
supported 
- The profound and large-scale acquisition 
strategy is enabled by the highly developed 
RIS as well as the prestigious US capital city 
status. 
E5.1: High institutional fragmentation and high local 
tax autonomy constrain regional coordination. 
Supported 
- 
E5.2: Coordination aims at overcoming the 
constraining parts of the MLG setting. 
Not supported - Coordination is not able to amend 
constitution-based capital city specific 
constraints and to overcome institutional 
fragmentation in the FUA DC  
E6: 
I: High local tax autonomy constrains to ask for 
public funds. 
II: Capital city specific constraints enable to ask for 
compensation payments. 
 
 
Supported 
Supported 
- 
 
Table 42 summarizes the tested expectations in the case of DC. In the following paragraph, I 
discuss the expectations stemming from the RIS as the explanatory variable whereas in the next 
paragraph I discuss the expectations stemming from the MLG setting. 
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The formulation of innovation policies is not enabled by the fully developed RIS (E1.1). On 
contrary, innovation policies are strategic locational policies tools to target the constraining 
elements of the RIS (E1.2). The highly developed RIS enables an image building strategy that unites 
the US capital city status with the economic dynamics in its highly regulated sectors (E2). Similarly, 
the acquisition strategy bases on both the capital city status and the highly developed RIS. Thus, 
DC is able to leverage its capital city status also in its acquisition strategy (E4).  
High local tax autonomy of US local governments in combination with high institutional 
fragmentation in the FUA DC causes a fierce regional tax competition (E5.1). The vertical 
institutional fragmentation (three states and the district) seems to especially fuel tax competition 
because the jurisdiction operate in different tax settings what creates an unlevel playing field. 
Coordination is not able to overcome this regional tax competition because the jurisdictions seem 
disillusioned and only willingly to cooperate in policies with few financial consequences at stake 
(E5.2). In this regional tax competition, the district does not focus on lowering tax rates. Instead 
DC invests heavily in infrastructure development and place-based development which should 
enlarge its property tax base and personal income tax base (E3). Furthermore, DC is not able to 
amend the constitution-based capital city specific constraints despite many attempts in doing so 
(E5.2). However, these capital city specific constraints are a good argument when negotiating for 
federal compensation payments (E6).  
8.4. Conclusion 
The locational policies agenda is dominated by four main topics. First, innovation policies are 
mainly formulated to enhance knowledge interactions in the medical sector and the high-tech 
sector whereas in the retail and hospitality sectors the emphasis is on educating and preparing the 
local workforce. This dual strategy addresses the duality of workforce.  “The challenge is to prepare 
the low-educated workforce for employment in the knowledge economy” (Interview Lazere). 
Another expert elaborates further: 
“If half a century ago, the challenge for DC was to generate any sort of jobs, the challenge today is 
different. DC generates high skilled jobs and there is a desperate need to generate jobs requiring 
lower skill levels. DC is hardly alone but the social consequences are a bit different because the 
federal government was the kind of employer who hired people at different skill levels for a long 
period of time. As the government has switched to contracting out many duties, al lot of jobs are 
no longer performed by people with a long term employment” (Interview Rubble). 
Second, the DC administration tries to leverage its US capital city status by even using the 
catchphrase “capital city of the free world”. DC managed to unite the government city image with 
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an image of an innovative business city. Similarly, the acquisition strategy bases on DC’s innovative 
economic sectors as well as its capital city status. Thus, the case of DC shows that if a capital city 
features a highly developed RIS, a positioning strategy can showcase economic and political local 
assets. 
Third, the development of infrastructure projects, the large real estate constructions and place-
based neighborhood development constitute central element of DC’s locational policies activities. 
Such physical development strategies are an instrument to directly enlarge the local property tax 
base as well as indirectly enlarge the personal income tax base by becoming attractive for wealthy 
residents. This development orientation may be explained by the regional tax competition in which 
DC is not competitive based on its tax rates. Instead, the district relies on core city advantages such 
as exciting, dense and diversified neighborhoods. Another explanation for this development 
orientation is the strong role of developers in the local governance regime. These economic actors 
have direct material interests in DC’s development orientation. A type of growth-machine can be 
found in DC. The district also hopes that these development activities will create jobs for low 
educated residents as they forecast a growth of 55’000 jobs in the construction and real estate sector 
until end of 2017 (The District of Columbia 2012, 12). This development strategy bears fruit as the 
population is growing steadily and the district is prospering. However, DC may also search for 
strategies to ensure the affordability of housing for its poor mostly African American residents in 
these ongoing gentrification processes (Howell 2016). For sure, DC is a place “in which rapid 
transformation rather than stability is normal” (Ruble 2016, 333). 
Fourth, since Home Rule in 1973, the district frequently launches new claims for federal 
compensation payments. DC always puts forward the many capital city specific constraints to 
justify these compensation claims. In fact, DC is the SCC in the Western world that has to face the 
most capital city specific constraints (Boyd and Fauntroy 2002; Wolman et al. 2007). Thus, I expect 
that such compensation claims will perpetuate unless it becomes politically feasible to ease the 
constitution-based capital city specific constraints.  
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9. Discussion: Comparing locational policies in secondary capital cities 
This chapter juxtaposes within-case analyses with a comparative case study research design that 
offers a solid base to evaluate causal claims (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2010, 10). The tested 
expectations and its underlying causal mechanism are compared expectation by expectation. All 
findings are discussed with regard to their theoretical and practical implications. Locational politics, 
i.e. the local governance regime, has been treated rather marginally so far but is addressed in 
subchapter 9.2. Finally, the external validity of the findings is discussed with regard to other SCCs 
as well as to state-anchored secondary cities (see subchapter 9.3). 
9.1. Expectation testing 
Table 43 summarizes the comparative results for each expectation. In the following, I discuss the 
results from the case studies expectation by expectation and outline their practical and theoretical 
implications. 
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Table 43: Comparative results from tested expectations 
Nr. Expectation Bern Ottawa The Hague Washington, 
D.C. 
Overall 
E1.1 - A moderately or highly developed RIS enables the formulation of 
innovation policies. 
- A weakly developed RIS constrains the formulation of innovation 
policies. 
Not supported Not supported Not supported Not supported Not supported 
E1.2 Innovation policies aim at modifying and transforming the 
constraining parts of the RIS. 
 
Partly supported Supported Supported Supported Supported 
E2 - A moderately or highly developed RIS enables the formulation of 
both a capital city image building strategy and a business town image 
building strategy. 
- A weakly developed RIS enables the formulation of a capital city 
image building strategy, but constrains the formulation of a business 
town image building strategy. 
Supported Supported Supported Supported Supported 
E3 - High local tax autonomy enables to focus on income taxes and 
constrains other manifestations of the business prerequisites category.  
- Low local tax autonomy constrains to focus on income taxes and 
enables to focus on providing and developing land and real estate. 
Not supported Supported Supported Not supported Partly supported 
E4 - A moderately or highly developed RIS enables the adaption of a 
profound and large-scale acquisition strategy. 
- A weakly developed RIS constrains the adaptation of a profound 
and large-scale acquisition strategy. 
Not supported Not supported Partly supported Partly supported Not supported 
E5.1 - High institutional fragmentation and high local tax autonomy 
constrain regional coordination. 
- Low institutional fragmentation and low local tax autonomy enable 
regional coordination. 
Supported Supported Partly supported Supported Supported 
E5.2 Coordination aims at overcoming the constraining parts of the MLG 
setting. Not supported Partly supported Not supported Not supported Not supported 
E6 - Low local autonomy enables to ask for public funds and 
compensation payments. 
- High local autonomy constrains to ask for public funds and 
compensation payments. 
Partly supported Supported Supported Supported Supported 
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9.1.1. Innovation policies 
I discuss expectation 1.1 and expectation 1.2 together because they contain opposite directions of 
causality. Whereas expectation 1.1 assumes that only in a well-developed RIS innovation policies 
are enabled because innovation as a non-linear and interactive process requires intensive interaction 
between different actors (Edquist 1997), expectation 1.2 assumes that innovation polices can 
directly aim at the needs and problems resulting from a RIS, i.e. they may directly address RIS 
failures (Cooke 2001; Tödtling and Trippl 2005; Martin and Trippl 2014). The case studies lend 
support to the latter expectation and do not support the former (see Table 44). In none of the four 
SCCs, innovation policies are constrained or enabled by the development of the RIS. However, 
innovation policies do not operate independently from the RIS, because innovation policies are a 
strategic locational policy tools that directly address the constraints ensuing from the RIS.  
Table 44: Results expectation 1.1 and 1.2 
Nr. Expectation Bern  Ottawa The 
Hague 
DC Overall 
E1.1 - A highly developed RIS 
enables the formulation of 
innovation policies. 
- A moderately developed RIS 
enables the formulation of 
innovation policies. 
- A weakly developed RIS 
constrains the formulation of 
innovation policies. 
 
 
 
 
Not 
supported 
 
 
Not 
supported 
 
 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
E1.2 - Innovation policies aim at 
modifying and transforming the 
constraining parts of the RIS. 
Partly 
supported 
Supported Supported Supported 
Supported 
 
The RIS in Bern is only weakly developed and only few innovation policies have been formulated. 
At first sight, the case of Bern seems to support E1.1. The interview data, however, reveal that the 
Bernese economic development agencies perceive themselves not as an agent contributing to the 
stimulation of innovation. Some cluster formation strategies are being formulated with the primary 
aim to stimulate inter-firm networks. The most promising innovation strategy is the establishment 
of a public private partnership in the medical technology cluster that unites all actors from the triple 
helix. In that sense, innovation policies target the fragmented RIS and are not constrained by the 
very same RIS. However, the formulation of innovation policies is by no means exploited in Bern: 
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No innovation policy targets the other RIS failures, i.e. organizational thinness, and few innovation 
polices try to stimulate knowledge interactions between the two RIS subsystems or target start-ups 
and entrepreneurship. 
In Ottawa, the city officials interpret their role in economic development actively. The newest 
economic development agenda explicitly focuses on innovation. The main goals are to improve 
the linkages between the key actors of the ‘triple helix’ and to coalesce the fragmented RIS. Thus, 
innovation policies in Ottawa tackle the RIS failures. For example, the economic development 
agency Invest Ottawa tries to improve the linkages between the various fragmented business 
communities and to facilitate the growth of start-ups.  
The case The Hague features similar dynamics as Ottawa. Both SCCs emphasize the importance 
of connecting all actors from the ‘triple helix’. Both SCCs employ innovation policies as a strategic 
tool to tackle the economic weaknesses stemming from the RIS. For example, The Hague does 
not apply classical cluster policies but stimulates crossovers between existing clusters in order to 
increase the knowledge flows in the whole knowledge application and exploitation subsystem. 
Furthermore, The Hague tries to attract knowledge institutions in order to enhance the 
organizational thickness of the knowledge generation and diffusion subsystem. In no other case 
study it was similarly evident that the local administration formulate innovation policies to tackle 
the RIS failures. 
DC rather resembles Bern than The Hague or Ottawa regarding expectation 1.1 and 1.2. In DC a 
well-developed RIS exist and I found a wide range of formulated innovation policies. The interview 
data reveal that the direction of causality equals expectation 1.2. Innovation policies aim to diversify 
the RIS towards technology-intense sectors in order to counter the federal spending decline 
because public sector dependency is a major threat stemming from the RIS. 
Theoretical and practical implications  
The within-case analyses reveal that innovation policies are instruments to specifically develop the 
RIS by trying to cast off RIS failures. This finding supports the RIS literature’s take on policy 
interventions. Innovation policies are a tool to overcome RIS failures (Asheim, Smith, and 
Oughton 2011; Cooke 2001; Martin and Trippl 2014). As putted forward by Tödtling and Trippl 
(2005), this thesis finds that policy actors, such as local governments or economic development 
agencies, can have a powerful role in shaping a RIS. Local public actors are especially well equipped 
to act as mediators tackling fragmentation between and within subsystems or in the words of 
Bradford and Wolfe (2013, 13) to act as “local brokers to ‘connect and cluster’ researchers, firms 
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and talent”. Thus, innovation policies have the potential to ‘structure’ the very economic structure 
of a locality and are thus a way for local policy makers to exert agency.  
Beyond that, I found that innovation policies are mostly formulated in knowledge-intensive and 
technology-intensive sectors (Asheim, Smith, and Oughton 2011, 881). Roughly speaking, SCCs 
feature two types of economic sectors. The first type of sector are the capital city service sectors 
such as restaurants, hotels, retail and conference venues that commodify the high numbers of 
guests visiting the capital. The second type of sector are highly regulated and technology-intense 
sectors such as medical technology, energy, education, or defense. The latter type of sector points 
to the capital city as a “information cities” (Castells 1989), “national information brokers” (Abbott 
1999; Abbott 2005) or “knowledge hubs” (Mayer and Cowell 2014). The case studies showed that 
most innovation policies in the four SCCs, with the expectation of Bern, target the emerging cyber 
security sector.  
Innovation policies appear in many different configurations. Yet, all four SCCs formulate some 
sort of cluster policies, but cluster strategies can take many forms: From stimulating the ‘triple 
helix’ in the cyber security cluster in The Hague, to stimulating inter-firm linkages in the ICT cluster 
in Ottawa, to organizing events for business leaders in the energy sector. Thus, the label cluster 
policies does by itself not contain much information about the exact configuration or quality of 
innovation policies. It seems that it befits local governments to formulate cluster policies for every 
local existing economic sector. Only in a second step, local governments evaluate their economic 
sectors and decide in which sectors they truly want to invest and which sectors are rather left alone. 
This observation can be illustrated with The Hague that pushes the cyber security cluster and, to a 
lesser extent, the international organization cluster, whereas the innovation policies in the oil & 
gas, the telecom & ICT and the financial cluster are marginal.  
Another very prominent innovation policy concept that I stumbled over in several interviews is the 
idea of the ‘triple helix’, meaning the knowledge interactions of industries, knowledge institutions 
and the government (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1995). Some interviewees directly referred to the 
concept causing a strange situation in which an academic concept is echoed from practitioners to 
academics. Other interviewees indirectly referred to the concept by highlighting the importance of 
these three actors for the local economy. This concept is especially relevant in SCCs given the 
presence of the government that other RIS largely lack. Second and following from the capital city 
function, SCCs are knowledge hubs due to the high presence of KIBS firms, intermediator 
organizations and knowledge generating organizations. The four SCCs have never been industrial 
cities. These cities were knowledge-based from the very beginning. Thus, the application of the 
‘‘triple helix’’ concept perfectly fits to the economic profile of a SCC.  
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9.1.2. Image building 
The within-case analyses support expectation 2 (see Table 45). The development of the RIS has a 
constraining or enabling effect on the image building strategies of SCCs. A weakly developed RIS 
constrains the opportunities to showcase itself as a business city as this would simply not be 
credible. A moderately or highly developed RIS enables to position itself as the capital city but as 
well as a thriving business city. A SCC able to employ such a two-dimensional image can 
strategically adjust its image building strategy to the target group. Even if we take into account a 
more nuanced gradation of the RIS development, i.e. the three stages, the same effect can be 
affirmed.  
Table 45: Results expectation 2 
Nr. Expectation Bern  Ottawa The 
Hague 
DC Overall 
E.2 - A moderately or highly developed 
RIS enables the formulation of both 
a capital city image building strategy 
and a business town image building 
strategy. 
- A weakly developed RIS enables 
the formulation of a capital city 
image building strategy, but 
constrains the formulation of a 
business town image building 
strategy. 
 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
Supported 
 
Supported 
 
Supported 
Supported 
 
The RIS in Bern is weakly developed. Bern invests in building an image as the political center of 
Switzerland, even though no other Swiss city can contest this function. The capital city status is 
strategically applied to shift the focus away from Bern’s low economic dynamics towards its 
political importance. This image building strategy was successful insofar as Bern has been placed 
in the top-tier of Swiss metropolitan regions in the Swiss Federal Spatial Concept although Bern 
does not meet the stated criteria of a metropolitan area.  
Ottawa features a moderately developed RIS. Image building in Ottawa changed several times, 
correlating with its economic ups and downs. Before the dot.com crash in 2001, Ottawa was able 
to build an image mostly around its vibrant high-tech sector but then Ottawa struggled with 
building up a new image for a long time because of the desire to copy the pre-crisis business city 
image. The city officials seem now to have accepted a twofold image building around the capital 
city status as well Ottawa’s economic sectors by presenting itself as a “G7 capital and high-tech 
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town”. They do no perceive the political and economic positioning strategy as mutually exclusive 
but rather try to come up with an integrated image of Ottawa. 
In The Hague, image building activities can as well be linked to the development of the RIS. The 
strong international sector provides The Hague with a prestigious and stable image of the 
international city of peace and justice although it took a while to come up with the current branding. 
The city officials are confident that the emerging (cyber) security sector enables the City to gradually 
shift the perception of The Hague to be also known as an international business city.  
The vibrant RIS in DC enables to strategically play with image building. DC leverages both assets, 
i.e. the capital city status and its highly developed RIS. For DC policy makers, it is not an either-or 
question but they adjust their image given the target group. Whereas towards the federal 
government, tourist or foreign investors, DC present itself as the capital city and pushes this image 
to the extent that they sometimes refer to DC as the “capital of the free world”. Towards firms 
DC highlights its dynamic economic sectors and the numerous economic opportunities stemming 
from the spatial proximity to governmental organizations.  
Theoretical and practical implications  
The case studies reveal that image building cannot be drafted out of nothing but should be linked 
to concrete functions a city is able to perform. Cities cannot compete in interurban competition by 
referring to a RIS that has not yet developed as it is simply not persuasive. Thus, image building is 
not primarily about persuasion but about responsiveness to local conditions (Eshuis, Braun, and 
Klijn 2013, 508).  
Capital cities possess an essential asset in the interurban position competition of cities because they 
can rely on their unique selling proposition as the political center. Economically weak SCCs can 
shift the focus away from their economic inferiority to their political superiority, a move that 
ordinary economically weak cities are not able to execute. The capital city function is thus a classical 
example of a very low locational substitutability (van der Heiden and Terhorst 2007, 242). 
As I have outlined, image building in SCCs can be multidimensional. However, the two logics – 
capital city vs. business city – are often interrelated in reality and merged into one coherent image 
building strategy. The Hague refers to the presence of international organizations but searches for 
ways to enrich this prestigious brand with economic assets. The two North American capitals 
operate more aggressively by labeling itself “G7 and business town” or “capital city of the free 
world and business town”. This two-dimensionality can be played out strategically as image building 
can be adjusted to the target group (Eshuis, Braun, and Klijn 2013, 507; Harvey 2012, 3) which 
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seems to be the other characteristic of responsiveness. Whereas for visitors, foreign investors, 
sector organizations and the central government the capital city function may be relevant, towards 
firms a SCCs should highlight its economic dynamics and not its capital city image. Thus, image 
building is about responsiveness (Eshuis, Braun, and Klijn 2013, 507) but responsiveness seems to be, 
at least in SCCs, composed out of two main features: On the one hand, responsiveness is about 
crafting an accurate image of the local conditions, and on the other hand, responsiveness is about 
adjusting the image to the target group.  
Regarding the economic-oriented image building strategy, the economic sectors are more 
important than the RIS in its totality. Dynamic industries embody the very image of business cities. 
Thus, functioning economic sectors can be exploited by an image building strategy that targets 
firms and thus can be merged with the acquisition strategy. In The Hague the upcoming cyber 
security cluster raises hopes to craft an international business city image, Ottawa was named 
“Silicon of Valley of the North” for a long time because of the bustling ICT sector in the early 
2000s and DC is well known for the dynamics in its highly regulated sectors.  
Whereas image building and acquisition fit together nicely, the case of Bern shows how a capital 
city image building strategy can be linked to the strategy of asking for public funds and 
compensation payments. The efforts to position itself as the political center and the following 
argumentative strategy that a strong political center is for the benefit of the whole country may 
give Bern a basis to justify federal support. The links between economic image building and 
acquisition as well as between political image building and asking for public funds and 
compensation payments supports the theoretical argument by Mayer et al. (2016) that distinguishes 
between two types of positioning strategies: the economical-orientated attracting money and the 
political-orientated asking for money.  
9.1.3. Business prerequisites 
The results stemming from the case studies regarding expectation 3 are mixed (see Table 46). 
Whereas high local tax autonomy, i.e. the right to tax personal and corporate income, does not lead 
to a sole focus on tax rates, low local tax autonomy leads to a focus on providing and developing 
land and real estate. In theory, high local tax autonomy should enable the formulation of all policy 
instruments in the business prerequisites category, but in practice, no SCCs engages in tax 
competition by lowering tax rates or offering tax reductions. The strategy of all SCCs is to develop 
land and real estate in order to enlarge the property tax bases. Furthermore, the two SCCs that are 
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able to collect personal income taxes try to attract residents by neighborhood development (DC) 
or increasing the quality of life (Bern).  
Table 46: Results expectation 3 
Nr. Expectation Bern  Ottawa The 
Hague 
DC Overall 
E3 - High local tax autonomy enables 
to focus on income taxes and 
constrains other manifestations of 
the business prerequisites category.  
- Low local tax autonomy constrains 
to focus on income taxes and 
enables to focus on the provision of 
land and real estate. 
Not 
supported 
 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
 
 
Supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
 
 
Supported 
 
The finances of the City of Bern are under stress, impeding the lowering of the comparatively high 
tax rates. To compensate for high tax rates, the City of Bern invests in so-called soft-factors or 
quality of life issues such as neighborhood development, preservation of green spaces, cultural 
activities or international schools. The strategy is to become an attractive place for new residents 
despite high tax rates. Among others, this focus on enhancing the quality of life may be explained 
by the scarcity of developable land and the low threshold for referenda concerning development 
projects. A similar mechanism is at work in DC. The tax rates of the district are not very 
competitive. As a consequence, DC engages in regional tax competition not by lowering tax rates 
or offering tax breaks but by trying to enlarge its tax bases. Place-based neighborhood development 
should attract new residents and developing brown fields or underdeveloped areas into taxable real 
estate enlarges the property tax base.  
In sum, both DC and Bern operate in a high local tax autonomy setting and both feature relatively 
high tax rates. Both SCCs are not engaging directly in regional tax competition by lowering tax 
rates or offering tax breaks but indirectly by becoming attractive for residents and thereby enlarging 
their tax base.  
Ottawa and The Hague are only allowed to levy property taxes. As a consequence, both cities are 
active in the provision and development of land and real estate. The City of Ottawa puts a lot of 
efforts in filling and updating its most valuable real estate assets in downtown. The Hague provides 
and facilitates the construction of modern real estate such as the new business park. These physical 
developments in the cities can be explained by the importance of the property tax as the only 
substantial independent revenue.  
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Theoretical and practical implications  
I found that in The Hague, Ottawa and DC the provision and development of real estate and land 
is a major policy issue in their locational policies agendas. Bern, on the other hand, takes a slightly 
different route as it concentrates on improving the quality of life for residents. None of the SCCs 
engages in lowering tax rates despite regional tax competition. Thus, the difference in tax regimes 
is not solely capable to explain the characteristics in the business prerequisites category.  
I turn to the revenue composition of the four SCCs to supplement the proposed causal 
mechanisms of expectation 4. Table 47 simplifies and compares the revenue side of the local budget 
in the four SCCs. Bern relies heavily on the personal income tax and it thus makes sense that Bern 
tries to attract new residents by focusing on the quality of life. In Ottawa, the property tax finances 
almost half of the local budget. Consequentially, the provision and the development of land and 
real estate are of highest priority. The Hague has few incentives to focus on tax bases because 
almost two third of the money stems from governmental transfers. However, they develop land 
and real estate. It may be the case that the property tax gives the city administration a little bit of 
leeway because this independently raised revenue comes with no strings attached. For DC, the 
property and personal income tax constitute important budgetary items.52 This may explain the 
focus on infrastructure development, large scale real estate constructions as well as on 
neighborhood development.  
Table 47: Local revenue comparison of the four SCCs 
Budgetary items Bern (%) Ottawa (%) The Hague (%) Washington, 
D.C. (%) 
Property tax 2.63 47.08 3.23 13.98 
Personal income tax 42.47 - - 11.64 
Corporate income tax 9.92 - - 3.21 
Other taxes 4.05 0 0.99 15.02 
Governmental transfers 15.26 18.74 63.59 28.26 
Payments in lieu of taxes - 6.21 - - 
User fees, assets, and 
miscellaneous revenue 
25.67 27.97 32.19 27.89 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Sources: Bern: Federal Finance Administration 2016, data from 2014. Ottawa: Municipality City of Ottawa 2016, 
data from 2015. The Hague: Municipality The Hague 2014, 242-244, data from 2015. DC: Source: United States 
Census Bureau, 2015: State and Local Government Finance, data from 2013. 
Together with national tax regimes, the importance of the respective taxes delivers a better 
underpinned explanation for the characteristics of the business prerequisites category. Especially 
                                                            
52 In the residual category ‘other taxes’, the sales and gross receipt taxes are important with 10.72 percentage points in 
DC. 
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property taxation directly incentives the development of land and real estate. However, I do not 
suggest that the focus on land and real estate development can be monocausally explained by tax 
rates. For example, the local governance regime is an important factor in explaining the land and 
real estate development orientation of some locational policies agendas (see subchapter 9.2). Yet, 
the direction of causality between taxes and the local governance regime is unclear. 
9.1.4. Acquisition 
Expectation 4 cannot be considered as supported because only in one case I could partly detect 
the proposed causal mechanism (see Table 48). Acquisition strategies seem to be based on a variety 
of local assets. The RIS is one out of many local assets although an important one. However, 
thriving economic sectors rather than the RIS per se are the bases for acquisition strategies.  
Table 48: Results expectation 4 
Nr. Expectation Bern  Ottawa The 
Hague 
DC Overall 
E.4 - A moderately or highly developed 
RIS enables the adaption of a 
profound and large-scale acquisition 
strategy. 
- A weakly developed RIS 
constrains the adaptation of a 
profound and large-scale acquisition 
strategy. 
 
 
 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Partly 
supported 
Partly 
supported 
Not 
supported 
 
In Switzerland, the whole acquisition process is organized top-down. The City of Bern does not 
have much discretionary power in acquiring firms or investments, at least not on the international 
level. In the first step, cantons cooperate in national or intercantonal organizations but are in a 
second step direct competitors when a contacted firm gauges different bids. The City of Bern does 
not have stakes in this game until the canton may contact the city to inquire whether suitable 
infrastructure would be available. Thus, not the RIS but the Swiss MLG setting in which the 
cantons occupy a central role constrains profound and large-scale acquisition strategies. 
Ottawa’s acquisition strategy is profound and large-scale but it is based as well on other local assets 
than only on its RIS. One out of three pillars of Ottawa’s acquisition strategy are local economic 
sectors. The other two pillars are praising Ottawa as a soft-landing spot to tap into the North 
American market plus the promotion of its high share of well-educated workforce as an 
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opportunity for companies to get access to a deep talent pool. Thus, Ottawa compensates or 
enriches its moderately developed RIS with other local assets.  
In The Hague the acquisitions strategy is based on already existing sectors, namely energy, telecom, 
business services and particularly (cyber) security. The Hague targets firms in sectors that already 
have a strong foothold in The Hague. The same is true when acquiring international organizations. 
The already present cluster of prestigious international organizations is the best asset in luring new 
organizations to The Hague.  
DC adopts a profound and large-scale acquisition strategy because different acquisition tools are 
in use and DC targets the national as well as different international markets. However, the 
acquisition strategy not only bases on the highly developed RIS. The combination of thriving 
clusters in highly regulated industry markets as well as the prestigious US capital city status enables 
such a profound and large-scale acquisition strategy.  
Theoretical and practical implications  
The within-case analyses have revealed that acquisition strategies are based on a variety of local 
assets. The RIS is certainly an important asset. However, not the RIS in its totality is leveraged in 
the four SCCs. Rather the most thriving economic sectors are suitable for acquiring firms and 
investments. Thus, economic development agents are not constrained by the RIS but enjoy some 
degree of agency when drafting acquisitions strategies (see subchapter 9.2). Similar to the image 
building locational policy, the capital city status can be leveraged as an asset for firms that seek 
proximity to federal government organizations. 
Acquisition is in fact a big business. In the Netherlands and Switzerland international acquisition 
is carried out by consolidated agencies such as the Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency or the 
Switzerland Global Enterprise. In a next stage, sub-national and local jurisdictions can hand in their 
competitive bids. This resembles the two step logic of firms’ locational choice proposed by Cohen 
(2000): In a first step, firms choose a region and in the second step the firms glance around for a 
specific location within the chosen region. The two North-American SCCs acquire rather 
independently or form strategic ad hoc alliances with other jurisdictions. Both DC and Ottawa 
invest considerable efforts in this task. Among others, they establish contact offices in foreign 
markets, set up incubators for foreign firms wishing to tap into the own local market, hire brokers 
and side-locators and are present at exhibitions and trade shows.  
The size of the country may explain these differences. In this international competition, the small 
cities of Bern and The Hague are economically too marginal to sustain in this competition. Thus, 
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the national level or in some instances the second-tier level steps in to increase economic leverages 
of smaller European cities. The price the two European SCCs pay for this service is the delegation 
of agency. In a sense, acquisition in small countries is delegate to higher-tier government as 
suggested by the principle of subsidiarity. 
9.1.5. Regional coordination 
The within-case analysis largely supports expectation 5.1 (see Table 49). It is particularly vertical 
institutional fragmentation and in a second step high local tax autonomy that hinders coordination. 
Vertical institutional fragmentation increases the complexity of regional coordination whereas high 
local tax autonomy is a cause for competition between jurisdictions within a region. However, an 
interaction effect between the two explanatory factors is at work. Only in vertically institutional 
fragmented FUAs, local tax autonomy unfolds its full negative effect on regional coordination. 
Thus, vertical institutional fragmentation must be considered an upstream explanatory factor. 
However, I do not want to propose an institutional determinism because regional coordination in 
its essence is also a matter of politics.  
Table 49: Results expectation 5.1 
Nr. Expectation Bern  Ottawa The 
Hague 
DC Overall 
E.5.1 - High institutional 
fragmentation and high local 
tax autonomy constrain 
regional coordination. 
- High institutional 
fragmentation constrains and 
low local tax autonomy enables 
regional coordination what 
leads to negative coordination. 
- Low institutional 
fragmentation enables and high 
local tax autonomy constrains 
regional coordination what 
leads to negative coordination. 
- Low institutional 
fragmentation and low local tax 
autonomy enable regional 
coordination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supported 
 
 
 
Partly 
supported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partly 
supported  
 
Supported 
Supported 
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In Bern I found negative coordination. The jurisdictions show little interest to create coordination 
synergies but they simultaneously do not engage in harmful beggar-my-neighbor behavior. It seems 
that low vertical institutional fragmentation enables the Canton of Bern to diffuse a consolidating 
order on the FUA Bern. All jurisdictions in the FUA Bern enjoys the same amount of local tax 
autonomy, which creates a level playing field. However, high local tax autonomy seems to 
disincentive jurisdictions to engage in locational polices because tax revenues are at stake. The 
within case analysis also points to political factors that may as well explain the reluctance to engage 
in regional coordination such as fear of ceding local autonomy and a political ideology divide 
between the city and the agglomeration municipalities. The case of the Capital Region Switzerland 
also supports expectation 5.1. The expanded perimeter leads to vertical institutional fragmentation 
increasing not just the complexity in decision-making but also the differences in the tax settings 
that creates a rather unlevel playing field where jurisdictions compete more fiercely.  
I also found negative coordination in the case of Ottawa that is primarily caused by vertical 
institutional fragmentation, i.e. the provincial border that cuts through the very middle of the FUA 
Ottawa-Gatineau. The provinces bring along different political systems and issues of Quebec’s 
status within Canada manifesting the very political struggles of Canada in Ottawa. However, there 
is no beggar-my-neighbor behavior even though Ottawa and Gatineau display some variance in 
corporate income tax rates. Corporate income taxes are the prerogative of the provinces what 
restricts Ottawa and Gatineau to engage in tax competition. Thus, it is mainly the vertical 
institutional fragmentation that explains negative coordination in the Ottawa-Gatineau region.  
In The Hague, the cooperation in the Metropolitan region Rotterdam The Hague (MRTH) seems 
to develop into positive coordination that can be mainly explained by both the absence of vertical 
institutional fragmentation as well as low local tax autonomy. All municipalities that cooperate 
within the MRTH belong to the Province of South Holland. The establishment of the MRTH was 
a strategic move of the two big cities Rotterdam and The Hague to gain more autonomy from the 
Province of South Holland. Thus, the partnership would not have happened if the cities belonged 
to different provinces. However, the municipalities still compete moderately in acquiring firms 
because Dutch municipalities have eager to bring local residents into employment in order to save 
social benefit expenditures. 
In the DC region, the different jurisdictions engage in a fierce competition or beggar-my-neighbor 
behavior that can be explained by two expected explanatory factors. The DC region is a typical 
case of high vertical and horizontal institutional fragmentation. Its core – the district – only 
accounts for about 10% of the population. The three states in the FUA and the district have 
different political settings as well as different tax regimes. It is the interplay between vertical 
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institutional fragmentation and high local tax autonomy that can explain this fierce regional 
competition. High local tax autonomy enables jurisdictions to offer tax benefits and other financial 
incentives that make the whole economic dynamic very competitive. Vertical institutional 
fragmentation in combination with high local tax autonomy creates an unlevel playing field that 
incentives competition between jurisdictions.  
Theoretical and practical implications  
The within-case analyses have revealed that second-tier borders are powerful institutional 
constraints for regional coordination. In the DC region and the Ottawa-Gatineau region, inter-
municipal coordination fails due to second-tier borders dividing the regions. The cases of Bern and 
The Hague illustrate that the vertical order matters for integration. In these cases, the canton 
respectively the province emulates a consolidated spatial order and plays an important role in 
fostering regional coordination. In spite of fragmentation at the municipal level, the upper-tier 
governmental entity serves as a proxy for consolidation which facilitates coordination. This finding 
is a piece of bad news for the category of SCCs, as they are prone to be located in a situation with 
high vertical institutional fragmentation (Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009). Horizontal institutional 
fragmentation did not display much of an influence in the four cases, but it seems reasonable to 
assume that horizontal institutional fragmentation increases transaction costs and collective action 
problems such as free-riding and opportunistic defections from voluntary agreements (Feiock, 
Steinacker, and Park 2009). 
Also the second explanatory factor proved to be meaningful. Generally, tax competition and its 
underlying rationale of ensuring efficient and lean government entities via competition are different 
to the underlying rationale of coordination as a welfare theoretical concept (Scharpf 1994). More 
specifically, the cases point to an interaction effect of two explanatory factors: High tax autonomy 
is an obstacle for coordinating locational policies but it only unfolds its full negative effect in 
vertically fragmented FUAs. Thus, the vertical institutional fragmentation is an upstream 
explanatory factor. The combination of both institutional factors creates an unlevel playing field 
for local tax competition. This finding supports the argument of Leitner and Sheppard (1999, 242): 
“When cities in competition face unequal conditions of possibility [i.e. an unlevel playing field] 
these not only affect the nature of local initiatives but also work to undermine the putative general 
benefits of entrepreneurial strategies: (…), and creating zero-sum or negative-sum game of ‘beggar 
thy neighbor’”. 
While this comparative analysis corroborates the importance of the two institutional explanatory 
factors, the cases also reveal that politics as well as the capital city status may matter in regional 
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coordination. In its essence, coordination is actually about agency, interests, and power relations. 
In Bern, the decision makers in the municipalities feared to lose their autonomy as it would 
endanger their political positions. This fear is enhanced by the partisan divide between the core 
city and the agglomeration municipalities. In Ottawa, the separatism issue of Quebec is an 
important barrier to coordination. In the case of The Hague, the new coordination body between 
Rotterdam and The Hague has to be seen in the light of the political power play between the 
province and its two biggest cities. And in DC, different political settings of the three states as well 
as the special governing situation of the District of Columbia and national state interests all 
aggravate regional coordination. Hence, politics is a factor in its own right since “cooperation 
results from bargaining and negotiating among the officials of affected jurisdictions” (Dowding 
and Feicock 2012, 37). Thus, an in-depth analysis of regional coordination in SCCs should 
incorporate political factors to do justice to the simultaneity of structure and agency. 
The capital city function may facilitate regional coordination. I found that the central government 
might nudge jurisdictions to regionally coordinate policies either via ‘carrots’ or via ‘sermons’ 
(Bemelmans–Videc, Ray, and Vedung 1998). Via ‘carrots’: The central governments may allocate 
funds for certain functions to regional coordination organizations instead of individual 
municipalities or second-tier entities (e.g. provinces, states or cantons). The Dutch central 
government, for example, re-directed public transportation funding to the MRTH instead of the 
province. Via ‘sermons’: In purpose-built capital cities the central level is likely to have already a 
foothold via land use agencies. These agencies can facilitate better regional coordination by 
bringing the jurisdiction to the table. In Ottawa, the NCC facilitated talks between Ottawa and 
Gatineau. The structural idiosyncracy of SCCs, i.e. the higher central government interests in the 
capital function, therefore may constitutes an opportunity structures for regional coordination.  
9.1.6. Coordination 
The cases do not support expectation 5.2 (see Table 50). Coordination is not able to tackle 
institutional constraints stemming from the political-institutional setting. Only in Ottawa, I found 
some traces of overcoming local autonomy constraints. In the others SCCs, coordination efforts 
either failed or there is no interest in overcoming these constraints. Predominantly, SCCs settle 
with these institutional constraints and focus on discretionary locational policy instruments. 
Table 50: Results expectation 5.2 
Nr. Expectation Bern  Ottawa The 
Hague 
DC Overall 
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E5.2 - Coordination aims at overcoming 
the constraining parts of the MLG 
setting. 
Not 
supported 
Partly 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
 
Bern is only constrained in the local governance dimension dominated by political actors. Private 
actors are fragmented as they pursue their interest via various organizations. Public actors show no 
desire to increase the interaction with private actors and they don’t see it as their task to integrate 
other stakeholders in the process of formulating locational policies. Thus, business actors have a 
hard time finding access points to the local governance regime.  
The local autonomy of Ottawa is constrained because of federal influence via the NCC and low 
local tax autonomy. Furthermore, the vertical institutional fragmentation in the FUA Ottawa-
Gatineau hinders coordinated locational policies formulation in the region. Coordination in Ottawa 
is not able to overcome vertical institutional fragmentation or low local tax autonomy. As an 
exception, the new governance model between the city hall and the NCC that intensifies and 
institutionalizes periodical meetings may be a way to deal with the local autonomy constraints 
ensuing from the NCC.  
Low local tax autonomy constrains The Hague in the formulation of locational policies. 
Coordination is not able to alter this hardnose institutional constraint. As an alternative, The Hague 
concentrates on discretionary locational policy instruments such as the development of land and 
real estate. 
DC faces many capital city specific constraints and the FUA is vertically institutionally fragmented. 
Regional coordination is not able to overcome vertical institutional fragmentation. The political 
feasibilities of easing the capital city specific constraints are low since they require constitutional 
amendment. Thus, DC is not able to overcome constitution-based capital city specific constraints 
but in some instances DC succeeded in negotiating federal compensation payments for these 
capital city specific constraints.  
Theoretical and practical implications  
Coordination is not able to overcome institutional constraints. In the outline of expectation 5.2, I 
chose the wording overcome instead of modify or transform because I anticipated the difficulty of 
‘structuring’ hardnose institutional constraints. Overcoming means finding pathways to alleviate 
the constraints or pathways to bypass the constraints. However, only in Ottawa I found some 
instances of overcoming local autonomy constraints. In the other SCCs, coordination efforts either 
failed such as the regional coordination platforms in the DC region, or there is no interest in 
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overcoming these constraints such as in the local governance regime in Bern. Predominantly, SCCs 
settle with these institutional constraints and concentrate on discretionary locational policy 
instruments. 
The within-case analysis reveals that ‘structuring’ the MLG setting is not possible contrary to the 
‘structuring’ of the RIS. It seems logical to assume that the local governance dimension would be 
the easiest dimension ‘to structure’ because a local governance regime is as much a product of 
agency as it is of structure. However, the cross-sectional comparison in this thesis does not look at 
developments over time. Thus, I could not systematically assess the aforementioned assumption. 
In Bern, the only case in which the local governance dimension constrains the formulation of 
locational policies, the authorities have no interest in integrating external actors in the locational 
policies formulation process.  
If I would expand the case selection or change the policy field, more examples of successful 
‘structuring’ the MLG setting may appear. For example, the city of Ulm in South Germany shares 
an economic development agency with the neighboring city Neu-Ulm that is located in another 
German federal state (Kaufmann and Arnold 2017). This astonishing coordination in a FUA that 
is vertically institutional fragmented at its very heart reveals that it is possible to overcome vertical 
institutional fragmentation. Regarding policy fields, it seems that jurisdictions are reluctant to 
coordinate locational policies because potential tax revenue is at stake. Cases like DC or Bern 
suggest that regional coordination is more likely to succeed in policy fields such as transportation, 
emergency response, environmental technology or cultural activities. This is a tragic dilemma 
insofar because metropolitan regions seem to be the decisive perimeter in the international 
competition of localities (Scott 2001; Hall and Pain 2006; Florida, Gulden, and Mellander 2008). 
Following from that, the formulation locational policies on the regional level is crucial to sustain 
in international competition.  
9.1.7. Public funds and compensation payments 
The within-case analyses support expectation 6 (see Table 51). The degree of local autonomy 
influences the priority of asking for public funds and compensation payments in a SCC’s locational 
policies agenda. More precisely, asking for public funds is enabled by low local tax autonomy, 
whereas asking for compensation payments is enabled by the intensity of capital city specific 
constraints. 
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Table 51: Results expectation 6 
Nr. Expectation Bern  Ottawa The 
Hague 
DC Overall 
E6 - Low local autonomy enables to ask 
for public funds and compensation 
payments. 
- High local autonomy constrains to 
ask for public funds and 
compensation payments. 
 
 
Partly 
supported 
Supported Supported  Supported 
Supported 
 
Bern is treated like any other Swiss municipality and thus does not have to cope with capital city 
specific constraints. The federal government believes that the City of Bern and its agglomeration 
profits form the strong presence of the confederation. As a consequence, Bern is constrained to 
ask for compensation payments based on the capital city status because there are no arguments at 
hand or because the federal level rejects the arguments. Given that the local tax autonomy is high 
in Switzerland, the attraction of public funds plays a minor role. Anyhow, the coordination 
platform Capital Region Switzerland was also established as a tool to tap into competitive funds 
from the federal level by stressing the political importance of the capital city region for whole 
Switzerland. 
In Ottawa, the attraction of public funds is an important element of the locational policies agenda. 
Low local tax autonomy leads to a higher dependency on governmental money transfers. As the 
only SCCs in the sample of this thesis, Ottawa receives payments in lieu of taxes (PILTS). These 
federal payments can be interpreted as a compensation for capital city specific constraints because 
PILTS were enacted at the same time as the federal competencies over its capital city were 
extended.  
As any other Dutch municipality The Hague features a low local tax autonomy which makes 
tapping into public funds important for sustaining the local budget. The Hague even established 
an own specialized municipal desk for attracting diverse public funds. It does not face any capital 
city specific constraints impeding the possibility to ask for compensation payments. 
DC faces extraordinary capital city specific constraints. City officials and the federal government 
negotiate local autonomy issues since the beginning of DC’s home rule in 1973. The capital city 
specific constraints are based on the US constitution what makes the political feasibility of easing 
these constraints unlikely. Thus, decision makers in DC lobby to receive compensation payments 
and have succeeded several times.  
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Theoretical and practical implications  
Different logics underlie asking for compensation payments and tapping into public funds. 
Whereas compensation is tied to the capital city status and thereby has to be justified based on 
constraints ensuing from that status, tapping into public funds is tied to the country specific local 
tax autonomy.  
Ottawa and DC both receive compensation payments whereas the two European SCCs do not 
receive this type of federal money. The local autonomy is constrained by a federal agency that 
represents federal interest over federal land in both North American capitals. In DC, the local 
autonomy constraints are more profound to the extreme that the Congress has de facto oversight 
over local policy-making. In neither of the two European SCCs a national land use agency exists 
nor is there a mechanism for the federal level to intervene in the local autonomy exist.  
This thesis suggests jumping one analytical step back in order to analyze why some SCCs face more 
capital specific constraints than others. I propose that the status of the city prior to its selection as 
the capital should be considered to explain capital city specific constraints. Both European SCCs 
were important cities in mediaeval times. Both cities exercised an important function in the national 
urban system at the time when they were chosen as the nation’s capital. Following from that, it 
seems unlikely that neither Bern nor The Hague would have accepted cutbacks in their local 
autonomy brought along by the capital city status. In contrast, the two North American capitals 
have been built from scratch or have been heavily developed to serve as the nation’s capital. The 
former seem to enjoy more local autonomy whereas the latter face more capital city specific 
constraints in their local autonomy. The case studies have revealed that compensation, for their 
part, should offset these local autonomy restrictions. Thus, it is important to differentiate between 
purpose-built capitals and purposely-selected capitals when studying compensation of capital city 
related costs and lost income. This differentiation has explanatory power when studying the local 
autonomy of SCCs and thus seems to enrich the existing political-institutional capital city 
categorizations proposed by Rowat (1973; see also Harris 1995; Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009).53  
The importance of public funds is dependent on the degree of local tax autonomy. This institutional 
feature is detached from the capital city status. If we take a look at the revenue composition of the 
                                                            
53Rowat (1973) distinguish between three types of legal statuses or governing structures of capital cities: (1) a capital 
city that is located in a special district, (2) a capital city as a city-state that is simultaneously a constitutive unit of their 
nation, and (3) a capital city that is located within a province, state or canton with no special status (see also subchapter 
3.5.1). 
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local budgets, we see that public funds are especially important in The Hague as they make up 
63.6% of the local revenue. In Ottawa, the property tax constitute almost half of the revenue and 
governmental transfers make only 18.7% of the revenue. Accordingly, in The Hague the attraction 
of public funds is of greater importance than in Ottawa.  
In both The Hague and Ottawa governmental economic development funds are awarded 
competitively. These economic development funds come with strings attached, i.e. awarding of 
funds based on conditionalities, which is an effective downward steering mechanism of higher-tier 
governments. What I found is that such a higher-tier governmental funding leads to a local 
implementation of higher-tier governmental economic development policy paradigms. In The 
Hague the central government’s innovation policy paradigm, which is to implement cluster 
approaches in key sectors and to incorporate all actors of ‘triple helix’, can be found as a crucial 
element of the locational policies agenda. In Ottawa, the conditionality of matching funds leads to 
private-public partnership models in economic development initiatives.  
These types of public funds can be described as ‘carrots’ or subsidies. Subsidies that distribute 
material resources are labeled ‘carrots’. Addressees of ‘carrots’ are not obligated to make use of the 
resources because they may hesitate to take the measures required to get it (Vedung 1998, 32). By 
controlling the material resources, higher-tier governments have influential remunerative power 
(Etzioni 1975, 55) over local locational policy-making via ‘carrots’. These “economic tools always 
leave the subjects of governance a certain leeway within which to choose by themselves whether 
to take an action or not” (Vedung 1998, 32). Thus, for SCCs in a setting with high local tax 
autonomy, i.e. for Bern and DC, this leeway is larger, than for SCCs in a setting with low local tax 
autonomy, i.e. for Ottawa but especially for The Hague. The real problem of such a dependency 
on higher-tier governmental money is that SCCs implement locational policies that are orientated 
to maximize tax revenue of these higher-tier governments and do not necessarily benefit the local 
level. As a consequence, local governments may lukewarmly implement these policy paradigms 
because they may not benefit much from the yields in the long run. Thus, I found similar effects 
as proposed by Jessop and Sum (2000, 2293): A higher dependency on higher-tier governmental 
transfer may bring local governments in an awkward dilemma between bottom-up initiatives that 
would benefit the locality and accepting resources that come with restrictive strings attached.  
9.1.8. Summary of the findings 
The comparison brought to light four explanatory factors that all account for parts of the examined 
locational policies agendas in SCCs (see Table 52). Especially local tax autonomy is a powerful 
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factor for explaining whole locational policies agendas. Given the neo-institutional framework of 
this thesis, these four explanatory factors represent the institutional context that enables or restricts 
the formulation of locational policies in SCCs. Thus, the assumption derived from the varieties of 
capitalism concept matter. The political-institutional setting proofed to contain more explanatory 
power than the economic orientation. However, I do not propose a deterministic institutional 
explanation of locational policies agendas in SCCs. I found that local decision makers have some 
leeway to gauge locational policy options and that locational policies can also target structural 
constraints (see subchapter 9.2).  
Table 52: Institutional factors to explain locational policies 
Institutional explanatory factors Locational policies  
Local tax autonomy - Business prerequisites 
- Tapping into public funds (public funds and compensation payments) 
RIS development  - Innovation policies (Structuring) 
- Image building 
Capital city specific constraints - Compensation payments 
Vertical institutional fragmentation 
+ local tax autonomy 
- Regional coordination 
 
Two similar factors had been identified as potential additional explanatory factors in the case 
selection: the inhabitants of the city, FUA or country and the size of the country (see subchapter 
4.1). Only in acquisition size matters. Acquisition strategies are often consolidated in the 
Netherlands and Switzerland because cities in these two countries would be two small and thus too 
marginal to compete in the international competitive acquisition business. All in all, inhabitants and 
the size of the country are negligible factors to explain locational policies formulation in SCCs. 
Two main types of locational policies agendas 
Different local tax autonomy settings account for differing incentive structures what leads to two 
main types of locational policies agendas. On the one hand, low local tax autonomy leads to a 
development and public funds locational policies agenda that aims to enlarge its property tax base and 
tries to attract higher-tier governmental funds. On the other hand, high local tax autonomy triggers 
a maximizing taxes locational policies agenda that focuses on increasing the tax revenue from 
different types of tax instruments. Thus, this thesis has revealed that local tax autonomy is a real 
game changer for locational policies agendas. These two types of locational policies agendas are 
largely detached from the capital city status and thus may be generalizable for similar cities in the 
relevant national urban systems.  
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Table 53: Two main locational policies agendas  
Locational policies 
agenda 
Development and public funds Maximizing taxes 
Explanatory factors Low local tax autonomy High local tax autonomy 
Main component(s) 
of locational policies 
agenda 
1. Property tax 
2. Attracting public funds 
1. Taxes 
- Personal income tax 
- Corporate income tax 
- Property tax 
Rationale to focus on 
job growth 
Avoiding spending Generating income 
Examples Ottawa, The Hague Bern, Washington, D.C. 
 
The development and public funds locational policies agenda focuses on enlarging the property tax base 
and attracting public funds. Property taxes occupy such a prominent role because the other tax 
bases are largely the prerogative of higher-tier government’s. As a consequence, infrastructure and 
real estate development is prioritized in order to boost the property tax base. Public funds are an 
important local revenue because a lot of local tax bases are restricted. The development and public funds 
locational policies agenda brings along three important implications. First, higher-tier governmental 
funds often come with strings attached, i.e. certain conditionalities that decree how to use these 
funds. Through these kinds of ‘carrots’ (Bemelmans–Videc, Ray, and Vedung 1998), higher-tier 
economic development paradigms disseminate from the central to the local level. These policy 
paradigms are formulated on higher-tier governmental levels that operate within a different 
incentive structure, i.e. different tax setting, than the local level. As a consequence, local 
governments may lukewarmly implement these policy paradigms because they may not benefit 
much from the yields in the long run. Second, local governments heavily focus on developing land, 
real estate and infrastructure. Such locational policies agendas may occur with a growth-oriented 
local governance regime (see subchapter 9.2.2). Third, the main locational policies goal in The 
Hague and Ottawa is to generate jobs. The reason for this goal is to avoid social assistance 
expenditures for their local residents, since the local governments do not profit from job growth 
via corporate income taxes or personal income taxes. Thus, The Hague and Ottawa favor job 
growth out of an avoiding spending rationale.  
Bern and DC feature a maximizing taxes locational policies agenda. Local governments in a high 
local tax autonomy setting can yield benefits from their locational policies activities in form of a 
variety of tax revenues. These two cities also strive for job growth but out of a generating income 
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rationale. Job growth enlarges the corporate income tax base and potentially also the personal 
income tax because some employees prefer to live close to their place of work. Thus, DC and Bern 
may directly yield the benefits from their locational policies activities in form of tax revenues. In 
general, Bern focuses rather on the personal income tax base by improving the quality of life, 
whereas DC focuses on the property tax base by developing large-scale construction sides as well 
as the personal income tax base by place-based neighborhood development. Since both SCCs do 
not feature competitive tax rates compared to suburban jurisdictions, it seems that they capitalize 
on core city advantages such as diverse neighborhoods, dense infrastructure, distinctive urban 
lifestyles, manifold opportunities, and cultural activities. 
9.2. Politics, local governance and agency in the formulation of locational policies 
The findings in this thesis represent so far institutional explanations of locational policies 
formulation. Until now, I have only slightly tackled locational politics, i.e. power, interests and 
governance that stand behind locational policies formulation. However, I do not propose an 
institutional deterministic explanation of locational policies agendas in SCCs. I invest a subchapter 
to reflect on local governance in SCCs and agency in the formulation of locational policies.  
9.2.1. Agency in the formulation of locational policies 
I introduced the concept of ‘structuring’ to theorize agency of local decision makers in the 
formulation of locational policies. ‘Structuring’ is based on a dualistic, reciprocal view of the 
structure-agency relationship by arguing that structures indeed shape individual actions but 
individual actions can simultaneously shape structures (Abrams 1982; Giddens 1984; Imbroscio 
1999, 46–47). In this thesis, the formulation of locational policies that alter the very institutions 
that enable or restrict the formulation of locational policies is conceptualized as a form of agency. 
I expected that innovation policies and coordination have the potential to engage in ‘structuring’: 
Innovation policies was expected to modify or transform RIS failures and coordination was 
expected to overcome constraints in the MLG setting. Thus, I expected that these two locational 
policies may serve as strategic and anticipatory policy options and thus valuable locational policies 
tools beyond place-based and path-dependent constraints.  
The cases have revealed that innovation policies live up to this pivotal task. Innovation policies 
have the potential to tackle RIS failures. What makes innovation policies so expedient is their ability 
to kick-start positive chain-reactions. By developing the RIS, innovation policies indirectly enable 
the formulation of locational policies that would have been constraint by an only weakly developed 
RIS. For instance, I found in this thesis that a weakly developed RIS constrains an image -building 
 217 
strategy that showcase the city as a business center. Innovation policies have the potential to 
indirectly enable such an image by developing the RIS. I found no evidence, however, that 
coordination would be able to similarly structure the MLG setting (see subchapter 9.1.6).  
Besides to ‘structuring’, local policy makers can gauge locational policy options what also 
constitutes a form of agency. Locational policies form a category for a wide array of policies that 
enhance the competiveness of a locality. Thus, if the formulation of a type of locational policy is 
restricted, local policy makers may fall back on alternative locational polices. Thus, the structural 
constraints does not coerce local policy makers but structural constraints give local policy makers 
more or less leeway in formulating locational policies. For example, acquisition strategies may 
leverage a variety of local assets such as being the capital city, its geographical location, or the 
talented workforce. Similarly, low local tax autonomy may lead to a prioritization of different 
locational policies. Thus, when local decision makers gauge locational policy options, they operate 
within structural constraints but they do not alter these structural constraints. Clearly, ‘structuring’ 
is a far stronger agency mechanism than gauging. 
9.2.2. Local governance in secondary capital cities 
Local governance types in the four SCCs are discussed and compared by focusing on the interaction 
between public and private actors in the formulation of locational policies. The findings are 
summarized in Table 54.  
Table 54: Summary of local governance regimes  
 Bern Ottawa The Hague DC 
Public actors Act dominant Act as brokers Act as brokers -Act inclusively  
- Rather weak 
position 
Private actors Fragmented - Fragmented 
- Developers are 
important 
A few well 
established 
organizations 
- Well-organized and 
powerful 
- Developers are 
important 
Interaction Low, due to public 
actors domination 
High, due to an 
inclusive local 
government 
High, due to 
institutionalization of 
interaction 
High, due to 
powerful private 
actors and their 
informal contacts 
 
In Bern, political actors dominate the local governance regime. The city hall and the cantonal 
administration are the relevant political organizations in the formulation of locational policies. 
Additionally, the political coordination bodies such as the Regional Sub-Conference Economy or 
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the Capital Region Switzerland constitute arenas to discuss and coordinate locational policies. The 
various private sector groups interested in promoting Bern as a locality operate rather isolated from 
each other, even though they share policy goals. The interaction between the public actors and 
private actors is limited. Political actors do not provide an institutionalized access for these private 
interest groups to engage in locational policies formulation. 
In Ottawa, the city administration and the economic development organization Invest Ottawa 
coordinate the formulation of locational policies in an integrative manner. Like brokers, these 
public actors are committed to bring all relevant local actors such as big firms, business 
organizations and universities into the locational policies formulation process. The private business 
community in Ottawa is fragmented. The different economic sectors are rather loosely connected. 
The Chambers of Commerce or the Business Improvement Districts are not able to consolidate 
the business community. The interviewees point to developers as most influential private actors in 
the absence of a well-organized business community. These developers seem to be important to 
support the growth-oriented locational policies agenda of Ottawa.  
Corporatism and consociationalism as the two main characteristics of the Dutch policy-making 
system can also be traced in locational policy-making in The Hague. The city hall takes the role of 
a broker that coordinates the institutionalized talks between the major interest group organizations 
in the Administrative Consultations for Economic Affairs (BOEZ). But this integrative role of the 
city goes beyond these institutionalized interactions. In different economic sectors, the city hall 
facilitates interactions between the most important actors of the ‘triple helix’. Thus, in The Hague 
the interaction between public and private actors in the locational policies formulation process is 
well institutionalized.  
The district administration does not hold a similar central position in formulating locational policies 
as local governments in the other three SCCs. The comprehensive locational policies activities of 
the district only started in 2012. However, the locational policies have been formulated in a 
profound consultation process integrating relevant business interest groups, sector organizations 
and universities. The private organizations in DC are well organized, powerful and thus equipped 
with an easy access to public leaders. Thus, the interaction between public and private leaders seems 
to work well via informal contacts despite lacking an institutionalized access to the district 
administration. However, the democratic legitimacy of these public-business entanglement seems 
questionable albeit this thesis does not address such questions. Especially the developers have been 
mentioned in the interviews as powerful agents in the local governance of economic development. 
Infrastructure projects and real estate development are projected to be the major drivers of job and 
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wealth creation in the district. Thus, the local governance regime in DC supports the development-
orientation of its locational policies agenda. 
Government led regimes in secondary capital cities 
Local governments occupy a central role in SCCs’ local governance regimes what stands in contrast 
to the ‘social production model’. In Atlanta, the business elites provided crucial resources such as 
money, land, and technical expertise, whereas only the electoral votes stemmed from the public 
actors (Stone 1989, 192–193; 197). Such a local governance description clearly differs from the 
realities in SCCs, where, with the exception of DC, local governments are crucial and business elites 
rather marginalized. Whilst in Bern public actors exploit this position to exercise a dominate role, 
the city administrations in The Hague and Ottawa operate in an integrative and coordinative 
manner.  
Business actors in SCCs are not able to provide such a variety of resources as described by Clarence 
Stone. In their essence, SCCs are government towns that lack an industrial tradition. In such a 
context, a resource-rich and thus powerful business elites could not develop. The only powerful 
business actors in government cities are developers. However, I only made this observation in 
North American capitals. In both of the European SCCs, developers do not have such a leverage 
on locational politics and locational policies. The locational policies agenda of The Hague also 
focuses on land and real estate development, but these activities do not translate in a strengthening 
of developers in the local governance regime. The limited role of developers may be explained by 
the corporatist traditions of policy-making in The Netherlands, in which only few private sector 
organizations have institutionalized access to public actors. In Bern, private actors are all together 
marginalized. This difference raises the following question: Why are developers important in North 
American SCCs but not in European SCCS? I suggest to consider three factors to explain this 
transatlantic divide.  
First, business elites and local public actors are generally closer entangled in the North American 
context than in Europe. This rather general observation was made in many cross-Atlantic studies 
of local regimes (e.g. DiGaetano and Klemanski 1999; Harding 1994; Harding 1995; Pierre 2005; 
Pierre 2014).  
In a similar vein, the Varieties of Capitalism concept distinguishes between two ideal types of 
political economies. The Liber Market Economies (LMEs) can be found in the US or Canada. 
LMEs coordinate their activities via competitive market arrangements, or if they fail via hierarchies, 
what gives market players more stakes in the political game. Coordinated Market Economies 
(CMEs) can be found in the Netherlands or Switzerland. CMEs coordinate their activities through 
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non-market relationships, networks, and collaborative arrangements what gives only the few 
institutionalized private actors a privileged role.  
Second, both North American countries are settler countries. Cities were at the forefront of this 
territorial expansion. These cities were originally founded as centers of trade and commerce and 
thus based on individual profit-seeking. The early city founders were local boosters who used city 
governmental power to promote local growth. Cities were corporations and the cities followed a 
politics of growth (Judd and Swanstrom 2015, 3–4). Thus, developers were needed to satisfy the 
demand for urban growth and they were from the beginning part of the North American urban 
history.  
Third, property taxation is more important in countries of the former British Empire compared to 
OECD countries with a different background (Brülhart, Bucovetsky, and Schmidheiny 2015, 1138–
39). In Ottawa property tax makes up 47 % of the revenue side and in DC it accounts for 14% of 
the local revenue what is more than every other tax category. These are high local budget shares 
especially if we consider that the local property tax base is restricted in capital cities given tax 
exemption of federal and international property.  
A combination of these factors is likely to explain both the importance of developers in the North 
American SCCs as well as the rather aggressive pursuit of a growth-orientated locational policies 
agenda. Developers and such a growth-oriented locational policies agenda seem to mutually 
reinforce each other. In sum, I found government led local governance regimes in all SCCs but 
only North American SCCs feature a government led growth-oriented regime in which developers 
occupy a central role.  
9.3. Generalization of the findings 
This subchapter aims to generalize the findings of this thesis to other SCCs as well as some of the 
findings to other secondary cities. An important part of case study research is to shed light on the 
larger class of cases in the population (Gerring 2007, 20; Blatter and Haverland 2012, 69). Most 
findings should bear some significance for the population of SCCs in OECD states. I furthermore 
relate the findings to SCCs outside OECD states. The generalization to other secondary cities is 
done with more caution since the SCCs feature a specific political economy. Therefore, I generalize 
to what I call state-anchored secondary cities (SASCs) which feature a political economy that is 
characterized by a strong state presence. Only if explanatory factors or locational policies are not 
associated with the capital city function, I try to generalize the findings to SASCs. Table 55 reports 
the main findings of this thesis and outlines possible dimensions of generalization. 
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Table 55: Main findings and their possible generalizations 
Explanatory factors Locational policy Dimension of generalization 
Local tax autonomy Business prerequisites State-anchored secondary cities 
Tapping into public funds (public funds and 
compensation payments) 
State-anchored secondary cities 
Regional coordination (together with vertical 
institutional fragmentation) 
State-anchored secondary cities 
RIS development  Innovation policies (Structuring) State-anchored secondary cities 
Image building Other secondary capital cities 
Capital city specific 
constraints 
Compensation payments (public funds and 
compensation payments) 
Other secondary capital cities 
Vertical institutional 
fragmentation 
Regional coordination (together with local tax 
autonomy) 
State-anchored secondary cities 
Local governance regime Government led infrastructure and land 
development regime  
Other secondary capital cities 
9.3.1. Generalization to other secondary capital cities 
RIS development and image building 
I found in expectation 2 that a well-developed RIS enables SCCs to position themselves as the 
capital but as well as a thriving business city. In contrary, a weakly developed RIS constrains SCCs 
to position themselves as a business city, whereas to position themselves as the capital city is not 
tied to the RIS. Descriptions of other SCCs suggests that the development of RISs challenges SCCs 
around the globe. Abuja is a purpose-built capital that serves as Nigeria’s capital since 1991 
(Elaigwu 2009). Abuja’s regional economy has not developed (yet) in line with the population 
growth what explains that the informal economy accounts for two third of all jobs (Abubakar 
2014). Also the purpose-built Brasilia has not been a catalyst for economic development of the vast 
interior to the extent it was expected in the planning phase of the new capital (Madaleno 1996, 
278). The GDP in Berlin, the purposely-selected capital of the reunified Germany, is lower than 
the German average (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln 2016). Such a brief literature review 
suggest that RIS development is a major issue for SCCs. In fact, the RISs in The Hague, Ottawa 
and especially Washington, D.C. rather represent positive outlier cases in the population of 
worldwide SCC-RISs.  
As a consequence, this thesis predicts that SCCs are likely to build their image around the capital 
city status. This expectation seems to be supported by secondary literature about SCCs. The 
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economic development plan of Canberra argues, for example, that while lacking manufacturing 
and natural resources, Canberra should focus on presenting itself as an attractive place for residents 
as well as for visitors (Samson 2009, 28–31). Ankara that once had been a small Ottoman town 
was selected as the new capital of Turkey in 1923 and has been developed and showcased until 
today as the product and the symbol of Turkish republican modernization and secularism 
(Batuman 2013). However, image building strategies in high-profile SCCs such as Berlin, Jerusalem 
or Rome clearly differ from the observed patterns in Bern, Ottawa, and The Hague. The former 
three cities have the capacity to build their image around their symbolic, historic and cultural 
legacies.  
Capital city specific constraints and compensation payments 
The distinction between purpose-built capitals and purposely-selected capitals is important in 
explaining compensation claims of SCCs. Purpose-built SCCs typically deal with more local 
autonomy restrictions compared to purposely-selected SCCs. As a consequence, purpose-built 
SCCs have a justification to ask for compensation payments. Such a mechanism can also be found 
for example in Brasilia or Pretoria. 
In the purpose-built Brasilia, federal property and property of other nations are tax exempted. 
Brasilia receives compensations for this fiscal constraints (G. Young 2008, 78). Additionally, the 
Brazilian capital receives national government subsidies through the “Constitutional Fund for the 
Federal District” to compensate for capital city burdens. The fund accounts for around 7% of 
Brasilia’s annual budget (Wolman et al. 2007, 16). Pretoria has been purposely-selected as the host 
city of the South African administration.54 Pretoria does not know any local autonomy constraints 
(Steytler 2009, 227–28) and does not demand capital city specific compensations, because the 
presence of the government is seen as adding value to the city. Interestingly, the former colonial 
capitals, that have not been selected to host any government functions, sought compensation for 
the absence of government (Steytler 2009, 233). 
Local governance regime 
This thesis has revealed government-led local governance regimes with a tendency to prioritize 
development of land, real estate and infrastructure. Secondary literature of other SCCs describe 
similar activities in land and real estate development. Canberra focuses on creating an attractive 
city for residents and tourists and strives to accomplish this by modernizing its infrastructure 
                                                            
54 Pretoria hosts the public administration whereas Cape Town is the location of the national government. 
Constitutionally speaking, South Africa does not feature a capital city (Steytler 2009).  
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(Samson 2009, 28). Canberra’s government justifies its policy prioritization of land and real estate 
development with its capital city status: “[G]iven the ACT’s [Australian Capital Territory] lack of 
manufacturing and resources such as mining and agriculture revenues, planning efficiency and land 
development are more economically significant in the ACT than in any other Australian 
jurisdiction” (ACT Government 2008, 4). In Ankara, urban regeneration dominates the local 
agenda. About 14% of all land is designated as urban regeneration zones. The local administration 
takes the lead by focusing on undeveloped land on the fringes of the city, on persevering and 
renewing ‘historic sites’ as well as by evacuation and redeveloping of squatter areas (Batuman 2013, 
588).  
This thesis suggests that the growth orientation of locational policies agendas in some SCCs may 
be triggered by local tax autonomy constraints and the absence of an industrial tradition, hence 
strengthening the importance of developers. Local tax autonomy constraints are common in capital 
cities. Capitals have to deal with limited property tax bases because of federal and foreign real estate 
that is property tax exempted. Limited tax bases urge local governments to act fiercer in developing 
this tax bases. The absence of an industrial tradition creates a vacuum for developers to get 
influence on city hall. The needed material resources for governing a city are provided by 
developers in the absence of other business elites. However, the claim that capital cities are prone 
to prioritize physical development is not systematically tested against similar cities in the country 
that do not face these capital city specific tax constraints and that feature an industrial tradition. 
Thus, this claim has to be treated with caution. Yet, it is an interesting direction of further research.  
9.3.2. Generalization to state-anchored secondary cities 
The theoretical framework in this thesis has been fine-tuned to SCCs. However, some findings can 
be generalized beyond SCCs to cities in OECD countries, whose economies are characterized by 
a strong influence of governmental organizations, i.e. the so-called ‘state-anchored’ towns 
(Markusen 1999, 37). State-anchored secondary cities (SASCs) feature large government facilities 
such as military bases, universities, or government offices. Such cities feature similar challenges as 
SCCs, such as becoming less dependent on government budgets, linking public and private actors, 
positioning themselves in a globalized and increasingly knowledge-intensive interurban 
competition. The assumption behind this generalization is that SASCs do also formulate locational 
policies to increase their competiveness in interurban competition.  
In order to generalize to SASCs two adjustments seem appropriate. First, public procurement is 
not a similarly important economic process in SASCs as in SCCs (Warland 2016b, 150). Public 
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procurement can be a driver for knowledge dynamics in SCCs, whereas in SASCs, knowledge 
dynamics are primarily driven by public organizations. Thus, in SASCs we are likely to find supply-
side driven knowledge dynamics whereas in SSCs we find supply and demand-driven knowledge 
dynamics (Mayer et al. 2016, 18). Second, SASCs are not tasked serving the nation states as well as 
its local residents. As a consequence, the nation state does not have many stakes in these cities, 
what makes local autonomy constraints less likely. By considering these adjustment, this thesis can 
also add some knowledge to explain locational policies agendas of SASCs. The findings of this 
thesis suggest that the local tax autonomy, the RIS development and the institutional fragmentation 
of the FUA need to be considered.  
Development of land and real estate and tapping into public funds 
This thesis suggests that SASCs focus on the development of land and infrastructure and try to tap 
into public funds, if their local tax autonomy is constrained. Cities focus on developing the property 
tax base if other tax bases are not available. This finding can be generalized to other cities, but it is 
important to note that also the local revenue composition should be considered. With regard to 
attract public funds, this thesis can add to research about SASCs in a more specific way. It is likely 
that SASCs try to leverage the presence of their government facilities by public actors to KIBS 
firms. The case studies suggest that these activities are not only triggered by the willingness to 
increase the innovation capacity. These cooperation models expand the opportunities to tap into 
public funds, because a lot of economic development funds in Western countries require such 
public-private partnerships.  
SASCs in a high local tax autonomy setting are likely to focus on place based development such as 
creating a high quality of life as well as providing attractive personal income tax rates. Similar as 
for SCCs, the challenge for SASCs is to create an entrepreneurial ecosystem of KIBS firms around 
those anchor organizations. Low corporate tax rates seem not to trigger the creation, development 
or attraction of KIBS firms. The presence of highly educated workforce is a local assets as firms 
follow talent (Florida 2005). Talent seem to locate where the environment offers opportunity and 
diversity, but also low personal income tax rates attracts highly skilled workers (Feld and 
Kirchgässner 2003; Florida 2005; Wittwer 2016). KIBS firms depend on an environment where the 
highly educated people feel comfortable and where interactions between KIBS firms and other 
actors are simplified due to spatial proximity (Florida 2005; Devereux, Griffith, and Simpson 2007; 
Brülhart, Bucovetsky, and Schmidheiny 2015; Wittwer 2016).  
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Innovation policies 
The challenges within RISs seem similar in SASCs like in SCCs: Organizational thinness of private 
sector firms, fragmentation between the public and private actors and lock-in. Especially 
fragmentation was the main target of innovation policies in SCCs. Also SASC-RISs are likely to 
feature highly regulated sectors in their knowledge application and exploitation subsystem. 
Dynamic knowledge flows between public and private actors in these highly regulated sectors are 
crucial for the development of the whole RIS. However, these two types of actors feature different 
characteristics with regard to culture, the willingness to take risk, the capacity to innovate and the 
possibility to be hold accountable (Warland 2016c). This thesis proposes that local governments 
can play an important role as brokers, facilitators and mediators in bringing together public and 
private actors. Thus, the concept of ‘triple helix’ may be of similar importance in SASCs as in SCCs. 
Furthermore, the within-case analyses showed that innovation policies can target RIS failures 
making them very valuable locational policy instruments. Innovation policies allow local decision 
maker to formulate locational policies with a kind of agency because they allow for ‘structuring’ 
the RISs. As a consequence, SASCs are well advised to concentrate on formulating innovation 
policies.  
Regional coordination 
Vertical institutional fragmentation in combination with high local tax autonomy is likely to be an 
obstacle for regional coordination in SASCs. However, three factors diverge regional coordination 
in SASCs from regional coordination in SCCs. First, SCCs are prone to be located near second-tier 
jurisdictional borders (provincial, state or cantonal borders) given the SCCs balancing function in 
the national urban system. SASCs do not have this propensity. Thus, it is more likely that FUAs in 
which SASCs are embedded are not vertically institutional fragmented. Therefore, SASCs are more 
likely to profit from institutional consolidation emulated by second-tier governmental entities. 
Second, government facilities in SASCs are not as important for the whole regional economy as 
they are in SCCs. Other local jurisdictions in the region may not profit much from spillover effects 
of governmental. This may lead to a related variety of economic bases what facilitates regional 
coordination. Third, SASCs do also have a disadvantage regarding regional coordination. The 
central government may not have the same interest in nudging regional coordination via ‘carrots’ 
or ‘sermons’ as it has in SCCs.  
In sum, SASCs are less likely to be embedded in vertically institutional fragmented FUAs than 
SCCs and the economic bases of the jurisdictions in the region are more likely to show related 
variety. These two factors increase the likelihood of coordination success in SASCs compared to 
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SCCs. On the other hand, central government may not have the same high interest in fostering 
regional coordination in SASCs, a factor that that slightly reduces the chances for successful 
regional coordination. 
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10. Conclusion 
This thesis focused on locational policies formulation in secondary capital cities (SCCs). Locational 
policies represent crucial instruments for localities to develop their place-specific assets and to 
position themselves in the globalized and increasingly knowledge-intense interurban competition. 
The need to be a competitive node in the international urban network is particularly salient for 
capital cities that are not the primary economic centers of their respective nations. This thesis was 
guided by four research questions. First, I wanted to investigate what kind of locational policies are 
being formulated in SCCs. Second, I was interested in what factors explain the formulation of these 
locational policies. Third, I examined what factors explain the configuration of whole locational 
policies agendas. Fourth, I studied the local governance regimes that engage in locational policies 
formulation in SCCs.  
The analytical framework of this thesis is embedded in the neo-institutional literature and more 
specifically in the varieties of capitalism theory suggesting that the economic orientation and the 
political-institutional setting of a political economy are the two crucial explanatory factors for 
strategic decisions of localities (Hall and Soskice 2001). The economic orientation was approached 
with the Regional Innovation System (RIS) concept stemming from economic geography literature. 
The political-institutional setting of SCCs was captured by the Multilevel Governance (MLG) 
concept. The underlying causal mechanisms of the analytical framework incorporate both structure 
and agency. The formulated structural expectations propose that a variety of economic and political 
structural conditions constrain or enable the formulation of different types of locational policies. 
The formulated agency-based expectations propose that local decision makers can also draft 
locational policies that aim at the very structures that simultaneously enable or restrict them. Hence, 
the analytical framework of this thesis is interdisciplinarily informed and incorporates the 
simultaneity of structure and agency.  
This thesis juxtaposed a within-case analysis of causality with a comparative case study research 
design by studying the four SCCs Bern, The Hague, Ottawa and Washington, D.C. (DC). The 
backbone of the data consists of semi-structured, in-person interviews. The interview data was 
triangulated with non-reactive data sources such as documents, reports or databases. The data 
collection was realized during three months of field studies in each of the four SCCs. 
Summary of key findings 
I found that four explanatory factors can explain the formulation of locational policies in SCCs: 
The degree of local tax autonomy, the development stage of RISs, capital city specific constraints 
and vertical institutional fragmentation in combination with the degree of local tax autonomy. 
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These four explanatory factors represent an extract of the institutional context in which SCCs are 
embedded. Besides these institutional explanatory factors, agency as well as the local governance 
regime proved to be important in the formulation of locational policies.  
Local tax autonomy is a game changer for whole locational policies agendas. The degree of local tax 
autonomy leads to two very different incentive structures that translate into two different locational 
policies agendas. On the one hand, low local tax autonomy pushes property tax as well as attracting 
public funds in the forefront of development and public funds locational policies agendas. As a 
consequence, infrastructure and real estate development is prioritized in order to boost the 
property tax base. The economic development public funds are so-called ‘carrots’, i.e. financial 
subsidies that are awarded with certain conditionalities. In that way, higher-tier economic 
development paradigms disseminate into local locational policies agendas. Additionally, these 
development and public funds agendas are not focusing on job growth but on avoiding expenditures for 
social assistance and welfare costs for their local residents, since they profit from increased 
corporate income tax revenues or an increased personal income tax revenues.  
High local tax autonomy, on the other hand, leads to a maximizing taxes locational policies agenda. 
The focus of such agendas is to maximize the revenue from their multiple tax instruments at hand. The 
rationale of the agenda is to generate income because these cities are able to directly yield the 
benefits from their locational policies activities in form of tax revenues. The two SCCs enjoying 
high local tax autonomy – Bern and DC – are both not directly engaged in tax competition by 
trying to lower tax rates or offering tax breaks. They rather try to enlarge their property tax base by 
developing large-scale construction sites as well as to enlarge the personal income tax base by place-
based neighborhood development and a focus on increasing the quality of life.  
The development stage of RISs explains the characteristics of image building strategies in SCCs. Image 
building cannot be drafted from scratch as an image should be linked to concrete functions a city 
carries. Thus, well-developed RISs and especially thriving economic sectors are important to 
explain whether SCCs are able to formulate image building strategies as business cities. Positioning 
itself as the capital city is always possible for SCCs, which enables economically rather weak SCCs 
to shift the focus away from their economic inferiority to their political superiority. Furthermore, 
RIS development cannot explain acquisition strategies of SCCs. Acquisition strategies can be drafted 
on the basis of multiple local assets. For example, the capital city status is in itself an acquisition 
argument applied to KIBS firms that seek proximity to governmental organizations.  
Capital city specific constraints explain whether SCCs ask for compensation payments based on their capital 
city status. The status of the city prior to its selection as the capital accounts for the intensity of 
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capital city specific constraints. Ottawa and DC were purpose-built capital cities whereas Bern and 
The Hague were purposely-selected capitals that carried a certain function prior to their selection 
as capitals. Purpose-built capital cities face more constraints than purposely-selected cities. 
Compensation payments are locational policy instruments in purpose-built capitals because they 
offset some of these capital city specific local autonomy constraints.  
Vertical institutional fragmentation in combination with local tax autonomy explains the success of 
coordinating locational policies in the functional urban area. Second-tier borders, i.e. state, 
provincial or cantonal borders, are powerful institutional constraints for regional coordination. 
Vertical institutional fragmentation only unleashes its full negative effect in combination with high 
local tax autonomy. Thus, vertical institutional fragmentation is an upstream explanatory factor. 
The combination of both institutional factors creates an unlevel playing field for local tax 
competition, i.e. differing tax regimes and consequentially different tax rates of jurisdictions, that 
leads to regional tax competition. The national level may nudge regional coordination by either 
directing funds to regional coordination organizations or by facilitating coordination talks between 
the jurisdictions in the region.  
The case studies have revealed how and why agency matters in the formulation of locational policies 
agendas. Innovation policies may alter the economic structural constraints that restrict and enable 
the formulation of locational policies. Thus, innovation policies by their ability to develop RISs can 
kick-start positive chain-reactions in the formulation of locational policies. I found no evidence 
that coordination may structure the MLG setting in a similar way.  
Furthermore, politics is a factor in its own right. Local governance regimes in SCCs seem to be 
distinctive from other types of cities. This thesis has revealed that not much business actors in 
SCCs are able to provide crucial resources – such as money, land, and technical expertise – needed 
to govern a city. SCCs are government towns that lack an industrial tradition. In such a context, a 
resource-rich and thus powerful business elite could not emerge with the exception of developers. 
Developers and a growth-oriented locational policies agenda seem to mutually reinforce each other. 
However, only in North American capitals have developers leverage on locational politics and 
locational policies. In sum, I found government led local governance regimes in all SCCs, but only North 
American SCCs feature a government led growth-oriented regime in which developers occupy a 
central role.  
The external validity of these findings is especially given for other SCCs. The development of RISs 
seems to be challenging for a lot of SCCs, which makes them prone to formulate image building 
strategies based on their capital city status. Furthermore, the distinction between purpose-built 
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capitals and purposely-selected capitals is important to explain capital city specific constraints. The 
former capitals are more likely to claim compensation payments. The external validity of the 
government-led local governance regimes with a tendency to prioritize development of land, real 
estate and infrastructure remains unclear. Whereas I found hints that the development of 
infrastructure is important in other SCCs, I could not systematically assess whether this 
development-orientation of the local governance regime is capital city specific.  
I only generalize the findings to state-anchored secondary cities (SASCs) whose economies are 
characterized by strong influence of governmental organizations. The degree of local tax autonomy 
is likely to have similar effects on locational policies agendas in SASCs as in SCCs. Low local tax 
autonomy leads to a prioritization of land, real estate and infrastructure development. Furthermore, 
it is likely that SASCs trying to tap into public funds in a similar way as SCCs, namely by leveraging 
their government facilities. SASCs in high local tax autonomy settings are likely to focus on place 
based developments as well as attractive tax rates in order to provide an attractive environment for 
KIBS firms and their highly qualified employees. I assume that innovation policies operate similarly 
in SASCs as in SCCs since both feature similar RISs. Local governments in SASCs can play an 
important role as brokers, facilitators and mediators in bringing together public and private actors. 
The preconditions for regional coordination make coordination more likely to succeed in SASCs 
than in SCCs.  
The findings in this thesis could be strengthened by an extended time frame. This thesis relied on 
a cross-sectional design with a within case analysis of causal mechanisms. However, the within case 
analysis could be extended over time, which would be especially helpful in studying the 
development and change of whole locational policies agendas as well as of local governance 
regimes. This would allow tracing how local governance regimes influence locational policies 
agendas and vice versa. Indeed, urban politics is treated rather marginally and could be improved 
by a more local governance regime-centered approach that would examine more thoroughly how 
globalized economic pressures are mediated by local decision makers (DiGaetano and Klemanski 
1999). This thesis focused exclusively on configurations of locational policies and did not evaluate 
their outcomes. It would be fruitful for further research to go beyond describing and comparing 
locational polices by evaluating the effects of concrete locational policy choices. A more systematic 
comparison of SCCs with SASCs would allow to better control for factors coming along with 
economic secondarity and thus illuminate more clearly the specific role of the capital city status. 
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Theoretical implications 
This thesis contributes to the urban studies literature in six ways. First, the locational policies 
framework developed in this thesis is fruitful for analyzing the variety of policies that localities 
formulate to strengthen their economic competiveness. Second, the distinction between purpose-
build capitals and purposely-selected capitals is relevant when studying capital city specific local 
autonomy constraints. Third, the development of the RISs and more specifically RIS failures are 
important to explain innovation policies. Fourth, ‘structuring’ is an eligible concept to incorporate 
agency in urban studies. Fifth, this thesis found government led local governance regimes in SCCs. 
This urban governance regime type may be applicable to other types of cities in which private 
actors are largely missing.  
The locational policies framework contains an added value for studying strategies of cities to face interurban 
competition out of two main reasons. First, it enables charting whole locational policies agendas by 
drawing several connections between locational policies. In addition, it allows linking allegedly 
different locational policies. For example, innovation policies are not just concerned with 
increasing the innovation capacity of a region but they are also tools to attract public funding. Only 
by considering a broad range of locational policy instruments are such empirical connections 
between locational policies traceable. Second, locational policies are an ideal area of research to study the 
effects of globalization on policies in a variety of cities because locational policies are simultaneously 
targeting and responding to an intensified, interurban competition. The actual locational policies 
configurations of the four cities are dependent on place-based constrains and resources.  
Building on the first theoretical contribution, this thesis supports a neo-institutionalist take in the 
analysis of urban strategies to compete in global interurban competition. Whereas the rational to 
be competitive in a globalized, knowledge-intensive interurban competition is shared by all four 
cities, the actual policy solutions are different given different constraints and resources. This thesis 
shows locational policies are the products of their local context, but they aim at further embedding 
their own jurisdiction into a globalized market. In these ways are locational policies – what Cerny 
et al. (2005) describe as – internalizing globalization. However, I could not find converge of 
locational policies in the four cases under scrutiny. In line with Variety of Capitalism Theory (VOC) 
(Hall and Soskice 2001), the diversity of locational policies in this thesis can be explained by the 
enabling and constraining settings in which SCCs operate. This thesis corroborates neo-
institutional arguments highlighting the similarity of motivations to engage in economic 
development whereas the concrete policy choices are shaped by place-based resources and 
constrains (Savitch and Kantor 2002; Malecki 2007).  
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This thesis suggests that the status of the city prior to its selection as capital should be considered 
to explain capital city specific constraints. The four cases in this study can be divided in purpose-built 
capital cities and purposely-selected capitals. The latter carried a certain function in the urban system prior 
to its selection as capital. Purpose-built capital cities seem to face more local autonomy constraints 
than purposely-selected cities. The latter would not have accepted cutbacks in the local autonomy 
brought along by the capital city status. The case studies have revealed that compensation payments 
are means to offset these local autonomy restrictions. Accordingly, it is important when studying 
capital specific compensations to differentiate between purpose-built capitals and purposely-
selected capitals. This distinction has explanatory power when studying the local autonomy of SCCs 
and thus enriches the existing political-institutional capital city categorizations proposed by Rowat 
(1973; see also Harris 1995; Slack and Chattopadhyay 2009). This distinction contributes to better 
understanding of the classical capital city conflict, i.e. the diverging priorities of capital cities to 
serve the whole nation as well as its local residents (Rowat 1968; Rowat 1973; Harris 1995). Given 
the population of SCCs in OECD countries, I could apply the distinction in the following manner 
while adding another category: 
• Purpose-built city: Ankara, Canberra, Ottawa, Washington, D.C. 
• Purposely-selected secondary city: Bern, The Hague, Wellington 
• Former primary capital cities: Berlin, Jerusalem, Rome 
This distinction may become especially relevant outside the OECD because former colonized 
nations often break with their colonial ties by building new capital cities from scratch (Moser 2010, 
285). Further research should show whether this distinction has potential to be generalized to SCCs 
outside the OECD.  
RIS failures explain the configurations of innovation policies. Innovation policies are instruments to 
specifically develop RISs by targeting RIS failures. This finding supports the RIS literature’s rather 
functionalistic take on policy interventions that expect policy interventions only in case of system 
failures (Asheim, Smith, and Oughton 2011; Cooke 2001; Martin and Trippl 2014). This thesis adds 
to this literature by embedding innovation policies in a wider set of locational policies that goes 
beyond the functionalist understanding of policy interventions. Thus, innovation policies should 
be understood in the context of multifaceted locational policy strategies.  
The concept of ‘structuring’ (Abrams 1982; Giddens 1984; Imbroscio 1999, 46–47) fits into a neo-
institutional analytical framework that aims to incorporate agency-based causal mechanisms. To my 
knowledge no empirical application of ‘structuring’ in urban studies exists, despite David 
Imbroscio’s (1999) discussion of ‘black urban regimes’. This thesis is a comprehensive application 
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of the ‘structuring’ concept in urban studies and may thus provide guidance for further applications 
of ‘structuring’. Such studies are needed because “understanding urban politics means 
acknowledging the simultaneity of structure and agency” (Ward et al. 2011, 855). 
This thesis brought to light a specific local governance type in SCCs: government led local governance 
regimes. As a particular form, the two North American SCCs feature a government led growth-
oriented local governance regime in which developers occupy a central role. The urban politics 
literature presents three similar regime descriptions. First, the government led pro-growth regime 
grasps local governments, often in partnership with elements in the private sector, as crucial agents 
in encouraging, promoting, and subsidizing private investment through grants, loans, land sites, 
and other inducements (DiGaetano and Klemanski 1999, 59). Second, Imbroscio (1998) describes 
a local-statist regime in which local governments’ activities in public property ownership and public 
profitmaking are more intense than the division of labor between state and market would suggest. 
Third, the growth machine (Molotch 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987) emphasizes the power of 
land and property owners that are constantly striving to increase the value of their property. Land 
and property owners ally with other local actors united under the interests of economic growth to 
pursue the development-oriented locational policies agenda.  
The local governance regimes in SCCs seem to entail elements of all three local regime descriptions. 
However, local governments in SCCs do not occupy a strong role because they control important 
local resources, but rather because no business actors possessed these resources. This can be 
explained by the lack of industrial tradition. The weak role of business actors are a characteristic of 
local governance regimes in SCCs. Developers seem to be important because they can fill the 
vacuum of private actors, and not because they are especially powerful and would thus trump other 
local business elites. Consequently, government led local governance regime are applicable to cities where private 
actors are largely missing. This regime description can thus fill a gap in the urban governance literature.  
Empirical implications 
The empirical implications of this thesis are fourfold. First, federal government interventions in 
local politics and local policy-making can be distinguished in ‘carrots’, ‘sticks’ and ‘sermons’. 
Second, local governments play an important role as intermediaries in a political economy that is 
fragmented between public and private actors. Third, developers are the most important business 
actors in the two North-American SCCs. Fourth, SCCs learn from each other because local policy 
makers grasp the similarity of their challenges.  
Federal governments steer their capital cities with a variety of policy instruments. The ‘carrots’, ‘sticks’, and 
‘sermons’ lens (Bemelmans–Videc, Ray, and Vedung 1998) clears the picture of federal 
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interventions in local politics and local policy-making of capital cities. ‘Carrots’ are mostly being 
offered via economic development funds. For SCCs enjoying high local tax autonomy, i.e. for Bern 
and DC, the leeway to refuse these resources is larger than for SCCs in a setting with low local tax 
autonomy, i.e. for Ottawa but especially for The Hague. Thus, an ulterior motive of Ottawa’s and 
The Hague’s locational policies is to tap into national public funds. I found instances that a higher 
dependency on these ‘carrots’ brings local governments in a dilemma between bottom-up initiatives 
that would benefit the locality and accepting resources that come with strings attached. This finding 
is not capital city specific and should hence be found for example as well in SASCs. ‘Sticks’ are 
direct interventions in the local autonomy of capital cities. ‘Sticks’ are often used in DC and to a 
lesser extend in Ottawa. In Ottawa, the federal land-use agency has authority over a considerable 
amount of land in the city. In DC, the federal oversight blocks local policies to the extent that the 
district became a nation-wide battle ground for contested societal policies. In no other SCC are 
capital city specific local autonomy constraints as intense as in DC (Boyd and Fauntroy 2002; 
Wolman et al. 2007). ‘Sermons’ have been found in these thesis particularly in regional coordination. 
National government organizations may facilitate coordination by bringing the jurisdictions in the 
region at one table.  
Local economic development agencies play an important role as intermediaries, local brokers or facilitators 
(Tödtling and Trippl 2005; Bradford and Wolfe 2013, 13). This observation is especially relevant 
for capital city economies because these specific economies are dependent on fruitful interactions 
between public and private actors. Intermediaries are necessary for SCCs because they have the 
potential to bridge the many differences between public and private actors.  
Developers are the most important business actors in North American SCCs. Their role seems to be so 
strong because SCCs lack an industrial tradition. Compared to European cities, business elites are 
closely entangled with local public elites in North American cities (e.g. DiGaetano and Klemanski 
1999; Harding 1994; Harding 1995; Pierre 2005; Pierre 2014). In the North American settler 
tradition, cities were at the fore front of territorial expansion and the engines of ‘the politics of 
growth’ (Judd and Swanstrom 2015, 3–4). Thus, developers are crucial players in the North 
American urban history. The importance of property taxation in the US and Canada (Brülhart, 
Bucovetsky, and Schmidheiny 2015, 1138–39) additionally pushes developers into a powerful 
position in North American local politics. These three reasons not just explain the importance of 
developers but may also account for the strong growth-orientation of locational policies agendas 
in North America. Developers and growth-orientated locational policies agendas seem to mutually 
reinforce each other. 
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There are empirical connections between SCCs. Local decision makers visit each other, derive lessons 
learned and share best practices (see for example Mayer et al. 2013). For example, the Capital 
Alliance is a cooperation between capital city planners of Ottawa, DC, Brasilia and Canberra. Of 
special interests in the context of this thesis are learning mechanisms between Ottawa and The 
Hague in cyber security issues. Since the The Hague Security Delta performs well, it gets attention 
from other cities that also feature cyber security firms or want to expand this sector. Ottawa has 
turned to The Hague, instead of borrowing from the closer DC, because Ottawa is interested in 
learning how smaller cities can position themselves prominently in such a promising sector.  
Practical implications 
The practical implications cannot be split up in different bullet points. Understanding the interplay 
between different locational policies and exploiting the potential of the ‘triple helix’ are the building 
blocks for a two-dimensional position strategy of SCCs.  
SCCs have the potential to position themselves two-dimensionally: As the capital city and as a business 
city. These two dimensions are not mutually exclusive. On contrary, they should be pursued 
simultaneously and can strategically be merged as shown by the examples of Ottawa, The Hague 
and DC. The capital city status is not substitutable by other cities what enables economically rather 
weak SCCs to shift the focus away from their economic inferiority to their political superiority. 
Thriving highly regulated sectors such as cyber security or medical technology are the basis to 
position SCCs as business cities. Whereas a positioning strategy as a capital city is always possible, 
only well-developed sectors enable a positioning strategy as a business city.  
The ‘triple helix’ concept proved to be meaningful to develop highly regulated sectors in SCCs. The knowledge 
interactions between industries, knowledge institutions and governmental organizations are crucial 
for dynamic capital city economies. The last actor type is largely missing in other regional 
economies making SCCs arenas in which the ‘triple helix’ may unfold its full potential. SCCs are 
knowledge hubs and thus dependent on knowledge spillovers between all crucial actors. In sum, 
the exploitation of the ‘triple helix’ is relevant for SCCs because of the strong presence of 
governmental organizations and the knowledge intensity of their economies. Innovation policies are 
the key locational policies to stimulate interactions in the ‘triple-helix’ and thus an important element to 
develop these highly regulated sectors.  
The beauty of innovation policies is that these policies are not structurally constrained. Innovation 
policies can be formulated to strategically develop the shortcomings of the economic sectors. In 
sum, innovation policies are expedient locational policies because they may kick start positive chain 
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reaction that enables the formulation of a wide range of locational policies and because innovation 
policies can be formulated rather independently form structural constraints.  
Concluding remarks 
This thesis has demonstrated that SCCs can simultaneously position themselves as capital cities 
and as business cities. Thriving highly regulated sectors are the preconditions for such a two-
dimensional positioning strategy. Innovation policies are the key locational policies to develop 
these highly regulated sectors. Thus, SCCs possess local assets suitable to sustain in the increasingly 
knowledge-intensive interurban competition. In that sense are SCCs not “leaves in the wind” of 
globalization (Savitch and Kantor 2002, 346) nor objects of nation states (Mayer et al. 2016). 
SCCs unify economic secondarity and political primacy what translate into a specific political 
economy. In today’s economic globalization, this specific political economy can be leveraged by 
positioning itself with a distinctive profile in interurban competition. The two-fold positioning 
strategy mirrors the political primacy and the economic secondarity of SCCs and thus perfectly 
reflects the main economic challenges of SSCs. Hence, this thesis supports the neo-institutionalist 
take on globalization by showing that policy responses to globalization pressures, i.e. locational 
policies, reflect place-based resources and constraints. SCCs cannot escape their destinies as 
government towns but they can formulate a variety of locational policies in order to supplement 
their capital city function with an economic promising profile.  
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12. Annex 
Table 56: List of interview partners 
Interview 
Nr. 
City Name Role Relevant affiliation(s) 
1 Bern Bratschi, Peter Private actor/Interest group representative 
Partner and lawyer at Bratschi Wiederkehr & 
Buob 
Founder Circle of Bern (Berner Runde) 
2 Bern Bucher, Jürg Private actor/Interest group representative 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Valiant 
(Swiss bank) 
Ex-CEO at Swiss Post 
3 Bern Buchmüller, Regula Public official Senior public servant at City of Bern 
4 Bern Fluri, Kurt Public official 
Member of the Swiss Parliament 
Mayor City of Solothurn 
President Association of Swiss Cities (Schweizer 
Städteverband) 
Board member Capital Region Switzerland 
5 Bern Gasche, Urs Private actor/Interest group representative 
Chairman of Board of Directors at BKW group 
Member of the Swiss Parliament 
Member of Circle of Bern (Berner Runde) 
6 Bern Gehrig, Orlando Economic development agent 
Vice-President Strategic Location Development, 
Bern Economic Development Agency (Canton 
of Bern) 
7 Bern Jocham, Uwe Private actor/Interest group representative 
Senior Vice President and General Manager CSL 
Behring AG 
President Employer Association Canton of Bern 
Member of the board at Chamber of Commerce 
Canton of Bern 
Member of Circle of Bern (Berner Runde) 
Member Fokus Bern 
8 Bern Messerli, Paul Expert Professor emeritus at University of Bern Economic geographer 
9 Bern Müller, Hans-Ulrich Private actor/Interest group representative 
President Swiss Venture Club 
Head Swiss Partnerships Credit Suisse 
10 Bern Nietlisbach, André Public official Senior public servant at economic department, Canton of Bern 
11 Bern Pfyl, Thomas Public official Financial manager municipality of Köniz,  Responsible for economic development 
12 Bern Poschet, Lena Public official Federal Office for Spatial Development (ARE) Bern Gilgen Thetaz, Regina Public official Federal Office for Spatial Development (ARE) 
13 Bern Rytz, Regula Private actor/Interest group representative 
Member of the Swiss Parliament 
Co-President Green Party Switzerland 
Ex-member of City Council Bern 
Co-President Bern Neu Gründen 
14 Bern Stampfli, Katharina Economic development agent 
Member of the Executive Board Economic Area 
Bern (Bern Wirtschaftsraum) 
15 Bern Stämpfli, Peter Private actor/Interest group representative 
Chairman of Board of Directors at Stämpfli AG 
Founder Fokus Bern 
Member of Circle of Bern (Berner Runde) 
16 Bern Steiner, Jürg Expert Journalist at Berner Zeitung Book author 
17 Bern Tobler, Georg Economic development agent Managing Director Capital Region Switzerland 
18 Bern Tschäppat, Alexander Public official 
Mayor City of Bern 
Member of the Swiss Parliament 
Board member Capital Region Switzerland 
19 Bern Walter, Felix Expert Head of economic department, Ecoplan 
20 The Hague Adarghal, Karim Public official Account Manager IT/Telecom industry City of The Hague 
21 The Hague Blokmaker, Daniel Private actor/Interest group representative 
Entrepreneur 
Ex-Business Development & Innovation 
Manager at KPN Telecom, 
22 The Hague de Vries, Jouke Expert 
Professor Public Administration University 
Leiden 
Dean Campus The Hague, University Leiden 
23 The Hague den Bruinen, Joris  Economic development agent Deputy Director The Hague Security Delta 
24 The Hague Dencher, Robert Private actor/Interest group representative 
Head Government Relations Netherlands at 
Shell International 
25 The Hague Genet, Louis Public official 
Director Investments International City The 
Hague, City of The Hague, 
The Hague van der Klaauw, Marcel Public official Senior Policy Advisor City of The Hague  
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26 The Hague Groen, Rosa Expert 
Lecturer and PhD candidate at The Hague 
University of Applied Sciences/Leiden 
University 
27 The Hague Hillen, Vincent written interview Public official Senior financial policy officer City of The Hague 
28 
The Hague Houtzagers, Bert-Jan Private actor/Interest group representative 
Dutch State Advocate 
Partner and lawyer at Pels Rijcken & 
Droogleever Fortuijn 
The Hague Scheltema, Martijn Private actor/Interest group representative 
Partner and lawyer at Pels Rijcken & 
Droogleever Fortuijn 
Professor Erasmus University Rotterdam 
29 The Hague Janssen, Sander Public official Head of the Host Nation Division at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
30 The Hague Kok, Laurens Economic development agent 
Foreign Investor Relations Manager at West-
Holland Foreign Investment Agency  
31 The Hague Krohl, Niels Economic development agent 
Senior Investor Relations manager at 
InnovationQuarter 
32 The Hague Meijers, Evert Expert Delft University of Technology, economic geographer 
33 The Hague Oliver, Iris Public official Senior Strategic Account Manager City of The Hague 
34 The Hague Schiebroek, Marleen Expert Consultant, Brain & Company 
35 The Hague Schuttenbeld, Ben Private actor/Interest group representative 
Senior Advisor Chamber of Commerce 
Southwest Holland 
36 The Hague Shimshon, Gideon Expert Director Centre for Innovation Leiden University 
37 The Hague van der Linden, Harry Public official Advisor The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Regional Affairs and Spatial Policy 
38 The Hague van Geelen, Nicolas Public official Strategic Advisor Administration & Policy Province South Holland 
39 The Hague van Haelst, Nicole Private actor/Interest group representative Director International Community Platform 
40 The Hague van Loon, Branko Public official Policy Advisor International Affairs City of The Hague 
41 The Hague van Ommeren, Kees Expert Partner and Founder Decisio The Hague Wijnen, Mathieu Expert Junior Advisor Decisio  
42 
The Hague van Vondel, Esther Public official Senior Policy Officer International Economic Affairs City of The Hague 
The Hague de Vries, Matthijs Public official Senior Advisor Spatial Economic Strategy & Policy City of The Hague 
43 
The Hague Vokurka, Lucas Economic development agent 
Director Economic Development Metropolitan 
Region Rotterdam The Hague 
The Hague Nijhof, Bart Economic development agent 
Process Manager Economic Development 
Metropolitan Region Rotterdam The Hague 
Ex-regional Econmic Cooperation Policy 
Advisor City of Rotterdam 
44 Ottawa Bashir, Saad Public official Director Economic Development & Innovation at City of Ottawa 
45 Ottawa Bird, Graham Private actor/Interest group representative President of GBA, developer 
46 Ottawa Champagne, Eric Expert 
Associate Professor in Public Administration at 
the School of Political Studies at the University 
of Ottawa and Assistant Director at the Centre 
on Governance 
47 Ottawa Chattopadhyay, Rupak Expert President and CEO at Forum of Federations 
48 Ottawa Light, John Expert Ex-Director of Regional Affairs for Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird 
49 Ottawa Dale, Jeffery Economic development agent 
Ex-President Ottawa Centre for Research and 
Innovation 
50 Ottawa Faris, Ian Private actor/Interest group representative 
President & CEO at Ottawa Chamber of 
Commerce 
51 Ottawa Fielding, John Economic development agent 
Regional Director Business Development 
Eastern & Northern Ontario at Ontario Centres 
of Excellence 
52 Ottawa Kristmanson, Mark Public official Chief Executive Officer at National Capital Commission 
53 Ottawa La Flamme, Guy Public official Executive Director at Ottawa 2017 Bureau 
54 Ottawa La Pointe, Francois Public official 
Ex-Senior Executive Capital Planning at 
National Capital Commission 
Senior Fellow Centre on Governance University 
of Ottawa  
55 Ottawa Lazenby, Bruce Economic development agent President and CEO at Invest Ottawa 
56 Ottawa McNabb, David Public official Acting Director General, Strategic Policy  at FedDev Ontario 
57 Ottawa Normand, Antoine Private actor/Interest group representative President Gatineau Chamber of Commerce 
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58 Ottawa Paquet, Gilles Expert Professor Emeritus Telfer School of Management University of Ottawa 
59 Ottawa Ritonja, David Private actor/Interest group representative 
Vice President at Alcatel-Lucent 
Co-Chair of Invest Ottawa 
60 Ottawa Saric, Sandra Economic development agent 
Vice President Talent Innovation at Information 
and Communications Technology Council 
61 Ottawa Sudds, Jenna Private actor/Interest group representative 
Executive Director at Kanata North Business 
Association 
62 
Ottawa Temsamani, Jalia Economic development agent 
Business development advisor Développement 
économique – CLD Gatineau 
Ottawa Cameron-Nunes, Émilie Economic development agent 
Responsable de la diversité culturelle at Ville de 
Gatineau 
63 Ottawa Terry, Bernadette Economic development agent 
Senior Business Development Lead for the 
Aerospace, Defence & Security Sector at Invest 
Ottawa 
64 Ottawa Varriano, Franco Private actor/Interest group representative 
Director of Startup Grind Ottawa 
Entrepreneur 
65 Washington D.C. Barros, Francis Public official 
Program Manage Small Business Services 
Department of Homeland Security 
66 Washington D.C. Bean, Chuck 
Economic development 
agent 
Executive Director at Metropolitan Washington 
Council of Governments 
67 Washington D.C. Boyer, Laurie 
Economic development 
agent 
Executive Director of Rockville Economic 
Development 
Co-President Council of Economic 
Development Officials 
68 Washington D.C. Buchanan, Robert E.  
Private actor/Interest group 
representative 
Partner Buchanan Partners 
Member 2030 Business group 
69 Washington D.C. Clinton, Kevin 
Private actor/Interest group 
representative Chief Operating Officer Federal City Council 
70 Washington D.C. D’Amore, Kristin 
Private actor/Interest group 
representative 
Director of Strategic Initiatives and President of 
The Entrepreneur Center at Northern Virginia 
Technology Council 
71 Washington D.C. Fuller, Stephen Expert 
Professor at George Mason University, Public 
Policy and Regional Development, Center for 
Regional Analysis 
72 
Washington 
D.C. Hawkins, Val  
Economic development 
agent 
Ex-President & CEO Alexandria Economic 
Development Partnership, Inc. 
Washington 
D.C. Landrum, Stephanie 
Economic development 
agent 
Current President & CEO Alexandria Economic 
Development Partnership, Inc 
73 Washington D.C. Khan, Sakina Public official 
Senior Economic Planner with the District of 
Columbia Office of Planning 
74 
Washington 
D.C. Koster, Julia Public official 
Director, Office of Public Engagement at the 
National Capital Planning Commission 
Washington 
D.C. Staudigl, Stephen  Public official 
Public Affairs Specialist at National Capital 
Planning Commission 
75 Washington D.C. Lazere, Ed 
Private actor/Interest group 
representative 
Executive Director at D.C. Fiscal Policy 
Institute 
76 Washington D.C. Levine, Mark 
Private actor/Interest group 
representative 
Managing Director at Core Capital Partners, 
venture capitalist 
77 Washington D.C. Loescher, Doug Public official 
Ex- Director of Business Development and 
Strategy at Washington D.C. Mayor's Office 
78 
Washington 
D.C. Richmond, Cynthia 
Economic development 
agent 
Acting Director Arlington Economic 
Development 
Washington 
D.C. Winn, Christina 
Economic development 
agent 
Director Business Investment Group Arlington 
Economic Development 
79 Washington D.C. Rivlin, Alice Expert 
Director of the Health Policy Center and Senior 
Fellow in the Economic Studies Program 
Visiting Professor at the McCourt School of 
Public Policy at Georgetown University 
Chair of the District of Columbia Financial 
Management Assistance Authority (1998-2001 
80 Washington D.C. 
Ruble, Blair 
written interview Expert 
Director Kennan Institute at Woodrow Wilson 
International Center 
81 Washington D.C. Smith, Walter Expert 
Executive Director DC Apleseed Center for 
Law & Justice 
82 Washington D.C. Stone, Clarence Expert 
Research Professor of Political Science and 
Public Policy at George Washington University 
Professor Emeritus at the University of 
Maryland 
83 Washington D.C. Stone, Nick Expert 
Director National Capital Region Operations at 
Virginia Tech 
84 Washington D.C. Tregoning, Harriet Public official 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the 
Office of Community Planning and 
Development 
Ex-Director of the District of Columbia Office 
of Planning 
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85 Washington D.C. Turner, Jeff 
Private actor/Interest group 
representative Managing Partner, Squire Patton Boggs 
86 Washington D.C. Watkins, Matthew 
Private actor/Interest group 
representative 
Economic Development Manager Downtown 
D.C. Business Improvement District 
87 Washington D.C. White, Kyle 
Private actor/Interest group 
representative 
Director, Economic Initiatives Greater 
Washington Board of Trade Board of Trade 
88 
Washington 
D.C. Wolman, Hal Expert 
Professor of Political Science, Public Policy and 
Public Administration, and International Affairs 
at George Washington University 
Washington 
D.C. Young, Gary Expert 
Professor and Associate Director at the George 
Washington University 
89 Washington D.C. Zahradnik, Robert Public official 
Ex-Director of Research District of Columbia 
Government, Office of Revenue Analysis 
Director State Policy, The Pew Charitable Trusts 
90 Washington D.C. Zipper, David Public official 
Ex- Director of Business Development and 
Strategy at Washington D.C. Mayor's Office 
Managing Director at 1776, global start-up hub 
91 Washington D.C. Anonymous interview Public official Federal level 
 
